Agricultural Issues in the Former Home-lands of South Africa: the Transkei*

This article examines the prospects for agricultural development and rural transformation in Transkei, one of the largest of the former homelands of South Africa. In view of Transkei's size, its substantial population and largely rural character, an understanding of its current problems and potential are extremely important in any assessment of agricultural prospects in the former homelands. The discussion draws on published research and on the authors' own fieldwork after the April 1994 elections. Some of the most intractable problems facing the Government of National Unity currently lie in the former homelands, which were starved of investment under apartheid. The article reviews patterns of peasant production and commercial agriculture (including contract farming) in Transkei and attempts to set current issues concerning land, labour (including the role of women and children), inputs and infrastructural provision within a national and international context. The article begins by briefly setting the national context, before moving on to examine the specific conditions of agricultural activity in Transkei.

The National Context: South African Agriculture under Apartheid Lipton and Lipton (1994) summarise South African agriculture under apartheid as an expensive dualistic structure in which large-scale, capital intensive and heavily subsidised white farmers provided the bulk of market production while a small-scale black subsistence sector suffered discrimination in terms of land rights, pricing, marketing, extension, research and infrastructure.The state has played a central role through subsidies (intended to modernise agriculture and keep white farmers on the land) and other regulatory measures.
Between 1960 and 1983 technical change allowed the massive forced removal of over one million Africans from white-owned farms, which had substantially reduced labour requirements, to designated homelands, including Transkei.In the 1980s agriculture grew more difficult for white farmers because of serious drought, high interest rates, poor terms of (international) trade and high input prices associated with overseas sanctions.Nonetheless, they remained in a far more advantageous position than black farmers, being favoured by the elaborate marketing board system and the state regulated supply of credit and inputs.
In the homelands which received nominal 'independence' in the late 1970s and 80s, agriculture remained marginal, restricted by limited capital investment and massive population increases as the black population was expelled from white farms and cities.In some homelands the best ten to fifteen per cent of arable land was allocated for capital intensive large-scale agricultural projects aimed at raising production.These were run by parastatals and in some cases were associated with contract farming (Drummond, 1992).
It is important at this point to emphasise the differences and similarities of homeland agricultural conditions and activities.There are significant differences in ecological conditions, levels of urbanisation, industrialisation and proletarianisation across the former homelands: Transkei has a higher than average arable holding size per household and few large urban industrial centres within close reach.It is thus not surprising that it also has well above average earnings from agriculture, compared to other former homelands.However, agricultural underdevelopment, and associated poorly developed infrastructure, inadequate basic services, low levels of nutrition and life expectancy are common characteristics of Transkei and the other former homelands, as is the long-standing heavy dependence on male migrant remittances.
With the assumption of majority rule the division between white South Africa and the homelands has been removed, and a new provincial structure instituted, though the poverty of the former homeland regions continues to distinguish them clearly from surrounding former white farm areas.State agricultural policies now apply to all areas in the new South Africa and a new agricultural policy is gradually taking shape.Individual aspects of this policy are considered in the relevant sections of the discussion portion of the article.

The Peasant Economy of Transkei
Transkei was one of the last areas of South Africa to be annexed and little land was taken for white settlement when it submitted, peacefully, to colonial rule in the 1890s.It was scheduled as a Native Reserve for occupation by Xhosa-speaking peoples in 1913 and became an 'independent' homeland in 1976.With the elections of April 1994 it returned constitutionally to South Africa and now forms part of Eastern Cape Province.Transkei is one of the three largest former homelands (Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu were of similar size) and, of the three, by far the least fragmented spatially.It shared its ethnic identity with Ciskei, the other Xhosa homeland, and it is perhaps significant that the former Transkei leadership rejected the concept of a specifically Transkeian identity, calling for a single 'greater Xhosaland' (Peires, 1995), which is, to some degree, achieved in the new Eastern Cape Province.
The traditional economy of Transkei was based upon cattle and maize.Male energies focused on cattle which played a central role in subsistence and social relationships, while maize was cultivated principally by women (Westcott, 1977).However, as early as the last decade of the nineteenth century this pattern was beginning to be disrupted by labour migration to the Rand mines, encouraged by factors such as the Rinderpest epidemic of 1897 (Southall, 1982:73-5).By 1936, 53 per cent of men aged 18-54 were absent from their homes (Southall, 1982:77): the agricultural burden was firmly upon the shoulders of women.
population.With few local employment opportunities, labour migration to the mines and other enterprises in white areas of South Africa has continued.In a survey conducted in the Tsolo area in the 1970s about 42 per cent of total income was provided by remittances from migrant workers (Westcott, 1977:139); a recent study in Transkei (Phillips-Howard and Oche, 1995) found that not one of a sample of 120 famers considered agriculture their main source of income.Although out-migration has not been exclusively male, many women have remained at home to tend cattle and cultivate subsistence crops, assisted as in earlier decades by their children, the elderly and infirm, and nowadays also by men no longer able to find waged employment.(There has been substantial retrenchment in the mines; Donaldson, 1992, reports that nearly 126,000 Transkeian migrants were employed by the Chamber of Mines in 1980Mines in , but only 90,600 in 1991.) .)Statistics on small farm agriculture are highly inadequate (Naidoo, 1993).Nonetheless, it appears that, in most families, production is insufficient to provide even subsistence requirements and remittances from migrant family members are used to purchase staple foods (particularly maize and wheat) which are imported from white farm areas.Around 70 per cent of food requirements is reportedly 'imported' (Beinart, 1992).With recession in South Africa, unemployed Transkeian men are remaining at home for longer periods.In this context, agriculture is growing in significance once more for the many families who can no longer depend on remittances for a major portion of their income.
The low and declining productivity of homeland agriculture in Transkei has been blamed by many commentators on inherently conservative, inefficient black farmers exploiting the land.Southall (1982:223), for example, cites the Tomlinson Commission of 1955.Many of the traditional practices -intercropping is a prime example -which were regarded as backward by white South Africans are now recognised elsewhere in Africa to be vitally important in the maintenance of ecologically sound fanning systems (Richards, 1985) (Endnote 1).Farmers possessed an impressive array of indigenous knowledge concerning soil types and indicators of soil fertility prior to colonial interventions (Bundy, 1988).The migrant labour system and forced removal of black populations to the homelands, leading to high rural de jure populations and widespread landlessness, has probably contributed far more than conservatism and poor farming practice to current problems.In the homelands, arable land availability in the early 1980s averaged only 1.3 ha per family, compared to 4.3 ha in the rest of South Africa, where yields were six or seven times higher (Bembridge, 1986).At an average of 1.5 ha per household, Transkei ranked highest among the homelands (compared to 0.2 in Qwaqwa, 0.5 in KwaNgwane and KwaNdebele, 0.6 in Gazankulu and Ciskei, 0.8 in KwaZulu and Venda, 1.0 in Lebowa and 1.4 in Bophuthatswana, see Bromberger and Antonie, 1993).Nonetheless, the region has been starved of investment: the little which has occurred has been spent mainly on large top-down capital-intensive projects which have had little success.Shortages of land, labour and capital are pervading themes in the region.In 1979 at least 40 per cent of rural families lived in a 'state of poverty' and possibly one-third of families had energy intake below minimum recommended levels (Bembridge, 1987a).A more recent survey in 1991 suggests that in Transkei 90.6 per cent of households lived below the Minimum Living Level (ARDRI, BRC and ISER 1995; in nearby Ciskei the corresponding figure was 72.6 per cent).
Arable production on Transkei peasant holdings is dominated by maize, though in the vast majority of cases farmers produce insufficient surplus for sale (Bembridge, 1988;Beinart, 1992).Indeed, maize production appears to be in decline, though given the considerable variation in Transkei production from year to year (partially associated with variable rainfall) this is uncertain.Dryland maize yields are perhaps as low as 0.5 t/ha (ARDRI, BRC and ISER, 1995).Westcott (1977) blamed Transkei's low crop yields on a mix of factors including limited plot size, the communal system of tenure, shortages of inputs (fertilizer, pesticides etc.), labour shortages and the migrant labour system.
Whereas commercial maize producers in white areas of South Africa have been supported by state subsidies and their marketing organized by the Maize Marketing Board, Transkeian peasant farmers have been left to fend for themselves.Thus even in a good year like 1994, when rains were well above average and some Transkeians managed to produce a surplus, lack of grain mills in the region, poor road communications and a lack of marketing facilities prevented effective sale of produce.In western Transkei, maize on sale at circa Rl,100 per tonne in 1994 could not compete with South African maize available at R515.Much potentially productive land remains under-utilised and many farmers now concentrate on growing maize and other crops -beans, pumpkins, fruit and vegetables -in homestead gardens, because they are easier to work, manure and protect (McAllister, 1989;1992) (Endnote 2).Despite this focus on the homestead garden, one of the remarkable features of Transkei's peasant agriculture sector is the dearth of small-scale irrigation enterprises, despite substantial irrigation potential in the region (Mclntosh et al. 1993;Phillips-Howard and Porter, 1996).This is particularly striking in the peri-urban areas of Umtata, where there are many excellent potential sites and a substantial market for fruit and vegetables (which is currently supplied almost exclusively by the white farm areas of South Africa).Discussions with TRACOR (Transkei Agricultural Corporation) in 1994 indicated that there was substantial interest in irrigation (using 'high tech' systems) among small farmers, but the Corporation lacked expertise in this field.One village, Highbury, on the outskirts of Umtata, for example, made an application to TRACOR for an engine to run an irrigation system for a cooperative project in 1989, but was still waiting in 1994.Around 1981 TRACOR imported 22 units and distributed them to farmers in the Umtata area but these were all out of action within a year -the parts were stolen or when broken (fuel filters were a major problem) could not be repaired.There also appear to be tenure problems round Umtata for individuals who wish to establish irrigation farms.Consequently, the Department of Agriculture's demonstration farm at Umtata dam has had virtually no spin-off effect in the area, despite its flourishing orchard and vegetable plots.According to Mclntosh et al. (1993) there are less than 150 small-scale irrigation farmers in the whole of Transkei, with plots ranging from 10 ha to 100 square metres (community garden plots for home consumption).The majority of commercial irrigation farmers are older men who had other businesses or salaries which provided capital for the establishment of an irrigated farm.In the Umtata area in 1994 the main irrigation farm was owned by an employee in the Department of Agriculture.
Approximately 61 per cent of Transkei consists of grazing land (though this percentage is low by comparison with most other homelands).Like other former homeland areas, Transkei has large quantities of poor quality multi-purpose livestock which contribute comparatively little to the cash economy though pigs and chickens, in particular, contribute significantly to domestic food supplies (Beinart, 1992).There are also around 1.5 million cattle, but only 50 per cent of households owned cattle by the 1980s, compared to perhaps 60-70 per cent in the 1950s; access to cattle by nonowners has also declined, partly because of the decline in loaning practices (Beinart, 1992).The average cattle owner in Transkei possesses six head of cattle (Bembridge, 1987b), which is below the minimum required to satisfy all subsistence, social and cultural needs.Only around 15 per cent of households have nine or more cattle (Steyn and Bembridge, 1990;Beinart, 1992).Herding is seen traditionally as a male task and young boys from the age of five or six are expected to take out cattle and small stock to graze early each morning.The work required of young boys has expanded as a result of labour migration and they commonly have to delay school attendance until midmorning in order to complete their tasks.The workload of some boys is so heavy that they eventually desert their homes; many are to be found on the streets of Umtata (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1994).Women only become heavily involved in cattle raising if there are no men or boys available.Similar patterns whereby men dominate livestock production are widespread in South Africa, though Cousins (1996) reports demands from the Rural Women's Movement that women be allowed to make decisions concerning livestock and to have access to land for grazing.
Cattle production is beset with problems such as poor winter feeding, low reproduction rates and high mortality, which are exacerbated by drought.Overstocking is said to cause veld deterioration, but this is contentious and dependent on local conditions (McAllister, 1992;Phillips-Howard, 1995;Cousins, 1996).As elsewhere in Africa, herders in Transkei and other former homelands appear to pursue opportunistic strategies, based on a 'fine tuned understanding of their environments' (Cousins, 1996).In Transkei, the majority of livestock serves local needs only -for investment, as bridewealth, for draught purposes and for milk -and is killed by local butchers in unsatisfactory conditions: there are only two abattoirs of a reasonable standard in the region.Marketing arrangements for stock are totally inadequate (Lugg et al. 1981;Bembridge, 1987b).In any case, veterinary services and disease control are so limited in Transkei that buyers from white South Africa are reluctant to purchase Transkei stock, particularly sheep (Endnote 3), which is unfortunate since Transkei contains around three-quarters of all homeland sheep (Bromberger and Antonie, 1993).This similarly acts as a restraint on sales of hides and skins.

Commercial Agriculture in Transkei
Commercial agriculture is very limited in Transkei: the Transkei Land Reform Research Group (1995) estimated the area under commercial agriculture at only 2.5 per cent of Transkei's total land area.It is dominated by parastatals.As Levin and Weiner (1993) observed, 'Bantustan parastatals are viewed as "white" institutions which are not intended to develop black agriculture'.There are perhaps two notable commercial crops, sugar cane and tea, each grown only in limited areas.
Sugar production is a difficult operation in Transkei, because of cool climatic conditions (this is the most southerly cane growing area in the world) and the distance of producers from the nearest mill, in KwaZulu-Natal.The cane is all grown by a parastatal and associated outgrowers in the coastal Pondoland region of Transkei.Production has developed here because of reductions in cane acreages in KwaZulu-Natal, to the north, where many large-scale cane growers have converted to timber production.The southernmost mill in KwaZulu-Natal at Umzimkulu consequently had a shortfall of cane and the millers (C.G.Smith Sugar Ltd.) were prepared to enter into contractual arrangements with a Transkei parastatal for cane production at North Pondoland, 70km distant.
Cane growing commenced in 1982 and by 1989 provided about one tenth of Transkei's domestic sucrose consumption (Endnote 4).The cane is rainfed and has a high sucrose content because it grows slowly.Unfortunately, there has been a serious drought problem, which has substantially reduced yields.
Outgrowing at North Pondoland Sugar began in 1986, reportedly because of pressure from local people, many of whom (possibly 30,000) had been dispossessed of land as a result of the scheme's establishment.By 1994 there were circa 130 outgrowers cultivating between 9 and 12 ha. of land each and further disbanding of the core estate is planned by the company as a result of labour problems.Outgrowers have made limited profits in some years because of drought, but remittances from family members have provided a safety net, and all seem to have other sources of income.The fact that no outgrowers have left the scheme since its inception is indicative of the perceived value of cane plots.
In 1994 on the core estate labour was employed at higher rates (R8.90c per day) than on outgrower plots (R6-7), but the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) has targeted government schemes since its unbanning in Tranbskei in 1989-90 and there has been a series of disputes between the union and North Pondoland Sugar (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1995).Labour rates are very low compared with those prevailing on other large farm enterprises in South Africa.
Tea has been grown further south in Transkei than sugar, on the Magwa tea estates at Majola and Magwa, since the mid-1970s.The estates consist of about 12,000 ha. of land; each of the two estates has its own factory.Together they produce about onethird of South Africa's domestic tea.Low temperatures reduce the profitability of the operation (as is the case with sugar), since plucking can only take place for eight months of the year, but high quality tea is produced and has found a ready market in South Africa because of the operation of a quota system which has protected domestic tea.The majority of the MTC estates are cultivated directly by the company (a parastatal), though there are 100 small growers with one ha. of tea each in the Mazizi portion of the Magwa estate and there are plans for the expansion of the outgrower component.This move to outgrowing, as at North Pondoland Sugar, is at least in part a response to the expansion of union (FAWU) activity.MTC was one of the first foci of FAWU interest when it began operations in Transkei, and there has been union membership among MTC estate workers since 1990.Following a successful strike in May-September 1990 wage rates improved and in 1994 stood at an average of R25 per day (well above the R15-16 paid on tea estates in white farm areas of South Africa).There is considerable local interest in tea outgrowing, because of the alienation of land and consequent resettlement necessitated when the Magwa estate was established: there is a waiting list for plots.Thus, contract tea production is likely to expand, despite union opposition.
The above review of peasant agriculture and commercial enterprises indicates a substantial range of problems, including issues of land, labour, inputs (particularly credit) and infrastructure, and (in the case of tea and sugar) the international context, all of which currently hinder agricultural and rural development in Transkei.A number of these issues are discussed below, beginning with land and labour which are particularly contentious issues across South Africa.

Land
According to the preliminary results of the 1991 Census, Transkei's total de jure population (including migrant workers) amounted to just over 4.5 million and its de facto population to over 3.5 million.The de jure population was recorded as being 95 per cent 'rural' and 5 per cent 'urban' (mainly in Umtata and Butterworth).The de facto population density averages 84 persons per square km., though with considerable variation between the sparsely populated rural interior and the particularly high densities of the northeastern coastal zone (Phillips-Howard and Oche, in press).
Land pressure has been exacerbated by the heavy traditional dependence on livestock (up to three times recommended stocking rates), the shortage of non-agricultural employment opportunities, and various population resettlement schemes.Of the latter, 'Betterment' and other recent resettlement associated with commercial agriculture are particularly notable.Betterment schemes, established from 1945 onwards in Transkei and other homeland areas (and by the 1970s covering 70 per cent of those areas) involved forced replanning of villages in gridiron pattern with standard house and garden plots, in order to concentrate population in closer settlement and combat erosion, rehabilitate land and improve agricultural production (despite local resistance).Fencing of controlled grazing areas and soil conservation works were to take place on arable land.Unfortunately, Betterment tended to stop people running their own small herds of cattle (because there was compulsory culling) and to deprive them of access to arable land, because land unsuitable for cultivation was removed from use.Also, basic services which were supposed to accompany the schemes were not forthcoming: many schemes lie long distances from basic transport services, education and health facilities, etc. Erosion and overgrazing increased with the disruption of cooperative social and economic relationships: agricultural production inevitably declined further (McAllister, 1989;1992;Mabin, 1991;de Wet, 1994;Winkler, 1994).Thus most people became more dependent than before upon migrant labour, though some people benefited from 'Betterment' through corruption and bribery (Spiegel, 1988, cited in Drummond, 1992:268;Spiegel, 1992).Additionally, more restricted population resettlement has occurred with the establishment of major agricultural schemes.In densely populated Bizana district at North Pondoland Sugar, 5,000 farm households (comprising about 30,000 people) were relocated (with limited compensation for the reconstruction of homesteads) on hilltop sites with inferior land, peripheral to the scheme.Here water and grazing is insufficient and children must make three to four trips per day for water collection down steep valley sides.According to the company the scheme was initiated at the behest of the local population, with voluntary population movement, but interviews with local people (both on-and off-scheme) tell a different story.They argue that it was only a few local chiefs who supported the project.There is now enormous resentment among the resettled population who have not obtained cane plots and 'youths' in the area who demand return of their land have become a major thorn in the side of the company.They are blamed for the unrest among core estate labour and arson attacks on both core estate and outgrower canefields.The North Pondoland situation supports Weiner and Levin's argument (1991) that often it is the highest quality of bantustan land that is used for large-scale agricultural projects.North Pondoland is a particularly contentious case, but similar resentment is felt, for example, on the Magwa tea estate in slightly less densely populated Lusikisiki District, which also required substantial resettlement.While contract farming can offer advantages to small farmers in terms of access to resources and services there are many potential problems, especially in situations where land appropriation occurs, as a substantial literature on contract farming in Africa now attests (e.g.Little and Watts, 1994;Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997).
The land question in areas like Transkei has become particularly acute with majority rule, because there was an assumption that problems of land could be righted immediately under the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme.It is now clear that the national land reform programme (aimed at ensuring security of tenure for rural dwellers) will take considerable time to implement and that land redistribution across South Africa will be far more restricted than many originally hoped.The new agricultural policy is only gradually taking shape, but land reform is obviously a central issue (Levin and Weiner, 1996;Murray, 1996).Some land redistribution will occur, and a two-year land reform pilot programme in each province, aimed at the poor and female-headed households, and organised by the Department of Land Affairs, is underway.(In Eastern Cape the first pilot project district covers Queenstown and five magisterial districts, including two from the former Transkei.)Nonetheless, a major redistribution of large white farms to black smallholders is unlikely, not least because currently they provide the vast majority of domestic food requirements (Levin and Weiner, 1993;Lipton and Lipton, 1994).Moreover, as Levin and Weiner (1996) point out, the DLA 'remains staffed by civil servants of the old regime'.The fact that food prices rose substantially after the 1994 elections, partly as a result of drought, may well have also deterred rapid change.In the first nine months of 1995 consumer food prices rose by a substantial 13.4 per cent, though the good rains of 1996 should ensure greater stability for a period (EIU, 2nd quarter 1995;1st quarter 1996;3rd quarter 1996).The RDP committed the ANC to aiming at the transfer of 30 per cent of farmland to black smallholders by 1999; principally existing state land at first, and then secondly land repossessed from indebted white farmers, of whom there are many, rather than through land expropriation.
It is already evident that land reform settlement is a highly complex issue in South Africa (Murray, 1996) (Endnote 5).The debate on land has inevitably led to consideration (and arguably reinterpretation) of land reform experiences elsewhere in the continent, notably those of Kenya and Zimbabwe (Masilela and Weiner, 1996;Williams, 1996).In particular, a major question surrounds the issue of whether emergent black commercial farmers will be given priority, to the detriment of peasant agriculture (Williams, 1996;Ottoway, 1996).Ottoway argues strongly for stimulating the revival of a subsistence peasantry where farming forms one component of a mixed survival strategy (and draws parallels with established support for the urban informal sector).There is much recent work to support this view.Cousins (1996) cites studies of use of water resources, woodlands, communal grazing land and wild food and medicinal plants which the natural environment and local production supplies, to emphasise the significance of access to land, particularly for the poorest households.However, Bernstein (1996) suggests that ANC leaders in government may fear that a strong initiative on land redistribution could catalyse 'uncontrollable' rural mobilisation sufficient to threaten the ANC's politics of reconciliation, the government's pledges regarding stability and the confidence of capital.In the case of redistribution of state owned land, Murray (1996) emphasises the difference between the rhetoric whereby poor people get land to farm, and the reality of purchase by middle class businessmen; the poor do not have the funds to bridge the gap between state grants and the purchase price of farms, or the capital to then start farming.In the case of removals of populations from homeland areas there is also the danger that only parts of a group will move (the wealthiest, the enterprising, the energetic) and the least enterprising will be left behind (de Wet, 1994).Moreover, it is important to recognise the fact that people want land for many reasons -not necessarily just to produce crops or stock.Land has symbolic value as a place to return to, and to pass on to heirs (Murray and Williams, 1994).Sometimes not any land will suffice: there are important links with ancestral burial grounds and it may be that, as controls on settlement are removed, many people will wish to return to such sites.
Communal tenure is another issue in the former homelands, though the government seems neutral on this issue.There has been much debate concerning the benefits and costs of freehold tenure: benefits in terms of increased production, costs in the sense of differentiation and landlessness as poorer households sell out.An estimated 86 per cent of Transkei is subject to traditional/communal tenure (Transkei Land Reform Research Group, 1995) but the Transkei government's Transkei Agricultural Development Study (1991) came out firmly against communal tenure.Weiner andLevin (1996a, 1996b) indicate how 'customary' land laws were actually shaped by Europeans in the early colonial period as a way of imposing manageable property systems and cite Ranger's (1993) study of so-called 'traditional communal tenure' in Zimbabwe.They point to the way the chiefs became part of the bantustan system and through bantustan tribal authority structures and their control over land allocation have become increasingly oppressive and corrupt.Consequently many people reject land allocation by the chiefs and want some form of 'democratisation' of communal forms of land tenure.However, Cross and Haines (1988) and de Wet (1991) suggest that agricultural productivity in the former homelands is little affected in any case by land tenure.

Labour
Many of Transkei's rural population are either totally landless or have access to so little land that they must seek employment.In the absence of alternative occupations, the vast majority of those seeking employment who stay in rural Transkei probably find work -if they manage to find work at all -as agricultural labourers.It is difficult to gain a clear picture of prevailing conditions for agricultural labour across Transkei, but limited evidence from research on the two major commercial schemes indicates the nature of the problem.
On outgrower farms -and presumably on similar uncontracted peasant holdingslabourers are paid appallingly low wages.In 1994 rates of R5-7 were prevalent among outgrowers employing labour at both the North Pondoland Sugar and MTC estates.On the nucleus estates, parastatals pay more, as a result of intense activity by FAWU since its unbanning in 1989-90.At Magwa Tea Estates, following extensive labour disruption, an average wage rate of R23.50-25.00 per day prevailed in 1994, which was substantially above that paid to tea workers in white farm areas of South Africa.There is even a creche where women labourers can leave small children on the Magwa estate.However, the rapid increase in rates in such a labour intensive activity as tea production (Magwa Tea estate employs nearly 3,000 labourers, Majola about 750) may place the enterprise in jeopardy in the future context of an unprotected domestic market for tea (see below).The company has been in financial difficulties since 1992.FAWU has had less success at North Pondoland Sugar, where the average labour rate in 1994 remained a mere one-third of that paid at MTC.Here the basic wage (R8.90 per day) is supplemented by 'rations': a fortnightly pack consisting of maize, beans, salt, cooking fat and crushed mealies and worth (according to the company) R22.(Such food packs were once common in the sugar industry but are now being phased out).The Union has other complaints against the company, which it has accused of treating workers like 'underdogs'.The dismissal of 140 workers in July 1994 (as the result of dispersal of core estate land to outgrowers) further fuelled their dispute.
It would seem that the vast majority of agricultural labourers in Transkei work in difficult conditions for very low rates of pay.Unions were banned in Transkei until 1989: since then FAWU has targeted government schemes on the basis that these should set an example in the region.It will be much more difficult to regulate wages on smallholdings.COSATU, the national trade union federation published a 'farm workers guide' which now gives guidelines for the employment of labour (Endnote 6) but the FAWU office in Umtata argued in 1994 that it was unable to obtain even parastatal adherence to its code of practice.
Agricultural wage rates and conditions are set to escalate as an issue of dispute.Town-based unions like FAWU have started to make their mark in rural areas and in 1993 a new union for farm workers was formed by COSATU (du Toit, 1994).Levin and Weiner (1996a) argue that Trade Unions need to extend their organisational capacity significantly in rural areas, despite continuing organisational and logistical difficulties.However, it is difficult to see how they can make an impact in poor, remote rural areas, particularly in the former homeland regions where the vast majority of farmers earn insufficient to pay their labourers adequate wages.

Women and Children in the Rural Economy
Women and children, together with the sick and the elderly, have borne the brunt of labour demands in Transkeian agriculture for many years, with seemingly little return for their efforts.In some areas cooperative work groups assist with ploughing and other agricultural activities (McAllister, 1989;Beinart, 1992) but across Transkei women work long hours without expectation of leisure time.In the absence of migrant husbands they have to take total responsibility for the farm enterprise.On the outgrower schemes at MTC and North Pondoland Sugar, women have very rarely obtained title to land unless they are widowed.(Across Africa, from Kenya to the Gambia, a similar pattern has been observed of allocation of plots to men on contract farming schemes, though in KwaZulu-Natal women have been relatively successful in obtaining registration on irrigated small holder sugar schemes; see Vaughan, 1991).Women in the Transkei schemes have to have a man as legal guardian in order to obtain loans: those without a husband must turn to a close relative or the local chief.Although women perform the majority of agricultural tasks on outgrower plots, it is their husbands who collect the cheque from the cane mill or tea factory.Male alcoholism levels are high and thus many women obtain only a small portion of the profits to pay for housekeeping, clothes and school fees.
Those women who obtain jobs as labourers on parastatal-run enterprises may appear to be better advantaged, as they obtain pay-rates for specific tasks such as weeding at the same rate as men -but predominantly male tasks (such as cane cutting and tractor driving) are paid at much higher rates.At North Pondoland, when retrenchments were made in estate labour, it was principally women weeders who were affected.
In addition to their agricultural tasks, throughout rural Transkei, water collection is a major problem for women because of the inadequacy of water supplies.Much time is spent by women (and their children) queuing at water points and head-loading buckets of water back to the homestead.Bembridge (1988) estimated that the average family spent over three hours per day carting water.
In view of these burdens it is hardly surprising that women turn to their children for substantial assistance with domestic and farm tasks.In traditional Xhosa society, boys of five or six years begin to herd livestock and girls of the same age to care for younger siblings and to help women carry water and collect fuel (Bembridge, 1988).Tasks expand with age, but particularly for boys, because of demands of stock care.Estimates of child labour inputs on Transkei farm enterprises made by Bembridge in 1979 provide an indication of the demands imposed on male children, in particular (Bembridge, 1988).
In 1994 children were still a major source of labour in Transkei's rural areas.At both North Pondoland Sugar and MTC, all the small farmers interviewed referred to the importance of assistance from school-^~~-â ge children.Significantly, the form discrimination on women's access to land as the Reconstruction and Development document sets out (ANC, 1994:2.4.4;2.4.11).However, some are sceptical regarding the ANC's total commitment to gender equality (despite the presence of an organised and vociferous women's lobby).Walker (1994), suggests that the ANC are likely to compromise or delay because of patriarchal attitudes among traditional leaders, particularly in the case of the land reform programme.

Inputs and Infrastructure
This section encompasses a range of issues -credit, agricultural marketing and transport.Shortage of capital and limited availability of credit are major constraints for Transkeian peasant producers.In a survey of 120 Transkeian farmers the major agricultural problems identified by farmers included not just shortages of land (36.5 per cent) and labour (25.0 per cent), but also capital (29.1 per cent) -which is needed to pay for fertiliser, seeds, ploughing etc. (Phillips-Howard and Oche, 1995).Another survey across Eastern Cape similarly shows farmers themselves expressing their need for state assistance such as ploughing services and the supply of subsidised inputs (seeds, pesticide, fertiliser) (ARDRI, BRC and ISER, 1995).Almost all of those few who succeed in agriculture -whether by developing an irrigated farm or acquiring an outgrower plot -appear to be men who have first obtained funds through salaries, pensions or other economic activities.At North Pondoland Sugar by 1993 there was such concern about this situation among outgrowers -probably in part because of fears of growing alienation from landless neighbours -that the farmers association committee decided to give priority to the poor without assets.They have subsequently turned down applications from current and former salaried workers.
However, prospective growers still have to make a 10 per cent down payment towards the development of the land.
Attempts are now being made to solve the small farmer credit problem: the Development Bank of Southern Africa is to begin offering loans and assistance to black farmers and the Agricultural Credit Union is to similarly shift its focus from white farmers (EIU, third quarter, 1994); BATAT (Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust) is another recent government initiative to improve credit access for small farming households (EIU, second quarter, 1995).These developments are long overdue.
Marketing of local agricultural produce is barely developed in Transkei, in part because of the limited nature of transportation and other infrastructural facilities.The Transkei Agricultural Marketing Board established in 1985, following recommendations in an agricultural marketing study commissioned by the Transkei government (Lugg, Harrison and Associates, 1981), had little success because it was dependent on South African government funding.The majority of basic foodstuffs traded in Transkei come from the white farm areas of South Africa where an elaborate marketing board system was established in the apartheid era for white large-scale farmers.Fraser (1994) indicates a similar problem of totally inadequate marketing structure in Ciskei.Only in the case of sugar and tea is there adequate marketing infrastructure in Transkei, but parastatals play the principal role in both enterprises and these crops are, in any case, restricted to a small portion of Transkei's total land area: few peasant farmers are involved in growing either crop.The general absence of rural periodic markets of the type widespread through much of tropical Africa is notable; under apartheid such meetings were not encouraged.There are signs of slow change in the broader marketing structure.The South African marketing boards have been undergoing a process of deregulation (with considerable benefits, for example, for maize producers with sizeable surpluses to sell) (EIU, 1st quarter, 1996).The Maize Board remains, but now only acts as a buyer of last resort (EIU Country Profile, 1995/6).However, as Bernstein (1996) argues, hidden monopolies by major (white) players are likely to continue.In any case, because of their distance from major markets and communication links, most black producers will also continue to be relatively disadvantaged (Williams, 1996).This will certainly be true for the majority of Transkei.Additionally, Transkei's farmers need considerable assistance with storage, grading, processing and provision of price information if they are to begin to compete with white farmers.
Perhaps there is also a need to look to different kinds of marketing structure, rather than merely replicating that which was developed in white farm areas.Periodic market systems of the type common in many parts of tropical Africa may be a useful complementary development for small farmers in the former homelands.A few roadside markets have begun to appear at road intersections along the major paved roads in Transkei and such meetings may possibly provide a very useful first stage in the development of a new marketing system providing for input supply to small black producers and bulking of small farm produce.The provision of basic facilities where spontaneous meetings appear could be a preliminary step in the right direction.A marketing support unit with marketing extension officers -including women -might also play a valuable role in the early stages of market establishment, but it is vital that top-down instructions do not interfere with grassroots initiatives (Porter, 1995).
Road network and transport service improvements are essential for both the improved supply of inputs and market access, and could also be valuable in allowing increased interaction between Transkei and the urban centres of South Africa, so that migrant men can travel more frequently home to assist with farm operations.There are only two major paved roads in the region, one of which, the N2, crosses the region from north to south, linking Umtata to Durban in the north and to Port Elizabeth in the south.The vast majority of rural settlements are poorly served by both roads and transport services.A recent white paper on agricultural policy focusing on food security observed the need for the government to expand infrastructure in rural areas, but the costs in regions like Transkei, which have been starved of investment in the past, will be enormous.Moreover, as de Wet (1994) points out, it is likely that this pattern will continue, because the state may allocate resources as a priority to regions outside the former homelands, in white farm areas, where the projected land reform will occur and must be seen to work.

Commercial Agriculture and the International Context
While the lifting of sanctions has brought new opportunities for South Africa in terms of penetration of overseas markets, especially for white farmers producing fruit and wine, the recently concluded GATT agreement requires South Africa to cut its domestic farm support (never enjoyed in the homelands) and to convert import barriers to tariffs, which are to be cut by one-third over six years (EIU, first quarter, 1994).The US has granted South Africa GSP status, which improves access to the US market somewhat, but in late 1995 the status of South Africa's access to EU markets was still being negotiated (EIU Country Profile, 1995/6).Consequently there are positive and negative elements in the new international environment for South Africa's commercial products.
In the case of Transkei's tea and sugar there is some room for concern.High cost South African tea, in particular, has been protected by a quota system and its protected status will be substantially dismantled under the GATT regulations.Transkei's leaf is particularly expensive to produce, especially on the MTC core estates where labour costs have risen substantially.Consequently the company may put greater emphasis on outgrower production in future, in order to maintain its share of the domestic market.While this offers opportunities to those who are able to join the scheme, loss of income to labourers (who will have to negotiate with individual smallholders) is likely to be substantial.
The lifting of sanctions has allowed the South African Sugar Association (SASA) to look to new overseas markets, notably in the Middle East and Nigeria.A recent increase in the US sugar import quota for South Africa is encouraging and sugar exports in 1996/7 are expected to exceed one million tons (EIU, 3rd quarter, 1996).However, there is competition on the domestic market from cheaper Swazi and Zimbabwean sugar which is grown under irrigation by large MNCs without trade union interference.Consequently, there is considerable interest at SASA in extending operations northwards into areas with flat land and good soil near the Mozambican border where sugar can be produced more cheaply.Should this happen, the expensive operation at North Pondoland Sugar in Transkei could be at risk, in view of the high transport costs of cane to the mill at Umzimkulu.
Overall, Transkei's relatively high cost commercial tea and sugar production appear somewhat vulnerable in the new international context.Schemes in other former homelands may face similar difficulties.Given, additionally, the unpopular nature of the agricultural parastatals which run these enterprises, there will need to be a thorough review of their role and composition.

Conclusion
Many promises have been made to South Africa's black rural population under the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Plan, but as yet there has been little concrete impact on former homeland areas like Transkei.Indeed, the programme has been widely criticised for 'corruption, incompetence and an inability to deliver on its promises' (EIU, 4th quarter, 1995).Although the new provincial structures are in place and the homelands have disappeared from the South African map, it will take considerable time and substantial commitment (and funds) to erase the visible evidence of the apartheid past from South Africa's landscape.In the vast area which once constituted the homeland of Transkei, land and labour problems remain substantially unresolved, initiatives on inputs and infrastructure are limited and proceeding at a frustratingly slow pace, and commercial agriculture is becoming increasingly vulnerable to international pressures.
Lipton and Lipton (1994) and Levin and Weiner (1996) suggest that part of the problem of agricultural improvement in the homelands lies at the national level with sections of the white agricultural establishment (and its allies in the former homelands) who are attempting to divert or block genuine reform by pre-emptive restructuring (see also Bernstein, 1996b).National sectoral funding allocations are another matter for concern.A number of observers point out that the balance of power lies with urban populations and this militates against radical agricultural reform, since there are major problems in that area which demand priority.Levin andWeiner (1993,1996a) and others have observed the continuing tendency to urban bias in ANC strategies.There are many interest groups keen to keep urban food prices down, and this further inhibits agrarian reform (Bromberger and Antonie, 1993;Levin and Weiner, 1993;Lipton and Lipton, 1994:24;du Toit 1994).Williams (1996)  Turning specifically to the former homeland areas themselves, future government planning in South Africa clearly needs to be flexible and responsive to changing conditions.Unfortunately, such work is hampered by the long delay in the reintegration of former homeland government departments and agencies into the new provincial framework and confusion over the allocation of functions (Murray, 1996).Nonetheless, there are considerable under-utilised natural resources and human potential in Transkei which, though ignored in the past, could be mobilised (Phillips-Howard, 1995).As this article indicates, there appears to be particular potential for small-scale market-orientated irrigated agriculture, and it has also been suggested that dryland maize production could be raised to 3-4 t/ha with effective farmer support programmes (Weiner et al. 1994).Whether such opportunities can be realised, however, depends, in part, on government support and a willingness to consider new approaches.There has been a tendency in Transkei and other former homelands to assume that agricultural progress requires expensive, high-tech solutions.It is perhaps time now to look for alternatives which will allow peasant farmers to develop their land in ways which do not involve substantial capital outlay.This approach will be particularly critical if government funding allocations retain their strong urban bias.In the case of Transkeian irrigation there may be lessons to be learned from indigenous small-scale farmer-managed irrigation as practised successfully in parts of Nigeria and Tanzania.Similarly, when looking at marketing structures, it is important to consider ways of improving distribution for small producers with limited, occasional surpluses.There may be a place for more diverse systems of marketing than operated in South Africa under apartheid.In countries like Nigeria, rural periodic markets have long played a critical role in the bulking of small farm production, despite their limited facilities.The roadside markets which seem to be emerging in Transkei need careful nurturing.
While such potential innovations appear to have relevance in a Transkeian context, it would be unwise to assume their applicability to all other homelands.Indeed, it is vital to avoid homogenised policies in all aspects of rural development.There is much current diversity even within Transkei regarding access to both internal and external resources.Such diversity is likely to increase and to alter as new opportunities become available -and others diminish -both within Transkei and elsewhere.Williams (1996) makes the point (in the context of a discussion of World Bank recommendations) that, matters of land and agricultural production are always particular and never general.
Effective policies capable of bringing about a variety of changes in the distribution of land and production of crops need to start from the very different circumstances obtaining within as well as among the different provinces and agro-ecological regions of the country.
Pickles and Weiner (1991) similarly argue that rural development policy 'must be sensitive to the issues of local history and struggle, of unity and cleavage, of vested interest and alliance'.This can not be an easy task!Monitoring of economic and social conditions in very poor rural areas like Transkei would appear to be particularly critical as policy formulation and implementation proceeds.The development of participatory policy formulation processes is especially important and recent innovative work in this field by Weiner et al. (1995) is encouraging.There is strong evidence to suggest that rural dwellers are the poorest people in South Africa, in terms of income, nutrition and access to education and health services (Lipton and Lipton, 1994), and that those in the former homelands are amongst the poorest of all.Consequently, it is vital that these people -so long neglected, so deserving of fair treatment -now obtain due consideration.Hearing what they have to say concerning their condition and their aspirations -and responding appropriately -is essential if positive change is to be achieved.
Gina Porter is at the Centre for Overseas Research and Development, University of Durham, UK.Kevin Phillips-Howard was in the Department of Geography, University of Transkei, Umtata, South Africa.

Table 1 : Major labour inputs of children
points out that the World Bank's review of South African agriculture ('Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring in South Africa, 1993') several times emphasises the opportunity to import food cheaply.What then are the prospects for change in Transkei and the rural areas of other former homelands, if urban priorities prevail in government funding allocations?On the one hand an overriding emphasis on urban development could trigger further rural-urban migration, exacerbating current urban problems; on the other, since urban and rural areas are closely interconnected, new opportunities in the cities could have a positive impact on the rural economies of regions like Transkei.