Article title: We Don't Know That We Have Been Left Behind: The Neoliberalization Of Conservation In The Burunge Wildlife Management Area, Northern Tanzania

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WE DON'T KNOW THAT WE HAVE BEEN LEFT BEHIND:
THE NEOLIBERALIZATION OF CONSERVATION
IN THE BURUNGE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA,
NORTHERN TANZANIA

by

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B.A., Catholic University of America, 1981

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This thesis for the Master of Arts

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Thesis directed by Assistant Professor James J. Igoe

ABSTRACT

Poverty alleviation policies in Tanzania are focused on market development and local economic transformations as primary contributors to the country's growth. These policies are intertwined with government legislation creating Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) near protected areas which encourage local people to use village land for ecotourism activities which will add value to natural resources while providing local opportunities for expanded livelihood options. Actively promoted by international conservation NGOs, WMAs are marketed as a people-friendly way to protect wildlife while encouraging conservation-friendly livelihood strategies. This study uses qualitative ethnographic methods to determine the effects of the Burunge WMA in northern Tanzania on people living in nearby villages. Results indicate that the needs and priorities of local people were not adequately or equitably identified and that WMAs actually reregulate land and resources in a way that allows external stakeholders to gain control of village assets, exclude local people, and capitalize on newly available economic opportunities. Moreover, because WMAs merge economic and conservation objectives in a way that is consistent with both the global neoliberal framework and powerful Western images and beliefs about nature and consumption, the rhetoric regarding this newest form of community-based conservation has been transformed into an officially legislated "truth" that is difficult to challenge. Suggestions for

countering this discourse and for future research into the effectiveness of community-based conservation as a viable mechanism for environmental protection and economic development are offered.

This abstract accurately represents the content of the candidate's thesis. I recommend its publication.

Signed _____
James J. Igoe

DEDICATION PAGE

To Lance, my favorite son.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A friend once told me that research is a journey, a passage that can take you places you have never been before, not just geographically, but also intellectually and emotionally. It can challenge you and shift the foundation of who you are right out from under you. But it can also transform and inspire you if you stay open to possibilities and new ways of thinking. To do this, my friend advised, you have to learn as much as you can about what you will be investigating, and then be prepared to abandon everything you have learned once you get to the field. This is because fieldwork rarely goes the way you planned, and what you end up finding out from your research may be quite different from what you expected to learn. But more importantly, what you think you understand when you start your journey is almost never the same as what you know at the end.

In January, 2006, I went to Tanzania to study community-based conservation. I spent five months learning about the Burunge Wildlife Management Area (WMA) which is located in the northern part of the country between two national parks, Tarangire and Lake Manyara. Simply put, a WMA is a portion of village common land that is set aside for conservation and for environmentally-friendly economic ventures, like ecotourism, which are meant to

protect wildlife while they generate income to help alleviate local poverty. I knew when I started my research that international conservation NGOs had been focusing much of their attention on the impacts of protected areas on local communities and on the importance of local support for long-term conservation plans. As such, efforts have been made to integrate traditional fortress conservation approaches¹ with programs to increase social equity by including local people in the process and application of conservation and by providing benefits to communities directly affected by conservation – benefits such as limited use of resources, sharing in the profits generated by protected areas, and being provided services and assistance from protected area employees (Barrow et al. 2001; Bergin 2001; IUCN 2004). Since a WMA is established on village-owned land and at the request of village residents, I thought that perhaps it would be a good example of how a community-based conservation program can actually accomplish conservation goals without increasing the vulnerability of already marginalized people.

To find out if this was correct, I first spent time examining the legal and administrative aspects of WMAs so I could understand how they are supposed to work. I also took classes at the College of African Wildlife Management and joined students on multi-day field trips to villages and parks to learn about how

¹ Fortress conservation, or the national park model of conservation, revolves around the idea that wilderness is “naturally...free of human beings and their activities,” but also that people must be forcibly excluded from nature in order to save it (Igoe 2004). In Chapter 2 I will explain more about fortress conservation and its role in Tanzania’s conservation history, and I will discuss how the vision of this model continues to inform the practice of conservation in Tanzania to the present day.

communities are involved in conservation initiatives like WMAs. Since I wanted to explore the specific effects of the Burunge WMA on people living in participating villages, I interviewed local residents and village officials about their experiences with the WMA and I went to village meetings where the WMA was a central topic. I had numerous opportunities, in both formal and informal settings, to listen to representatives of conservation NGOs and officials of the District in which the Burunge WMA is located explain why conservation is so important for Tanzania's citizens, not just its wildlife, and I heard these same spokespeople talk about how the Burunge WMA was going to be such a good thing for people living in the area. Finally, I even got to see what conservation looks like from a tourist's perspective by spending two weeks on a safari with my son at the end of the five months, traveling again through the same area (although in somewhat more luxurious conditions). At the end of it all, I could see clearly how WMAs have become a popular medium for participatory conservation, local economic development, and poverty alleviation in Tanzania, and just as clearly how the Burunge WMA was directly and negatively affecting the livelihoods and culture of local people. This thesis will describe those effects and clarify why, despite official rhetoric that predicts a vastly different outcome in a WMA, the effects that I observed are really the outcomes that we should expect.

Officially, it appeared that support for WMAs was enthusiastic and unqualified. WMAs appear to embody the positive aspects of both conservation

and development, and they serve as a vehicle for the benefits that can arise when the objectives from these two imperatives are combined. From a conservation perspective, as environmentalists have come to recognize that ecosystems do not follow man-made political boundaries the emphasis of conservation has shifted to the protection of large-scale ecological processes that will address the fundamental causes of biodiversity loss more effectively than a narrow focus on specific localities or species. For this reason, conservation initiatives in Tanzania have moved outside of the geographic islands that most national parks have become and into the surrounding landscape. Since WMAs are typically located near or adjacent to established protected areas, they provide physical links from parks and reserves to community conservation zones, thereby encompassing more of the local ecosystem, ensuring that natural migration routes are kept open for wildlife, and enriching the vitality of biodiversity.

From a development perspective, one that is focused on poverty alleviation, WMAs are a natural convergence of biodiversity conservation and economic growth, drawing tourists by appealing to Western ideals of nature and wilderness while using the money those tourists bring to improve the lives of the people who have made parts of that wilderness possible. Enriching the vitality of biodiversity and making it more accessible to tourists generates opportunities for local people to economically benefit, moderating concerns about involving those who are directly affected by conservation in its implementation and management (community-based

conservation) while giving life to a vision that conservation can play an important role in individual, community, and national prosperity, especially in impoverished countries (conservation is good business). In a place like Tanzania, where protected areas cover nearly 30% of the country's surface area and tourism accounts for 17.5% of the annual GDP (URT 2008), pursuing environmentally-friendly economic ventures is strongly encouraged as a more sustainable use of scarce resources, and establishing a WMA is now considered the most practical way for local people to capitalize on the value of those resources as coveted commodities in a global tourist market.

As a model for neoliberal conservation ideals,² one that is eagerly promoted by the Tanzanian government and transnational conservation NGOs, WMAs are designed to ensure that wildlife is protected by the same people who stand to gain from that protection. They are presented as a strategy for devolving responsibility for wildlife management, and access to its associated income, to local communities after they are assisted in legally securing "user rights"³ to wildlife outside of protected areas (URT 1998: §3.3.4v). By giving them control over natural resources, WMAs afford local people the opportunity to pursue livelihood options

² Neoliberalism includes the commodification of resources which previously had no monetary value and the appropriation of these resources under the mantle of free markets. I will discuss neoliberalism in detail in Chapter 5.

³ User rights include the right to use wildlife resources in a WMA and enter into investment agreements with the private sector for wildlife utilization and investment in the WMA (URT 2005: §3 & Parts II & IV).

that add value to those resources, options that include payment for their use by safari companies and other investors. As local residents participate in more sustainable and profitable management of their own land, WMAs demonstrate that conservation can be a viable form of land use in rural areas. At the same time, tourists get to enjoy nature as they imagined it would be, and wildlife is protected for future generations.

Yet, as I listened to what villagers had to say about the practical effects of the Burunge WMA on their lives and livelihoods I learned that, for them, it was something very different from what it was supposed to be. Despite the enthusiasm and official support surrounding the Burunge WMA, my research found that local participation, transparency, and consensus were illusory. I discovered that most people in the villages affiliated with the WMA did not really understand what it was. Moreover, although selected villagers had attended government and NGO sponsored seminars held to explain the particulars of establishing a WMA, most people had not participated in the creation of the Burunge WMA, nor were they benefiting from it in any way. Many villagers had lost access to resources critical for maintaining their livelihoods, and some villagers had actually been displaced from their homes when the WMA was established and were living a precarious existence on the fringes of the communities. Finally, the much flaunted investment opportunities, which should have been providing cash to replace direct resource use, had not transpired. In fact, for the villages involved with the Burunge WMA,

cumbersome regulatory requirements and manipulation by powerful vested interests had made the likelihood of any real local economic progress doubtful indeed – a situation that became more apparent as villagers began to realize just how much land and resources they had to surrender to be a part of that progress.

The inconsistencies between what the Burunge WMA is supposed to be and what its tangible effects have actually been for local people are obscured by a narrative that validates and encourages that convergence of biodiversity conservation and economic growth. This union is accepted as both natural and necessary while its practical consequences are effectively ignored or even actively concealed by those stakeholders bent on spinning the narrative. Grounded in historical precedent that defines and circumscribes what conservation is in modern-day Tanzania, it revolves around the construction of an image of African wilderness that is separate from people, one that has been carefully crafted and marketed to tourists by travel companies, government agencies and conservation NGOs. This image is reinforced by the ongoing production of virtual experiences for these tourists, experiences which give them the Africa they expect to see – the only Africa they are actually allowed to see (my safari experience made this embarrassingly clear) – but one that does not actually exist for Africans. In this Africa, one that has been created for tourists, local people are a peripheral part of the landscape; they are only visible to the extent that their activities do not detract from the tourist experience, and they are only important as long as their local

economies contribute to the global economy that makes these experiences possible. In other words, their activities must enhance the economic value of the landscape while they complement and advance that vision of wild Africa.

To this end, their subsistence-based livelihoods must be converted into ones more attractive to foreign tourists – certainly in terms of the visible impact those livelihoods have on the landscape (after all, tourists come to Tanzania to see wildlife and wilderness, not poor farmers and scrawny cattle) but also with respect to the compatibility of those livelihoods with a market economy. This transformation is set in motion by the reregulation of their communally-owned resources into tradable commodities (Castree 2008), making them available for sale to consumers with ready cash. For the villages in my study area, the tradable commodity is wildlife and it is only valuable and marketable to the extent that it can be protected for tourists and put on display for their consumption. This kind of protection is most easily accomplished through internal policies of territorialization (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995) that permit and oblige the inclusion and exclusion of certain activities and people within distinct geographic areas. The result is a literal partitioning of land into what Ferguson (2006: 48) refers to as selective “zones of exclusion” where resources, as well as people, can be controlled for the sake of more universal concerns like the environment and economic growth, and often in the name of the very people being controlled. The Burunge WMA is just such a zone. The focus there is on the value of nature and wildlife as marketable

goods, on the economic incentives that are available to those local people who have the ability to appreciate and the initiative to act upon the enterprise potential of their ecosystem, and on the role that conservation can play to help make all this a reality. The fact that those local people must actually relinquish control of their land and resources in order to benefit from that untapped enterprise potential is glossed over, or even concealed. Ideals of democracy, participation and benefit-sharing notwithstanding, the creation of a WMA ultimately redefines a village landscape to suit a business agenda, one that requires residents to become “responsibilized” individuals accountable for preserving the value of their landscape even while their relationship with and access to that landscape is legally reconstituted (Goldman 2001) and effectively severed.

This notion of separation is everywhere in Tanzania – from the literal enclosure of land and property, complete with guards and guns to let some people in and keep others out; to more subtle kinds of disconnection, like the one evidenced by my safari truck-mate who asked me to stop talking about how difficult life is for people living outside protected areas lest I “ruin his vacation.” The virtual and physical segregation of people and nature, and people and people, is presented to foreigners and native Tanzanians alike as something that is both normal and necessary, and the moral and practical consequences of these divisions are not often questioned. In this presentation, humans can be generally accepted as part of ecological systems and even part of the landscape while their actual

relationships with the environment, and the needs and rights of individuals who depend on the environment for their daily needs, can be discounted or ignored. This is especially true for developing states where large parts of the population still live in rural areas and are dependent on natural resources for survival, but where the actions of these states are often constrained by externally-driven financial and environmental commitments that ultimately determine how those resources can be used, and who gets to use them.

For instance, because Tanzania's current poverty alleviation strategy (MKUKUTA)⁴ is directly linked to its UN Millennium Development Goal commitments, the country's leaders are all but required to direct their attention to meeting time-bound and quantifiable national economic goals that may not actually reflect any tangible local economic progress. MKUKUTA specifically recognizes the value of wildlife and conservation ventures in contributing to the country's sustainable development, and it calls for collaboration among local citizens, the private sector and development partners in decentralizing environmental economic activities so that those citizens who are most affected by conservation policies can participate in the financial benefits that can arise from their implementation.

WMAs are seen as a principal instrument for realizing these kinds of alliances.

However, local development is merely one element of the economic

⁴ MKUKUTA is the Swahili acronym for Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (URT 2005a and 2005b).

transformations envisioned by MKUKUTA, and the formation of a WMA ultimately redirects the economic ambitions of rural communities toward the realization of broader, national objectives. So, while free enterprise is promoted as the axis around which conservation agendas and poverty alleviation campaigns should converge, a convergence which suggests that financial and environmental goals are equally achievable everywhere and by everyone, in fact the country's poorest citizens can wind up separated from their land and resources even as they become the model for participatory conservation's role in Tanzania's economic expansion.

By keeping the focus on the bigger picture, one that successfully unites seemingly unrelated imperatives to protect the environment, make money, and end poverty, the implicit and literal kinds of separation that are inherent in a WMA become an essential prerequisite for, and an accepted side-effect of, reaching these goals, even as their existence is never publicly acknowledged.⁵ Detaching people from their resources in order to protect and enhance the value of those resources is, then, not only justifiable but essential in a world where only a limited number of resources are available to accomplish a wide variety of presumably equally important objectives. Likewise, reregulation and territorialization of local land and

⁵ Mosse (2004) argues that, rather than practice being produced by policy and regardless of the actual effects that result from practice, development actors must always "maintain coherent representations of their actions" as products of the policy they are charged with implementing. The ethnographic question then, according to Mosse, "is not whether a project succeeds, but how success is produced." This is a question that I will address in Chapter 5.

resources become necessary parts of a process for mainstreaming these people into the global economy even while the consequences of this process are obscured by ambiguous administrative constraints and ambitious marketing campaigns that encourage green consumption but discourage close scrutiny of the means by which green commodities are made available, and by whom. The only task that remains is to convince local people, like the ones involved with the Burunge WMA, that nature is not being protected from them but for them and to ensure that while local authorization for community-based conservation is obtained as required, local involvement is consigned to a place less likely to interfere with more far-reaching, and therefore more important, concerns.

The results of my research show that, for the villages which were part of the Burunge WMA, the structures designed to provide transparency and include local people actually operated quite well without them. Villagers recognized that their participation was more symbolic than real and they understood that their continued involvement was simply not necessary to maintain the illusion of participation. Although many people had been hopeful that the WMA would provide much needed benefits, they did not seem all that surprised when they were, in fact, forgotten as the WMA process unfolded and essentially took on a life of its own. For them, this was simply more proof that conservation is ultimately incompatible with their livelihood priorities. As a conservation strategy that requires significant diminution of the local resource base and more limited access to land, conditions

that contributed to these communities' impoverishment in the first place, the Burunge WMA produced effects that were direct and acute but still rather easily disregarded by its most vocal proponents – international conservation NGOs, private and corporate interests, and the Tanzanian government. This thesis will describe these effects and outline the reasons why they are so different from the outcomes put forth by these proponents. To do this, I will begin by briefly situating WMAs in an historical context with respect to Tanzania's conservation policy before and after the country's independence. In Chapter 3, I will provide details about the administrative structure and legal nature of WMAs as outlined in various government regulations, policies and guidelines. Chapter 4 will present an ethnography of the effects of the Burunge WMA on the residents of two villages, Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu. I will recount how residents understood WMAs in terms of transparency, participation, and benefits and compare this to the realities they were facing when I left the field. Chapter 5 will discuss WMAs with respect to reregulation and territorialization and demonstrate how these fundamental processes are obscured by the administrative and technical requirements with which villages must contend, by the powerful ambitions of better-positioned stakeholders, and even by the all-important expectations of foreign tourists. Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude by highlighting the lessons learned from this research and offering suggestions for future research into the effectiveness of community-based

conservation as a viable mechanism for environmental protection and economic development.

CHAPTER 2

WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS AND THE HISTORY OF CONSERVATION IN TANZANIA

Wildlife Management Areas are presented as a redefinition of conservation—an innovative approach that necessitates community involvement while focusing on the value of wildlife as a unique natural resource that can, if properly developed and managed, play an integral role in Tanzania's economic growth. Because they require local participation and local management, WMAs are by definition distinct from a traditional fortress conservation paradigm premised on the exclusion of local people—a paradigm around which Tanzania's colonial and post-colonial conservation history has revolved. As a model for participatory conservation, a new standard that operates outside protected area boundaries and independent of protected area constraints, WMAs are seemingly removed from that history. However, they are structurally and ideologically derived from the same kinds of fortress conservation frameworks that produced protected areas like Serengeti, the country's first national park and the prototype for all other parks gazetted in Tanzania. These frameworks are direct legacies of colonial land laws which were premised on state control and the protection of external interests, concerns which have remained largely intact since Tanzania's independence in 1961. Indeed, these

concerns have become even more magnified and entrenched as economic and political liberalization have paved the way for Tanzanian and foreign elites to impose new kinds of control on what are now lucrative conservation resources, control which is far more insidious but equally as repressive. Since conservation is now enhanced by a profit motive, the current argument is that nature and wildlife must be kept separate from people not just to protect it but also to protect its value as an economic resource. But even though the outcome for local people is the same as a park – a boundary is imposed to keep them out of an area they used to be in – their exclusion is made to appear voluntary. In the end, although a WMA is packaged to look like a different kind of conservation, one that is participatory, equitable, and sensible, its effects make it essentially a modern-day extension of the traditional fortress conservation paradigm. And efforts to dissociate WMAs from this paradigm serve not only to deny the historical context that gave them life, a context fraught with conflict, but also to disallow the possibility of adverse effects from what is deemed an ideal alternative to conventional forms of exclusionary conservation.

Conservation in Tanzania has always been about wildlife. An internationally recognized setting for biologically-rich habitats and unique concentrations of wildlife, the country has an extensive network of protected areas, including national parks, game reserves, and game-controlled areas, dedicated

solely to the protection of its wildlife resources.⁶ Unlike parks in North America, which were created either to keep natural resources out of private hands or to preserve vast expanses of natural beauty (Nash 2001), protected areas in Tanzania were established for the express purpose of protecting wildlife from natives so that it could be directly or indirectly exploited by non-natives. The first game reserves, demarcated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were essentially hunting blocks set aside for the use of foreign settlers and wealthy tourist hunters. These areas were chosen specifically for their concentrations of megafauna, and the protection of resident wildlife was not intended to benefit native inhabitants who, it was believed, lacked the capacity to appreciate the practical or aesthetic value of the natural world. Instead, forest and game laws enacted by colonial authorities sought to promote conservation efforts that would directly benefit settlers and tourist hunters on land that was often considered economically useless (especially in terms of agriculture) and essentially uninhabited. To the extent that an indigenous presence was acknowledged, it was usually not associated with wildlife in meaningful or positive ways. Moreover, traditional land use practices, such as firewood collection, coordinated herding systems, and controlled fires, which were successfully employed by indigenous groups to maintain landscapes and their

⁶ National parks prohibit human settlement and resource use; game reserves allow hunting on a permit basis but no human habitation; game-controlled areas allow limited farming, grazing and controlled hunting (Goldman 2003).

related ecological systems were largely ignored and later criminalized by colonial authorities (Goldstein 2005; Igoe 2004; Neumann 1998).

National parks as we know them in the West did not exist in Tanzania until after World War II when international conservation groups concerned about the future of African wildlife and the effects of growing European settlement, commercial exploitation of game, and increased hunting by elite foreign sportsmen called for the official establishment of parks reminiscent of the Yellowstone model.⁷ In keeping with this model, one based on the Western notion of parks as pristine, uninhabited wildernesses, native and tourist hunting was forbidden inside newly gazetted national parks, and human settlement, at least by African humans, was officially prohibited.⁸ Accordingly, indigenous groups that still remained in these areas were removed or, when allowed to remain, were required to live

⁷ The membership of these conservation groups consisted primarily of socially and politically elite members of the British and American public. These individuals had connections to colonial governments and personal interests in preserving their access to big-game hunting, a pastime which required that wildlife be safeguarded inside parks so it would be available to them outside parks. Indeed, many game reserves in Tanzania are located immediately adjacent to national parks. Hunting, as both a conservation strategy and an economic strategy, is still strongly encouraged in Tanzania.

⁸ For non-African humans, especially conservationists, the restrictions on settlement were rather more lax. For instance, Bernard Grizmek, founder of Frankfurt Zoological Society, lived inside Serengeti for many years after he called for the removal of all human beings (black and white) from the park. He is buried along with his son on the rim of Ngorongoro Crater (Igoe 2004). Tony Fitzjohn, field director of the Tony Fitzjohn/George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust, still lives inside Mkomazi Game Reserve, although indigenous pastoralists in the Reserve area were permanently evicted by July, 1988 (Brockington 2002).

traditionally (Igoe 2004).⁹ In due course, pressure from Western conservation groups resulted in the relocation of all indigenous groups from inside Tanzania's national parks and the eventual elimination of indigenous access rights to park resources.

The progressive alienation of local people from their land and resources in the name of conservation has been mirrored by the progressive expansion of state control and external influence over those lost assets. With the country's independence, authority over public lands officially moved from the British crown to the President of Tanzania who, as trustee for the nation, also has authority over all the country's wildlife, authority which is exercised through the Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Although Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) holds sway over what goes on inside the national parks,¹⁰ the Wildlife Division has absolute jurisdiction over the utilization of wildlife outside of parks and the impact of this authority is most clearly reflected in the Division's control over hunting.¹¹ Just as in colonial times, hunting is big

⁹ An example of one such traditional group was the Maasai which inhabited the Serengeti Reserve prior to its designation as the first national park in East Africa in 1940, and its re-designation in 1948 as Tanzania's first national park (Goldstein 2005). Maasai were allowed to live in Serengeti until 1958 at which time the park was divided and the pastoralists were confined to Ngorongoro Conservation Area. Maasai settlements were forced out of the interior of the Ngorongoro Crater in 1974 and their movements have continued to be restricted ever since (Igoe 2004).

¹⁰ TANAPA is a quasi-governmental authority that operates under a separate budget and is administratively independent from the workings of the Tanzanian government.

¹¹ Recent changes in the regulations governing photo safaris and other forms of non-consumptive tourism will also provide the Wildlife Division a measure of control, in the form of access to fees, over non-hunting activities (URT 2007).

business in Tanzania and the lucrative income stream generated from hunting blocks leased to safari companies, blocks which are controlled by the Wildlife Division and which can be located essentially anywhere national parks are not (including on village land), ensures that this branch of the central government and its affiliated employees in regional and district offices wield inordinate levels of power. No matter where wildlife is located – on village land, inside a national park, or in a WMA – it is always owned by the state and rights to its utilization, whether through consumptive activities like trophy hunting or non-consumptive activities like photo safaris, can be assigned by the state to stakeholders as it sees fit (URT 2005, 2007 and 2007A). Accordingly, all human-wildlife interaction must be formally sanctioned (i.e. by permit), but official sanction is typically reserved for the types of clients whose livelihoods do not depend on lost land and resources. Instead, it is most often granted to those patrons whose investment in and support of conservation efforts coincide with Western-inspired conservation goals while contributing much-needed revenue to the central government's coffers.

The exclusive power of the state over wildlife is directly reflected in top-down approaches to conservation which have been adopted in the policies, laws and regulations enacted by the independent government, directives which were created under the advice and guidance of Western conservation agencies, if not simply written by them. These directives, starting with The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 and continuing through various revisions mirroring changes in

conservation methods, emphases and goals, have upheld and reinforced the dominion of the state over land and resources even while they conferred upon external conservation agencies extraordinary management powers over large areas of the country and, consequently, over significant numbers of Tanzanian citizens. These agencies point to the invitation issued by the country's first President Julius Nyerere, in his celebrated Arusha Manifesto, to contribute money, expertise and manpower to help Tanzania manage its wildlife resources as justification for their initial and continued role in conservation policy and practice.¹² It is certainly accurate to say that, as one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of only US\$319 per person (US DoS 2008), Tanzania does not have the financial wherewithal to autonomously protect all of its wildlife resources. To achieve Western-inspired conservation goals it needs Western resources. But the application of those resources by conservation agencies in response to Nyerere directly reflected the colonial-style attitude that Africans lacked the necessary qualifications and mind-set to successfully practice conservation without outside intervention (Igoe 2004). Until very recently, this belief was manifested in the absence of local participation, if not the absence of African participation, in Western-sponsored conservation initiatives. It was further expressed in the ways

¹² These agencies neglect to mention that this invitation, part of a speech given by Nyerere at a conference organized by international conservation NGOs to discuss "the future of colonial conservation policies in independent African countries," was actually crafted by consultants for the World Wildlife Fund (Igoe 2004; Neumann 1998).

that Western conservation ideology and practice have been institutionalized in Tanzania – through donations of equipment and vehicles, training of protected area personnel at facilities such as the College of African Wildlife Management at Mweka,¹³ and direct involvement in the creation and management of the country's national parks (Igoe 2004).

The influence of Western conservation NGOs is pervasive in Tanzania and the evidence is everywhere you look. At Mweka it seemed as if every building, uniform or piece of equipment had some organization's logo slapped on it somewhere, a constant reminder that if not for the largesse of these agencies whatever object you were looking at simply would not exist. Similarly, in addition to TANAPA's insignia, national park signs and vehicles and buildings often have conservation NGO logos affixed to them along with cheerful disclosures about that agency's financial and technical generosity.¹⁴ Also, you soon discover that many of the educational displays and materials provided for the public at national parks, exhibits which convey very specific (and very Western) ideologies, were designed and installed by the conservation NGO with jurisdiction over that park.

Jurisdiction is the correct term because, as I explained above, although these agencies are not branches of the Tanzanian government, they have been given

¹³ Funding and support for establishment of the College of African Wildlife Management at Mweka has been provided by African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) along with various other international development agencies (Igoe 2004, Neumann 1998).

¹⁴ I often wondered if employees and citizens didn't tire of being constantly reminded that their country's conservation infrastructure teeters on external munificence.

official authority over conservation activities in different parts of the country.¹⁵

Consequently, conservation NGO personnel have virtually unfettered freedom of movement in the areas where this authority has been granted and the dictates and tactics of the agencies they represent (and their own actions as well) are not often questioned, at least not in public. For example, employees at the AWF office located in Namanga, Kenya, which coordinates work in the trans-border Kilimanjaro Heartland encompassing parks and community lands in both Kenya and Tanzania, regularly cross national boundaries without passing through customs.¹⁶ Needless to say, whether you are a native Tanzanian or a foreign researcher, challenging these organizations is difficult and Tanzanian officials are quick to defend the practices and policies bankrolled and administered by them.¹⁷

In my research area, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) has dominated conservation for decades. Its influence is far-reaching, but its reputation among residents of the area is somewhat less than illustrious. AWF was instrumental in the establishment of Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks, and it continues to promote efforts to address threats of habitat fragmentation and degradation of

¹⁵ Specifically, GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) directs conservation efforts in the central Selous region, WWF has the southwest part of the country, Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) manages Serengeti and its environs, and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) is in control of the northeast part of the country, including my research area (Igoe and Croucher 2007).

¹⁶ This information came from Clive Jones, former AWF Director of Land Management, at a presentation given at AWF's Arusha office on February 22, 2006. I attended this presentation as part of a Conflict Resolution and Management class at the College of African Wildlife Management.

¹⁷ See Chapter 4 for a personal account of what this kind of programmed defense looks like.

wildlife migration routes in areas around and between the parks. The organization has been primarily fixated on marketing its large landscape conservation approach, the African Heartlands Program,¹⁸ to local people living in the Tarangire area even while it works vigorously to discourage human activities that it maintains are incompatible with conservation, such as farming and settlement in areas where wildlife lives or moves around. Practically speaking, the entire area between the Tarangire and Lake Manyara is one huge migration corridor and wildlife is everywhere, a fact not lost on AWF which recently privately acquired, through its affiliate non-profit Tanzania Land Conservation Trust (TLCT), the 44,000 acre government-owned Manyara Ranch – an action which directly reflects the organization’s solution for land protection: acquiring or “piecing together” critical wildlife areas threatened by private development (AWF 2007a). This piecemeal solution involves other kinds of strategies for separating people from land and resources in the name of conservation, including programs that encourage farmers to convert their farms into conservation easements¹⁹ and also including, of course,

¹⁸ According to AWF’s website, “Far larger than any park or reserve, an African Heartland combines national parks and local villages, government lands and private lands into a large, cohesive conservation landscape...people and wildlife live side by side, and the needs of both are balanced” (AWF 2007). The Maasai Steppe Heartland, which encompasses a total area of 6,327 sq. miles, includes Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks and all the villages and open areas between and surrounding the parks (AWF 2007b).

¹⁹ Investment in conservation easements – in effect paying people not to farm so that their land remains undeveloped and open for wildlife movement – is a new concept in Tanzania. In my research area, AWF and TLCT were for a time urging people living in the Kwa Kuchinja corridor, an historical migration route running from Tarangire to Lake Manyara that also includes the centrally located Manyara Ranch, to become part of a program called KKEEP – Kwa Kuchinja Easements for the Environment through Partnership. Residents quickly became less enamored with

the Burunge WMA. When looked at collectively²⁰ all of AWF's projects in the Tarangire ecosystem are directed toward the broader goal of linking the core protected areas (Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks, and now Manyara Ranch) into a single stronghold that AWF argues is necessary for effective land management and the success of long-term conservation goals (AWF 2007 and 2007a).

This argument is ingrained into the history of the Tarangire area and it has turned up time and again as part of various conservation campaigns. It revolves around the concept of maintaining (or creating, depending on your perspective) safe passage for wildlife between these protected areas and ensuring that any humans who inhabit that space do not interfere with wildlife or its habitat. This concept gained even more momentum (at least among Westerners) after Tanzania became a party to the CITES agreement in 1980 (see Bonner 1994), especially as a dramatic increase in elephant populations due to CITES has resulted in increased pressure on lands surrounding protected areas.²¹

the project when they discovered that payments they would receive for not farming were one-time only and living in the corridor with no means of subsistence was both impractical and dangerous (also see Appendix A).

²⁰ Given their lack of access to the kinds of technology (like computers and the internet) that we in the West take for granted, looking at the collective direction of AWF's programs can be a very difficult task for local people and even for local government officials.

²¹ The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora is a voluntary international agreement that is meant to ensure that international trade in wild animal and plant specimens does not threaten their survival (CITES 2008). Elephants were declared an endangered species under the treaty in October, 1989 (Bonner 1994).

From a practical perspective, ensuring that humans do not interfere with wildlife is virtually impossible today given the livelihood choices of most people in the region. To survive people must farm – even members of traditional pastoral groups like the Maasai have resorted to at least some part-time farming to fill the gaps that livestock herding alone can no longer fill.²² But farms either block wildlife, or they are simply destroyed by wildlife as it passes through. Prior to the establishment of the WMA, wildlife had mostly stayed within the boundaries of Tarangire. Elephants in particular knew exactly where the park borders were and had avoided traveling through the villages, instead moving to the south or north of the villages on their way to Lake Manyara. When people and farms were moved out of the WMA, informants told me that elephants began to fearlessly venture into new areas, confronting humans they had formerly avoided, and causing damage to homes and farms in areas of the village that had historically been relatively safe from wildlife activity. The acquisition of Manyara Ranch by AWF intensified this destruction as elephants now had shorter distances to travel between the two parks with a safe haven in between. In the end, although the presence of villagers in and near the community forest reserve between the village and Tarangire had created a

²² Interestingly, AWF claims that a priority in the Maasai Steppe Heartland is “empowering people [by] working with Maasai pastoralist communities” (AWF 2007b). It also claims that Manyara Ranch “successfully manages cattle in conservation-friendly ways” (AWF 2007a). Maasai that I interviewed complained that not only had they been excluded from prime grazing land in the Ranch when it was acquired by AWF, but also that grazing land throughout the Tarangire area was quickly becoming less available as areas set aside for conservation continued to expand (also see Appendix A).

buffer that ensured wildlife would stay nearer the park, the lack of a human presence in the area after the establishment of the WMA meant that the buffer essentially no longer existed.²³

So, given that wildlife and farming are often ill-suited (even the locals will agree with this), the focus of conservation has always been on moving farms and people out of the way of wildlife rather than on making sure “the needs of both are balanced” (see footnote 18). Indeed, while on a visit to Manyara Ranch as part of a field safari with students from Mweka, the community outreach representative told us: “These people need to understand that they are in the wrong place. It is no longer safe for them here. Our job is to help them understand this.” However, this focus on moving farms and people ignores the fact that many people in the Tarangire area had already been displaced from other parts of Tanzania for similar reasons, sometimes on multiple occasions. People had been living and farming in this area for quite some time (see Table 2) but most everyone I spoke with was originally from somewhere else. A common story among interviewees concerned displacement by a new protected area or a large-scale commercial venture (and in at least one case, a military complex) or forced migration when available farmland became scarce due to the displacement of others. As with WMAs, these kinds of displacements often assume that local people will simply stop farming and be

²³ See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the community forest reserve.

effortlessly integrated into the newly created market economy. Unfortunately, assuming there is enough industry to go around (and there NEVER IS), rural producers seldom possess the necessary skills for an industry-based economy and they subsequently become a problem that must be dealt with. Alternatively they can just be ignored, a more common response in Tanzania considering that the kind of capitalism going on there is less concerned with social impacts or absorbing people than it is with making money in ways that involve minimal risk and outlay.

According to conservationists, the problem in the Tarangire area was too many people living in all the wrong places. People all over my research area (see Figure 2.1) talked about being repeatedly informed by AWF or TANAPA officials that they lived smack in the middle of a wildlife corridor and that they needed to provide a passageway for animals to move between the parks:

In 1991-1992 [we] were told that [we] lived in a corridor area for wildlife. (Interview 07M Mdori Evictee)

People were told to provide [a] wildlife corridor in their area and people said “we do not have land to make it a wildlife corridor.” (Interview 02M Almasi Evictee)

AWF came and said we need to connect Tarangire and Lake Manyara. Idea for conservation area came from this. (Interview 11F Songa Mbele)

In the year of 1999-2000, they said they need a wildlife corridor so the wild animals from Tarangire could pass and go to Manyara National Park up to Ngorongoro. Again people came in 2005 looking for wildlife corridor but the village did not agree. We told them if they want that corridor by force, ok, take it but if for *hiari* [choice, option], we are not ready. (Interview 07M Mswakini Chini)

We fought for 10 years to keep this place [Minjingu] from becoming a corridor. (Speaker at a Special Committee meeting of Minjingu village assembly)

Kwa Kuchinja has always been known as a corridor – but no restrictions on settlement or farming or wildlife. AWF came in and said, “Let’s make it official!” (Interview 01M Shimamo)

One interviewee in the area of the Kwa Kuchinja corridor remembered that on at least two occasions beginning in the late 1970’s there was talk of joining Tarangire and Lake Manyara into one park and everyone in between being forced to move (Interview 10M Shimamo). Another person in Minjingu stated that “in the 1970’s some white people wanted to move everyone from Makayuni all the way to (Minjingu) out of the area – [they] didn’t say where, just get out” (Interview 19M Kakoi). Many individuals were aware that on numerous occasions the idea of moving entire villages had been explored:

1974 – I heard about people being moved. Nothing since then, except in 2000 heard people in Mswakini Juu were to be moved to make a wildlife corridor. (Interview 02M Almasi Evictee)

Three years ago – rumors that the whole western side of the village [Minjingu] might be moved somewhere else. (Interview 21F Songa Mbele)

We heard at one time that the government would come to move us because we heard it on the radio...said that people living near the Park will one day be moved so that the animals have a chance to breathe. (Interview 04F Olevolos)

Figure 2.1 The Research Area

AWF wants to move people in Oltukai to expand Manyara Ranch boundaries – more wildlife areas and less grazing land. Lake Manyara National Park, Tarangire, Manyara Ranch – this is what AWF wants. People will have to move, Oltukai is surrounded by protected areas – it’s an island. Look at Minjingu – surrounded by Tarangire, Lake Manyara, Manyara Ranch, the WMA – it’s going to be an island too, whether we like it or not. Because AWF has an interest eventually we will have to move. (Interview 02M Makao Mapaya)

10 years ago an American in Tarangire [a donor] had idea of moving the village of Minjingu and compensating everyone. [He said] the area is good for a corridor. (Interview 23M Songa Mbele)

At least six other people had the same recollection as the Songa Mbele resident regarding the “American in Tarangire” and the plan to move the village of Minjingu. They remembered specific details about the plan, including surveys which counted the number of people, households, livestock and trees (oddly enough) in an effort to determine how costly the move would be. They also remembered that the plan was abandoned when the cost was deemed prohibitive. Nevertheless one of my interviewees, after introductions had been made and before I could even ask my first question, immediately blurted out, “Are you going to move us?” (Interview 21F Olevolos)

Many interviewees ridiculed AWF and TANAPA for their unceasing efforts to define boundaries for and then hypothetically enclose wild animals, scoffing at the notion that wildlife can be made to stay in a corridor any more than it can be made to stay in a park:

Wildlife is all around us, silly to think they’d stay in a corridor. (Interview 06M Shimamo)

The whole idea of a corridor for animals is ridiculous because they go wherever they want. (Interview 10M Shimamo)

The whole village seems like a corridor now since wildlife goes wherever it wants to. (Interview 05M Shimamo)

Animals go wherever they want. Call it a corridor if you want to, doesn't make any difference to us. (Interview 01M Randilen)

By far the majority of people I spoke with in the Tarangire region were well aware that their close proximity to the nearby protected areas made them extremely vulnerable to the aggravations and hazards caused by resident wildlife. Indeed, they deal with this on a daily basis.²⁴ But they were just as conscious of the fact that they have little influence over how this situation is ultimately managed. Because they live in what AWF has identified as a key conservation landscape (AWF 2007), they know they are equally as vulnerable to the whim and power of a government that cannot afford to lose control over valuable conservation resources as they are to a conservation agency with sometimes far different ideas about what is best for them than what they imagine for themselves.

The Burunge WMA is a quintessential example of what this vulnerability can look like. As I stated earlier in this chapter, the Burunge WMA was identified

²⁴ Although my field notes are filled with stories about crops being eaten or trampled and roofs of houses being ripped off by elephants bent on snarling up just-harvested grain, my favorite story of people coping with wildlife is one I witnessed personally. During an interview with a subject who lived quite near Tarangire and immediately after a herd of giraffe had passed right next to his house, a neighbor walking by pointed vaguely to the tall grass and said in a rather ho-hum tone of voice, "There's a lion out there." While this incident, which had yet to result in loss of life or livestock, was obviously routine for my interviewee and his neighbor, it was positively surreal for me.

as one of the pieces needed to “put the landscape of the Maasai Steppe back together” (AWF 2007c: 1). To be sure, this particular piece ties Tarangire to Lake Manyara in a way that leaves no doubt about the overall conservation objective – its corridor-like nature is rather easy to see (see Figure 2.2). However, because *a village must formally and legally resolve to create a WMA*, the very existence of the Burunge WMA suggests that people in this area had finally decided that this conservation strategy was one they could support. The fact that the Burunge WMA became a reality implies that swapping direct use of land and resources for indirect benefits from ecotourism must have seemed to villagers a more judicious use of scarce village resources. Since the focus of the WMA approach is unquestionably on encouraging private enterprise to harness the power of the market to achieve a kind of economic growth that is compatible with conservation goals, WMAs seem to offer local people opportunities which were not previously available to them – opportunities which are intended to help satisfy their livelihood needs while protecting wildlife. However, while both these objectives are formally codified in official government regulations, the bureaucratic complexity and unwieldiness of these regulations obscures the fact that because non-village stakeholders are far better positioned to manipulate the technical nature of the WMA process, local people have little control over how the economic power inherent in WMAs is actually expressed. To understand how this control is simultaneously attained and lost, Chapter 3 examines WMAs from a legal and administrative viewpoint to help

Figure 2.2 The Burunge WMA

illuminate why this form of community-based conservation ultimately denies local participation while it effectively quashes attempts at local self-determination and economic progress.

CHAPTER 3

THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS²⁵

To assist in achieving the combined goals of biodiversity conservation, community participation, and economic development, the Tanzanian government enacted The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2002 [Revised Edition 2005] (hereafter the “WMA Regulations”), as a formal mechanism to govern the formation and management of WMAs. The WMA Regulations are an amendment to The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 (hereafter the “Act”), the country’s original principal legislation governing the protection and utilization of wildlife resources. The WMA Regulations outline and stipulate specific steps that must be taken by a village to create and manage a WMA. Read literally, they operate in a linear fashion (e.g., first complete Step A, then Step B, etc.) with the village being the catalyst for initiating the WMA process and then continuing to have the leading role as that process evolves. In reality, however, the successful execution of the provisions of the WMA Regulations simultaneously produces and is produced by a legal and administrative framework that provides

²⁵ Much of the material for this chapter also appears in an article titled Conservation, Commerce and Communities: The Story of Community-Based Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania’s Northern Tourist Circuit in *Conservation and Society* (Igoe and Croucher 2007).

non-village stakeholders virtually unobstructed control over tasks, objectives, and benefits. This control is hidden within an officially holistic approach which presupposes the existence of mutual needs, expectations and goals among all stakeholders. Because this approach appears comprehensive, there is an underlying assumption that the realization of broad objectives, such as creating a cohesive conservation landscape and enhancing national economic growth, will automatically mean the achievement of smaller, more specific ones, such as alleviating poverty in one rural village. As such, the manner in which the WMA Regulations are construed and implemented by non-village stakeholders obscures the negative effects of this conservation strategy on local people even as those people are portrayed as the very foundation of its success and the primary beneficiaries of its outcomes.

This portrayal is an essential one since local people and their land are critical components of the WMA structure – without a local decision to participate there can officially be no WMA. Hence, first and foremost, the WMA Regulations emphasize the role of a village or group of villages in *independently* resolving to create a WMA and in having the capacity, or the ability to gain the capacity, and the legal authority to manage it. Other stakeholders are expected to step in when they have specific tasks to perform, including the relevant District Council, the District Natural Resources Advisory Body, the Director of Wildlife, the District Game Officer, authorities of Tanzania National Parks and the Ngorongoro

Conservation Area Authority (where applicable), the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism, the relevant international conservation NGO (see footnote 15 in Chapter 2), and the private sector, all of whom have different responsibilities for ensuring the success of the WMA project before and after its execution (URT 2005: Part V & §77). Still, the village is always depicted as the primary stakeholder, and the stakeholder who must fulfill the necessary prerequisites of the WMA Regulations and officially move the process along if a WMA is ever to be established. From this official perspective, non-village stakeholders merely help to facilitate the process so as to ensure the exclusive use of the WMA for wildlife and biodiversity conservation and for investment in wildlife resources so that member villages can obtain benefits from the WMA.

The process of creating a WMA formally begins with the approval by a village assembly, at the recommendation of the village council, to officially set aside land for a WMA, which approval is reflected in a certified copy of village assembly meeting minutes.²⁶ The village is then required to establish a Community-Based Organization (CBO) and register it with the Tanzanian government for the purpose of managing the WMA. The village assembly, through the CBO, should then approve a Land Use Plan and a General Management Plan or Resource Management Zone Plan, which include specific biological and socio-

²⁶ A village assembly includes all the adult members (male and female) of the community. A village council is comprised of elected members of the village assembly.

economic data about the land and village, an Environmental Impact Statement, and boundary descriptions of the proposed WMA, all in accordance with the WMA Regulations and applicable land tenure laws. If multiple villages are involved then Joint Land-Use Plans must be prepared and they must all be then submitted to the District government for final approval.

The Land Use Plan must correspond with existing village by-laws for natural resource management which are also approved by the village assembly; if by-laws do not yet exist they must be created. Finally the CBO applies to the Director of Wildlife to become an Authorized Association (AA). If the Director endorses the authorization of the CBO as an AA, he will then forward the application to the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism for approval. If the Minister approves, then s/he issues a Certificate of Authorization declaring the CBO to be an AA and authorizing it to manage wildlife in a particular WMA. Simultaneous with this declaration and authorization, the WMA is gazetted by the Minister. The Director is then, according to the Regulations, expected to grant the AA user rights in the WMA based on the General Management Plan or Resource Management Zone Plan (user rights are *not* automatically granted with the Certificate of Authorization). These user rights include the right to enter into investment agreements with the private sector for wildlife utilization and investment in the WMA (URT 2005: Parts II & IV).

This process, although long and convoluted, appears mostly administrative in nature. And once these administrative tasks are completed, it appears that the village(s) will gain autonomous decision-making power and become the primary beneficiaries. However, this situation is actually different than it looks at first glance. The fact is that establishment of WMAs, and access to the opportunities that come with them, is actually restricted by the §17 of the WMA Regulations to locations previously designated by the Wildlife Division. These locations, called Pilot WMAs, were specifically chosen for their proximity to “core wildlife protected areas” (ibid.: §11.1) and, as a practical matter, WMAs are only allowed in villages which contain portions of land that have historically served as buffer zones for a protected area or are considered natural passages for wildlife. This exercise in delineating land for future WMAs – a process of territorialization that I will discuss further in Chapter 5 – was undertaken by the Wildlife Division with help from the private sector and international conservation NGOs long before any rural villagers knew that they controlled land that is critical to the success of the WMA model. Instead, the fact that village land meets the required criteria for WMA status must first be conveyed to residents, and then they must be educated about the economic potential of their resources and instructed as to how to participate in conservation activities which will allow them to utilize their valuable assets and become the kind of stakeholders the WMA Regulations intended them to be.

Transforming themselves into conservation producers and protectors – those responsabilized individuals I spoke of in my introduction – is not something that villagers can be allowed to attempt on their own. Instead, the engineers of WMA Regulations foresaw that this would be a task for stakeholders with prior experience in this arena. For instance, the Guidelines for Wildlife Management Areas and their accompanying Reference Manual, both of which were provided by the Wildlife Division as “supplemental to the WMA Regulations” (URT 2002: 6),²⁷ simply declare that villages cannot decide whether to establish a WMA until they are “made aware of the importance and cost-benefits of conserving wildlife resources” through “vigorous sensitization” by the Wildlife Division along with other stakeholders (URT 2003: 11). Accordingly, the Guidelines place a great deal of emphasis on initiating, facilitating and training by non-village stakeholders of village stakeholders, targeting “specific community groups, e.g. school children, elders, women, youth, poachers, local leaders, politicians and other influential people” (ibid.: 11). In other words, since rural villages have no experience managing wildlife and WMAs are a new approach to wildlife conservation in Tanzania, local people must be made aware of the value of wildlife resources on

²⁷ Although the Guidelines and the Reference Manual have no legal power on their own, they are referred to several times in the WMA Regulations. The Foreword to the Guidelines states that they were intended to support the Wildlife Policy and “rationalize in practical terms” the WMA Regulations in a more “user-friendly” way, and to “amplify and try to clarify certain matters which are contained in the Regulations” (URT 2002: 6).

village land and they must be shown how they can get involved in conservation in a participatory and lucrative way.

However, even after this enlightenment occurs, villages are not expected or even allowed to implement or manage the WMA on their own. Non-village stakeholders remain collaborative partners throughout the process and continue to have officially described responsibilities after the WMA is gazetted, even as those responsibilities are portrayed as being rather general in nature (URT 2005: Part V & §77). Clearly, the designers of the WMA model anticipated that rural villagers would need to be guided through the process of establishing a WMA step by step, and would need constant monitoring after the fact. Of course, from a practical perspective, it is true that rural villagers often lack the legal and technical skills necessary to fulfill the rather onerous requirements of the WMA Regulations, especially the provisions governing the initial establishment of a WMA. But this potential incapacity is not specifically addressed. Rather the WMA Regulations are written in such a way that villagers and village leaders are presumed to possess the skills needed to follow the steps required to have a WMA after simply being made aware of the value of having one. In this case the general nature of non-village stakeholder responsibilities makes sense: collaborating, coordinating, facilitating, and overseeing are more appropriate activities if a community can follow the law and accomplish community-based conservation on its own.

But following the law and accomplishing the kind of community-based conservation that a WMA entails means that local people must have the ability to negotiate the complexities of the Tanzanian legal system. For example, in addition to the provisions of the WMA Regulations, members of village councils and village assemblies also need to understand their legal rights and responsibilities with respect to land laws and the applicable rules governing tourism and hunting.²⁸ However, Tanzanian laws and regulations are often contradictory and downright confusing. Sweeping powers granted to officials to enforce rules and enact changes in one government sector may actually conflict with rules and changes enacted in another. Moreover, many rural Tanzanians are illiterate and must rely on their leaders for accurate interpretations of laws and regulations and truthful dissemination of information about how those laws and regulations may affect them. Compounding this burden, some laws and regulations are only written in English (although English is an official language, Kiswahili is the national language), and most rural Tanzanians (including village leaders), do not speak or read English, or at least not well enough to decipher legal minutiae. Furthermore, Kiswahili translations of English documents, when available, sometimes differ from the originals in substantial ways. Interestingly, Section 82 of the WMA

²⁸ The Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations 2000 [Revised Edition 2002] and The Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 play a major role in establishing jurisdiction over consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife resources in Tanzania. The Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 and the Land Act No. 4 of 1999 detail Tanzania's land tenure framework at local, district, regional and national levels.

Regulations stipulates that in the event of a conflict of interpretation between the Kiswahili and English versions, the English version prevails.²⁹

In addition to understanding the legal side of WMAs, villager leaders and assemblies must also have the technical capacity to initiate, or at least play a part in assembling, the Land-Use Plan, General Management Plan or Resource Management Zone Plan, the Environmental Impact Statement, WMA Data Sheets, etc., that are required for WMA approval. With respect to the WMA data and forms required to be prepared by a village and submitted to the Director of Wildlife by the village CBO, most are quite technical in nature and assume training of villagers in workshops and seminars that may not have occurred.³⁰ In most cases, to complete the forms required by the WMA Regulations, villages will require professional advice from and collaboration with outside experts, advice that may not always serve the village's best interest. Interestingly, Tanzania's protected areas often lack management plans and the plans that do exist were largely created and undertaken by international conservation NGOs.³¹

²⁹ Although there most certainly are English words and concepts for which no suitable Kiswahili translation exists, our rural informants were quick to imagine that translations are different for other reasons, not the least of which is a deliberate attempt to confuse or mislead the Kiswahili reader.

³⁰ The General Management Plan format (URT 2005: Seventh Schedule) actually makes reference to using a "Logical Framework Approach in analyzing problems and presenting the purpose [and] objective of the WMA and management strategies in a logical manner." It also refers the preparer to the "Consultative Workshop" and "Technical Session" to obtain information needed to complete the Plan. Nowhere in the WMA Regulations or Guidelines are these terms defined, nor is there information given about how to participate in the training described.

³¹ See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the creation of Land Use Plans for two of the villages in the Burunge WMA.

If a village is successful in navigating its way through the administrative and regulatory labyrinth in which WMA gazettement resides, it is still stuck waiting for the Director of Wildlife to grant those all-important user rights before it can proceed with any economic plans it may have. Here it is important to remember that legal ownership and control of *land* in Tanzania is separate from legal ownership and control of *wildlife*. As I have said before, a WMA can only be established on village land and this land remains village property after the WMA is gazetted. So, technically, land management in a WMA is subject to Tanzanian land tenure laws and, theoretically, under the legal control of the village or villages involved.³² The village retains the right to determine exactly how the *land* will be used, and by whom. The right to manage and benefit from wildlife in ways that are most useful to it should logically follow from this. However, as I explained in Chapter 2, wildlife is always an asset of the state and under the specific jurisdiction of the Wildlife Division (WD). Protecting wildlife in a WMA basically means protecting the interests of the WD, whether or not this results in any advantage for a village. Essentially, once a WMA is gazetted and the land is officially off-limits to villagers for subsistence activities, rights to the use of resources on that land essentially disappear, only to reappear under the authority of the WD.

³² The Land Act No. 4 of 1999 (§1(1)(k)(4)) establishes three categories of land: general land, reserved land (the category under which most wildlife management falls), and village land. The Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 (Part IV, §7-8) defines village land and establishes the village council's authority (with village assembly approval) to manage village land and resources (Nshala 2002).

This authority is virtually all-inclusive and seemingly unassailable. Since hunting blocks continue to be allocated by the Director under the Tourist Hunting Regulations no matter where they are located (URT 2002a: Part II), a hunting company can be allocated a hunting block that is located in a WMA and issued hunting permits by the Wildlife Division (with authority granted under the Act), but have no permission from a village (with authority granted under the Village Land Act) to actually establish a hunting camp on that land. Moreover, since hunting companies typically have long-standing relationships with the WD, which has both the legal authority and political clout to force rural villages to comply with its directives, the reality of this kind of inconsistency usually means that villages have no direct legal control over what goes on in a WMA. Conversely, a contract between a village and an investor that existed prior to the establishment of the WMA may be worthless or inoperative if a WD-approved hunting company has rights to a hunting block on village land that overlaps with the land used by the village's investor.³³ With respect to non-hunting activities, under the recently enacted Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulations, 2007, the Director now has the authority to issue permits and collect fees for non-consumptive wildlife utilization activities as well. Non-consumptive wildlife utilization consists of “every activity conducted in game reserves,

³³ This very situation occurred in Minjingu while I was in the field – see Chapter 4 for details.

controlled areas, wildlife management areas and open areas outside Ngorongoro Conservation Area and those under TANAPA,” including but not limited to walking safaris, commercial and non-commercial photographic safaris, game viewing, sport fishing and even educational research (URT 2007: §14).³⁴ These new regulations conveniently filled a gap between the Tourist Hunting Regulations and the WMA Regulations which had allowed villages to independently collect fees for non-consumptive wildlife activities and which had also allowed these activities to occur in a hunting block without Director approval if that block was located in a Wildlife Management Area. The WMA Regulations have always required that prospective investors of any type in a WMA, whether a hunting outfit, photo safari company, or any other sort of economic venture, be approved by the Director (URT 2005: §65.4), and the Director has the power, again at his/her discretion, to withdraw or revoke any investment agreement (*ibid.*: §66.5). Now any activities that involve wildlife in a WMA, including just looking at it, require permission from the Director and payment of substantial and cumulative fees directly to the WD (*ibid.*: Third and Fourth Schedule). Needless to say, since the official terms of the WMA Regulations favor it, the Wildlife Division has every reason to support the implementation of WMAs. WMAs can indeed be a valuable

³⁴ Although the 2007 Regulations are a bit murky in terms of what qualifies as “research and educational activities in non-consumptive wildlife utilization” (§5), I can only imagine that if I wanted to conduct research on WMAs today I would be required to apply for a permit from and pay a fee to the Wildlife Division for that permit, assuming I could even get one considering the controversial nature of my research topic.

tool for conservation of wildlife and economic enhancement – village land used exclusively for wildlife protection and to augment wildlife habitat is the next best thing to a protected area, especially if that protection increases wildlife numbers, helps to guarantee sustainable wildlife utilization, and contributes necessary tourist and hunting fees to the Wildlife Division's bottom line.

Unfortunately, the economic power of WMAs does not appear to be trickling down to the villages that invested their land and future in the promise of prosperity from conservation-oriented, ecotourism-based, wildlife investment activities. Indeed, as I explained earlier in this chapter, villages that decide to demarcate land for a WMA are then at the mercy of the Wildlife Division for access to user rights so they can utilize wildlife inside the WMA, utilization which is critical if they are to have any chance at cashing in on that potential prosperity. Without user rights they cannot negotiate with investors or seek approval of the Director for proposed economic ventures.

Even if a village is awarded user rights and its legal agreement with a WMA investor does meet with the approval of the Director, the WMA Regulations are not clear about where the revenues from these investments actually go, referring the reader to “circulars issued by the Government from time to time” to determine

how benefits should be allocated.³⁵ The WMA Regulations do, however, provide a reminder that benefit sharing “shall adhere to mechanisms of equitable distribution of costs and benefits targeted at economic development and poverty eradication” (URT 2005: §73.1). Tanzania’s Wildlife Policy calls for distribution of revenue and benefits to stakeholders “which considers their relevant roles in different categories of land, the effort invested in conservation of the resource, and the institutional and management costs” (URT 1998: §3.3.9). The Guidelines argue that, in addition to the village and the AA, the Wildlife Division, Tanzania National Parks, Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority, Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute, Tanzanian Wildlife Protection Fund, the Department of Treasury, and District Councils are all “stakeholders to the benefits, revenue and cost sharing in a WMA” (URT 2002: §12.10). And, lest we forget, the village’s investor will also want to make money. Truly, it is difficult to contemplate how a village can actually earn significant amounts of money from a WMA with so many other stakeholders to accommodate.

³⁵ The WMA Regulations do state that the AA is required to direct not less than 50% of its annual gross revenue to member villages of which there can be many. Of the 15 Pilot WMAs, for instance, 3 had 19 or more member villages, and 7 had 6 or more. Of that 50%, not less than 15 % must go toward “resource development reinvestment” (not defined), and not less than 25 % must be used to “strengthen” (also not defined) the Authorized Association (§73.2). Assuming that only the minimum requirements are met for these categories, there is no mention of how the remaining 10% should be spent, nor is there specific direction as to what happens with the other 50% of the gross revenue except that it is absorbed in various administrative overhead costs (ibid.).

To complicate matters even further, some stakeholders are probably less interested in the revenues generated from WMA investment and filtered through multiple layers of government than they are in maintaining or improving their respective status quo. A hunting company that was established in a hunting block before a WMA was gazetted, and which cannot be forced by a village to relinquish its hunting rights, may consider its position more secure if villagers are no longer able to use WMA land for subsistence and the land reverts to a “wilderness” that is better for business. Nearby protected areas gain ready-made additions to protected area land, which often are critical to the health of the protected area and the wildlife and biodiversity within it, without having to go through the messy politics of establishing a new protected area. And conservation NGOs get official proof of conservation success that is signed and sealed by the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism. Whether or not that success is compatible with the short and long-term economic needs of local people is beside the point. Continued donor funding for conservation requires that “real conservation” be achieved. In Tanzania, there is no easier way to realize this than with the official designation of a Wildlife Management Area. Not only does it accomplish conservation objectives, but it demonstrates, however superficially, that rural Tanzanians are “participating” in conservation and easing into a market economy in a way that provides them with opportunities while it protects wildlife. This is, in the end, the *fait accompli* of the

WMA: participation and benefits that do not really interfere with the business of conservation or the business of business.

For villagers on the receiving end of the opportunities available from WMAs, transparency, participation and benefits can be rather elusive even as they are touted as the very essence of this community-based conservation strategy. I have demonstrated that the predefined agendas that gave rise to WMAs, and the legal and administrative frameworks that sustain and strengthen them, effectively render local peoples' involvement cursory and irrelevant. As a result, the needs of these people are often ignored. In fact, their involvement is simply not necessary to maintain the illusion of participation, and the local benefits that do not materialize are simply the cost of doing business. For the villages in my research area, the ideals of fostering 'participation and transparency' in the establishment of the Burunge WMA did not mean that villagers got what they wanted, or even that they understood what they got. It did mean, however, that external stakeholders were able to profit from conservation and, in the process, effectively dispossess the villagers from their land and push them deeper into poverty.

CHAPTER 4

“THERE’S A PLACE WHERE ANIMALS LIVE
AND WE AREN’T ALLOWED TO GO THERE.
IT’S CALLED THE WMA.”³⁶

As I mentioned in my introduction, many people in my research area had been hopeful that the WMA would provide them with much needed benefits. Specifically designed to promote local economic growth, this conservation strategy appeared to offer them unprecedented opportunities. The emergence of these opportunities was directly related to the fact that local people controlled an essential input to WMAs – village land. Because their jurisdiction over this land seemed to be protected by Tanzania’s legal framework, most people in Minjingu village felt that the collective wishes and decisions of the village would always guide how the land was utilized. And since they also understood that wise use of this land was critical for maintaining and improving their livelihoods, they were willing to explore the idea of setting aside some of it to obtain indirect benefits from ecotourism. However, the villagers I spoke with overwhelmingly insisted that this exploration was far from complete and most were still waiting for information about how the WMA would directly help them. As one resident put it “We don’t

³⁶ From Interview 01F Songa Mbele in the village of Minjingu.

hate animals, we know they have benefits but we haven't been educated as to how to reap those benefits" (Interview 19M Kakoi).

Familiarity with and understanding of the details about WMAs often differed from one person to another and from one end of the village to the other. However, by all accounts neither village leaders nor residents ever intended that their land would be carved out and made inaccessible to them. Nevertheless, according to almost everyone I interviewed, this is exactly what happened. Local people had watched as concrete beacons demarcating the boundaries of the WMA were plunked down on village land without their involvement and in locations that were often far from the borders of the conservation area that had been contemplated by the village, sometimes right in the middle of farms. They later discovered that, although their own village assembly meeting minutes reflected that the WMA had not yet been approved, a different set of these minutes *approving* the WMA was on file at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in Dar es Salaam.³⁷ Finally, instead of being positioned to benefit from the WMA, some villagers were

³⁷ While this may appear to be just another example of the sort of corruption we in the West have been taught to expect from African governments and officials, it is important to remember that simply calling it corruption implies an ideal of how things should work, an ideal that just does not exist in most African states (or in the U.S. for that matter – can we say Enron?) and the consequent distortion or falling short of this ideal. Moreover, labeling the creative coping mechanisms that elites and non-elites use to survive and improve their circumstances as nothing but corruption excuses the colonial and post-colonial influences, including neoliberalism, that are ultimately responsible for the conditions that make what Westerners might consider deceitful practices virtually compulsory at every level of Tanzanian society (see Chabal and Daloz 1999). As such, I have adopted a more nuanced view of corruption as an inevitable manifestation of these influences rather than merely a failure to achieve an ideal.

compulsorily displaced from it and others suddenly found themselves living perilously close to wildlife that was regularly causing damage to homes and farms that they simply could not afford. Although, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, residents of the area had been coping with wildlife problems for years, the people I interviewed were nearly unanimous in their belief that the WMA had intensified these problems. As one person who was regularly dealing with destructive elephants observed, “I go to bed rich and wake up poor” (Interview 12M Kakoi). Conditioned as they were to the imposition of external policies by the central government and foreign agencies (“We were told we can’t compete with the government – we should agree to do this”),³⁸ most people were not really *surprised* that they were effectively barred from their own land even though they were struggling to understand how this had actually happened. Leaders and ordinary citizens alike were unquestionably frustrated over the near absence of transparency and participation in a program that was allegedly specifically designed for their direct involvement and benefit. As the following ethnography demonstrates, this confusion and frustration was reflected throughout the village of Minjingu before and after the WMA became a reality. In the end, villagers were left wondering how their needs had been so profoundly ignored even as those people suffering most from the ill effects of the WMA searched for alternate ways to survive on what had

³⁸ From Interview 17M Kakoi in the village of Minjingu.

become for them an even more constrained and more hostile landscape.

“We Are Now a Village Inside a Park!”³⁹

One day in late April, about halfway through the field season, I happened to run into the Minjingu Village Chairman alighting from a bus that had just arrived in the village from Dar es Salaam. Greetings were brief and rushed (which is unusual in Tanzania) and, visibly upset about something, he hurried on his way. By chance, later that day my translator and I happened on his house and, invited in for tea, we asked the Chairman about his trip to Dar. Still clearly distressed, he explained that village leaders had heard rumors earlier that month that the WMA had been approved. Knowing that the village had not given its official sanction, and after their inquiries were rebuffed by District officials, he and the Village Secretary along with two elders had decided to travel to the capital to speak directly with the Director of Wildlife. After several days of getting the run-around at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and the Land Commission,⁴⁰ they finally verified that Minjingu was indeed part of a WMA. They also learned that the Ministry had

³⁹ Comment made by a Minjingu villager in a discussion about the WMA at a village assembly meeting, May 3, 2006.

⁴⁰ In the May 3 village assembly meeting, the Village Chairman described how employees at the Ministry were obviously alerted to the fact that they were on their way and, in his words, “Next thing you know, no one is in the office when we get there.” Committed as they were to ferreting out the truth and with few other options for accomplishing this task, I got the distinct impression that these four gentlemen parked themselves in the Director’s office and refused to budge until they were heard.

on file a copy of Minjingu's August 19, 2003, village assembly meeting minutes which discussed the formation of a village conservation area, and they were shocked to discover that the minutes explicitly authorized the establishment of a WMA in the village. This was a shock for them as the minutes on file in the village office specifically state that villagers refused to approve the WMA plan at that time, but asked for more information about it so they could understand their rights and responsibilities under Tanzanian law in case they decided to go forward with the plan. To add insult to injury, when at long last they were able to meet with the Director of Wildlife about the WMA he told them, "This doesn't belong to you. It belongs to the citizens and I will only listen to them." He then added, "You are in and you are going to have to get yourselves out. But if you refuse [to stay in the WMA], then don't touch any animals."

Alarmed and disheartened that a completely different version of a village legal document had somehow made its way to Dar es Salaam and was now the foundation for Minjingu's participation in the WMA,⁴¹ the Chairman was further exasperated to learn that, while he and the others were in Dar trying to get to the bottom of the WMA rumors, our research team had received an e-mail from the

⁴¹ The surfacing of the pro-WMA minutes explained how approval of the WMA could have occurred administratively, although how these minutes came to exist in the first place caused outrage and dismay among villagers when they were told about it in subsequent village meetings.

IUCN heralding the fact that on March 31, 2006, the Minjingu village conservation area had been officially gazetted as the Burunge WMA – one of the first four WMAs in Tanzania. Attached to the e-mail was the official announcement from the Tanzania Government Gazette, a public document which is supposed to provide time for interested parties to comment on government decisions before they are finalized.⁴² The publication of this announcement was never disclosed to the village of Minjingu and, although the e-mail extolled the success of WMAs as a model for participation and transparency in community-based conservation, it took a long and expensive trip to Tanzania's capital by people who could ill afford it, and an auspiciously timed e-mail to a researcher who just happened to be working in the village, for the people of Minjingu to finally confirm rumors about the WMA. Stunned to discover that the WMA had been officially gazetted and that Minjingu was part of it, and greatly perturbed that village leaders and residents were the last to find out about it ("If people decided this thing then why doesn't anyone know about it?"),⁴³ the Chairman was at a loss as to how to undo what had happened. He was confused about the village's rights and responsibilities and said to me, "We are blind on whose property the WMA is at the end of the day – is it community or Wildlife Division property?" He was also concerned as to what this

⁴² This e-mail was sent to Jim Igoe on or about April 21, 2006, and I learned about the function of the Tanzanian Government Gazette in a conversation with him around that time.

⁴³ The Chairman made this comment at an April 28, 2006, Village Council meeting.

turn of events meant for villagers' continued access to resources that were vital for maintaining local livelihoods.

The sentiments expressed by the Chairman – uncertainty about tenure rights, concern over local access, and frustration over the lack of participation, transparency and even honesty in the creation of the WMA – were echoed by people throughout my research area.⁴⁴ In interview after interview, villagers told me that they were not involved in the formation of the WMA, that no one told them what would happen inside it, that they knew of no benefits coming from it, and that removing people from the area had done more harm than good. In particular, the majority of villagers claimed that since there was no longer a buffer between the village and Tarangire National Park, wildlife had become bolder and was straying into the village far more often causing damage to crops and houses that villagers could ill afford, especially in the parts of the village that bordered the WMA. Indeed, as with most development-oriented programs focusing on the “community,” I quickly discovered that the costs and benefits of the Burunge WMA were not equitably distributed and instead followed clear spatial patterns that were determined by geographic location and the economic, social and political status that can accompany living in a particular place.

⁴⁴ Although there are 5 member villages in the Burunge WMA, my discussion focuses on the villages of Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu and their sub-villages. Information about the methods I used can be found in Appendix A.

Peoples' familiarity with and experience of the WMA was directly influenced by their proximity to it, by distance from the paved road that runs through the northeastern part of the village, and by the opportunities and disadvantages that resulted from these geographic circumstances. The paved road, which was built to more comfortably shuttle tourists from park to park in the northern tourist circuit (see Figure 4.1), is an east-west artery that runs from northeast Tanzania near Kilimanjaro through Arusha, the largest metropolitan area in the region, then west past Manyara Ranch and straight into the tiny commercial center in Minjingu. At the village of Makayuni just east of Minjingu, the paved road intersects with a road that leads north and west to Lake Manyara National Park, Ngorongoro Crater, and eventually Serengeti National Park. At Minjingu's commercial center the paved road connects with the road leading south to the entrance of Tarangire National Park, and then it continues southwest where it ends rather abruptly about a mile and a half later when the pavement on the far side of the village center crumbles (literally) into the dirt road that leads to the District offices in Babati. If you're moving too fast and not paying attention you can get quite a jolt transitioning from the black top of modernity to the potholed reality that is most of the rest of Tanzania, an experience that happened to me several times along this road. This paved road is *the* road in northern Tanzania and the people living nearest to it have much greater access to merchants, transportation, and tourist dollars, not to mention schools for their children and limited medical care,

Figure 4.1 Villages, Roads and Parks in the Burunge Area

than do people living farther away from the road. In the case of Minjingu, farther away from the road meant closer to the WMA and to Tarangire and therefore closer to the attendant negative impacts that go along with living at the bottom of the village and nearer to destructive and dangerous wildlife. Furthermore, living far from the road also meant being excluded from decisions and processes that ultimately had drastic impacts on some villagers' ability to survive.

You can see from Figure 4.1 that Minjingu butts up against the northeast corner of Tarangire National Park and extends northward all the way to Lake Manyara National Park. As I explained in Chapter 2, the livelihood options of people in this area are severely limited and the majority of villagers in Minjingu are farmers who also do some livestock-keeping. Pastoralists are scattered throughout the village, especially on the northwest side of the paved road where the alkaline nature of the soil close to Lake Manyara makes farming all but impossible. I encountered several villagers living close to the road who were primarily shopkeepers, but they almost always had small farms somewhere else in the village that supplemented their meager incomes. Where the population was more crowded near the road and available farmland more constrained, informants often disclosed that they were forced to farm plots far away from their homes, or hire someone else to farm for them, to make ends meet. Indeed, there are farms all the way down to the bottom of the village and prior to the gazettement of the WMA there were farms all the way down to the national park.

The further you go from the paved road the more hostile the environment becomes, and the visibly poorer people are.⁴⁵ There are houses where you'd least expect to find them – often not on clear paths or dirt roads, seemingly far from reliable water sources, and definitely far from the attention paid (however limited that may have been) to the parts of the village that sit right next to the road. As I worked ever closer to the WMA, I became very conscious of the fact that I needed to pay attention to my surroundings and watch out for potentially dangerous wildlife. Nevertheless, people popped out of the bush in places where it seemed they could not possibly survive – places where my instincts told me it was not safe to live. But people with few alternatives, especially those who have been displaced from other regions or from the nearby protected areas and forced to live wherever they can find available land, can and will find ways to live and farm almost anywhere – even in places that were completely inhospitable and downright frightening to me. Furthermore, because these people are no longer rooted in place and spatial disconnection has become an everyday reality for them, they are far more likely to be displaced again and to even harsher areas.

I mentioned in a footnote to Chapter 2 that my field notes are full of stories about crops being eaten or trampled by wildlife and houses being destroyed by

⁴⁵ Although I had little exposure to the 3rd World before I went to Tanzania, I could still recognize that there were different degrees of poverty depending on where you were and to whom you were speaking. In particular, the Barabaig pastoralists that we stumbled upon were just barely able to eke out a living on the tiny patches of grazing land that were becoming ever more scattered and far-flung. Their degree of poverty was, I think, life-threateningly severe.

elephants looking for stored foodstuffs. Nearly everyone I spoke with had experienced close encounters with wildlife, or else knew someone nearby who had:

I had 48 bags of corn. He [the elephant] ripped off the door and started eating maize. Then he came back the next day and knocked down the whole house. He ate three bags of corn and ruined my house. After that I decided to sell the corn before he finished my corn and my house. (Interview 08M Olevolos)

The elephant comes into the kraal...then he puts up his trunk and smells. From that he knows which houses have people and which do not. He knows which houses have corn and which do not. He goes to the house with the corn and he rips off the roof. Then he begins to take out the bags of corn. If there are 10 he makes sure that he gets all 10. Then he rips them all open and he eats everything inside. At first elephants went into farms, and they realized that it tasted good. Then they smelled the corn that was drying outside people's houses and they ate that. Then they realized that there was corn inside people's houses and they ate all that. (Interview 05M Kakoï)

At least the zebras leave something for us, but the elephants take it all. Two elephants can finish 5 acres of corn in a night. They come from the *bwawa* [dam or water hole], they come up the road and look for the fields with the corn in it, and they know which ones they are. (Interview 06M Kakoï)

When we moved here in 1988 we never heard [of] elephants breaking into people's houses. Nowadays you have to guard your crops when they're in the field. You have to guard them while they are drying outside your house. Even when you take them in the house you are not certain enough to say "this is my food." (Interview 06F Songa Mbele)

Far and away most of the people who had *not* been directly affected by wildlife, in other words people who had not suffered personal damage to crops or their property, lived in areas closest to the paved road:

People to the south of here don't sleep at night for all the elephants; more problems for people on the periphery [of the village]. (Interview 21F Songa Mbele)

No house breaking over here – close to the Park and WMA in the south are those problems. Elephants follow forest/WMA back and forth to the Lake. No real problems here. (Interview 07M Almasi)

People who live in Makao Mapaya, they don't have the same kinds of elephant problems as us, so they don't really understand what kinds of problems we have here. The people who live near the road wanted the thing [the WMA] because we are the fence that protects [them] from the animals. (Interview 02M Olevolos)

I have not had a house broken into; bad problem with sub-villages near to Park. (Interview 07M Makao Mapaya)

And far and away most of the people living closest to the WMA and Tarangire, where wild animals roam free, spent a disproportionate amount of their time guarding their farms against intrusions by wildlife:

In the past only Francolin birds ate seeds after planting. Today wildlife [zebras, wildebeest] eat crops; elephants even go to the extent of breaking into houses. I have them in my fields almost every year – they know exactly when crops are ripe, especially this farm closer to the [Tarangire] River – my other farms are more in the center of the village. If I don't sleep in my farm the elephants will eat the whole thing – [they] always get at least a quarter. (Interview 17M Kakoi)

Between 1970 and 1978 there was very little crop damage, but now it's like we are raising them [wildlife] as our own children. (Interview 18M Olevolos)

There are zebra, but if you chase them off they run away. But if it's an elephant you are [the] one who will get chased off – not him. The elephants have become habituated to us. We used to hit a piece of metal and he would run away. Now if we hit a piece of metal he knows that there is something here to eat and he comes right over. (Interview 05M Kakoi)

Animals can come into your farm at night and when you wake up in the morning all that's left to do is to pick up whatever you can from the ground. (Interview 06F Songa Mbele)

Elephants have eaten my farm; can't do anything about it except try to chase them away. (Interview 12M Kakoi)

More importantly for this discussion, the people who lived farthest from the village center and who were experiencing the majority of wildlife-related problems were also those who appeared to have been the least involved in the creation of the WMA. As a practical matter, people living nearest the village center probably had more opportunities to learn about the meetings scheduled to discuss the WMA and, for reasons of distance and the time involved in traveling on foot from one place to another, more opportunities to actually attend the meetings in person. Conversely, interviewees at the bottom of the village indicated that although they sometimes knew that meetings were scheduled, attending these meetings in person was often far beyond what they could manage. As a result, they were frequently uninformed or misinformed about the positive or negative impacts a WMA could have on their lives. A man in the sub-village of Kakoi which borders the WMA put it like this, "There were meetings at the village office, but we didn't go because it was too far away. I don't have a lot of time to go to their meetings. So I don't know what the WMA is really supposed to do for us" (Interview 06M Kakoi). In addition, several informants in the bottommost parts of the village flat told me that they were not aware of any meetings about the WMA:

I know there's something over there; never invited to any meetings about it. (Interview 13M Kakoi)

I was never invited [to] any meeting. I heard about it from other herders. When we met at the water, people told me – this isn't our *eneo* [area/space] anymore. (Interview 05M Olevolos)

We heard about the WMA, never invited to meetings. Our husbands probably went. (Interview 09F Almasi)

Those people who were dealing with WMA did not involve the people in Mbulungu about the issue of WMA. (Interview 02M Mdori Evictee)

Many people believed that village leaders were less concerned with the needs of people outside the village center than with the needs of people living nearer the village center. As one person in a group of men I interviewed in the sub-village of Almasi observed, "The village government may not consider [our] concerns. Sub-village chairmen are with communities. Village government is less involved with communities" (Interview 02M Almasi). Like most rural communities in Tanzania, Minjingu encompasses a number of sub-villages: Kakoi, Songa Mbele, Olevolos, Almasi, and Makao Mapaya. Each has its own elected Chairman, just as leaders are elected at the village level, and it is to these individuals that many residents turn to for government news and updates that affect them.⁴⁶ Many people in the sub-villages felt that the disparity in knowledge about the WMA was due to or at least compounded by the fact that information

⁴⁶ People also relied on their neighborhood *balazi* to provide them with news from the various levels of government. Under single party rule, this person had been responsible for keeping tabs on what were essentially political cells comprised of 10 household units. This function technically went away with the institution of a multi-party system in Tanzania in 1992 (URT 2008a) but many interviewees still referred to their *balazi* as a person who "represents 10 households on the village assembly – this person should give and take information" (Interview 02M Almasi).

disseminated in village meetings sometimes did not make its way to the sub-village Chairman much less the rest of the sub-village. Indeed, the Chairman of Songa Mbele told me, “In the first meeting about a conservation area they promised to meet with everyone before the beacons were put in, then [they] just put them in – didn’t consult with sub-village leaders at all” (Interview 10M Songa Mbele). Moreover, many people throughout the village recognized that the District officials who were involved with the WMA plan, and who are not popularly elected but instead are appointed by the central government, were not beholden to villager opinion as to whether or not the WMA was a good idea for their village.

As the field season progressed and the number of interviews began to mount, it became clear that the people of Minjingu were not all privy to the same information regarding the WMA, nor did they suffer equal costs or receive equal benefits from its creation. It also became clear that despite these intra-village differences, the vision of prosperity inherent in the WMA concept succeeded in achieving what the African Wildlife Foundation had been unable to accomplish for decades – convincing at least some inhabitants of the Tarangire area that it was in their best interest to set aside land for conservation and stay out of the way of wildlife. To be sure, it is far easier to convince residents of a key conservation landscape that they should set aside land for environmental protection, and for the economic ventures that can result from this protection, if those residents are not dependent on that landscape for their very survival. Certainly villagers living

nearest the paved road were least likely to suffer ill effects from diminished access to natural resources and most likely to benefit from the economic opportunities that WMAs are supposed to produce. Likewise, they were more accessible and so more likely to be part of “the community” that proponents of the Burunge WMA were required to produce and include. Yet, I came to realize that even when villagers supported the idea of a WMA, they were never completely informed as to how this sort of endorsement might actually play out, especially when non-village interest groups in the WMA had their own agendas to advance.

Conservation and the Community of Minjingu

As I described in Chapter 2, since the 1990’s there had been numerous meetings facilitated by AWF and Babati District officials involving village leaders and other members of the Minjingu community with respect to safeguarding wildlife in the area and maintaining viable migration routes between Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks. Villagers involved in these meetings reported that the central theme had always involved setting aside village land for wildlife and biodiversity conservation. Promotion of the WMA concept had been going on for several years, albeit usually only among a select group of local officials and villagers:

There was a seminar, but only people from the village government went, not regular villagers. (Interview 12M Songa Mbele)

We heard that people were going to seminars, but they didn't explain anything to us when they came back. The village leaders and their wives went to the seminar. (Interview 03M Kakoi)

We weren't consulted when area was made – just a few people in village office were involved. We're still confused about it – not involved in it. (Interview 19M Kakoi)

District officials and AWF had, predictably, touted the economic benefits of having investors in the village WMA and the need to protect wildlife so as to attract tourists and generate revenue for village projects:

One of main things we were told is that the conservation area is for the villagers. Village will take care of it. Investor – area can be for one of those. The conservation area is for the benefit of the village no matter who invests in it – for our children's future. (Interview 23M Songa Mbele)

I knew that what was expected from WMA was that money comes back to the village from photographic investors and from people hunting there. (Interview 10M Olevolos)

I was told at the meeting that established the WMA [that it could be used for] camps for money to be generated. Camps will pay fees to village government and money is used for village projects like building schools. (Interview 04M Almasi)

They told us that if we set that area aside that we could get an investor and that would help us. (Interview 04M Kakoi)

I know about WMA – area given by village government...heard from other villagers there was a land use plan – livestock grazing permitted, investor camps are permitted there to make money, money supposed to be used to build schools, administrative costs, etc. (Interview 01M Almasi)

AWF – [told] the villagers that we need this area – Mbulungu – to protect and conserve wildlife for your benefits, i.e., you will be selling wild animals.⁴⁷ (Interview 01M Mdori Evictee)

⁴⁷ Many informants identified parts of the area encompassed by the WMA as Mbulungu.

These efforts dovetailed nicely with MKUKUTA directives to promote community based ecotourism schemes capitalizing on Tanzania's abundant natural attractions. In my introduction I explained that MKUKUTA, Tanzania's current poverty reduction strategy, specifically recognizes the value of wildlife and conservation ventures in contributing to the country's sustainable development. Accordingly, it calls on all stakeholders to collaborate in strategies that will conserve biodiversity while creating opportunities for economic activities that will help to alleviate rural poverty.⁴⁸ WMAs, with their emphasis on collaboration, local participation and economic growth, are exactly the type of strategy that MKUKUTA planners had in mind.

According to villagers, the area in question, which loops west from the southern side of the village all the way north to Lake Manyara (see Figure 2.2), has historically been what they termed a forest reserve that could also be used for livestock grazing, gathering firewood, and collecting reeds for basket weaving, an important source of cash income for many villagers:

The area beyond the beacons and before the Park is a future farming area for children. [We] can collect dry wood, no cutting of trees – that's restricted by the village government.⁴⁹ (Interview 14F Olevolos)

⁴⁸ However, MKUKUTA fails to acknowledge that individual citizens will experience tremendous difficulties transitioning from a land-based economy to a market-based economy in a place where no viable market-based industries, other than tourism, exist. Even tourism, with a long history of hiring people from other countries like Kenya and South Africa, offers few opportunities for rural citizens and would be hard pressed to generate enough local cash to sustain the populations currently surviving on subsistence-based livelihoods.

⁴⁹ Villagers also referred to these beacons as drums or tins.

A place you can't cut trees, a place you can graze livestock, no firewood gathering allowed. (Interview 09F Olevolos)

During the dry season we graze in the forest.⁵⁰ (Interview 08M Almasi)

Conservation area is good – if trees are cut there won't be any water and no animals. Also, there's reserve pasture in there we can use if there's a bad year. (Interview 11F Songa Mbele)

They put in the beacons in 2000, but even before that it was called *hifadhi* [reserve]. (Interview 03M Olevolos)

As indicated in the first quote above, most villagers also thought of the area as a reserve for farming in the event that land grew scarce in the village and young families needed room to grow. In fact, villagers were already living and farming in the proposed conservation area:

There were people in the WMA all the way to Mdori. (Interview 10M Almasi)

I lived for 7 years in Mbulungu – given a piece of land – 10 acres by the village government. (Interview 06M Almasi Evictee)

I came here to Minjingu in 1996 and went to Mbulungu where I was given a *shamba* [farm] by the Village Secretary. (Interview 07M Almasi Evictee)

I moved from Manyara Ranch to Mbulungu, met a few people there and joined them and [we] became 56 people. Those people they settled as the village and they elected their leaders. Majority of people in Mbulungu were [from] different tribes from Tanzania, such as Wagogo, Wafipi, Wanyatum, Wanyeremba, and Warusha, and were neighbors.⁵¹ (Interview 12M Mdori Evictee)

⁵⁰ The “forest” is the wooded area between the village and Tarangire, in other words the WMA.

⁵¹ Another interviewee identified 66 people and their families who lived in Mbulungu when it became the WMA.

Before the conservation area, I had a farm there a few years ago...my husband found the land – got it for the future for their sons. My husband chopped trees and planted sisal, had not planted yet; had about 100 acres. There were people farming in the conservation area – taken out and put in a very small place – Vilima Vitatu. (Interview 15F Songa Mbele)

As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, by all accounts the citizens of Minjingu, both leaders and residents, never intended to restrict any part of village land to a single use, nor did they intend to completely bar villagers from access to that land or its resources. They had already taken steps toward sustainable management of village land, and in fact the Minjingu Village By-Laws for Development Activities prominently make mention of the need for protecting water sources and prohibiting tree-cutting or burning of forest without a permit, and the charge of every resident to farm and graze livestock responsibly (MVC 2005, §10-13). There is no mention of a WMA or of a conservation area per se. In our discussions with villagers, it was clear that although they were sometimes leery of just how beneficial wildlife could really be for them, they understood perfectly the need for environmental management and they were often miffed by what they perceived to be a misconception on the part of outsiders as to their inability to perform this task. As one person living near the WMA put it, “they [AWF] said, also let’s not cut trees here. And we were surprised because we take care of our trees already and we don’t need lessons in that department” (Interview 08M Olevolos). Then again, local ideas about sustainable land management are bound to be different from the kinds of sustainable development initiatives that can be

found in the agendas of international conservation NGOs like AWF. Moreover, the goals of a Minjingu environmental management plan probably also fail to fall within the larger development profile envisioned by those for whom the area presents an ideal investment climate.

Even though most villagers understood the importance of protecting their natural resources, many people sensed that the act of demarcating land specifically for conservation was tantamount to losing the land completely:

If area becomes a WMA, then Division of Wildlife controls it and can charge a 300,000 TSH fine if anyone is caught doing things on land other than investor activities from which we receive very little. Basically land becomes Division of Wildlife land; they manage, they collect fines and keep [fines], villagers have to stay away completely. (Interview with Minjingu Village Chairman and Executive Secretary, April 25, 2006)

It cuts across people's farms and only leaves little pieces of farms. They put drums in the ground and if you go on the other side of those drums you get arrested. (Interview 06F Songa Mbele)

TANAPA is patrolling now and restricting grazing. WMA is more like it belongs to TANAPA than village – like an extension [of the Park]. (Interview 18M Kako)

We think that the government took this land, but we as *jamilii* [community] can't do anything about it. We think it is for their livestock, which is wildlife. (Interview 06 Olevolos)

Furthermore, questions concerning the value that could be brought by investors, versus the costs of relinquishing village land and making it unavailable for other uses, had yet to be answered:

I personally haven't seen any benefit from the WMA. I really don't know how community conservation could benefit us. (Interview 01F Songa Mbele)

We don't know what the objective of the conservation area was to begin with – don't know if it's accomplished what it set out to do – just know we get no benefits and we pay a cost in lost farms. Farms are in the middle now – elephants can come from all sides. (Interview 17F Songa Mbele)

We appreciate the importance of the environment. We live here, we already protect the environment. Problem is that things were promised to us if we set this land aside, but those things have not happened. There are investors down there, but the income they make is just for them. (Interview 16M Songa Mbele)

Minjingu and the Practical Realities of Participatory Conservation

According to villager accounts, and in spite of this confusion and tension, the District formed a CBO on the village's behalf and then identified and recommended to the village the most appropriate citizens to be members of it. These citizens were taken to a hotel in the city of Arusha in 2003 to attend an AWF-sponsored seminar designed to explain the doctrine and procedures of a WMA. Later, these villagers did acknowledge to us and to their fellow citizens that they had participated in this and other seminars, but they claimed that they never really understood what was being discussed. These claims seem credible given that the 2003 workshop was conducted in English, even though village representatives did not speak English. Several informants said the workshop was confusing and, because of the presence of district and parliament officials and academics, they felt

intimidated and compelled to remain silent. Moreover, the CBO participants claimed that they did not comprehend the consequences of forming a WMA in the village or how a WMA differed from the forest reserve the village already had. Former village leaders made similar assertions, maintaining that the plan for the proposed conservation area was always presented as part of a village *land use plan*, not a *WMA plan*:

In 1995 we had a village meeting to make a village land use plan – road, shops, farms, pasture, and forest. And we made the appropriate by-laws. We didn't know about any of this WMA stuff. We set that land aside as a forest reserve and that's how it should be...A lot of stuff has been done in our name, but none of us understands what has happened. We've created a *boma* of people, which is completely surrounded by animals. (April 28, 2006 Village Council Meeting)

In this village we had seminars about forest reserves. But I never understood that it was going to be a WMA. (Former Ward Councilor and CBO member at the May 3, 2006 Minjingu Village Assembly Meeting)

The people from CBO didn't know what was going on. A few people passed all this; not in the way it was meant to be passed. (May 3, 2006 Special Minjingu Committee Meeting)

The plan that was presented as a village land use plan is not a village land use plan, it's a WMA plan. The English plan has a lot of details about WMAs, but not the Swahili plan. (April 28, 2006 Village Council Meeting)

The Minjingu village land use plan, which is formally titled *Participatory Land Use Management Plan of Community-Based Wildlife Management Area (CWMA) Programme – Minjingu Village, Babati District, Manyara* (hereafter, the “LUP”), was actually prepared by AWF with input from District officials. In it there is an account of how “broad-based participation” by villagers helped

determine a zone from within the village that would be for “Community-Based Wildlife Management Area purposes,” an area that just happened to “encompass the entire area which is normally used as passage by wildlife when migrating to and from the two national parks” – Tarangire and Lake Manyara (AWF 2004: §6.3). The LUP also discusses village by-laws that were prepared to “guard and guide the agreements arrived [at] by the whole village” (ibid.: §7.3), by-laws that the village has no record of.⁵² Ultimately, the LUP set aside 3,747 HA for tourist hunting, tourist photography and video-shooting, camping sites, and tourist hotels in the WMA – approximately 16 per cent of total village land area (ibid.: §6.5).⁵³ The remaining village land was earmarked for other uses, including farming and pasture land, and a forest reserve area (ibid.: §6.4).

It is important to note that both English and Kiswahili versions of the Minjingu LUP were prepared by AWF. My translator and I spent several hours comparing these versions word for word and we discovered some interesting irregularities between them.⁵⁴ The first page of the English version, a page that is missing in the Kiswahili version, is sub-titled “This Document in Brief” and it explains that the LUP is divided into two parts. Part One is the “Project Proposal”

⁵² The only by-laws the village has on file are the By-Laws for Development Activities described earlier in this chapter.

⁵³ The neighboring village of Vilima Vitatu, one of the other 4 villages included in this WMA, lost even more land: 12,830 HA out of a total of 19,800 HA, almost 65 per cent of total land area in that village (AWF 2004: Executive Summary).

⁵⁴ There are also inconsistencies between the English and Kiswahili versions of the WMA Regulations.

which is supposed to provide “an overview of the general concept that AWF had in mind which led to it funding and facilitating the entire project” (AWF 2004: i). Part Two “is comprised of the planning process of each individual village out of those 5 villages which AWF earmarked as CWMA (Community Wildlife Management Area) pilot project” (ibid.). As you read through Part One you quickly realize that this section was written far in advance of any village involvement. It appears to be geared solely toward convincing AWF’s donors of the viability of the CWMA plan as it relates to the organization’s PLUM (Participatory Land Use Management) mode of approach and its goals of achieving sustainable ecosystem development in the Burunge area (AWF 2004), all in a sort of past-tense fashion. In other words, it talks about the WMA (or the PLUM Project as it is most often defined in this document) as if it was already a done deal, and the process of actually gaining village approval, formal endorsement by the Director, and a Certificate of Authorization from the Minister were merely administrative formalities. The Kiswahili version, the only version that the CBO members, the leaders of Minjingu, or anyone in the village assembly could read and understand, merely discusses use of the land in the village as that was determined by the “work group” and “blessed” by the village assembly. Part One does not exist.

Part Two relates AWF’s PLUM Project to the village of Minjingu, making specific references to the CWMA as “the project.” The word “project” is used

repeatedly throughout this section, as it is in Part One. Consequently, it is difficult to think of this document as a self-governing land use plan that has any kind of organic connection to the village. Instead, with its constant references to capacity building, obstacles and (my personal favorite) resistance to change, it is quite clear that the villagers of Minjingu are as much “the project” as the land on which the “the project” was supposed to reside – land which they legally controlled. This sort of focus on local education and attitude changing is not so surprising given the ongoing efforts of AWF to convince residents of the Tarangire area that they needed to rethink their relationship with their land (see Chapter 2). However, my point is that this LUP is less a local endeavor to manage the village’s natural resources than an external endeavor to manage the village. In other words, rather than Minjingu’s Land Use Plan creating a legal space, in a geographic sense, for the PLUM Project (i.e. the WMA) to exist, the PLUM Project actually created a legal need for the Land Use Plan. Therefore, whatever villager participation there may have been in the development of the LUP was irrelevant since the acceptance and execution of this document by the representatives from Minjingu was merely a required administrative step in the discharge of a larger “project” that was already well underway.

Even so, §6.1 of the LUP states that “after a series of capacity-building meetings with different stakeholders of the project (i.e. village community, AWF officials, National Parks officials and District authority interdisciplinary staffs)

consensus on [the] Minjingu Land Use Plan was reached.” Then, after land parcels were earmarked for the project, “the proposal was tabled before the whole village assembly meeting where it got all the blessings required” (AWF 2004: 30). Finally, even though village leaders and residents believed, and village council and assembly meeting minutes confirmed, that plans for a WMA were still being explored, concrete beacons were situated on village land to demarcate the boundaries of the soon-to-be conservation area. According to the majority of our interviewees, placement of those beacons was often in areas far from those discussed in the meetings and, as I mentioned earlier, sometimes right in the middle of farms:

In 1994 they [District Game Officer] began to come here and educate people. At first they deceived us. They said it would be on the other side of the *korongo* [ravine, channel]. Then after we agreed they put the beacons in, and it was on this side. (Interview 03M Olevolos)

Villagers told district and village leaders that they’d put in beacons with them – this didn’t happen. Instead, beacons just appeared – one was inside my farm. I dug it up, took it ½ kilometer to where I thought it should be. [When] people came to look for beacon, I told them they put it in the wrong place so I dug it up.⁵⁵ (Interview 12M Songa Mbele)

My farm goes right up to the beacons. Surprised to see beacons appear; car with no markings. When questioned, [workers] said they were putting up beacons. Asked if they could be moved to the other side of the [Tarangire] River so we’d have grazing room, told no this was where they were told to put them. [We] should have been the ones putting in the beacons, not outsiders. (Interview 19M Kakoi)

⁵⁵ This villager was arrested for moving the beacon, thrown in jail for a day, fined 50,000 TSH, and forced to put the beacon back where it had originally been placed.

Villagers are mad that beacons were put in places that weren't agreed to – agreed to straight lines [baobab to baobab, etc.]. Instead [there are] jagged lines – think maybe it was an attempt to just get more land for conservation area. (Interview 13M Songa Mbele)

One interviewee described how villagers dug up a beacon that they believed was deliberately placed in the wrong location and, after realizing that they could not lift it, peeled off the metal band containing its identifying number and turned it on its side. She also said that villagers dug up another beacon and managed to heave that one some distance into the Tarangire River (Interview 17F Songa Mbele).

Although the Minjingu LUP states that “the relevant working group from AWF, National Park and relevant district authorities trekked along the village boundaries [and identified] reference points for future demarcation of [the] Community-Based Wildlife Management Area” (AWF 2004: §6.2), villagers had conflicting stories about who was responsible for placing the beacons. However, most informants agreed that non-villagers were in charge of this process and there was little that villagers could do to stop it:

No one from the village was involved in putting in the beacons. A team from the District came and put in the beacons. (Interview 05M Kakoï)

Villagers said ok, but let's put beacons up together so they won't interfere with established settlements. Next thing we knew TANAPA people were putting up the beacons without them. At the same time, a white Land Cruiser with AWF logo on the side went with the TANAPA car to put beacons up. (Interview 17M Kakoï)

As I remember, it was the people from Tarangire who put in those beacons. (Interview 09 Songa Mbele)

Beacons put up by District Wildlife Officer, Village Chairman, Village Secretary and Ward Councilor – [they] determined where they went. (Interview 13M Songa Mbele)

Beacons put in with only a few leaders involvement, not with the whole community's involvement. (Interview 16M Songa Mbele)

People from AWF [put the beacons in]. AWF had a meeting about where they should put the beacons, but everyone boycotted it so they [AWF] went out and put the beacons up. (Interview 11F Songa Mbele)

By far the majority of villagers in all parts of Minjingu resented the fact that the placement of the beacons demarcating the village conservation area did not follow the borders that had been talked about in village meetings. Furthermore, they were angry that the act of delineating a village conservation area seemed to mean that now they were restricted from land they should, as villagers, still be able to use:

When the WMA started, we heard it belonged to the AWF. (Interview 02M & 03M Songa Mbele/Mbulungu)

We've probably been cheated – people had farms down there – I had 32 acres that I lost. Not like village land anymore – I guess we were cheated. No farming, no grazing – land is [in] the hands of the government. (Interview 12M Olevolos)

When the conservation area was first discussed, the idea was that Tarangire River would be the dividing line, plus main highway would be dividing line, rest would be village. This is what the village wanted, but people promoting the idea said this wouldn't work – needed a wider corridor, even though the villagers said elephants were already going through farms and they could deal with that. So, agreed to move beyond rivers in straight lines. Ultimately this wasn't done either; conservation area took even more land into village. (Interview 13M Songa Mbele)

They came in and put in the beacons. They said, "On the other side of this beacon is no longer yours. You can herd your livestock in here, but otherwise you'd better stay on the other side." We still haven't seen a

benefit. If someone takes something from you and promises something in return, then you expect to see that thing someday. Up till now, all they've given us is [those] beacons sticking in the ground over there. (Interview 04F Olevolos)

To me it looks like the land doesn't belong to the village anymore because there were people living inside and they were moved out. (Interview 08M Kakoi)

When asked what the beacons mean: "You get arrested by village government if you get on the other side." (Interview 08M Almasi)

One informant who identified herself as a former village councilwoman said she had resigned her office when the beacons started going in. She said that people began to accuse her of being in cahoots with outsiders who were pushing for the conservation area and "selling the land in the conservation area."⁵⁶ She told us later that she thought we were there to bribe the old men sitting on her porch into giving us information so we could take more land for the conservation area.⁵⁷ Although she was adamant that Minjingu villagers all knew that land was being set aside for conservation – "we all agreed to do the management area, no one should be complaining now" – she also admitted, when asked about the money coming from the WMA, that things had not really worked out as people were led to believe they would: "There should be lots of services – there are none. None coming to the village, no one knows where it's going – no hospitals, no schools. If this is really a

⁵⁶ This woman was extremely suspicious of us, actually positioning herself about 15 feet away from us the entire time we talked.

⁵⁷ Actually, she also said the old guys were stupid, so she came to intercede. She clarified this by saying, "In my experience, land is taken away because people are illiterate. People come from outside and ask them to sign something, that's how they lose their land."

reserve it has to be administered as such, animals should be guarded; benefits should go to the village. Now it's called a reserve, but that's not really what it is. No one benefits from it now; it's just a big, empty area now."

While this woman was clearly better off than most people we encountered (after all, she had a porch), she was also clearly disgusted with how the process of establishing and managing the WMA had unfolded saying "if things continue this way without clear laws we'll wind up selling our whole country without even knowing what we got for it." Finally, she ended the interview by telling us that she "believes people who started the conservation area will ultimately fail. It's cursed because people worked hard to prepare farms over there and the farms were taken away."

Displacement for Conservation

As it turned out, we were able to locate and interview 23 of the people who had been living and farming in the forest reserve and who had subsequently lost those farms and been forced to leave when the beacons were placed. These informants had been moved to the sub-villages of Almasi and Mdori⁵⁸ and they were able to collectively identify at least 66 separate households that had been

⁵⁸ Mdori is a sub-village of Vilima Vitatu, a neighboring community.

evicted from the WMA area, in some cases forcibly, and scattered throughout northern Tanzania. According to our informants, these 66 households would have included approximately 200-250 family members, a range which is not implausible (and it is probably too small a range) considering the average size of a rural household in Tanzania. The evictees were given little direction as to where they should go and little assistance in replacing the farmland they had lost. When they were given farmland, and many were not, it was neither comparable to what they had lost nor enough to fulfill their needs and the needs of their families:

The village government did not tell us where to go. They just removed the people from WMA and brought them to this area [Almasi] like *wakimbizi* [refugees]. (Interview 03F Almasi Evictee)

We were told to move ourselves otherwise the government will use force to remove us. The evicted people were to find themselves where to go without any assistance from the village. (Interview 01M Almasi evictee)

The village government had tried to allocate evicted people just a plot to live but not even good for cultivation. (Interview 02M Almasi evictee)

The people within the village did not support the village government and its partners [the District Game Officer] on the issue of removing people from WMA. Instead they – village – asked, “Where are [you] going to put these people from WMA?” (Interview 06M Almasi evictee)

People from WMA were to be given a place to live in the villages, [but] no place was prepared for those people. (Interview 01M Mdori evictees)

They did not given enough land to farm and the small land people were given was very salty, not good [for] agriculture activities. That is why most of people sold their *shamba* [farm] here in Almasi, went to the other places like Mto wa Mbu to farm there. (Interview 09M Almasi evictee)

Mbulungu was very fertile; you can grow crops and have enough yields so you can send the children to school. Here [in] Mdori is a dry area not suitable for growing crops and now we are not able to send children to school. We do not have any things to sell and buy materials when they are needed in the school. (Interview 04M Mdori evictee)

The people who got kicked out of the WMA got split up. Some moved here, others moved to Almasi. Others moved to Magara and Kiteto. When we moved out we were told to go to the village office to be allocated a new area of land. When we got to the village office, however, they told us that there were no plots left. We asked where we should go. They told us to go back to where we came from in the first place. (Interview 05M Songa Mbele)

It is important to note that this process of displacement for WMAs is not unique to a few people in one small community; in fact it has been documented all over Tanzania (NORAD 2007). Certainly villagers throughout Minjingu knew about these evictions and many of these people had lost land in the WMA themselves:

They drew the borders and the people who lived in the bush over there came to live here. (Interview 01F Songa Mbele)

People were living there, moved into interior [of] village. Some people complained – were not happy – evicted and lost farms. Other people felt threatened – next time it could be us who gets moved. It's a loss – people have already lost farms and it might happen to me too. People who lost farms have been taken back to poverty. (Interview 21F Songa Mbele)

People were evicted and moved out across the *korongo* [river channel] and settled on the other side; couldn't go anywhere else in Minjingu because it was already filled up. (Interview 06M Almasi)

I heard that people were evicted and brought to this side of the beacons. (Interview 06M Makao Mapaya)

Mbulungu – they don't have any place to live. An entire sub-village...they live off itinerant labor. (Interview 03M Olevolos)

People were moved from WMA, farms burned, moved from Mbulungu, farms abolished. (Interview 13M Olevolos)

And despite official claims that a WMA is the very essence of transparency and participation, only four of the 23 evictees that we interviewed, one of whom was a former village chairman, said that people in the proposed conservation area were given information about the WMA before it was turned into a WMA. One person was told, when he questioned why he had to move, “Be quiet, the government is doing its work here” (Interview 02M and 03M Songa Mbele/Mbulungu). All the other interviewees maintained that they first learned they had to move at the meeting where they were told to get out, or else they learned it when officials showed up at their houses to make them move. And move them they did:

Force has been used to remove us, and we were told that you must move whether you like or not. They broke the houses of the people in the WMA to make sure people moved. (Interview 07M Mdori Evictee)

Third time those came again trying to remove people in WMA area and people refused to go out of WMA area and this time they used force to remove them and some people were arrested who refused to get out. (Interview 02M Almasi Evictee)

They broke the houses of the people in WMA to make sure people move. The last day when the District Commissioner came, told them, “Do you see this soldier? Next time when I come back I will be like them and we will move you by power.” They were given a deadline – one month to move. (Interview 07M Mdori evictee)

Mekokacha came with a car and passed through the field and *kukanyaga mazao shambani* [tread on their farms]. Many people left their crops in the

fields and houses, whereby Mekokacha said “What kind of house is this? It is like a *choo* [latrine].”⁵⁹ (Interview 04M Almasi evictee)

The official from Babati came with a gun and chased them as wild pig. The man was very powerful and he joined with the Village Secretary to remove people from WMA. One person was beaten by the *askari* [policeman] who [was] brought by Mekokacha. (Interview 04M Mdori evictee)

We were told to go where we are come from – most of you look like *majambazi* [crooks, criminals]. (Interview 08F Mdori Evictee)

Of course, the official version of how people were moved out of the WMA was quite different from the accounts of the evictees themselves. In a meeting our research team had with Mekokacha, we were informed that any stories we heard from villagers about local people not wanting the conservation area, or about being removed from their homes forcibly or violently, were just lies because the people living in the WMA had left voluntarily and AWF had a video that showed this and that also showed how all the villagers had participated. We obtained a copy of this video and it does show a few people being notified by the DGO, the District Commissioner, and the Ward Councilor that the area in which they were living had been designated a conservation area. However this is no meeting; more accurately it is an announcement of that designation by the District Commissioner who went on to admonish her tiny audience that they were living in the area illegally and to remind them that she was from the government and they needed to do what she

⁵⁹ Mekokacha is Nashon Mekokacha, the Babati District Game Officer (or the DGO). In addition to being identified by the Almasi evictee quoted above, Mekokacha is mentioned 51 other times in my field notes as being involved in the meetings held with AWF to discuss the conservation area, the placement of beacons, or the removal of people from the WMA.

said. In the background are several other District officials, a couple of game guards, Mekokacha, and Patrick Bergin, the President of AWF, obviously all there to show how collaboration and participation were important parts of this process. But rather than showing participation, this video simply shows resignation on the faces of the few villagers who were rounded up to be in it. It also shows one of those villagers telling the District Commissioner how he was arrested, along with another villager, when he balked at moving until someone could tell him where he was supposed to go. We already knew that an entire group of elders had been arrested when they went to the District to complain about what was going on.⁶⁰ They were not released until the other villagers had moved (or been moved) from the WMA (Interview 05M Songa Mbele). Finally, the video also shows District officials, game guards, Mekokecha and Bergin present at the placement of some of the beacons. There are no villagers helping; only a group of children running excitedly behind the truck, as children are apt to do.

I soon learned that what was happening in Minjingu was not unique to that village. In Vilima Vitatu, another of the member villages in the Burunge WMA,⁶¹

⁶⁰ One of these elders was a *balozi* who was described by an informant as “a very powerful and strong person with *msimamo* [position],” attributes which seemed to have mattered little when it came to being displaced (Interview 02M Almasi Evictee).

⁶¹ In total there were 6 member villages originally slated to be in the Burunge WMA, although one village, Mayoka, was withdrawn from the project prior to gazettement.

a parallel story was playing out. Villagers had been involved in the same AWF-sponsored workshops and seminars and similar discussions had occurred in village assembly meetings regarding a conservation area. AWF and the District had prepared an LUP that was virtually identical to the Minjingu LUP, right down to the typos and math errors,⁶² but no official approval for the WMA had come from this community's village assembly either. As in Minjingu, official gazettement of the WMA came as a complete surprise to the citizens and leaders of Vilima Vitatu:

We don't want the area to be a WMA. We want it to be a forest reserve. That has always been our aim. (May 9, 2006 Vilima Vitatu Village Council Meeting)

Why did you change the community agreement from a community forest area to a WMA? (Vilima Vitatu Village Chairman at the May 9, 2006 Village Council Meeting)

This question from the Chairman was directed to the Secretary of the CBO who explained that the CBO representatives had presented documentation evidencing the community agreement about a forest area at the WMA seminar sponsored by AWF. Like the forest reserve in Minjingu, Vilima Vitatu's community forest area made similar allowances for livestock grazing, agriculture and settlements in

⁶² The Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu LUPs are obviously duplicates with identical narratives and identical discrepancies between the English and Kiswahili versions. The only differences between them are changes in facts, figures and dates (when they were caught before the copy was made) that correspond with the target village. While there is a page in each indicating that the LUP was prepared according to the Village Land Act and this page contains signatures of former village leaders and the District Land Officer confirming their commitment to implementation of the LUP, the template is obviously designed for use by AWF and the focus of both documents, as I have already explained, is clearly on how this commitment and implementation fits with AWF's approach and objectives.

addition to conservation. The CBO Secretary went on to say that they had consented to the WMA after the Director of Wildlife insisted that they “focus on how wild animals [can] help your people by setting the area [aside] for them.”

As I said earlier in this chapter, many villagers believed that setting aside village land strictly for conservation meant that it was no longer legally a part of the village. Since most residents of both villages had used the land and resources in the WMA in some fashion prior to its gazettement, they were quite concerned that they would now be prohibited from entering the area (as they were prohibited from entering Tarangire), and fined an exorbitant amount if they did. Indeed, the WMA Regulations (§71) sets fines for unlawful entry or activities at six times higher than what was mandated for similar offenses in Minjingu’s Village By-Laws for Development Activities. Identical disparities in Vilima Vitatu’s By-Laws were spelled out by the Chairman in a village assembly meeting held on May 10, 2006: “We set a fine of 50,000 TSH in the By-Laws, but now regulations say 300,000 TSH or six months in jail for the first mistake and 600,000 TSH or one year in jail for the second.”

Finally, villagers I interviewed also suspected that any revenues collected from activities within the WMA would go straight to other stakeholders and bypass the villages completely:

WMAs haven’t benefited us – people are poorer. We’d be happier about the WMA if it created jobs and then we could send kids to school.
(Interview 02M Kakoi)

There hasn't been any benefit. Perhaps there may be one coming, but we haven't seen it yet. We hear that wildlife is supposed to be valuable, but so far we haven't seen any [value]. (Interview 08M Kakoi)

They call it a Community Conservation Area, but it's just a name. It's here to conserve the environment, but we don't see any benefit that comes from this thing. (Interview 08 Songa Mbele)

I haven't seen any benefit from that [WMA]. Maybe some people have, but if so it's only a few. I understand that wildlife generates a lot of revenue. I wish the people from the game division realized that there are also people here and we are suffering and that they would use some of that money to ease our suffering. (Interview 05M Kakoi)

Not certain. I heard there's money in the bank⁶³... Benefits should be: dispensary, school, water hole for humans and animals. These would benefit the whole community. (Interview 17M Kakoi)

They said that they would put campsites in there and people would come in there. If there are any benefits maybe for the people in the village office, but here in Songa Mbele we haven't seen any. Actually for us it is a liability because it brings the animals closer to our farms. Those people who built those campsites pay something to the village office, but we never see any of it! If somehow that money could reach us then it wouldn't be quite so bad. (Interview 06F Songa Mbele)

Instead of one person eating while everyone else starves, everyone should get some of the benefit. We would sit down as elders to decide how it would help our children. The WMA is supposed to conserve for families of the future, so even its benefits should do the same. (Interview 07M Olevolos)

Their suspicions seemed even more plausible after the people of Minjingu discovered that their photo safari investor, who had a camp in the village forest reserve and had been paying fees to the village regularly for use of that area, had

⁶³ He laughed as he said this.

been legally ejected by the safari company which had rights to the hunting block inside what was now the WMA, rights granted to it by the Division of Wildlife. Neither village had any idea if arrangements with other private investors had been executed “on their behalf” nor did they know how to tap into the revenues that would surely flow from these private investors if they did exist. In the end, the majority of people believed that the WMA had nothing to do with them, and that once again their interests and needs had been ignored:

WMA should be opened up for farming. That would be the best benefit. Look at the kids around us – they’re fed from farms. If there are more farms everyone will have enough to eat. (Interview 16M Kakoï)

It’s there to protect the natural resources. We thought it would have a big benefit. If it were run as it was meant to be run it would be good, but right now most people see it as a burden. The average person sees no reason to give up this area without giving something back. (Interview 09M Kakoï)

They tell me the animals are everyone’s cows. But at the end of the month I don’t get anything. No milk, no meat, nothing. So I know they are not my animals. (Interview 03M Kakoï)

Once the authority has been taken out of your hands you can’t do anything to protect yourself anymore. (April 28, 2006 Village Council Meeting)

As accusations of deception and corruption started to fly (from the Minjingu Village Chairman: “I didn’t know if I should start at the top and climb down or start at the bottom and climb up.”), the leaders of both villages scrambled to figure out how to extricate Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu from the WMA. Village leaders called village assembly meetings to inform citizens about the WMA and to take a vote on whether or not to withdraw from it. Both villages overwhelmingly voted to

withdraw, although one astute citizen questioned: “How do you pull out of something you never joined?” When we left the field, the villagers were exploring how to change the village LUPs, disband the Authorized Association (both of which should cause the WMA to cease to exist under the WMA Regulations), or apply to the Director for de-gazettement of the WMA. Once again, all options entail endorsement by the Director and approval by the Minister, a process bound to be much more difficult since it involves unwinding a project that involves numerous powerful stakeholders with a great deal to lose.

“This is a war, and unfortunately it is a war against people who understand the law much better than we do.”⁶⁴

I suppose any undertaking involving different interest groups with potentially contradictory objectives can result in wide-ranging accounts of processes and outcomes. For ventures like WMAs which depend on measurements of “success” that are tied to vague and variously definable concepts like participation, transparency, and benefits, perception can definitely be relative and utterly constrained by predetermined goals. Our meeting with Mekokacha, rather than a constructive attempt to convince us that our research was lacking in important information that only he could provide, was really just a warning that we

⁶⁴ Comment made at the April 28, 2006 Minjingu Village Council Meeting.

should not be conducting this research at all. This meeting came about after Mekokacha had complained to administrators at Mweka that we were breaking laws in his district and demanded (unsuccessfully) that the College make us stop working in the villages. Summoned to Babati to discuss these allegations, we were summarily informed by Mekokacha that we owed him thanks because he had talked his boss out of having me and my translator arrested on several occasions. The reasons for our potential arrest were that (a) we were working without a permit (we showed him the permit); (b) it is against the law to translate English documents for Tanzanian citizens (it isn't and we didn't);⁶⁵ and (c) we had claimed to be experts and so were illegally influencing Tanzanian citizens (we didn't and we weren't). He then cautioned us that even if we had not told people we were experts, we should never give people advice because they might *think* we're experts since we're white (both research assistants are black Africans). He also warned us that we should not associate with criminal types in the villages, telling us that the village leaders we had been speaking with were corrupt and he would deal with them later.

Finally he told us, in an obliquely threatening way, "You need to be careful in these villages because sometimes people can misunderstand what you are doing

⁶⁵ We had already learned that workers at the Ministry had been instructed by the DGO not to provide the Kiswahili version of the WMA Regulations to the representatives from Minjingu, but that the village leaders and elders had managed to procure several copies anyway. Believing that his instructions had been followed, he probably assumed that the only way the village leaders could have found out what was in the Regulations was if we had translated the English version for them.

and you know how these people all carry machetes. You could get cut with one of those machetes if you're not careful." As for our research, he said that we should not be looking at things like this anyway, saying "The government and AWF have spent so much money and time on this project – we won't allow it to fail."⁶⁶ This experience made it clear to me that the formation of a WMA is predestined in ways that essentially make local participation superfluous. In the end, whether or not the villages of Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu were ultimately successful in becoming viable partners in the WMA, or whether or not they found ways to secure tangible benefits from it, are rather insignificant goals compared to the hierarchy of objectives that must be achieved by other, more powerful stakeholders.

⁶⁶ The Village Chairman and Village Secretary told us that the DGO showed up at a village assembly meeting held in Minjingu on April 24, 2006, to try to convince villagers that they should stay in the WMA. After being told that they did not want the WMA, he replied that he would "need to call James Kahurananga at AWF since AWF has put so much money into this project." According to the village leaders, "the village council told him he can eat the money since this was done without village consent – [they] don't care how much money AWF put into it."

CHAPTER 5
THE BUSINESS OF CONSERVATION AND
THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS

Virtualisms, Reregulation and Territorialization
In the Burunge Wildlife Management Area

It is tempting (and easy) to focus on the convoluted legal and regulatory features of WMAs to identify all the technical reasons why the effects of WMAs are what they are. Indeed, ever prone to detail overkill, I spent many hours at the beginning of my research doing just that – picking apart laws and regulations in alternate states of confusion and fascination as I tried to impose logic on the circuitous ways that local people are engaged and mobilized in the process of creating a WMA, while simultaneously being excluded from it. It is equally as tempting (and easy) to place blame for the ill-effects of WMAs on the legacy of corruption that is present in varying degrees in Tanzania, as it is in most African states. Certainly corruption exists and it exists in ways that I could not possibly have imagined before I got there. From the policeman who barred our way out of the airport the night of my arrival, intent on acquiring my advisor's soda, to the Mweka administrator who absconded with my passport for much of the field

season, intent on acquiring a bribe,⁶⁷ I would say that people in Tanzania have found very creative ways of dealing with the constant and sometimes life threatening scarcities of resources and opportunities that are facts of life in this part of the world.

However, while they certainly contribute to it, a muddled legal system and corrupt state agents are not the primary reasons why WMA outcomes are so different from the outcomes that are officially predicted. In fact, even if WMAs may not work for local people, even if they are not participatory, transparent, or beneficial, still they do *work* and they work in spite of these apparent failings. Moreover, because of this apparent success, WMAs have become a symbol for those ideals and a model for synthesizing two seemingly incompatible goals – biodiversity conservation and economic development. Nestled in market logic meant to convince everyone involved – the Tanzanian government, conservation organizations, donors, local people, and even foreign tourists – that a practical and legal convergence of environmental and economic objectives is the obvious way (maybe the only way) to protect wildlife and alleviate poverty, WMAs effectively and necessarily breach the line that has traditionally divided conservation and business. They do this by providing the physical space needed to generate the image of African wilderness that is crucial to both endeavors, an image which is

⁶⁷ He didn't get one.

packaged and sold to Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians alike as the key to saving wildlife and helping people to prosper, while using that image to legitimize neoliberal fixes “that aim to conserve resources and ecosystems by allowing them to be privatized and marketized” (Castree 2008: 147). Meanwhile, the underlying processes that make this image possible – reregulation of communally-owned resources and territorialization of local activities and people – are obscured in ways that fundamentally and irreversibly change the relationship of local people to their landscape, even as they are held accountable for preserving the value of this landscape and the ideal that this landscape represents.

As I explained in the introduction to this thesis, the image of Africa as a vast wilderness that is separate from people has been carefully crafted and promoted by travel and safari companies, conservation NGOs, and the Tanzanian government. Each of these interest groups needs this image for similar reasons: private companies need it to attract customers (tourists and hunters), the government needs it to attract private companies (and other sources of external cash), and conservation agencies need it to attract donors (individual, corporate and government). As such, the image is a valuable marketing tool for all of these groups in every sense of the word. It is also a product that tourists will pay to see and experience. West and Carrier (2004) maintain that for developing countries with limited resources for environmental protection or economic development, commodifying natural resources and attracting ecotourists to consume those

resources can serve to increase local and national income as well as augment the resources needed by conservationists for protecting biodiversity. They focus specifically on ecotourism as an activity that is distinct from traditional tourism, describing ecotourists as “people who travel to enjoy features of the environment among attractive exotic people in ways that are responsible environmentally and beneficial socioculturally” (ibid.: 483). I would argue that this distinction clearly fits the marketing strategies of Tanzanian safari companies and conservation NGOs as well as the self-image of the safari customers who I encountered, all of whom were in Tanzania specifically to experience a natural environment and exotic peoples not available in other parts of the world and who were sincere in a conviction that their activities had no negative impacts on the environment or on native peoples.⁶⁸

West and Carrier report that, depending on how this growing sector of the tourist industry is defined, estimates for global ecotourist expenditures range from US\$30 billion to \$1.2 trillion (ibid.: 483). In Tanzania, where wildlife-related tourism ventures contribute significantly to the country’s economy, tourism receipts in 2005 totaled US\$836 million, an increase of nearly 34% since 2001 (Igoe and Croucher 2007; WRI 2008). However, West and Carrier contend that

⁶⁸ Indeed, this conviction is understandable given that tourists are sold an image of African wilderness that is pristine and untouchable (and so cannot be despoiled) and restricted to interacting with only those people who have adjusted their lifestyles to conform to Western expectations of the exotic and who are suitably appreciative of the generosity afforded them.

ecotourism leads “not to the preservation of valued ecosystems but to the creation of landscapes that conform to important Western idealizations of nature through a market-oriented nature politics that results in the creation of a product that fits the [ecotourist] market needs” (ibid.: 485). Indeed, the commodification of “wild Africa” in Tanzania has essentially institutionalized an aesthetic that leaves little room for thinking about anything other than wildlife and, when and where there is room, allows for only certain types of human activity and certain types of humans. The prevalence of so many national parks in Tanzania further reinforces this aesthetic by giving foreign tourists and donors the impression that not only are there distinctly separate places for people and for wildlife, but that the only times these places intersect are when people intentionally or illegally interfere with wildlife.

The maintenance of this aesthetic involves the production of virtual experiences for tourists that give them the Africa they expect to see. Igoe and Brockington (under review) describe how the logic of neoliberalism and the discourse and practices of biodiversity conservation rely on “the production of virtualisms: systems of images, ideas, discourse, and values that contribute to the reproduction of the material world according to ways that they imagine it to be.” By detaching nature from its context – by presenting it as an object to see and to save (and to buy) rather than a part of the “reciprocity of connections that exist between humans and ecosystems” (ibid.: 5) – conservation and consumption can

interact in ways that the average middle-class Western consumer both expects and requires. Interestingly, this process requires not only that people who do not fit the aesthetic be excluded from it, but also that consumers of the aesthetic be restricted to it. For instance, on the safari at the end of my field work I asked the driver if he would mind stopping briefly at some places I wanted to show my son, places that while not on the designated route were not so far off-track that stopping would have delayed our trip in any measurable way. The driver insisted that he was not allowed to stop at locations that were not specifically described in the travel brochure. This meant that we basically zipped from park to park and lodge to lodge with no “experiences” in between, passing people and houses in a blur as if they did not exist.⁶⁹ On two occasions my son and I resorted to jumping out of the moving vehicle when it slowed down for a turn or a speed bump while our driver (after scolding me for jumping out of truck) kindly drove around for the short time it took me to show my son what I wanted him to see. I am quite certain everyone else in the truck thought we were nuts since getting out of the truck meant we were mingling with the locals. On this safari, as on most safaris, mingling with the locals was supposed to be a controlled experience that isolated us from local people and local people from us. Carrier and Macleod (2005) term this isolation an

⁶⁹ People living near the parks were well aware that travel companies work hard to insulate their customers from the harsh realities of life in rural areas. One gentleman, who lived near Tarangire, observed that safari company vehicles loaded with tourists “pass us by like we’re statues.”

“ecotourist bubble” saying that it “focuses attention on the interaction between ecotourists and the particular nature or culture that they are visiting, which induces ignorance of the context of the visit which [is] relatively invisible because [it is] outside the bubble” (ibid.: 316). Being in this safari truck felt very much like being in a bubble,⁷⁰ and I was mortified as we flew through the countryside past villagers I recognized but was unable to greet. My truck mates, on the other hand, made it very clear that other than the controlled experience arranged by the safari company they had no real interest in seeing or interacting with the people between or on the outskirts of the parks they had come to visit.⁷¹ Their interests were in seeing wildlife⁷² and if the Africans they encountered were not there to serve their needs or enhance their African experience, then for them they were not really there at all.

I mentioned earlier, and my safari experience confirmed, that because local people are a peripheral part of the landscape in this “wild Africa” they are only visible to the extent that their activities do not detract from the tourist experience, and they are only important as long as their economies contribute to the global economy that makes these tourist experiences possible. In this respect, poor people

⁷⁰ My son actually used this word at that time to describe our experience, comparing our isolation and the chaos that ensued when this isolation was breached at a gas station near Lake Manyara to a Seinfeld episode about “The Bubble Boy.”

⁷¹ This controlled experience was a visit to a Maasai cultural boma near Serengeti where we were treated to traditional dances and visits to local households, all chaperoned by a young Maasai man in traditional garb. In a conversation with him during the dancing he informed me that he comes home from college in the U.K. during the summer to help coordinate tourist visits. The village was using the money it collected from tourists to build a school.

⁷² At times they were almost frantic to see it and our driver, whose income obviously depended on tips from the tourists he was shuttling around, was frantic to make sure they saw it.

have relatively few choices. Essentially, they can either *become* a commodity – allow themselves to be fetishized as a “suitable ecotourist attraction” and sold to ecotourists; or they can *provide* a commodity – allow their assets or handicrafts to be fetishized as a “suitable ecotourist attraction” and sold to ecotourists (Carrier and Macleod 2005: 329). To be sure some Africans, namely Maasai, have found lucrative ways to take advantage of what Marx observed was the “tendency to the fetishization of commodities in capitalist systems, the tendency to present the commodity for sale in a way that obscures the social relations and situations that bring it into existence and to the attention of the potential buyer” (ibid.: 329). Other Africans, who are perhaps less identifiably exotic, have fewer opportunities to impress Western consumers. For them, access to ecotourism and the global economy that comes with it means they have to rethink their relationship to their land and resources. In other words, they must learn to relate to their land and resources less in terms of direct value, as part of a system of livelihood maintenance, and more in terms of indirect value, as commodities that tourists will pay for.

The spread of global neoliberalism has broadened the space for these types of relationships making them more ubiquitous and increasingly more sophisticated. Peck and Tickell (2002: 400) maintain that neoliberalism has demonstrated an ability “to ride – and capitalize upon – the very economic cycles and localized policy failures that it was complicit in creating.” This reflexivity and the

naturalization of a “growth-first” approach to development (ibid.: 394) has permitted the extension of market logic into social and political spheres where it might not have existed in the past. Therefore, the agenda of neoliberalism, they argue, involves ongoing processes of *neoliberalization* that transform and self-actualize ever more technocratic regulatory and governance systems into “depoliticized” and privileged forms of social interventionism and economic (and environmental) management. No longer simply an end-product of deregulation and decentralization of state power narrowly focused on mobilizing and extending markets and market logics, processes of neoliberalization now continuously reconstitute the social and political spheres within which markets operate for the purpose of redefining access to those markets in terms of what are purported to be rational, and therefore depoliticized, dimensions of fitness and value.

In Tanzania, state downsizing and decentralization due to structural adjustment reforms have allowed and compelled state actors to exercise control over fragmented and valuable pieces of governmental sovereignty that can be used to broker alliances with private investors and donors who bring the money, expertise, and technology on which state officials are highly dependent (Ferguson 2006; Igoe and Croucher 2007). Indeed, this “privatization of sovereignty” (Ferguson 2006) appeared to play an important role in the coalitions that were formed to ensure that the establishment of the Burunge WMA was an administrative and marketing success. But this success was also dependent upon a

figurative and literal reconfiguration of village land and resources to conform to an internationally valued idea of nature as both a transnationalized space of high biodiversity value and a resource to be commercially exploited (ibid.). These reconfigurations involved reregulating village-owned property, formerly available to the entire community and important to local people for its use value, into quasi-private property with unambiguous resource rights now more important, to some stakeholders at least, for its exchange value. While the land legally remained part of the village (and the village technically lost nothing), access to that land and the resources contained within it was restricted to a transnational network of interest groups that could focus on the commercial potential of conservation. As such, village land and resources were transformed into tradable commodities and villagers, willingly or not, were expected to trade their access to it for money (Carrier and Macleod 2005).

Although the Tanzanian state provided the mechanism by which this reregulation could occur – recognizing legal ownership of village land by granting certification of WMA status as a first step to the villages transacting business with outside investors – all WMA stakeholders, even some local people, shared an interest in facilitating this reality. Proponents of neoliberalism argue that opening up new spaces for conservation-business partnerships will necessarily translate into opportunities for local people to benefit (Igoe and Brockington n.d.). However, it is important to keep in mind that “such benefits are not an intended consequence of

neoliberalism” (ibid.: 446) and the competitive environment that invariably fills these spaces is one in which local people, who must often learn the game as they play it, are at a serious disadvantage. Privatizing and marketing resources and ecosystems in the name of conservation and economic growth can (and in this case did) result in unequal commercial and ideological advantages even as the negative social and economic consequences for local people can be subsumed under the costs of doing business in a macro-oriented world.

Castree (2008: 146) argues that neoliberal “environmental fixes” are a specific strategic objective for both capital and the state. By bringing the non-human world “more fully within the universe of capital accumulation” (ibid.: 147), state environmental responsibilities can be off-loaded to private sectors. In Tanzania, these private sectors – non-profit private and commercial private – were primed to assume that responsibility all along. Consequently, the neoliberalization of nature in the Burunge WMA meant that local perspectives about the function and value of the environment could be ignored as external interests went about extending their entitlements to nature – entitlements that existed by virtue of the commercial and ideological capital they possessed – however it pleased them (Castree 2008).

These kinds of entitlements are part of what Goldman (2001: 500) calls “the recent phenomenon of new global regulatory regimes for the environment.”

Describing how World Bank practices are facilitating the birth of “environmental

states” in the Global South, Goldman argues that institutions of “eco-governmentality” define some “qualities of territory as degraded, and others as necessary instruments for the improvement of populations, states, and natures” (ibid.: 501). Likewise, similar value classifications extend to the resource-based communities that inhabit these territories, meaning their worth is now measured in terms of their “eco-rationality” and their ability to become oriented to the global market (ibid.: 506). This categorization of the value of nature and people reconfigures administrative and cultural boundaries into “eco-zones” where land and resource use can be governed according to ideas of conservation and sustainability, and then simply relocates those individuals who are not “eco-rational...who do not fit the required social characteristics for eco-zone habitation” (ibid.: 513) to places that are less valuable. However, rather than simply “proscribing or prescribing specific activities within spatial boundaries” (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 388), this sort of inside-out territorialization places accountability for inclusion and autonomy within eco-zones squarely on those individuals who are least likely to have the resources necessary to establish and maintain their eco-rationality. Accordingly, individuals who cannot show an ability to appreciate nature and its economic capacity are rendered invisible, disposable, and excludable in the context of more universal concerns about the environment and economic growth.

To be sure, this same kind of eco-rationality was an important requirement for the villages participating in the Burunge WMA and its proponents argued that villagers' ability to discipline themselves to exclude themselves from their own land was a critical step toward realizing the value of the nature they controlled (Igoe and Croucher 2007). At the same time, this putative self-imposed exclusion was a direct consequence of external abstractions about a detached nature (see above) and prior external arrangements bent on making that detachment more concrete, and therefore permanent. As I explained in Chapter 2 and reiterated in more detail in Chapter 4, conservationists in the Burunge area had maintained for years that effective land management and protection of biodiversity could only be achieved if the area between Tarangire, Lake Manyara, and Manyara Ranch was kept clear of the sorts of human activities that it claimed interfered with wildlife. However, the neoliberalization of local land and resources finally made it possible for the wildlife corridor to be officially segregated as a "zone of exclusion" (Ferguson 2006: 48), a place from which local people could be and should be removed so that the value of the landscape could be fully realized.

According to villagers I spoke with, although the idea of officially delineating what everyone already knew was a natural wildlife corridor was introduced by conservationists at least as far back as the early 1970s, it became a specific AWF objective in the early 1990s. Although villages had steadfastly refused to abandon village land in favor of wildlife (because they simply could not

afford to do so), the land use plan created on their behalf by AWF and the District as part of the WMA process specifically correlated the WMA zone to that natural wildlife corridor. Clearly, as far as conservationists were concerned, there was never any question that land for the WMA had to be the same land that AWF had labored to identify as a key conservation landscape at least a decade earlier. As far as government interests were concerned, although support for that identification and its ultimate manifestation in a WMA might have been a foregone conclusion, the motivations driving it are not so well-defined. Although the early days of Tanzania's independence saw the socialist government laboring to protect the rights of local people, neoliberalism and structural adjustment reforms have significantly eroded the social contract between citizens and the state. As a result, state actors have become dependent on flows of external income. In particular, the private and non-profit resources available from conservation are especially lucrative. Hence, despite any alternative values that local people may have given that landscape, when villagers in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu decided to explore the economic advantages available through conservation and when they "accepted" external support in this investigation, they essentially provided a legal and conceptual space for the state to step in as proxy landlord and award control of that land to external stakeholders who had been trying to control it for years.

The defining of a physical space for the WMA, a definition that had been undertaken by external interests long before villagers in the area knew that they

controlled land that was critical for WMA success, ultimately meant that territorialization in the Burunge area had the effect of “eliminating or altering the need [of the state] to regulate specific resources and individuals” (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 388). Classifying the WMA by area and drawing a boundary around it accomplished what Vandergeest and Peluso call “functional territorialization” – a process of controlling what people do on the basis of land-classification criteria that reflect so-called scientific standards and often mask economic interests. The example of functional territorialization which they provide is the Thai government’s efforts to control rural peoples’ activities and their access to and use of local resources by demarcating and mapping the boundaries of the nation’s reserve forests. In this situation, regulation of forest use “shifted to the surveillance of boundaries and the simple prohibition of most activities within these boundaries” (ibid.: 410). Likewise, in discussions with villagers in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu it appeared that an analogous kind of surveillance was going on in the Burunge WMA and people in the area were very aware that any attempts to go past the concrete beacons, however desperate their reasons for doing so, would result in harassment if not outright violence. However, scientific classification of village land as a conservation landscape, enjoinder of villagers to focus on economic activities that would complement that classification, and cooperation by the state to certify that classification as a Wildlife Management Area made it possible for that surveillance to be seen as a depoliticized effort to give local people what other

interest groups would argue they asked for all along. In essence, regulatory and territorial controls that effectively terminated villagers' access to the WMA could be touted as legitimate forms of governance for individuals who were obliged to demonstrate an environmentally rational mindset. Consequently, in the topsy-turvy world of participatory conservation making local people partners in a grand solution for environmental protection and sustainability in Tanzania ensured that their surrender of land and resources was deemed an eco-rational necessity.

As I have demonstrated above, in a world where a detached nature appears normal and characterizations of its value are tied to market forces rather than to symbiotic relationships between humans and ecosystems, rights to the use of nature increasingly involve processes of neoliberalization that legitimize systems of governance to control people and activities even as that governance is made to appear self-imposed. By keeping the focus at a macro level, a place where seemingly wildly different imperatives to protect the environment, make money, and end poverty can be successfully united, the implicit and literal effects of WMAs become accepted side-effects of reaching those goals even as these side-effects are never publicly acknowledged. In his analysis of the relationship between policy models and the actual practices of development agencies, Mosse (2004: 646) argues that because operational control of events by bureaucracies and NGOs is constrained and limited, it is more important and more practical for them to control "the interpretation of events." Accordingly, development actors must

always “maintain coherent representations of their actions” as products of the policy they are charged with implementing (ibid.: 639). Moreover, because the primary function of policy is to legitimize practice rather than to orient it, the success or failure of a project is a “policy-oriented judgment that obscures project effects” (ibid.: 662). Indeed, the “interpretive communities” (ibid.: 646) that were responsible for maintaining the coherent policy idea that a WMA represents could no more acknowledge its damaging side effects than they could turn over its control to those people whom it was intended to help. Although Mosse points out that “claims to success are always fragile” (ibid.: 645), the need to preserve scarce supplies of reputation and legitimacy in a competitive development environment most certainly played a part in efforts by conservation NGOs and the Tanzanian government to convey and capitalize on an illusion of WMA success. But by trying to control the interpretation of events in the Burunge WMA the exigencies of these entities collided head on with the “unruly objects of development” in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu (ibid.: 654). In the end, while I know it is doubtful, I like to imagine that somehow those unruly people managed to shed their role as mere targets of policy model validation and appropriate that policy for their own use.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of my journey I did not realize the extent to which conservation has been influenced by the ideologies and practice of business and I certainly did not appreciate the significance of that influence. After years of working in the financial industry I had a solid understanding of business practices and objectives and I was very much aware of the implications of creating and maintaining value, selling an image along with the product, and keeping an eye on the bottom line. Although I understood intellectually that conservation NGOs need to stay visible and viable just like for-profit businesses, I had not focused on the fact that these aims are not incidental to but a vital part of their success. In business the goal is to make money, pure and simple. In conservation, while the purity of the mission is expected to be kept separate from the contaminating effects of pecuniary realities, the fact is if no money comes in then no conservation gets done. In business, image and the value that goes with it are forever tied to the vagaries of the market and the focus is most always on short-term objectives rather than long-term consequences. As it turns out, the same holds true for conservation NGOs. They have an image to maintain and a product to sell and, absorbed as they are with capitalizing on opportunities and generating success stories, they have an

on-going need to find new donors (customers) and keep the ones they already have. To be sure, the business of conservation is as much about preserving and enhancing the means by which conservation gets done as it is about doing conservation.

As such, an alliance between conservation and business, like that which transpires in a Wildlife Management Area, should not seem all that surprising. These seemingly disparate endeavors are already aligned in all kinds of ways. In television commercials and magazine ads, on billboards and bumper stickers – supporting environmental causes and being green is definitely hip for the business world and it has become as valuable in a fiscal sense as it is purported to be in an environmental one. Corporate literature and advertisements are now chock full of green strategies and humble (yet somehow still supercilious) testimonies to long-standing environmental commitments, obligations that consumers are now expected, shamed into, or even required to be a part of.⁷³ Similarly, conservation agencies see no reason to hide their corporate connections or their business orientation. For instance, AWF’s website tells business owners that the organization will work with them “to develop a cause-marketing promotion” that will further AWF’s mission “while bolstering sales and brand equity in the process” (AWF 2008). WWF recently published a job ad for a Corporate Marketing Partnerships and Promotions Manager who can “increase awareness of

⁷³ Think about how many companies no longer offer paper statements. I won’t go into how that translates into profit.

the WWF brand through branded products and promotions” while “cultivating new opportunities for corporate partnerships as well as development and managing new cause-related marketing programs with existing WWF corporate partners” (Idealist 2008). And Conservation International has a separate link on its website targeting “Business Leaders” where you can get information about “Greening Business” as well as the names of CI’s conservation partners, which include McDonald’s, Starbucks and Wal-Mart (CI 2008.).

Although I am not suggesting that corporate efforts to protect the environment are all bad, more attention definitely needs to be focused on the constant process of negotiation that occurs between a company’s environmental and social responsibility promises and its financial objectives and commitments. In other words, attention needs to be paid to the positive contributions that corporate green policies make to a company’s bottom line, and how those policies will be affected if the bottom line changes to a negative number. I am also not suggesting that coalitions between conservation NGOs and corporations are all bad. While environmental causes currently have a distinctive cachet, international conservation NGOs operate within a highly competitive environment and changes in the global economy can have dramatic effects on their ability to perform. Partnering with familiar brands can provide them the kind of security and visibility they could probably never attain on their own as well as give them opportunities to communicate their environmental protection objectives to a much wider audience.

Frankly, in today's neoliberal environment, it would probably mean institutional suicide for an organization if it did not partner with private industry, accept the bounty offered by it, and then trumpet this news to the rest of the world, a world which expects to see market relationships wherever it looks.

But what is troubling is how much the alliances between conservation and business appear to depend on each other for the legitimacy of the agendas they independently espouse, and the degree to which the need for this legitimacy can supersede the needs and rights of individuals who are peripheral to those alliances. It is even more disturbing when these individuals are ideologically part of that legitimizing process but practically excluded from the benefits that accrue from it. I have argued in this thesis that this is exactly what happened in the Burunge WMA. Certainly, local people were a part of it – without their “participation” the establishment of the WMA could not have happened. But their role was eclipsed early on by the agendas of other interest groups and their needs were subsumed under all-purpose categories like participatory conservation, economic development and poverty alleviation. While the ideals these categories elicit appeal to the kinds of audiences that are tremendously important to conservation, business and government interests, the practical benefits for local people that emerge from these ideals are few. In the Burunge WMA, the picture of community-based conservation that was painted by conservation NGOs, private industry and the Tanzanian government ensured the kind of on-going moral and financial support

that is critical for these groups. But as a practical matter, participation, transparency and benefits in this case was more a process of selling a preconceived idea, convincing local people that this idea was best for them, and then persuading them to bear the up-front costs by relinquishing their land and resources for the good of the project. As such, it is important to remember that conservation and development can and will go forward with or without real community involvement, and that the structures designed to promote transparency, ensure participation and provide benefits can actually operate quite well without them.

I said in my introduction that despite the official rhetoric that predicts a vastly different outcome in a WMA, the effects that I observed are really the ones we should expect. But these kinds of effects cannot be seen from a distance. They also cannot be seen if the observer concentrates on those parts of a community that are easy to distinguish and easy to reach. Moreover, “the community” is never simply a benign entity with common goals, values or experiences, nor is it necessarily ever bounded or integrated in ways that make sense to people from a Western system of thought. Consequently, not only will different groups “not share a common vision and objectives regarding the future development of their community” (Botes and van Rensburg 2000: 48), but they can often be manipulated to legitimate decisions that have already been made for them. Conservation and development programs have a tendency to employ “one size fits all” approaches based on data gathered from fractional samples of communities or countries (or

continents). They also have a tendency to presume that people want the same things no matter where they are and to imagine what is best for local people and the ecosystem they are a part of without seriously exploring (or just disregarding) what that human-ecosystem relationship is all about. As this thesis indicates, whether or not the needs of everyone in a community are accounted for in conservation and development programs, whether or not people actually get benefits that offset the costs they must bear, and whether or not the human-ecosystem relationship is ultimately enhanced has little to do with how the success of these programs is sometimes perceived and communicated by actors who are oriented less toward the value of process and more toward the imperatives of delivery (ibid.). As a result, details that might have helped to improve the project or that could significantly impact the implementation of similar projects elsewhere are simply lost.

Even so, I feel confident that most conservationists and development practitioners are sincere in their altruistic intentions, however unpleasantly those intentions may play out on the ground. But maybe that's the problem: are these folks ever really on the ground? And if they are, do they really pay attention to what they see and hear? I was in the Burunge area off and on for five months and in the field full-time for two of those months and during that time I managed to hear a lot of voices and triangulate those voices from all sorts of directions. Two

months was all I needed to discover the effects of the WMA.⁷⁴ However, the non-village stakeholders I encountered, who had been there far longer than I had, appeared to be oblivious to these effects or else they simply discounted their importance and severity. I ran into this same kind of reductionism when I returned home. A few months after I got back to Colorado I had an encounter with a local conservationist who simply refused to believe that the things people told me could be true or that an international conservation agency like AWF could be less than forthright in its dealings with local people or in any way involved with corrupt state officials. She boasted that she knew rural places well and blamed the results of my research on “deep misunderstandings plaguing the area” and “misperception on the part of local people.” She also said, “Just because everyone thinks something does not make it true...I can’t say that AWF has done anything wrong based on peoples’ perceptions of a situation.”⁷⁵ She was not interested in the number of interviews the research team had conducted nor did she want to hear about the consistency with which people protested the official claims about their familiarity with the WMA project much less their involvement. In fact, she essentially disallowed opportunities for either of us to learn from each other when she stopped responding to my detailed questions about her position. It was abundantly clear from our

⁷⁴ Actually, I figured it out a lot quicker than that.

⁷⁵ Quotes are from e-mails between the author and an Outreach Manager of The Nature Conservancy, November 13-14, 2006.

conversation that the only people whose perceptions mattered were the conservation, government and development agents tasked with executing the project, an opinion that eerily echoed the comments made to us by the District Game Officer in Babati.

Outright rejection of the kinds of realities that I have discussed in this thesis is not uncommon. Indeed, these realities are far less appealing than the noble ideals around which conservation and development missions revolve – ideals that are difficult to effectively criticize when they are so utterly fixed to powerful images and beliefs about nature and consumption. These realities are also far less appealing than that omnipresent neoliberal narrative which imagines a compatible and favorable convergence of conservation and development goals, a blending of common interests which is putatively advantageous for everyone involved (Igoe and Croucher 2007). Nevertheless, acknowledging and honestly talking about these realities is, I believe, a critical step that must be taken if there are to be any real changes in the way that conservation and development get done, changes that will oblige the organizations tasked with the doing to accept responsibility not just for the positive outcomes but for the negative ones as well. Advanced kinds of dialogue and accountability will require the type of information that only detailed investigations of the connections between conservation and development can provide. And this sort of meticulous research, the kind that can help us understand the effects of those connections on different cultures and different kinds of local

settings, demands up close and personal exchanges with the people who are most directly impacted by those effects.

In Tanzania there are numerous opportunities for this kind of research. The WMA program offers a wealth of information from WMAs that have been or are still being established in other parts of the country. In addition, there is a need for further research regarding the Burunge WMA in particular. Since the effects of this program appeared to reinforce long-standing beliefs among people in the area that conservation is ultimately incompatible with their economic priorities, it seemed clear when I left the field that local people were unlikely to support future conservation efforts. Moreover, I can only imagine that the conflicts produced and exacerbated by the WMA, and the lack of local support for it, placed wildlife in further jeopardy. If this is all true, I am curious how business interests, which are highly dependent on a thriving wildlife population, have fared and also how AWF has been able to justify the sorts of negative conservation outcomes that reduced wildlife numbers represent. Since conservation in Tanzania seems to bend with the wind (or perhaps it is more accurate to say it moves with the money), I am also curious whether or not the Burunge WMA has simply morphed into some other kind of conservation scheme – one that would allow external interest groups to tie up all the dangling loose ends while still claiming that all-important success.

Finally, the Tanzanian government, which like other African countries has few options, displays a similar ability to adapt to circumstance and follow the

money. This reality can be clearly seen in the way the nation's new Wildlife Policy has almost completely shifted focus from community conservation to water and wetlands (URT 2007a), a shift no doubt related to the introduction of The Nature Conservancy as a new conservation player.⁷⁶ Since development programs surrounding water tend to have major impacts on rural people and communities, the ramifications of how this new conservation focus aligns with the nation's economic interests will need to be explored. In the end, whether their strategies are carried out independently or in partnership with each other, conservation and development are extremely important to the future of the nation. But if concern for Tanzania's citizens is continually subordinated to concerns for the environment and for business, it is hard to imagine how effective these imperatives can really be.

⁷⁶ Two of TNC's "priority conservation initiatives" are fresh water and marine ecosystems. The organization partnered with AWF to promote its private land conservation easement program in late 2006 (TNC 2008a).

APPENDIX A

METHODS

This research was conducted from January to June, 2006. I spent the first two months at the College of African Wildlife Management in Mweka reviewing government and conservation documents regarding Tanzanian land tenure, natural resource and wildlife management, and WMAs. I also took classes in Conflict Resolution and Management as well as Community Conservation and Participatory Planning, participated in class field trips to villages and parks both in and around my research area, and attended presentations on specific conservation topics organized by international conservation agencies and local civil society organizations.⁷⁷ These experiences helped to narrow down my research area and the villages most appropriate to my study as well as to identify all the conservation programs that were being promoted in the Tarangire area. I also gained a better understanding of the extent to which conservation schemes had been and were affecting the area although it took a lot of interviews for me to really comprehend how singularly focused the schemes all were. From March to June, I was based

⁷⁷ Living at the College and taking classes with students from Africa and other parts of the world was an experience all its own. Nevertheless, it definitely helped to ease me into a culture that was drastically different from my own and it prepared me to better understand and contextualize what I later learned in the field.

near the village of Minjingu, alternately living in a hostel inside Tarangire National Park and a hotel in the nearby town of Mto wa Mbu. Fieldwork was conducted in five villages located in between Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks and Manyara Ranch (see Table A.1). Data analysis for this thesis includes interviews carried out in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu. An explanation for the additional data collected and its relevance to the topic is provided at the end of this Appendix.

The Setting: Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu

Minjingu is located between Tarangire National Park, to the east and south, and Lake Manyara National Park, to the northwest. According to the land use plan created by AWF and the District, the village covers an area of 23,680 hectares and had a population of 9,322 in 2004, a number which reflected 1,852 households (AWF 2004). However, at the time my research was conducted village officials indicated that there were approximately 106 households in Minjingu representing a total population of approximately 1,200 people. Ground surveys of households conducted by the research team closely agree with the figures provided by village officials, although because some of the sub-village maps do not reflect individual households the numbers are probably higher.⁷⁸ Minjingu is comprised of five sub-

⁷⁸ Until recently, Vilima Vitatu and the neighboring village of Olasiti were considered part of Minjingu. Although I cannot say for sure, I suspect that the numbers used by AWF in the land use plan represent the larger village unit prior to the time it was partitioned into separate villages.

villages: Kakoi, Olevolos, Songa Mbele, Almasi and Makao Mapaya. The Village Chairman and Village Secretary for the main village and the sub-village chairmen for each of the sub-villages are elected officials. There is also an elected village council and the village assembly is composed of all adult member of the community, male and female. There is a village office located along the paved road which is used for village assembly and village council meetings and other official village business. The research team attended several village meetings at this office. We also had several informal meetings with the Chairman and Secretary in their shared office next to the main assembly room, and were allowed access to village documents and maps that were housed there. Minjingu has a small commercial area along the paved road which is also used by people from surrounding villages. Other than a few private vehicles, the only transportation in and out of the area is by foot or via a public bus which stops at that commercial center. The village has a primary school (the land use plan identifies three schools but I never saw the other two) and a clinic was being built on the west side of the village while we were there.

Vilima Vitatu is located southwest of Minjingu on a rough dirt road.⁷⁹ The public bus travels along this road and makes a stop in the village on its way to the district headquarters in Babati. According to the land use plan created by AWF and

⁷⁹ Driving along this road during the rainy season ranks as one of my scariest experiences in Tanzania.

the District, the village covers an area of 19,800 hectares and had a population of 1,323 in 2000, a number which reflected 356 households (AWF 2000⁸⁰). Vilima Vitatu has a village office similar to the one at Minjingu although construction on this building seems to have terminated long before it was completed. In fact, because of the condition of the building it appeared that only one room could actually be used, and when an unusually large number of citizens showed up for the village assembly meeting that I attended the crowd and the Chairman's desk had to be moved outside to make room for everyone. There is no commercial area like the one in Minjingu although at that time there was a small restaurant down the road from the office. The description of the local ecology and economic activities in Vilima Vitatu provided in the land use plan, which matches the one in Minjingu's land use plan word for word: is accurate:

Like all other surrounding villages, Vilima Vitatu faces socio-economic problems arising from draughtiness (*sic*). Semi-arid nature of the area gives rise to people, livestock and wildlife relying on rainwater. They all rely on shallow, small-excavated ponds which do not suffice water needs all the year round. Economic activities are diverse from agriculture, livestock keeping, bee keeping and fisheries, handcraft activities (weaving) and small businesses. The village community may be classified under the national poverty line. Houses are of mud and stick, thatched with grass. (2000:16-17)

Needless to say, infrastructure in both villages is very basic and people are very

⁸⁰ The village assembly approval date on Vilima Vitatu's land use plan reads "3rd July, 2000" and the dates corresponding with the signatures of the Chairman, Secretary, and District Land Officer read "28/02/2005." Minjingu's land use plan has only one date: "31 December, 2004."

poor. Although a few people were cultivating cash crops, by far the majority of farmers were growing only subsistence foods. Many people disclosed that men in the village sometimes worked seasonal jobs in other locations to supplement their income, leaving their wives and families at home to tend the farms and returning at harvest time to help bring in the crop. Indeed, I encountered households where the men were working far away and the totally worn-out looking women appeared to be scraping by as best they could.

Research Design and Qualitative Methods

This research was designed to inductively generate grounded theory to explain how WMAs had become a popular medium for participatory conservation, local economic development and poverty alleviation throughout Tanzania even as the specific effects of the Burunge WMA were directly and negatively affecting the livelihoods and culture of local people. There was never any question for me that arriving at this theory necessitated qualitative inquiry since in-depth, intensive interviews seemed the only accurate way of capturing the real-world experiences of local people. I was further convinced of this after familiarizing myself with the details of the WMA program and realizing that its administrative requirements and restrictions essentially excluded the very people it was supposed to be helping. It seemed clear that starting with a priori assumptions about what WMAs are

supposed to do could limit discovery of patterns and themes that might shed light on what WMAs *actually* do. As Patton points out, specifying a research hypothesis based on an explicit theoretical framework means that observations can only be understood in terms of that framework and force the researcher to “decide in advance what variables are important and what relationship among those variables can be expected” (2002: 56). A strategy of inductive design, on the other hand, will “allow the important analysis dimensions to emerge from patterns found in the cases under study without presupposing in advance what the important dimensions will be” (ibid.).

Staying open to those emerging dimensions was critical to keeping up with ongoing changes in the field. As I explained in Chapter 4, the first WMAs (including the one in my research area) were not gazetted until halfway through my field season. In fact, when I arrived in Tanzania it appeared that the WMA process throughout the country had stalled and in some areas plans for pilot WMAs had been completely abandoned (TNRF 2006). As such, my initial focus was on a process that I thought was still underway. What began as a project to document the experiences of villagers who were purportedly part of the process of creating a WMA wound up including an analysis of how a WMA could have been officially gazetted when the people who were its main beneficiaries, and who were supposed to be in control of the process, seemed not to know what was happening on their own land. This abrupt change in circumstances made it even more necessary that I

focus on discovering as many details as possible about villagers' experiences with the WMA so that I would be able to tell their story as it unfolded for them.

These kinds of details, which do not lend themselves to numerical analysis, are only available through qualitative inquiry. Certainly, if I had been "constrained by predetermined categories of analysis" (Patton 2002:14) it would have been difficult to keep up with the flow of information or to add questions as that information changed. Indeed, discovering that the Burunge WMA had been gazetted necessitated changes in the tenor and scope of the questions that I was asking. Patton describes one of the components of a qualitative research design as "Emergent Design Flexibility":

Openness to adapting inquiry as understanding deepens and/or situations Change; the researcher avoids getting locked into rigid designs that eliminate responsiveness and pursues new paths of discovery as they emerge (ibid.: 40).

He goes on to say that this kind of openness and flexibility is inherent in a design strategy that is naturalistic. Naturalistic inquiry involves "studying real-world situations as they unfold naturally; nonmanipulative and noncontrolling; openness to whatever emerges" (ibid.). In this type of inquiry the setting is not controlled and the output is not constrained by preset variables. As Patton puts it, "The data of the evaluation include whatever emerges as important to understanding what the participants experience" (ibid: 42). Since the participants' experiences were the primary focus of my research, and those experiences were still happening, it was

important that I remain flexible to what turned out to be a changing reality and be comfortable with taking the research in directions that I could not have contemplated when I arrived in Tanzania. To me, this is the essence of a qualitative research design: to capture the participant's view of their world as they actually see it and not as the researcher imagined it would be.

Data Collection Methods

Semi-Structured Interviews

Interviews with villagers were semi-structured and utilized a purposeful sampling technique meant to target households in all parts of the villages. Patton explains that, "purposeful sampling focuses on selecting information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions under study" (2002: 230). For my purposes, generating a complete picture of WMA effects required connecting with people all over the area. In other words, most every case was information-rich because it provided further confirmation of the findings, increasing their credibility. On the rare occasions when cases were not confirmatory, when they provided a "rival interpretation" (ibid.: 239), identifying the reasons why this was so actually served to clarify the significance of certain patterns that were appearing in the data. For example, the differences reported in experiences with wildlife damage were directly related to proximity to the village center, an important point that would

have been missed completely if the research team had worked in only one part of the village (i.e. near the paved road or far from the road, but not both) and gotten only a one-sided view of this experience.

As a practical matter, purposeful sampling in a remote and not very densely populated area requires a bit of snowball sampling as well. We needed help identifying residents who had been in the area a long while so that we could obtain their perspective on ecological and socio-economic changes over time. When we discovered that 66 families had been evicted from the WMA, we needed assistance to confirm their identities and their locations so we could track them all down (we found 23 of them). Finally, we wanted to find out who might have had specific experience with the CBO and the AWF-sponsored seminars; the process of asking this question tended to generate the same names again and again.

The semi-structured interviews utilized a guide which involved both open- and closed-ended questions designed to elicit information about the participant's involvement with the WMA project and what they expected the project would mean for them as individuals and for their village. I also asked questions about the participant's history in the area; changing relationships between residents and wildlife; and how those relationships were affecting the participant and his or her family economically. Finally, I asked about their knowledge of other conservation programs in the Tarangire area (see Appendix B). Some of the closed-ended questions produced quantitative data that, while not significant to my research

question, may help the reader better contextualize the setting and the situation. This information, including gender percentages, distribution of interviewees among villages and sub-villages, and length of residency, is provided in Tables A.1 and A.2. All total there were 125 separate interviews of villagers and village leaders conducted by the entire research team, 96 of which were conducted in Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu. I conducted 43 of those 96 interviews assisted by a local interpreter. Interviews typically lasted anywhere from 30-90 minutes. In many of these interviews at least one additional person was present, usually another family member, and these people occasionally provided responses to the questions along with the interviewee. Also, village leaders, sub-village leaders, or designated village “guides”⁸¹ sometimes accompanied us to interviews and made comments during the discussions that ensued. In these cases my field notes indicate who is speaking if it is someone other than the interviewee identified initially. There were also three occasions when interview turned into impromptu focus groups with various individuals answering questions, often simultaneously. Although attempts were made to identify who was speaking in the field notes this was sometimes impossible, especially since translations were occurring while other people were speaking. Finally, an interviewee’s assorted family members often suspended what

⁸¹ I was also followed around by an “undesigned guide” in Minjingu. This fellow, who was always dressed in a t-shirt with “Batman” emblazoned on the front, rode his bicycle all around the village. It took me a couple of weeks to realize that he was everywhere we were and women and children tended to scatter when he appeared. I have no idea if he was following us out of curiosity or if there were other reasons involved.

they were doing to listen to the interview without commenting on the proceedings. This happened so often, in fact, that it was actually a rare occasion when an interview occurred without another person present. Sixty-one of these additional people are accounted for in the interviews that were conducted throughout the five villages (see the note for Table A.1).

Because I am not fluent in Swahili, a local translator mediated between me and each interviewee. I recorded each interview in a field notebook and on several occasions the interpreter made his own notes in a separate notebook as he translated questions and answers for me. Access to uninterrupted electricity was rare in the field so field notes were not transcribed into electronic format until after I returned to the U.S. As a precaution, I made copies of all the notebooks when I left the field (that was fun) and had the copies shipped home ahead of me.

Additional Informants

Although village leaders certainly provided me with information that was perhaps not readily available to the average villager, I hesitate calling these individuals key informants since they were often just as confused about the situation as everyone else. Also, as the research team was trying hard to stay removed from village decisions regarding what to do about the WMA and there was an undercurrent of suspicion about the involvement of elected officials in the WMA process, I did not

Table A.1 Distribution of interviews by gender, village and sub-village

Village and Sub-Village	Males	Females	Unidentified	Total Interviews
Minjingu				
Kakoi	17	2	0	19
Songa Mbele	11	10	2	23
Olevolos	10	5	1	16
Almasi	16	3	0	19
Makao Mapaya	7	0	0	7
Vilima Vitatu				
Mdori	9	3	0	12
Mswakini Juu				
Shimamo	10	0	0	10
Randilen	3	0	0	3
Corridor area (sub-village not identified)	5	1	0	6
Mswakini Chini	9	0	0	9
Oltukai	1	0	0	1
Totals	98	24	3	125

Note: One additional person was present at 15 interviews (M=8/F=6/U=1); two additional people were present at 4 interviews (M=6/F=2); five additional people were present at 1 interview (M=5); 13 additional people were present at 1 interview (M=13); and there were two groups of people with approximately 10 men in each.

Table A.2 Immigration to the study area

Dates of Immigration	1955-1959	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2002	Total
Number of interviewees who had immigrated to the study area	3	18	26	24	25	1	97

Note: Twenty-eight interviewees did not provide information about their length of residency.

want to appear to be working with these officials to influence them one way or the other. Nevertheless, the leaders of Minjingu in particular seemed sincere in their support of my research not the least because they were very interested in what people in the furthest reaches of the village had to say.⁸² They were well aware that these people are effectively beyond their reach because they physically can't get to them. They were very open in terms of discussing things about the village including its history, the relationship of that history to the national parks, and how that history was reflected in the village records we were allowed to scrutinize and, in some cases, copy.

Another informant who contributed to my research was the soon-to-be former land manager of AWF. Although this individual had his own lively history in the area, a history that did not always sit well with local residents, he was actually frank at times regarding the questionable strategies and objectives of the organization. He also provided opportunities for field trippers from Mweka, including me, to visit the AWF office in Arusha and learn about the conservation programs that AWF sponsored or supported in the Tarangire area. Finally, he made himself available informally for discussions with the research team. Another AWF employee provided some rather delicate information to us about the organization,

⁸² I never was quite sure about the sincerity of the Chairman of Vilima Vitatu. I just couldn't get past my initial impression that he was interested in us for reasons other than simple curiosity or the potential assistance that most people assumed we could provide.

the kind of information that made us think twice about going back in the field after meeting with the Babati District Game Officer and made me hustle to the nearest copier so I could make sure we were covered if our field notes “accidentally” disappeared.

Documentary Investigation

I collected and examined numerous documents published by various agencies of the Tanzanian government relating to conservation, natural resource and wildlife management and land tenure. I have already described the purpose of these examinations in multiple sections of this thesis, and I will rely on Patton to clarify the importance of those assessments:

Documents prove valuable not only because of what can be learned directly from them but also as stimulus for paths of inquiry that can be pursued only through direct observation and interviewing. (2002: 294)

Data Analysis

Interviews were preliminarily analyzed at the end of each field day to identify common themes, evaluate the relevance of the questions being asked, and add new questions if a different pattern appeared to be emerging. All field notes were transcribed and typed into a word processing program by the author after

returning to the U.S. When field notes were written in Swahili, as sometimes happened when a Tanzanian member of the research team was independently interviewing villagers, translations were made by my advisor, Jim Igoe. Handling all the transcription on my own meant that I could immerse myself in the data and take my time understanding how it was all connected. Since some of the interviews were conducted by other members of the research team, getting a feel for the data as a cumulative product was extremely important in helping me to identify and understand themes and patterns. I eventually produced several different versions of this product which allowed me to approach the data from different angles.

Isolating themes and patterns that were identified in the field notes required a constant comparison of the stories told with the documentary evidence that I had collected, and then linking all this to existing theories and other case studies about community-conservation programs. Since an inductive, grounded theory approach strives to build from the specific to the general, the theory that I discussed in Chapter 5 is directly related to the research process. But rather than simply “a set of findings, it offers an explanation about phenomena” (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 22) that are found not only in Tanzania but most anywhere conservation and development are associated.

Study Limitations

As mentioned above, although I had a basic understanding of Swahili I used a Tanzanian interpreter for all of my interviews. Two male interpreters were available, both of whom were fluent in Swahili and English. Although they were from other parts of the area and also strangers in the villages in which we worked, because they were Tanzanian they could, as Crapanzano described: “be incorporated into [the informant’s] world, could be classified and understood in a way that I could never be” (1980: 145). Consequently, they were indispensable to me not only as interpreters but also as intermediaries who could negotiate with village leaders for access to a village, encourage informants to participate in interviews, and mediate my relationship with those informants. Typical interviews consisted of me posing questions which were translated by my interpreter, who then translated the answer back to me. Because these gentlemen were experienced field assistants who had worked with my advisor on prior research projects, I felt confident trusting them to decide if a question was for any reason inappropriate or if the timing was off. For instance, they could postpone or skip a question if the mood had changed in such a way that asking the question might elicit a negative reaction toward us, or they could ask questions out of order to more closely follow the dialogue or to allow for more detailed investigation of particular topics. Finally, since most interviews elicited similar information, the interpreters often

combined questions or prompted interviewees for information outside of the questions if they sensed a new direction emerging. I did the same, and the interpreters and I got to a point where we could often anticipate each other's sense of the best route to take as an interview progressed.

As stated above, my advisor had prior experience with both field assistants and he trusted their abilities as translators. Nevertheless, there is always the potential for problems when an interpreter is used. On a basic level, the rhythm of the interview can be slowed or disjointed, especially if an informant is at all distrustful or unenthusiastic to begin with. There are also nuances that may be missed in translation, and there are cultural meanings and understandings that may not translate accurately from one language to another or that may not even exist in the other language. In addition, contrary to Crapanzano's assertion that the reality of an encounter between individuals is "usually presumed to be the reality of one's counterpart to which one has acquiesced" (Preface: ix), I would argue that the reality of an encounter is always our reality that we project on "the other". The interpreter, as "a spokesman" for both parties (ibid.: 149) and the "controller of the word" (ibid.: 150), may accidentally or intentionally skew a question or an answer to correspond with his worldview or intentions. Likewise, there is no way to know how much my inability to understand what was being said, or an informant's belief in my inability to understand what was being said (not to mention the fact that I was white, female, and a foreigner), might have influenced the direction of the

interview, the answers to the questions, or the product of the research. Crapanzano wrote that “we assume the transparency of language” but this assumption is a “mystification that [is] necessary for social existence” (ibid.: 137). Indeed, perhaps the informants gave me what they thought I wanted, or perhaps the interpreters conveyed what they felt was important.

However, I had confidence that both field assistants understood the importance of encouraging informants to be candid in their responses and in accurately reporting what those responses were. Invariably my assistant and I discussed each interview after it ended – not only to fill in potential gaps in my notes, but also because we were both interested in and excited about the information that we had obtained. At the end of each field day the field assistant almost always read through my notes to verify their accuracy and, as I explained earlier in this Appendix, every evening we discussed the general themes that had emerged so as to confirm the essence of the interviews and explore any new directions that needed to be pursued.

Finally, my advisor was present at several interviews and he was able to corroborate the translations. Moreover, interviews that he conducted in Swahili on his own for the parallel research that he was conducting produced similar responses to the survey questions, further validating the translations that I was getting. I contend that the truth of the translations in this field study is not only in the sheer number of interviews that were conducted, but it is also in the degree to which

those interviews resulted in similar responses and criticisms and reflected mutual frustrations and disappointments on the part of the informants. In addition, our collective resolve to hear as many voices as possible and to constantly triangulate their stories from every conceivable direction allowed us to find the truths in the confusing and conflicting discourse produced by government officials and conservation representatives.

Additional Data Collected

Although this thesis focuses mostly on Minjingu and Vilima Vitatu, it is important to note that nearly 24% of the interviews conducted (N=29) involved residents of the neighboring villages of Mswakini Chini, Mswakini Juu and Oltukai. My fieldwork included these villages for two basic reasons. First, because the categories used by local people to discuss the WMA were conceptualized and defined using different terminology (WMA, Community WMA, conservation area, forest reserve, etc.) it was a bit unclear at the beginning of the field season where the WMA began and ended and which villages and parts of village land were actually included in it. Some people thought their village was part of the WMA when it wasn't and others thought they weren't part of the WMA when they were. Accordingly, the research team spent a lot of time looking at village maps and creating additional maps based on descriptions provided by

interviewees and village leaders and then orienting these descriptions with WMA beacons, the boundary of Tarangire (when we could find it), and the increasing ruggedness of the environment the closer you went to the WMA and the Park. Second, it became clear early on that although conservationists had basically one objective – saving wildlife by keeping people separate from it – the means by which this objective was accomplished involved different strategies depending on where a village was located. In other words, even for villages that did not control land targeted for the WMA, there were still other kinds of conservation that could be made to work for them.

For instance, Mswakini Juu and Mswakini Chini had been specifically targeted by African Wildlife Foundation for a conservation easement program called Kwa Kuchinja Easements for the Environment through Partnership or KKEEP. As I explained in Chapter 2, Kwa Kuchinja is an historical wildlife migration corridor running from Tarangire past the Ranch to Lake Manyara. The corridor bisects Mswakini Chini and Mswakini Juu and you can easily identify it due to the near-absence of trees and houses, the smoothness of the terrain, and the hand-lettered sign on the paved road that points it out to passing tourists. The KKEEP program encouraged residents of these two villages to turn their farms into conservation easements in exchange for cash so that the corridor would remain undeveloped and open for wildlife movement. In Oltukai, Maasai herders were targeted for programs emanating from Tanzania Land Conservation Trust (TLCT),

the AWF affiliate managing Manyara Ranch. There is a long and conflicted history between Maasai and the Ranch pre-dating AWF's involvement which I will not delve into here (see Igoe 2007 for details of this history), but suffice to say that because of this history AWF has been obliged to publicly focus attention on the needs of and its apparent partnership with this community. Indeed, a good chunk of its website is focused on Maasai located in The Maasai Steppe Heartland, an area which includes both national parks and the Ranch (AWF 2007, 2007a, 2007b and 2007c). However, the realities of this focus don't quite make it down to the ground where Maasai we interviewed spoke loud and long about their exclusion from the Ranch and the steady imposition of AWF programs on their way of life. Likewise, many people in the villages targeted for KKEEP also complained about the grazing policies instituted by TLCT and the shrinking availability of grazing land that was severely affecting their ability to maintain their livelihoods.

Consequently, it was critical to understand the multiplicity of conservation programs in the area and how these programs fit together to accomplish the kinds of environmental goals that require the inclusion of land and resources of more than just the villages involved with the Burunge WMA. Examining the experiences of other people who were targeted by conservation in different ways but for similar reasons simply provided more verification of the findings I had already collected.

APPENDIX B

Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Record the date, the village name and the gender of interviewee. Also determine if the interviewee holds any office in the village government, sub-village government or a political party.

Start with questions about the interviewee's history in the area:

1. How long have you been here and where did you come from?
 - a. Why did you move? (possible answers: too many people, large farms, park nearby)
 - b. How did you hear about this area? Why was it a good place to move to?

Questions about the research area:

2. What was the area like when you first got here?
 - a. Lots of farms?
 - b. Lots of livestock?
 - c. Just open space with wildlife?
 - d. Who was here (other tribes, foreigners, etc.) and are they still here?
 - e. If not, where are these people they now?
 - f. How has the area changed since you arrived?
3. When you first came here was wildlife a problem?
 - a. If so, are things better now or worse?
 - b. Which animals cause the most problems?
 - c. What is it they do?
 - d. Have you ever had a house broken into by an elephant?
 - e. What was the damage? House destroyed? Grain taken?

- f. When was the first time you heard about elephants breaking into houses?
- g. Why do they do this?
- h. Is one time of year worse than another for this behavior?
- i. Does drought intensify this behavior?
- j. Does the Park have anything to do with this behavior?
- k. Does the conservation area (WMA) have anything to do with this behavior?

Questions about individual livelihood strategies:

- 4. Do you farm in the village or nearby?
 - a. How many acres?
 - b. On average how many gunias do you get per acre?
 - c. Has that changed from years past?
 - d. Is the farm big enough to sustain the household, i.e., is everyone getting enough to eat?
 - e. What do you lose on average from elephant damage?
 - f. How much can an elephant destroy in one night?
 - g. Did you have a farm in the conservation area (WMA)?
 - h. If interviewee is keeping livestock or if a pastoralist only: what kinds of concerns do you have vis-à-vis farming and the conservation area (WMA)? Are these activities encroaching on grazing land?

Questions about conservation programs in the research area:

- 5. Depending on the location of the village:
 - a. Have you heard of the conservation area, WMA, KKEEP, Manyara Ranch?
 - b. What do you know about it/them?
 - c. What were you told about it?
 - d. Did anyone tell you what it was for?
 - e. Who told you? When did they come?
 - f. Who has authority over it?
 - g. What benefits do you get from it?
 - h. What benefits were you told you would get from it?
 - i. What benefits would be important to you or good for you?

Specific questions about the WMA:

6. For villages with the WMA:
 - a. Was anyone living in the WMA before it was established?
 - b. Was anyone farming in the WMA before it was established?
 - c. Were you living or farming in the WMA before it was established?
 - d. If so, what happened to you?
 - e. Did someone ask you to leave or make you leave? If so, who was that?
 - f. Who, if anyone, helped you find another place to live?
 - g. Where were you told to go? Were you given choices?
 - h. Who put in the beacons?
 - i. Who patrols the area?
 - j. Do you know if anyone has been harassed for being in there for any reason?
 - k. What benefits come from the WMA?
 - l. What benefits do you see yourself from the WMA?
 - m. If you don't see benefits, who does?

Specific questions about KKEEP:

7. For villages with KKEEP:
 - a. Where is the village conservation area?
 - b. Where is the KKEEP area?
 - c. Is anyone living in either of these areas?
 - d. If so, has anyone been asked to move from either of these areas?
 - e. Who asked them to move?
 - f. Were they compensated in any way?
 - g. Where were they told to go?
 - h. Does anyone patrol either of these areas?
 - i. Can you graze livestock in either of these areas?
 - j. Can you farm in either of these areas?
 - k. What benefits come from the conservation area and/or KKEEP?
 - l. What benefits do you see yourself from the conservation area and/or KKEEP?

- m. If you don't see benefits, who does?

Specific questions about Manyara Ranch:

- 8. For villages near Manyara Ranch:
 - a. Can anyone go onto the Ranch?
 - b. Do you go onto the Ranch?
 - c. What for?
 - d. Do you graze livestock on the Ranch?
 - e. Do you need a permit to do this?
 - f. Who owns the Ranch?
 - g. Who patrols the Ranch?
 - h. Do you have enough grazing land for your livestock?
 - i. What benefits come from the Ranch?
 - j. What benefits do you see yourself from the Ranch?
 - k. If you don't see benefits, who does?

General questions about popular concerns:

- 9. A lot of places we go to people ask us if we're here to move them.
 - a. Have you heard of people doing this?
 - b. Have you heard of any people being moved?
 - c. If not, why do you think people are worried about this?
- 10. Do you have any questions for me?
 - a. About what we're doing?
 - b. About what we'll do with the information we get?

APPENDIX C

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AA	Authorized Association
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CWMA	Community-Based Wildlife Management Area
AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
FZS	Frankfurt Zoological Society
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
LUP	Land Use Plan
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MKUKUTA	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PLUM	Participatory Land Use Management
TANAPA	Tanzania National Parks
TLCT	Tanzania Land Conservation Trust
WD	Wildlife Division
WMA	Wildlife Management Area
WPT	Wildlife Policy of Tanzania
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

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