

The Bush Administration & African Oil: The Security Implications of US Energy Policy

Daniel Volman

'It's been reliably reported,' former US Ambassador to Chad Donald R. Norland announced during a House Africa Subcommittee hearing in April 2002, 'that, for the first time, the two concepts—'Africa' and 'U.S national security'—have been used in the same sentence in Pentagon documents.'¹ When US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Michael A. Westphal held a press briefing that same month, he noted that **'fifteen per cent of the US's imported oil supply comes from sub-Saharan Africa' and that 'this is also a number which has the potential for increasing significantly in the next decade.'** This, Westphal explained, is the main reason that Africa matters to the United States and why **'we do follow it very closely,'** at the Pentagon.² And during his July 2002 visit to Nigeria, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Walter Kansteiner declared that **'African oil is of strategic national interest to us' and 'it will increase and become more important as we go forward.'**³ While American interest in oil and other strategic raw materials from Africa is not new, the Bush Administration's decision to define African oil as a **'strategic national interest' and thus, a resource that the United States might choose to use military force to control is completely unprecedented and deeply disturbing.**

Bush Administration Energy Policy & African Oil

This new attention to African oil is a direct consequence of the Bush Administration's new strategy to ensure US national energy security. The administration's new strategy is based on the conclusions of the May 2001 report of the president's National Energy Policy Development Group, chaired by Vice President Richard Cheney and known as the Cheney Report. According to the report, the only way to satisfy the growing demand of American consumers and producers for energy and maintain American prosperity is to ensure that the United States has reliable access to increasing quantities of oil and natural gas from foreign sources. Without more oil and gas, President Bush warns, the United States will face significant threats to its economic well-being and its national security.

While most public attention has been focused on the implications of the new strategy for the expansion of oil exploration and drilling within the United States, the Cheney Report itself makes clear that most of the additional oil that America wants will have to come from abroad. At present, the United States gets about 53 per cent of its petroleum requirement from foreign sources; by 2020, according to the Cheney

Report, that figure is expected to rise to 62 per cent because overall US oil consumption will continue to rise.⁴ This means increasing America's oil imports by 50 per cent, from 11.5 million barrels per day in 2000 to 17.7 barrels per day over the next two decades.⁵

The Bush administration has explicitly characterised this reliance on imported oil as a threat to national security. 'On our present course,' the Cheney Report warns, 'America 20 years from now will import nearly two of every three barrels of oil—a condition of increased dependency on foreign powers that do not always have America's interests at heart.'⁶ Of particular concern to the Bush administration, according to the Cheney Report, is the 'policy challenge' posed by the 'concentration of world oil production in any one region of the world' (i.e. the Persian Gulf region).⁷ The Persian Gulf has long been an area of turbulence and war, which have led to the periodic interruption of oil exports, and concerns about US access to oil resources has only been fueled by the events of 11 September 2001 and the outbreak of the war with Iraq in March 2003. 'To meet our long-range energy needs,' Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham told the House International Relations Committee on 20 June 2002, 'we must expand and diversify our sources and types of energy. To assure energy security, we need to maintain a diversity of fuels from a multiplicity of sources.'⁸ So, as a matter of policy, the Bush Administration will encourage greater oil production throughout the world to enhance the diversity of sources for oil available for import and to make sure that American industries and consumers (particularly car owners) can get cheap and reliable supplies of oil.

This emphasis on diversity has led the Bush Administration to devote its attention to several other oil-producing areas, the Caspian Sea region, Latin America, and 'of particular note' to Africa. Thus, the Cheney Report declares that, 'greater diversity of world oil production remains important,' most 'notably through deep-water offshore exploration and production in the Atlantic Basin, stretching from off-shore Canada to the Caribbean, Brazil, and West Africa.'⁹ Sub-Saharan Africa, the Cheney Report observes, 'holds 7 per cent of world oil reserves and comprises 11 per cent of world oil production,' and 'is expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market.'¹⁰ In 2000, the Cheney Report states, African countries provided 14 per cent of total US oil imports' (equivalent to the per cent provided by Saudi Arabia);¹¹ but by 2015, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency, West Africa alone will supply 25 per cent of America's imported oil.¹² Of particular significance is the fact that 'many West African streams are lighter, higher-valued crude oils that are tailor-made for US East Coast markets and are able to offer an alternative to Middle Eastern supply sources.'¹³ In its efforts to promote greater diversity in oil supplies, the Bush Administration is focusing its attention on six African countries: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.

In 2000, the Cheney Report notes Nigeria 'exported an average of 900,000 barrels of oil per day to the United States, out of its total production of 2.1 million barrels of oil per day;' and 'has set ambitious production goals as high as 5 million barrels of oil per day over the coming decade.'¹⁴ This constitutes 9.7% of US oil imports and made Nigeria the 5th largest crude oil exporter to the United States, behind Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela. The country has estimated proven oil reserves of 22.5 billion barrels and approximately 65% of its main crude oil is what is known as light and sweet (oil that is easy to pump and refine because it is more fluid and has a low sulfur content). Along with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (the state-owned oil firm), companies with major interests in Nigerian oil include the American firms ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, Anglo-Dutch Shell, the Italian firm

ENI/Agip, and Franco-Belgian TotalFinaElf. The country has resolved disputes with Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé over the division of oil production in contested maritime border regions, but refuses to accept the 10 October 2002 decision of the International Court of Justice awarding control of the nearly all of the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. This dispute has led to several clashes between Nigerian and Cameroonian troops in recent years and remains a potential flashpoint for war.¹⁵

The Cheney Report observes that in 2000, 'Angola exported 300,000 barrels of oil per day out of its 750,000 barrels of oil per day of total production to the United States, and is thought to have the potential to double its exports over the next ten years.'¹⁶ In fact, according to the US Energy Department, 'Angola's oil production will increase to levels of 2.1 million barrels per day by 2010, almost tripling current levels, and to 3.3 million barrels per day by 2020.'¹⁷ Therefore, 'there is a long-term strategic value to Angolan crude oil supplies that should not be underestimated.'¹⁸ Angola is the ninth largest supplier of imported oil to the United States and the second largest non-OPEC supplier outside the Western Hemisphere. The leading foreign oil companies operating in Angola in association with the state oil company, Sonangol, are the American firms ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, and the Franco-Belgian company TotalFinaElf.¹⁹

'Other significant exporters to the United States,' the Cheney Report remarks, 'include Gabon and the Congo-Brazzaville.'²⁰ Gabon (which left OPEC in 1996) is sub-Saharan Africa's third largest oil producer and exported about 140,000 barrels of oil per day to the United States in 2001, accounting for over 46% of Gabon's crude oil production. The country's proven oil reserves have increased to 2.5 billion barrels in 2002 and are composed chiefly of the more desirable light and sweet variety. Major oil companies operating in Gabon include Anglo-Dutch Shell, Franco-Belgian TotalFinaElf, Italian ENI/Agip, and the American firm Amerada Hess.²¹ In March 2003, Gabonese paramilitary police occupied the island of Mbagne, a tiny territory in the oil-rich waters in the Bay of Corisco that has been claimed by both Gabon and Equatorial Guinea since 1970.²² The Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) is sub-Saharan Africa's fourth largest oil producer and while most of its exports are destined for France, it exported 38,000 barrels of oil per day to the United States in 2001. The country's estimated proven reserves stand at 1.5 billion barrels and are generally of the medium-to-light and sweet type. Franco-Belgian TotalFinaElf and Italian ENI/Agip dominate oil production in Congo-Brazzaville, but the American firms ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil are partners in the development of several oilfields.²³

In Chad, two American firms – ExxonMobil (40%) and Chevron (25%) – and Malaysia's state-owned Petronas (35%) are investing 3.7 billion to develop major oilfields in the Doba Basin in the southern part of the country and to build a pipeline to carry the oil through Cameroon to a storage and off-loading facility near Kribi on the Atlantic coast. Construction of the pipeline will be completed in 2003 and, when the oil begins to flow soon thereafter, Chad will be able to export 225,000 to 250,000 barrels per day.²⁴ In recent years Equatorial Guinea has also become a major exporter of oil from offshore deposits. Production reached 181,000 barrels per day in 2001, of which almost two-thirds was purchased by the United States. Four American companies 'ExxonMobil, Marathon Oil, Amerada Hess, and Ocean Energy' dominate oil production and exploration in Equatorial Guinea.²⁵

In addition, there is no doubt that the Bush Administration wants America to regain access to Sudan's oil. Crude oil production in Sudan averaged 227,550 barrels per day in 2002; the country's oil output could surpass 300,000 barrels per day in 2003, with plans to reach 450,000 barrels per day by 2005. And Sudan's estimated proven reserves of crude oil stood at 563 million barrels, as of January 2003. At present, US law prohibits American trade with Sudan, as well as investment by US businesses in the country and all business dealings with the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (the international consortium of companies currently extracting oil from Sudan). Along with the Sudanese national firm Sudapet (5%), the consortium is made up of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (40%), Malaysia's state-owned Petronas (30%), and the Canadian firm Talisman Energy (25%). In October 2002, Talisman agreed to sell its oil assets in Sudan to Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, the Indian state oil company, and in March 2003, Talisman announced that it still expected to complete the sale, despite months of delay.²⁶

The Bush Administration is now making a concerted effort to promote a negotiated settlement of the civil war in Sudan, which would make it possible for American oil companies to return to the country. President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth, an influential Republican and an old friend of the president, to be his special envoy to Sudan in a move intended to give new life to the negotiation process being undertaken by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development under the leadership of Kenya. With Ambassador Danforth's involvement, the government in Khartoum and the leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Army has reached a partial ceasefire and are now moving toward agreement on a framework peace agreement, although vital issues 'including the distribution of political authority, the application of *sharia* law, and the distribution of revenues from oil exports' remain unresolved. Oil is not the only reason for the administration's efforts to end the Sudanese conflict. But it is certainly one of the main factors 'along with the pressure from human rights groups, African-Americans and Africanist activists, right-wing groups with an interest in US policy toward Islamic extremist governments and toward China, and Christian churches and missionary organisations' that got President Bush's attention.²⁷

US National Security & African Oil

As a result of the Bush administration's strategy of increasing oil imports and ensuring that the United States has access to as many sources as possible, thus, African oil is now seen in Washington as a 'vital national security interest' of the United States. Achieving the goals of the administration's energy policy, including that of maintaining and expanding access to African oil, will be central preoccupation of the entire Bush Administration, but they obviously have a particular significance to the Defense Department. What then is the Pentagon doing now to ensure that African oil will continue to flow to the United States?

One possibility now being considered is to assign responsibility for Africa within the Defense Department to a new Africa Command. At present, responsibility for Africa is divided between the European Command (which is primarily responsible for military operations in Europe, but is also responsible for operations in north Africa and most of sub-Saharan Africa), the Central Command (which is responsible for operations throughout a wide region stretching from Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east to Egypt, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa in the west), and the Pacific Command (which is responsible for operations in the Indian Ocean. This means that Africa is neither a focus of attention for either command nor a priority for their staff officers,

whose career prospects depend upon their service in the protection of American interests in other parts of the world. A new Africa Command would have direct authority over military units that are currently dispersed among the other commands, just as was done in 1980 when the Central Command was created in response to growing concern about access to Persian Gulf oil in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. 'I know it's been discussed,' Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael A. Westphal disclosed at his April 2002 press briefing, and 'I've actually engaged in a couple of discussions' about creating a separate Africa Command.²⁸ Consideration of an African Command will continue, but the prospects for its creation in the near future appear slight, due to the inevitable bureaucratic resistance from the other commands and the scarcity of funding and resources at a time when the Pentagon is preoccupied with developments in the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, Central Asia, the Philippines, Colombia, and Venezuela.

In the immediate future, therefore, the attention of Mr. Westphal and other Defense Department officials will be engaged chiefly with efforts to strengthen the security forces of oil-producing countries and enhance their ability to ensure that their oil continues to flow to the United States. It is doing this through three main channels. The first of these is the sale of arms to African governments through the Foreign Military Sales program and the Commercial Sales program. The second is the provision of military training and education programs both in Africa and in the United States for African troops and officers through the International Military Education and Training program, the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program (the successor to the African Crisis Response Initiative program created by the Clinton Administration in 1997), and the African Regional Peacekeeping Program. Finally, the Pentagon is conducting joint military exercises with military forces throughout the continent in order to train local forces and to enhance the ability of US forces to engage in military operations in Africa.

As the chart below indicates, the principal target of US military assistance programs is Nigeria, the country that is America's most important source of oil imports from sub-Saharan Africa. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 (1 October 2002-30 September 2003), the Defense Department intends to sell \$4.5 million worth of arms to Nigeria (funded by low-interest US loans for which repayment is generally waived) along with another \$12.6 million worth of military equipment that will be sold directly to Nigeria by private US arms-producers under licenses issued by the State Department. The Pentagon also plans to give nearly \$1 million worth of military training to Nigerian troops at military facilities in the United States through the IMET program, an amount that will cover the costs of training some 200 Nigerian officers in a wide variety of combat operations and administrative functions; this is the second largest IMET program for sub-Saharan Africa, exceeded only by the IMET program for the Republic of South Africa. The Pentagon also proposes to give military training through the IMET program to significant numbers of military officers from all the other major oil-producing countries of sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. And two of these countries – Angola and Gabon – are expected to buy substantial amounts of US military equipment from private US arms-producers under licenses issued by the State Department.²⁹

The Bush Administration has worked vigorously to promote these security relationships at a series of high-level meetings between American officials and African political leaders and government representatives. On 4 June 2002, US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham appeared before the Third US-Africa Energy Ministers Meeting in Casablanca, Morocco. 'All of us here face one overriding energy challenge:

energy security,' Secretary Abraham declared. 'We all agree that we must have plentiful, reliable and affordable supplies of a mix of energy sources, produced both at home and abroad,' because 'energy security is essential to economic growth and prosperity.'³⁰ When Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner traveled to Africa on 21-26 July 2002, the two countries he visited were Nigeria and Angola. During his visit to Nigeria, he met with President Olusegun Obasanjo to discuss oil production and cooperation on counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and other security matters. Kansteiner denied reports that the United States was pressing Nigeria to leave OPEC, proclaiming that 'it was never raised' and 'it's not for us to weigh in on that.'³¹ But 'what we did discuss was how the Gulf of Guinea writ large, from, you know, Côte d'Ivoire to Angola, how it is continuing to provide additional barrels per day to the United States, and as we look in the future, West Africa will probably play an increasingly important role in providing the United States with imported oil.'³² And he publicly announced, 'African oil is of strategic national interest to us.'³³ In Angola, Kansteiner met with President Jose Eduardo dos Santos for talks on oil production and other topics, including the food crisis in southern Africa. On 3-11 October 2002, Assistant Secretary Kansteiner traveled to four countries, two oil-producing states – Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe – and two other west African states – Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea – threatened by conflict and regional violence. And on 5 September 2002, during his three-nation tour of Africa, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Angola and Gabon, both important oil-producing countries, after attending the UN conference on sustainable development in Johannesburg, South Africa.³⁴

When President Bush went to speak at the United Nations on 13 September 2002, he took the opportunity to meet with the presidents of eleven African countries: Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, South Africa, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Along with topics such as corruption, investment, HIV/AIDS, and conflict resolution, President Bush took the opportunity to discuss America's need for energy security with the heads of state of four current oil-producing countries (Chad, the Congo Republic, Cameroon, and Gabon) as well as those of two countries that could become important producers in the future (São Tomé and the Democratic Republic of Congo).

In advance of the talks, President Fradique de Menezes of São Tomé confirmed that President Bush and he would be discussing the possibility of increased cooperation in security matters. In recent months, São Tomé has repeatedly been mentioned as a potential site for a major new military base that would be used by the US military. In July 2002, General Carlton Fulford, deputy commander of the US European Command, visited the country for talks on security cooperation. In October 2002, Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner declared after visiting São Tomé that there was no question of building a US base there, although the administration was thinking of providing patrol boats to build up the country's maritime and customs controls and would be supplying other types of security assistance as well. 'There are no plans to set up US military installations in São Tomé. In fact, there are no plans to set up US military installations anywhere in Central or West Africa, so there were no discussions *per se* on that.'³⁵ However, when São Tomé and Nigeria settled a dispute about the division of oil production in a contested maritime border region, Nigeria pledged to fund the construction of a deep-water port in São Tomé and Prime Minister Maria das Neves has indicated that the facility will be made available to the United States for use as a 'sheltering port.'³⁶ And in May 2003, NATO Supreme Commander, US General James Jones told defense correspondents that 'the United States plans to boost is troop presence in Africa and, specifically, that 'the [aircraft]

carrier battle groups of the future and the expeditionary strike groups of the future may not spend six months in the Med[iterranean Sea] but I'll bet they'll spend half the time going down the West Coast of Africa.³⁷ In addition, the Bush Administration has expressed interest in expanding its small training program for the country's naval forces. 'Nothing specific is on the table right now,' stated Theresa Whelan, the director of the Pentagon's Office of African Affairs, but 'it is true that we do have legitimate security interests in ensuring that the offshore oil is protected and that the states that own those offshore rigs are able to protect them, so we have discussed the possibility of providing limited amounts of assistance to the coastal navies of such states.'³⁸ These plans may have been put in question, however, by the recent military coup in São Tomé.³⁹

To further bolster the ability of African military forces to protect access to oil resources, the Bush administration is in the process of transforming the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) – the program created in 1997 by the Clinton administration to enhance the ability of African troops to participate in peacekeeping operations – into a new, 'more robust' program to be known as the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program.* The transformation process began in December 2001 and continued through March 2002; in May 2002, the ACOTA program of military assistance and training began operating and the Pentagon is now recruiting new partner countries. The new initiative will provide 'more robust training and assistance relative to the likely threat environment,' including training in 'convoy escort, logistics, protection of refugees, negotiations, robust force protection, and command and control.'⁴⁰ It will also provide 'basic equipment appropriate to the full range of peace support operations, such as a comprehensive communications package, portable electric power generators, mine detectors, night vision devices, portable light sets, and water purification units.'⁴¹ The Pentagon is requesting \$10 million to fund the new project in Fiscal Year 2003.⁴² According to Greg Engle, the Director of the Office of Regional and Security Affairs at the State Department, 'we're moving ahead with Ghana, with Senegal . . . we're going ahead with Kenya, with Botswana. Ethiopia has indicated interest in going ahead. We're in discussions with the South Africans to build a program for that country and also with Nigeria.'⁴³

According to a US government official in Kenya speaking on condition of anonymity, the new scheme will constitute a more aggressive, military-style training initiative and will likely involve more training with weapons. It will include training of the sort that the Pentagon provided to Nigeria in 2000 through 'Operation Focus Relief (OFR)' to enhance their ability to intervene in the civil war in Sierra Leone. 'What we're looking at is something that retains the peacekeeping mission of ACRI and combines it with the military training component of OFR,' the official stated.⁴⁴ In FY 2003, the Pentagon has also requested to spend \$30 million to fund the Africa Regional Peacekeeping program. This program will be used to assist ongoing peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Burundi, and on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Perhaps the most important proposal contained in the Pentagon request, however, is to use some of the money to supplement Defense Department funding of the US European Command's 'Operation Shared Accord.' Through 'Operation Shared Accord,' the European Command will sponsor yearly sub-regional peacekeeping and disaster response exercises jointly with troops from African countries.⁴⁵

All these programs are intended to bolster the capacity of African military forces to protect oil production and transportation facilities from any conflict that might

disrupt oil shipments. But many oil fields lie in contested territory, as noted above, and most oil-producing countries are experiencing serious internal unrest. This is especially true in the case of Nigeria, which is by far the most important country from Washington's vantage point, where the dispute with Cameroon over control of the Bakassi Peninsula remains unresolved and where sectarian conflicts, political violence, and ethnic strife in the vital Niger River Delta area continue to escalate and spread.⁴⁶ It is clear that Washington would prefer to rely on Africans to ensure the free flow of oil, thus avoiding the need for any direct American military involvement, much less military intervention. However, the United States is also preparing for the day when American troops may be sent to Africa by conducting military exercises in Africa.

In February 2002, for example, 2,100 US Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the amphibious assault ships USS Bonhomme Richard and USS Pearl Harbor were redeployed from the Indian Ocean – where it was participating in the war in Afghanistan – to East Africa to conduct three weeks of joint maneuvers with Kenyan troops on that country's coast, including helicopter operations and amphibious landings. In April and May 2002, two US Navy hospital ships, the USS Dallas and the USS Minneapolis, conducted the regular West African Training Cruise and Medical Outreach Program mission, spending two weeks stationed off Togo and Ghana. In August 2002, US military medical personnel and Special Forces troops held a two-week long medical training exercise, known as MEDFLAG 02, in Entebbe and Sorotti, Uganda. And in September 2002, 200 US Air Force personnel went to the Waterkloof Air Force Base in South Africa to participate in the first bilateral training exercise with South African forces. And in December 2002, 300 Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Navy explosives experts, and Kenya troops took part in exercises at Manda Bay on the Kenyan coast that included an airfield seizure scenario and combat engineering.⁴⁷

Moreover, the Bush Administration is now engaged in an unprecedented effort to shift the forward lines of its existing overseas deployments deep into oil-rich regions of the world, specifically into Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. While the deployments will be small, in terms of numbers, they will pave the way for the establishment of equipment stockpiles and periodic training exercises for American troops. In addition, the United States will make major improvements to local airfields and other military facilities to prepare for future operations. In North Africa, Pentagon officials are looking at bases in Algeria, Morocco, and possibly Tunisia. South of the Sahara, they are examining the prospects for using bases in Senegal, Ghana, Mali, and Kenya. According to Marine General James L. Jones, head of the US European Command, the Pentagon was seeking to acquire access to two kinds of bases. Some would be forward outposts that could house up to a brigade (made up of 3,000 to 5,000 troops) and 'could be robustly used for a significant military presence.' Others would be prepared locations where Special Forces, Marines, or Army units could be moved quickly in times of emergency. As General Jones explained, 'we're trying to come up with a more flexible basing option that allows more engagement throughout our area of responsibility.' According to one Pentagon official, the United States could increase its troop strength to as many as 5,000 to 6,500 troops at up to a dozen bases.⁴⁸ The Bush Administration has also reached access agreements allowing American troops to use airfields in Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Zambia, and Namibia, and is discussing access agreements for the use of airfields in Nigeria, Benin, and Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁹ In the coming years, thus, the Bush administration will be strengthening American military ties with Africa (particularly with oil-producing countries) and ensuring that US troops are ready to

launch operations throughout the continent.

Conclusions

Does this mean that Washington will use military force to make sure that African oil continues to flow to the United States in the event that insurgents, civil wars, other internal conflicts, or conventional wars between African states threatens to disrupt it? This seems unlikely in the immediate future, if only because Washington has so much unfinished business in the Middle East to absorb its attention: the military occupation of Iraq, continuing operations in Afghanistan, and the crisis in Israel/Palestine. In the longer term, however, it appears that this is a real possibility, especially since African oil supplies will become ever more important to the United States over time. Washington is already committed to use military force to ensure the steady flow of Persian Gulf oil to the United States. 'An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States,' President Carter proclaimed in his State of the Union address in January 1980, '[and] will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.'⁵⁰ As African oil supplies become ever more vital to the United States, the prospects for direct American military intervention are sure to rise/mount.

Daniel Volman is Director of the African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, and the author of numerous articles on US military policy toward Africa and African security issues.

Endnotes

1. 'Testimony of His Excellency Donald R. Norland (Ret.), Former US Ambassador to the Republic of Chad,' House International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearing on the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline: A New Model for Natural Resources Development, 18 April 2002, p. 8.
2. US Department of Defense News Transcript, 'DoD News Briefing –Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Michael A. Westphal,' 2 April 2002, electronic version, p. 1, access at <<http://www.defenselink.mil>>.
3. 'Kofi Akosah-Sarpong, 'Washington eyes Africa's oil,' *West Africa*, No. 4354, 2-8 December 2002, p. 10.
4. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Annual Energy Outlook 2002,' December 2001, electronic version, p. 5, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/>>.
5. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Annual Energy Outlook 2002,' December 2001 electronic version, p. 60, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/>>.
6. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, p. x, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.
7. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, Chapter 8, p. 6, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.
8. US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, 'Statement of the Honorable Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, Before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, June 20, 2002,' electronic version, p. 4, access at <http://www.house.gov/international_relations>.
9. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, Chapter 8, pp. 6-7, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.
10. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001,

electronic version, Chapter 8, p. 11, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

11. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, Chapter 8, p. 4, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

12. US Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, 'Global Trends 2015,' December 2000), electronic version, p. 50, access at <<http://www.cia.gov/nic>>.

13 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'International Energy Outlook 2002,' April 2002, electronic version, p. 35, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>.

14. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, Chapter 8, p. 11, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

15 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Nigeria Country Report,' January 2002, electronic version, pp. 2-6, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>; 'Cameroon awarded oil-rich Bakassi,' BBC News, 10 October 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; 'Nigeria rejects world court ruling,' BBC News, 23 October 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; and John Chiarmen, Reuters, 'Nigeria Disputes Ruling to Cede Land,' *The Washington Post*, 24 October 2002, p. A30.

16. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, Chapter 8, p. 11, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

17. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'International Energy Outlook 2002,' April 2002, electronic version, p. 35, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>.

18. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'International Energy Outlook 2002,' April 2002, electronic version, p. 35, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>.

19. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Angola Country Report,' November 2002, electronic version, pp. 2-4, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>.

20. *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, Chapter 8, p. 11, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

21. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Gabon Country Report,' September 2002, electronic version, pp. 2-4, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>.

22. 'Guinea, Gabon row over oil island,' BBC News, 13 March 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>.

23. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Congo-Brazzaville Country Report,' March 2002, electronic version, pp. 2-4, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>.

24. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Chad Country Report,' October 2002, electronic version, pp. 2-4, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>> and *National Energy Policy*, report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001, electronic version, Chapter 8, p. 11, access at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

25. Ken Silverstein, 'US Oil Politics in the 'Kuwait of Africa', ' *The Nation*, Volume 274, Number 15, 22 April 2002, pp. 11-20; US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Equatorial Guinea Country Analysis Brief,' April 2002, electronic version, pp. 2-5, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/eqguinea.html>>; and Howard W. French 'West Africa's New Oil Barons: Equatorial Guinea Joins the Region's Bonanza,' *The New York Times*, 7 March 1998, Business, pp. 1-2.

26. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 'Sudan Country Report,' January 2003, electronic version, pp. 2-5, access at <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>> and 'Talisman promises Sudanese sale,' BBC News, 5 March 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>.

27. See 'Walter H. Kansteiner, 'Testimony,' House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearing on Reviewing the Sudan Peace Act Report, 13 May 2003, electronic version, access at <http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/kans0513.htm>.

28. US Department of Defense News Transcript, 'DoD News Briefing – Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Michael A. Westphal,' 2 April 2002, electronic version, p. 7, access at <<http://www.defenselink.mil>>.
29. US Department of State, 'Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2003,' April 2002, electronic version, pp. 450-524, access at <<http://www.state.gov>>.
30. US Department of Energy, 'Energy Security, Regional Integration and Energy Independence: Remarks by Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham at the Third US-Africa Energy Ministerial Meeting, Casablanca, Morocco, June 4, 2002, p. 2.
31. US Department of State, 'Briefing on Trip to Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria: Walter H. Kansteiner, III, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,' electronic version of press release, 29 July 2002, access at <<http://www.state.gov>>.
32. Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 'Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter H. Kansteiner to Travel to Luanda and Abuja,' electronic version of press release, 19 July 2002, access at <<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200207220033.html>>; Charles Cobb, Jr., 'US Not Pressuring Nigeria on OPEC, Says Kansteiner,' electronic version, access at <<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200207300254.html>>; and Carl Morished, 'US presses Africa to turn on the tap of crude oil,' *The Times* (London), 1 August 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk>>.
33. 'Kofi Akosah-Sarpong, 'Washington eyes Africa's oil,' *West Africa*, No. 4354, 2-8 December 2002, p. 10.
34. James Dao, 'In West African Visits, Powell Seeks to Prime Oil Pumps,' *The New York Times*, 6 September 2002, p. A6 and Glenn Kessler, 'Powell Warns of Reduction In Aid to Oil-Rich Angola,' *The Washington Post*, 6 September 2002, p. A17.
35. US Department of State, 'On-The-Record Briefing on Trip to Africa: Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,' electronic version of press release, 15 October 2002, access at <<http://www.state.gov>>; see also Jon Lee Anderson, 'Our New Best Friend,' *The New Yorker*, 7 October 2002, pp. 74-83.
36. James Dao, 'In Quietly Courting Africa, White House Likes Dowry: Oil,' *The New York Times*, 19 August 2002, p. A6; 'US naval base to protect Sao Tome oil,' BBC News, 22 August 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; Keith Somerville, 'US looks to Africa for 'secure oil',' BBC News, 13 September 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; Mark Doyle, 'US eyes African oil,' BBC News, 9 October 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; and 'Sao Tome plans US-backed oil boom,' BBC News, 14 October 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>.
37. Charles Cobb, Jr., 'Larger US Troops Presence May be Needed in Africa, Says NATO Commander,' AllAfrica news, 2 May 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200305020307.html>>.
38. Alex Belida, 'Pentagon: No Decision Yet on Military Assistance to Sao Tome,' *VOA News*, 24 July 2002, electronic version, p. 1, access at <<http://www.voanews.com>>.
39. 'Military Coup Ousts Government of Sao Tome in West Africa,' *The New York Times*, 17 July 2003, p. A5; 'Sao Tome Agreement Reinstates President: Mutineers Pardoned,' *The New York Times*, 24 July 2003, p. A6; 'Junta' declared in Sao Tome,' BBC News, 16 July 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; 'The Sao Tome coup-makers,' BBC News, 17 July 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; and 'Amnesty for Sao Tome coup,' BBC News, 24 July 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>;
40. US Department of State, 'Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2003,' April 2002, electronic version, p. 238, access at <<http://www.state.gov>>.
41. US Department of State, 'Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2003,' April 2002, electronic version, p. 238, access at <<http://www.state.gov>>.
42. US Department of State, 'Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2003,' April 2002, electronic version, p. 238, access at <<http://www.state.gov>>.

43. Alex Belida, 'US Readies to Launch Military Training Program for Sub-Saharan African Countries,' *VOA News*, 25 July 2002, electronic version, p. 1, access at <<http://www.voanews.com>>.

44. Kevin J. Kelley, 'US to Give Kenya Forces More Muscle,' *The East African*, 7 January 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/14012002/Regional/Regional21.html>>.

45. US Department of State, 'Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2003,' April 2002, electronic version, p. 242, access at <<http://www.state.gov>>.

46. See, for example, Somini Sengupta and Neela Banerjee, 'Nigerian Strife, Little Noticed, Is Latest Threat to Flow of Oil,' *The New York Times*, 22 March 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://nytimes.com>>; Associated Press, 'ChevronTexaco Shuts Facilities in Nigeria Delta,' *The New York Times*, 24 March 2003, p. A6; Reuters, 'Tribal Warfare Imperils Nigeria's Oil Facilities,' *The Washington Post*, 24 March 2003; Associated Press, 'Nigerian Troops Move Into Delta to Put Down Ethnic Riots,' *The Washington Post*, 26 March 2003, p. A11; Somini Sengupta, 'Ethnic Dispute Stills Nigeria's Mighty Oil Wells,' *The New York Times*, 1 April 2003, p. A3; Somini Sengupta, 'Oil Companies to Resume Work in Niger Delta,' *The New York Times*, 5 April 2003, p. A4; and 'Ethnic Militias Wage Battles in Nigeria, Killing 100,' *The New York Times*, 23 August 2003, p. 5.

47. Jerry Rostad, 'Fleet Hospital Prepares for West African Exercise,' *Naval Media Center NavNews*, 16 February 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.navy.mil>>; Christina Skacan, 'Navy Medicine Reaches West African Village,' *Navy and Marine Corps Medical News*, 25 April 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.navy.mil>>; Christina Skacan, 'US Naval Reservists Train with West Africans to Cope with Disaster,' US European Command Press Release, 30 May 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.eucom.mil>>; 'MEDFLAG 02,' US European Command Exercise Notice, August 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.eucom.mil>>; Rosaire Bushey, 'Air Force participates in South Africa exercise,' US European Command Press Release, 18 August 2003, electronic version access at <<http://www.eucom.mil>>; Eric Schmitt, 'Troops of US and Kenya Plan Exercise,' *The New York Times*, 3 February 2002; 'Kenya joins US in terror war games,' / BBC News, 5 December 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>; 'Kenya, US conduct military exercises,' Grandforks.com, 3 December 2002, electronic version, access at <<http://www.grandforks.com>>.

48. Greg Jaffe, 'Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners,' *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 May 2003, pp. A1 and A6; Greg Jaffe, 'In Massive Shift, US Is Planning To Cut Size of Military in Germany,' *The Wall Street Journal*, 10 June 2003, pp. A1 and A7; and Eric Schmitt, 'Pentagon Seeking New Access Pacts for Africa Base,' *The New York Times*, 5 July 2003, pp. A1 and A7.

49. Eric Schmitt, 'Pentagon Seeking New Access Pacts for Africa Base,' *The New York Times*, 5 July 2003, pp. A1 and A7. Martin Plaut, 'US to transfer troops into Africa,' BBC News, 17 September 2003, electronic version, access at <<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>.

50. Jimmy Carter, 'State of the Union Address,' 23 January 1980, text as published in *The New York Times*, 24 January 1980.