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Kenya & the War on Terrorism

Wanjiru Carolyne Kamau

During the past ten years, Kenya has endured a surprising amount of terrorist activity and has borne much of the brunt of international terrorist violence in Africa. This violence included an episode in 1998 when a car bomb exploded in the middle of bustling downtown Nairobi, killing 213 people, and wounding and maiming more than 4,000 more. The target of this attack was the US embassy in Nairobi. Another car bomb targeting the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, a major city in neighbouring Tanzania exploded simultaneously, injuring 85 people.

In 2002, the bombing of an Israeli-owned resort in the coastal town of Mombasa resulted in 18 dead.¹ Three Israeli guests and twelve Kenyan dancers from the Mabumbumbu Giriama troupe were killed in a blast after three bombers detonated their four-wheel-drive SUV packed with explosives.² In a simultaneous attack, a gang launched a missile aimed at an Israeli jet taking off from the Moi International airport also in Mombasa. The missiles, reportedly launched from another SUV outside the airport perimeter fence, failed to hit the aircraft and were found on farmland up to 40km away.

This essay explores what happens when the global war on terror, as led by the US and Britain, collides with the politics of democratic transition in Africa, and Kenya in particular. Specifically, I ana-lyse the unwavering response of Kenya's civil society in rejecting the Suppression of Terrorism Bill. Kenyans widely perceived this legislation, proposed by the four month old coalition government, as the government's submissive response to pressures by the US and Britain. This paper works to capture the moment when a very vocal civil society successfully rejected the influence over Kenyan politics that these major powers have exerted.

I begin with an exploration of the impetus for anti-terror legislation and then describe the Suppression of Terrorism Bill that the government proposed. I then explore the nature of civil society's responses to the proposed legislation, and turn to the political science literature on transitions to explain the ability of civil society to force the government to withdraw the legislation from parliament despite incredible pressures from foreign donors to see the legislation passed. I conclude with a brief discussion of democracy and the importance of a vocal civil society that remains vigilant even after a transition from dictatorship. Indeed, with the wave of democratisation currently sweeping across the continent, the Kenyan case provides helpful insight into the role of civil society in the consolidation of new democracies.

Domestic & international calls for a response

The terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa left Kenyans feeling particularly vulnerable. Even though the attacks were focused on foreign interests, it is

Kenyans who bore the brunt of these attacks. The government faced increasing pressure from domestic sources to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorists. In response to calls by the public, the Minister for Home Affairs, Moody Awori, declared that the ‘threat of terrorism had dealt a big blow to Kenya's economy and must be fought by all means’ (Africa News Update). Statements such as these from prominent government officials sought to ease Kenyans’ fears about repeated attacks.

International commitments also meant that the government was under pressure to act decisively. Kenya has signed and ratified all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism). In addition, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 sets a fierce and ambitious legislative and administrative agenda for all UN member states. This resolution was passed soon after, and in reaction to the tragic attacks on key US institutions on September 11^th 2001.

US and British government restriction of their citizens’ ability to travel to Kenya until anti-terrorism legislation was enacted also augmented international pressure on the Kenyan government to act. The presidents of Kenya and Tanzania complained that the travel restrictions and bans amounted to ‘economic sanctions’ against the East African states as they depended, to a large extent, on tourism as a hard-currency earner (Kuhenga, 2003).

The travel restrictions translated into severe economic pressure on the newly elected government as it was running low on funds to implement expensive campaign promises. It is in this context that the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Kiraitu Murungi, asserted that, ‘terrorism is threatening the economic recovery programme of the Government. In these circumstances, the Government is determined to take all possible action to fight the menace’ (Muriuki, 2003). The new government had made promises such as implementing free primary school education for all children and income from tourism was diminishing precisely when the government needed this money the most.

Thus, calls from the Kenyan public, commitments to international conventions, the equivalent of economic sanctions by the US and Britain which led to a lack of funds to implement its programmes, all pressured the Kenyan government to propose anti-terror legislation.

The proposed legislation

In the face of this pressure the newly elected coalition government took action. On 30 April 2003 the government introduced the Suppression of Terrorism Bill (Supplement No. 38 of the Kenya Gazette). Almost immediately the Bill came under attack from members of civil society who primarily rejected it as violating the Kenyan Constitution, legalising the violation of human rights, and particularly targeting Kenyan Muslims as terrorists. The Bill was accused of being a vulgar reproduction of the US Patriot Act. Opponents of the Bill, comprising diverse members of civil society, organised protest rallies around the country to educate Kenyans on the evils of the Bill.

Violating the Kenyan constitution

One of the major campaign promises of the coalition government was to introduce a new Constitution to the country within 100 days of taking office. Responsible for studying the flaws of the existing Constitution and gathering the views of Kenyans from all walks of life, the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission was also charged with drafting a new Constitution that would better reflect the wishes and values of all Kenyans in the post-independence era. The new Constitution was to replace the Lancaster House Constitution which the country inherited from Britain at independence in 1963.

The Suppression of Terror Bill was proposed at a time when the country was in the process of drafting a new Constitution and at the time of the Bill's tabling in parliament, the country was embroiled in a bitter battle over the importance and inviolability of the Constitution. These debates about the nature of the Constitution filtered into the conversations about the proposed Suppression of Terrorism Bill. Indeed, one of the major reasons cited for the Bill's rejection was that it violated the existing Kenyan Constitution. One Constitutional Review Commissioner, Githu Muigai, described the Bill as ‘an excellent example of the kind of law that we should never enact’ (Africa News Update). Muigai continued to lament that the law

had been drafted by people with no understanding of the Kenyan Constitution or criminal law and was contemptuous to the country's governance (Africa News Update).

Other commissioners on the Constitutional Review Commission, Mr. Isaac Lenaola and Mr. Ahmed Isaak said that ‘the Bill should be rejected on the basis that it was unconstitutional’ and, if enacted, would legitimate the harassment of innocent people. These sentiments were echoed widely across the country as those calling for a rejection of the Bill cited it as violating the existing Kenyan Constitution. These comparisons of course made mention of the ways that activists in the US were also taking exception to the US Patriot Act for its violations of the US Constitution.

Violating human rights

The proposed legislation was also rejected on the basis that it legitimised a violation of the human rights of Kenyans. The government was roundly criticised for ‘proposing a law that violated even United Nations conventions’ (Africa News Update). Among the most vocal opponents who cited a violation of human rights were Amnesty International and the Law Society of Kenya, the umbrella professional organisation for law practitioners in Kenya. In a press release Amnesty International stated that the organisation,

is seriously concerned that Kenya's Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 contains measures that violate Kenyan law, human rights treaties to which Kenya is a party, and may result in human rights violations (Amnesty International).

The potentially overwhelming power of the police was most frequently cited as one way in which passage of the law would inevitably lead to violations of human rights.

One of the claims made against the Bill was that it allowed for problematic police searches and extra-judicial actions against suspected terrorists who would have no recourse within the law. Speakers at a forum on the Bill sponsored by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) criticised the sweeping powers the Bill would give police for the arrest and holding of terrorist suspects without allowing them to contact lawyers and relatives (Wahome Thuku, 2004).

Indeed, police officers would be allowed to use force and even kill suspected terrorists who resist arrest under this Bill. Furthermore, police would have 36 hours with a suspect before the suspect is allowed access to legal advice or to any other person except a Government doctor. The suspects do not necessarily have to be detained at a gazetted (known to the public) police station. The minister in charge of national security would have powers to order the detention of suspects in any other place. As one commentator noted,

our security and intelligence apparatus is hopelessly ineffectual and ill-prepared to track down and apprehend terrorists before they attack. Under the present circumstances, passing such legislation on terrorism would be gratuitous and would only have the effect of increasing the already immense discretionary powers our police enjoy (Kagari, 2004).

Kenyans were concerned at conferring even more power on a police force that had not shown restraint in the past.

The provisions of the Bill that further empowered the police harkened back to the days of the British colonial administration as well as the Kenyatta and Moi regimes which were notoriously violent and saw the deployment of police to brutally silence opposition. It is in this context that the Kenya Human Rights Network declared that,

having critically examined the provisions of the Bill, we are convinced that its enactment will present a grave, serious and tremendous blow to human rights and civil liberties of Kenyans and effectively halt the democratisation process (Africa News Update).

The very recent history of a dictatorship based on police coercion of citizens was at the centre of concerns about the law's legitimisation of human rights violations. The Bill's provisions struck a historical chord and Kenyans remembered how, during Moi's rule, the police had been granted immense powers to deal with ‘enemies of the state’ and frequently held and tortured dissidents in secret without bail or any access to the outside world.

In addition to concerns about more general human rights violations, the proposed law was also understood to pose a threat to the human rights of Kenyan Muslims. As the BBC reported,

Kenyan Muslims, who make up 30% of the country's 31 million people, have been expressing fears that the Bill targets them (BBC, 2003).

Particularly insidious to the Muslim community was a section of the Bill that seemed to introduce a dress code or at least outlaw certain dress. Reports by the BBC reflected the concerns of Kenyan Muslims stating that,

the Bill also outlaws the wearing of clothes that are closely associated with extremist groups (Ibid.).

Part Three, section 10 of the Bill held the stipulation that,

a person who, in a public place wears an item of clothing, or wears or carries or displays an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist organisation is guilty of an offence (Government of Kenya, 2003).

The Bill makes clear that such person may be arrested. This provision left Muslim Kenyans vulnerable to the whims of police officers who could decide that donning any religious garb constituted support for a terrorist organisation.

Leading the charge that the Bill targeted Muslims in particular was the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM). Supkem chairman Prof. Abdulghafur El-Busaidy said:

Muslims bore the brunt of police harassment on suspicion of sheltering terrorists (Africa News Update).

With Muslims already feeling particularly targeted, provisions such as the one regarding dress led to further feelings of oppression at the hands of a Christian majority. Indeed Muslims and other Kenyans had suffered greatly under the Moi regime and the transition to the Kibaki regime held much promise. Provisions of the Bill that violated the existing Constitution and human rights regulations, and particularly those expanding police powers and attempting to regulate dress were seen as a regression to the dark days before the country's ‘second liberation’.

It is important to understand opposition to the Bill as broad and extending beyond groups who were understood to be particularly targeted such as Muslims. As a member of the Law Society of Kenya, Harrison Kinyanjui lamented, ‘this law violates rights of all Kenyans and foreigners and not just those of a particular religious group as feared’ (Africa News Update). Further, the words of Presbyterian minister Rev. Timothy Njoya to a crowd gathered at a protest rally best capture the reasons for public opposition to the Bill. He mourned that,

the proposed legislation turns back the clock on the gains Kenyans made in the areas of freedom and human rights, and violates the current constitution (Majtenyi, 2003).

Not made in Kenya

A variety of critics agreed that the Bill was in the interests of, and probably drafted by, western powers – the US and Britain in particular. Across the spectrum of those opposed to the Bill there was concurrence that the Bill was not a home-grown solution to the problem of terrorism in Kenya. The British press reported that,

legal experts and human rights groups in Kenya have dismissed the Bill as an absurd imitation of the US Patriot Act 2001, the South African Terrorism Bill 2002 and Britain's Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (BBC, 2003).

These suspicions were born out of provisions of the Bill that granted inexplicable power over Kenyan officials to foreign governments and the actions of the US and British governments as they restricted their citizens’ travel to Kenya. One clause of the Bill causing it to attract heavy criticism as ‘foreign-made’ would have eased the extradition of Kenyan suspects to other countries without the normal safeguards and allowed foreign security forces to operate in Kenya. At the time the Kenyan media reported that,

section 34 of the Act gives foreign states authority to directly compel the Commissioner of Police to make available terrorism intelligence and logistical support for their pursuits in the country. It also requires our Attorney General to promptly ‘execute’ any request from foreign states to track down, attach or forfeit any suspected terrorist property located in Kenya. Failure or delay in complying requires an explanation to the foreign state by the AG (Murunga, 2003).

Particularly stunning and repulsive was the fact that Kenya's Attorney General owed an explanation of his/her actions to a foreign state. This is the same Attorney General who, in the years of the Moi regime, had never given Kenyans any explanation for selective and undemocratic application of the laws of the land.

The government even admitted to the influence of foreigners when the Justice Minister Kiraitu Murungi agreed that, while the Bill was meant to address the terrorism threat in Kenya, it had been drafted with help from other countries. He conceded that, ‘there is no way you can reinvent the wheel … governments all over the world assist each other in drafting Bills’. Still the government worked hard to convince Kenyans that the Bill was more home-grown than a foreign import.

Those citing the Bill's foreign origins were fully vindicated when, as soon as the government tabled the Bill in Parliament, the first British Airways flight to Kenya in slightly over a month arrived at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport with more than 200 tourists. Previously, the UK had banned direct flights to Kenya – diverting British Airways flights to Uganda or Tanzania which had both already drafted anti-terror legislation.³ The local Kenyan press reported that,

the Bill has been cited as one of the conditions for removal of US and British restrictions of travel to Kenya which included a ban on British flights to the country (Africa News Update).

The banned flights, in addition to the travel advisories warning tourists against visiting the country had severe economic ramifications that reverberated deeply in the Kenyan economy which was, and remains, dependent on tourism as a major foreign exchange earner.⁴ As mentioned earlier, the presidents of both Kenya and Tanzania had complained that these warnings constituted economic sanctions against their countries.

In all, members of civil society alleged that the Bill rolled back the democratic gains of Kenyans who had recently rid themselves of a despot. Emerging out of Kenya's ‘second liberation’ from the Moi dictatorship, diverse elements of civil society came together to challenge the government and in the end the government was forced to withdraw the legislation from parliament and to return to the drawing board. The Kenyan government has since brought five revisions of the Bill to Parliament and all of them have been rejected after major outcries from civil society. Civil society has so far prevailed in its opposition to the proposed legislation.

Foreign influences on Kenya politics

This episode raises broader issues about the precise role of foreign countries in democratic transitions, and especially major donors – specifically their role in the Kenyan case. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) contend, for instance, that ‘although international factors played an important part in explaining democratisation, they remained secondary’. This contention has been widely challenged by scholars of transitions, many of whom base their arguments on their analysis of the Kenyan case. Studies on the Kenyan transition after 1992 argue that it was more driven by foreign (particularly US and British) interests than by domestic activists. Brown (2000:v), for instance, argues that it was a direct suspension of donor aid that forced Kenya's authoritarian leadership to hold elections. He writes that donors facilitate the democratic transition by ‘raising the cost of continued authoritarian practices and helping build democratic institutions and local capacity’. Nyinguro (1999) also uses the Kenyan example to emphasise the important role that the US played in the democratisation process:

The US used both its hegemonic position as the sole superpower and influence in the donor community to rally international pressure for democratic reform in Kenya. It also deployed its diplomatic and economic leverage it had accumulated over the years as one of Kenya's major donors and diplomatic patrons to apply pressure independently on the Moi regime.

In general, the scholarship on the Kenyan transition makes clear the incredibly powerful role that foreign donors play in shaping the emergence of a post-Moi regime. This influence the foreign donors had on the Kenyan political scene continued into the new Kibaki administration. The US and Britain in particular had helped the opposition into power and it was widely understood that the new government would follow the wishes of their benefactors. It was in this context that the new anti-terror legislation was understood nationwide. Activists opposed to the legislation claimed that the proposed law went too far in placing the country's politics in the hands of foreigners. The Daily Nationreported that ‘groups allied to the Kenya Human Rights Network said the Bill was ‘unacceptable as it puts the country's sovereignty at the whims of US and British governments’ (Wahome Thuku, 2003). In the words of another commentator opposed to the Bill,

We do not have to behave like lemmings, and blindly follow the path laid by other countries in their war against terror (Kagari, 2004).

Recognising the decisive role that the US and Britain play in the IMF, opponents of the Bill also saw it as the government's attempt to secure IMF funding. ‘Of what use is qualifying for IMF loans while we are bound and gagged, slaves with no rights, citizens of a Republic without sovereignty?’ complained one unidentified activist. This sentiment reflected the sense across the country that the Kibaki government proposed the anti-terror legislation to please their backers (the US and British government) who had supported their opposition to the Moi regime.

With the powerful evidence of the close dependent relationship between the Kibaki regime and the US and British governments, how can we understand the ability of domestic activists to force the new government to shelve the proposed anti-terror legislation? Foreign donors had been able to exert decisive pressure on the Moi regime, forcing him to leave office. They had also actively supported the Kibaki opposition that was now in power. The expectation then, is that the Kenyan government as a whole, and the Kibaki regime in particular would be more receptive to foreign pressure, and especially pressure from the US and Britain, than to its own domestic activists.

The anti-terror legislation is therefore interesting because it presents us with a case of US and British interests losing out to the pressure applied on the Kenyan government by domestic activists.

Indeed it is telling that as the Kenyan government is responding to foreign pressure by proposing this legislation, there is an almost unexpected reaction by civil society which has up until this point been in support of the Kibaki government. This reaction is so intense that it has the effect of causing the new government to withdraw the anti-terror legislation from parliament. How then are we to understand the actions of the Kibaki government in bending to the will of domestic activists at the grave risk of angering its foreign backers?

The impact of foreign powers seems to have different abilities at different moments during the transition process. Indeed as Brown (2000:vi) argues,

political conditionality is inherently most effective in prompting political liberalisation in an authoritarian country, less effective in ensuring a full transition to democracy and least effective in promoting consolidation. It becomes progressively more difficult for donors to focus their limited leverage effectively as the political reform agenda becomes more broad.

In the Kenyan case foreign donors have not had the same ability to influence they had earlier in the liberalisation process. By this stage domestic actors have become strong enough to provide an effective counter-balance to foreign donors in the political arena.

A well-organised civil society that is not afraid to challenge the government on issues of policy has proved crucial to the government withdrawal of the anti-terror legislation. The same organisations that had risen to challenge the Moi regime now have the organisational capability to rise up against the Kibaki government's policy. In the first few months of the new government organisations such as the Law Society of Kenya and the Kenya Human Rights Network had stood silent and watched to see if it would make good on campaign promises to respect human rights. When the government brought the anti-terror legislation to Parliament these organisations saw a clear violation of human rights and mobilised to challenge the government. Clearly, had these organisations demobilised after the election of the Kibaki government, they would have been unable to offer such a quick response to the proposed legislation. These organisations were able to organise public rallies and educational forums to educate the public and members of parliament about the Bill.

The ability of activists to stop government from following the will of foreign donors, and act without fear of persecution or a government crackdown might point to the conclusion that Kenya has achieved a stable democracy. However, it is important to exercise caution before embracing this conclusion. The resistance to anti-terror legislation is merely one moment of political struggle where a government didn’t automatically get its way. A consolidated and stable democracy constitutes many such moments. The anti-terror legislation seems the first incident to jolt civil society out of its complacency with the new government that it helped bring about. It will take years, and many more moments of successful challenges to state power and its foreign backers before Kenyans can truly rest assured of a stable democracy.

Wanjiru Carolyne Kamau , University of Minnesota; e-mail: [e-mail]

Notes

Editor's Note: On the US militarisation of Africa see Daniel Volman in ROAPE nos. 98 (December 2003) and 32 (March 2005); Jean-Christophe Sevant in no.95 (March 2003) and Sandra Barnes in 104/5 (June-September 2005). In the next issue of ROAPE Jeremy Keenan will be looking at security issues in North Africa; Michael Klare & Daniel Volman will be looking at ‘America, China & the Scramble for Africa's Oil’.

However, while this global military industrial complex is encircling the globe – see the ‘nousbases’ website for shocking documentation of US military scrambling all over Latin and South America as well as the Pacific – there is another, covert element which is just as evil: the so-called ‘contractors’/mercenaries and the brokers who trade in arms. Contributions please to [e-mail].

And in our ongoing quiz to see if you’re paying attention, in 1986 it took 15 cows to buy an AK47; how many does it take today? The prize will be our ROAPE Reader or two back issues of your choice.

Kenya's constitutional reform referendum

Lionel Cliffe

In November 2005 Kenyans went to the polls to vote for or against a draft constitution, a majority rejecting the proposed document. This marked the most recent stage in a long-drawn-out process. Kenya's (still) existing constitution had been drawn up at its own Lancaster House Conference in London in 1962 and had been in force though under threat at some crisis moments since Independence in 1963. The only significant amendments to it were the move to a one-party system in the 1970s and then, under after widespread demonstrations and sustained pressure from civil society – and from international donors’ threats – the amendment in 1992 to allow registration of other parties. This latter change heralded in a new period of civic political activity and competitive parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992, 1997 and 2002. But like the other few changes it only amended one small part (Section 2A in this case) of the overall document.

Thus Kenya is still saddled with what is essentially a colonial document: produced in London with the Kenya delegates under pressure to accept the formula, underwriting property rights, enshrining the centralised authoritarianism of the (settler-) colonial state. Activism spear-headed by the particular vigorous civil society organisations in Kenya in the 1990s was frustrated at every turn by the Moi government, which still felt it necessary to concede a Constitutional Review Act in 2000. This provided for a suitably long period of public debate and even political education about the issues, and put the drafting in the hands of a Commission with civil society members as well as representatives of the Executive and Legislature. But the Commission and the task of writing remained contested terrain throughout the four years of work before it delivered a draft in October 2004.

The contestation was a three-way struggle: between the government (including the new Kibaki government elected in 2002), parliament and the political parties, and the civil society bodies – with politicians even of the opposition parties as likely to oppose the last as support their efforts. Indeed even after the Commission's draft had been submitted, efforts to undermine it persisted and were finally successful when Parliament decided that it was the sole body that should draw up and approve a constitution. So although there was a referendum which did limit their having the final say, the voting was on a new draft put together by the Government. It was referred to as the Wako draft, after the Attorney General (both in the Moi and Kibaki governments). As some commentators remarked ‘the politicians high-jacked the process’.

In the campaign some members of the government as well as other MPs opposed this new draft and mobilised against – under the banana voting symbol, against the ‘orange’.

The European union in the IGAD-Subregion: insights from Sudan & Somalia

Marie Gibert

The partnership between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) in Darfur is attracting renewed, and critical attention on the former's growing political role in Africa. The EU is a major aid provider in Africa and has tended, since the beginning of the 1990s, to expand its exclusively developmental role to a more political one through a greater involvement in security issues. In the Horn of Africa, however, most former colonial powers have only maintained loose links with their former colonies, with the obvious exception of France in Djibouti. The Horn's very strategic location has slowly made it a US chasse gardéewhere the EU and its member states often remain behind the scene. Since the 9/11 attacks it has been one of the regions most closely observed by Western intelligence. Counter-terrorism issues have clearly influenced US politics in the region. This Briefing will examine whether the EU shares these and other US concerns.

Europe's development aid: a political tool?

Many observers have underlined the uniqueness of the link between Europe and the states of Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific, the so-called ACP. The first Lomé Convention, in 1975, was hailed as a new departure in North-South relations: it was put forward as a path-breaking ‘partnership of equals’. Sudan and Somalia were then listed among the least developed ACP states that would need special attention and have, ever since, remained on this list. European aid was, under the first three Lomé conventions, ‘softer’, both in financial terms and in general conditions, than that of the other donors or of the international financial institutions. Lomé, however, failed to fulfil its promises: the reality of the Convention has been that both aid and trade provisions have acted to confine ACP countries to the export of certain primary commodities (Hewitt, 1989).

At the end of the 1980s, Lom slowly submitted to the international development policy trends. An unprecedented political element was introduced in Lom IV (1990), which acknowledged that a democratic environment was favourable to economic development (Lom IV, article 35b), while respect for human rights became a conditionality in Lom IV bis (1995). Still, at the end of the 1990s, the Lom Conventions had failed to adapt to the international economic situation. The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, therefore introduces an important degree of ‘normalisation’ by subjecting the EUACP trade arrangements to WTO rules and democracy, good governance and respect for human rights conditionality (Cotonou Partnership Agreement, articles 8 to 13).

Somalia & Sudan: The Central Conflict Issue

In the Horn of Africa, the EU has remained relatively absent from the political and developmental scene, especially if one compares its involvement there to its actions in other regions. In spite of this background position, however, the EU followed a rather clear pattern borne of the region's many conflicts. Neither Sudan nor Somalia could fulfil the political conditions tied to the ACP-EU agreements of the 1990s. EU relations with both countries were therefore limited to humanitarian assistance in response to emergency needs and to an often timid support to peace negotiations. In Somalia, the EU modelled its level of involvement in the peace process on that of the US: no EU official has been assigned full-time responsibility for the process, and political support to the conference has been largely delegated to a European Commission regional advisor with competing responsibilities elsewhere. The EU has certainly been more active in Sudan but its contribution to the resolution of the conflict remained well behind that of one of its member-states, the United Kingdom, or of the US and Norway.

IGAD Member States
The seven member states of IGAD – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda – cover an area of 5.2 million sq. km and have a population of more than 160 million. The IGAD region is very rich culturally due to its numerous ethnic groups, languages and religious practices. The average population growth rate of 2.5 % is one of the highest in the world and nearly half of the population is under 14 years of age.
The region is highly affected by internal and external conflicts, therefore the joint peace and conflict prevention efforts of IGAD member states are crucial for a sustainable development of all countries.
The region has abundant resources, which when properly developed and tapped could secure economic prosperity for the people, in particular, the rich endowment of rivers, lakes and forests, the large livestock stocks and the high agricultural production potential. IGAD provides the political platform through which the Governments of the member states pool resources and coordinate their efforts to initiate and implement regional programmes and projects to tackle development challenges facing the region. As one economic block, IGAD region will have added advantage to effectively compete in the global economy.

Progress made in the peace negotiations in both Sudan and Somalia has however led the EU to reconsider its position and mention the possibility for both countries to enter the Cotonou Agreement. Cooperation in Somalia is defined by the ‘Strategy for special aid to Somalia’ that recommends flexibility, strict neutrality, contacts at local level and a multisectoral strategy, from humanitarian aid to relief through rehabilitation to development. EU Member States have reviewed the political situation since early 2001 and initiated an internal reflection on ‘conditions which need to be met before a legitimate authority in Somalia could sign the Cotonou Agreement’, thus implying that until further notice, the aforementioned arrangement should be maintained (EU Relations with Somalia, EU website, 2003). The EU has recently allocated about 85 million euros to organisations offering services in Somalia, but further aid depends on political stability and the Somali Transitional Federal Government's capacity to put an end to its endless wrangles.

In November 1999, the EU and Sudan started a political dialogue aimed at addressing concerns about human rights, good governance and rule of law and democratisation.¹ Parallel discussions were held in 2002 and 2003 with the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The agreement signed in January of this year gave the green light for a resumption of development cooperation between the EU and Sudan (EU Relations with Sudan, EU website, 2004); 590 million euros stand available in the European Development Fund and will help provide a substantial and immediate peace dividend. The Commission, however, has also made clear that the resumption of cooperation will be progressive, taking into account the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the evolution of the situation in Darfur. A special envoy on Darfur, Mr Sten Rylander, has been part of the Darfur mediation team for the past year, while an EU Special Representative, Mr Pekka Haavisto, was appointed in July 2005 in order to ensure maximum effectiveness of the EU's contribution to the peace processes.

Development & conflict resolution

The security conditionality the EU had introduced in the delivery of its development programmes in Sudan and Somalia from the beginning of the 1990s was formalised and theoretically grounded by Western donors and NGOs during the following decade. Development was not just about concluding trade agreements and building infrastructures; political stability and democratisation had become new essential conditions for its realisation. The EU began serious reflection on peace-building and conflict prevention in Africa in 1993. In December 1995, Council conclusions on ‘Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping in Africa’ were adopted, which reflects an ‘exclusive approach’ according to which the EU should mainly support national activities of EU member states, as well as African initiatives. These conclusions were also meant, however, to serve as a basis for a more comprehensive policy that could open the door for an operational follow-up (Landgraf, 1999). The very first European crisis management military operation was led in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, proving that the EU's resolution to enhance its conflict resolution capacities in Africa had not weakened.

Regional integration for peace & development

In spite of this success, however, the EU and its member-states are increasingly reluctant to send troops or intervene directly in conflicts (Keane, 2004). Thus, the EU encourages the development of African intervention capabilities and mediations (Landgraf, 1999) – the principle of ‘African ownership’ – and has developed what could be called ‘multilateral subsidiarity’: the African Union and regional organisations such as IGAD should intervene as soon as they can. When this is not possible, however, or when rapid intervention or financial support is needed, the European Union will be ready to lend its support. The support lent to the African Union for its mission in Darfur (AMIS) is the very illustration of both the desire to tackle the issue of conflicts in Africa and the unwillingness or incapacity to send troops to Africa (Monaco and Gourlay, 2005).²

This insistence on peace-keeping interventions by African regional organisations is part of a general European and international focus on regional integration in Africa as a solution to Africa's economic and political crises. The Cotonou Agreement, which runs over 20 years, should lead to Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP regional organisations, in spite of the many reservations expressed by analysts and African trade negotiators.³ The EU has lent the same support to regional peace processes. The EU and its member states, as members of the IGAD Partners Forum and the IGAD Standing Committee on Somalia, actively supported the IGAD peace processes (EU Relations with Somalia, EU website, 2005). The EU has often been willing to unblock funds to support the IGAD or the talks that led to the May 2004 agreement on a monitoring mechanism in Darfur. However, there again, reservations are numerous. Regional solutions are certainly desirable, but the EU has ignored that the region's civil conflicts often involved neighbouring countries. The interconnectedness of the conflicts in the Horn has been analysed in-depth but has not led to better communication and coordination between the European in-country delegations in the region.

‘New Wars’ & international terrorism: the supposed link

After the shock caused by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, finding answers to the questions why and how these attacks, and international terrorism in general, took place became pressing. The link between internal conflicts, criminal networks and international terrorism is the one most often emphasised and one that is of interest here, as Somalia and Sudan are directly concerned. Some authors mention an obvious link. For Mark Duffield, the key-word is ‘networks’: terrorism is based on the same networks as the ‘new wars’ of the last decades. War economies, terrorist networks and criminal syndicates have increasingly become interconnected among themselves and with legitimate businesses and established systems (Duffield, 2002). A number of UN reports have also established linkages between money laundering or the trade of rough diamonds from conflict areas and the financing of terrorism (United Nations Action Against Terrorism, 2004). These networks – whether they support terrorist or rebel groups – are said to have reached an unequalled level of integration in the society and, therefore, of camouflage (Duffield, 2002). However, most reports published by NGOs and state administrations and based on field observation remain very vague on the linkage between the criminal networks that sustain the new wars and international terrorism. They do mention possible common networks but don’t trust themselves in going much further (International Crisis Group, 2002).

Sudan & Somalia: safe havens for terrorism?

Sudan has a long history of suspected sponsoring of terrorism: the Sudanese regime was accused of harbouring Libyan terrorists as early as 1985. Sudan welcomed radicalised veterans of the Afghan war and provided a home to Osama Bin Laden from 1991 to 1996. The Sudanese regime has always denied having had any relations with the al-Qaeda leader and accepted, in 1996, to expel Bin Laden, although it thought it better to keep him in the country where he would be under control (Rose, 2002). It is, however, assumed that the al-Qaeda leader has created business linkages that have persisted after his departure. Al-Qaeda would also enjoy an unknown level of popular support within Northern Sudan, where demonstrations of support have been modest but persistent. All these elements have made Sudan a priority focus for US investigations immediately after September 11^th. Sudan responded positively to the cooperation demands expressed by the US administration but remains on the list of suspects (Morrison, 2001; US Department of State, 2005).

Somalia has quite other reasons to attract Western suspicion. It was known to American intelligence that al-Qaeda had sent Islamic proselytes – possibly mujahhedin veterans – to Somalia from Sudan in 1991-1992 and that these proselyte movements organised a welfare organisation called Al-Itihaad Al-Islami. Al-Itihaad and other such Muslim charities enjoy considerable popular legitimacy in central Somalia for the social welfare they have created (Morrison, 2001). Supported by wealthy Saudi elements, Al-Itihaad is alleged to have been closely associated with violent al-Qaeda operations against US personnel and is listed by the US Department of State among terrorist groups (United States State Department website, 2004). Somalia's anarchic state would also be a safe haven for al-Qaeda members who need to transit through Somalia while organising operations in other countries of the region (Morrison, 2001). Finally, some remittance businesses are suspected of being an efficient financial link between the influential Somali diaspora and the Muslim associations: the US has frozen the assets of the leading company in financial services and telecommunications, Al-Barakaat, following September 11^th (Menkhaus, 2002).

Proof of these allegations is however lacking, although this would never be officially acknowledged. Observers note that most reports produced by American intelligence on Sudan during the 1990s were the product of disinformation. The Clinton administration therefore listed Sudan among state sponsors of terrorism and obstinately refused to change its mind in spite of Sudan's cooperation offers and pressure from the US intelligence community to accept these offers. The US administration finally agreed to send a joint FBI-CIA team to Sudan and the team gave the country a clean bill of health in the summer of 2001 (Rose, 2002). Suspicions concerning Somalia and Al-Itihaad are, according to Ken Menkhaus, just as ill-founded. Holding fixed territory proved to be a curse for Al-Itihaad, as it made it a sitting target for neighbouring Ethiopia, which is firmly committed to fighting Islamic extremism. For the past seven years, the organisation's strategy has therefore been to integrate into local communities and work within legitimate sectors. Above all, Al-Itihaad has mainly been focused on a domestic, not global, agenda and the bulk of its members have nothing to do with terrorism and al-Qaeda. Menkhaus further underlines that Somalia is a notoriously difficult place for non-Somalis to operate in secrecy (Menkhaus, 2002). There is no more evidence of ties between the remittance companies and Al-Itihaad. The move against Al-Barakaat has never been clarified and is questioned by Somalia analysts. Somalia may be a growing transhipment zone into Kenya and a short-term safe haven for foreign terrorists, but its implication in terrorist activities has been modest compared with countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Yemen and even Kenya (Menkhaus, 2004; Crisis Group, 2005a).

The war on terror, a political instrument in the horn

It was not difficult for the Horn's leaders to quickly assess the political advantages they could get out of the ‘war on terror’. Ethiopia was the first to play the counter-terrorist card to influence the regional political game. Its intelligence services maintain a significant presence in Somalia and Ethiopia has not hesitated to use the supposed terrorist threat to oppose Somalia's first Transitional National Government (Markakis, 2003). The new Transitional Federal Government (TFG), since its formation in October 2004, has been very keen on exploiting the terrorist threat for short-term political gain. Suspected terrorist acts are now at the centre of the Somali peace process: Each deadly incident in Mogadishu is interpreted by the interim president Yusuf and his allies to demonstrate that the capital is not safe for the TFG to be based there, that foreign troops are required for its security and that its political adversaries support terrorist networks. The scramble by faction leaders to find al-Qaeda figures for American reward money has created a real industry in abductions. Many Somalis are dedicated to the containment of terrorism but now strongly resent counterterrorism measures (Crisis Group, 2005a). Western governments have generally shown little sympathy for the Ethiopian and TFG position, but this local ‘war on terror’ is likely to trigger more damage than the terrorist networks it aims at stopping.

Surprisingly and in spite of its presence on the US list of states sponsors of terrorism, the ‘war on terror’ has played a much less central role in the Sudan peace process. US President Bush repeatedly stressed to the government of Sudan that ending its support to terror was no substitute for ending the civil war inside Sudan. The domestic mobilisation, in the US, on the war in Southern Sudan may well have helped reduce the risk that the quest for peace would be sacrificed to counter-terrorism (Rogier, 2005).

The EU & counter-terrorism in the horn

The lack of proof of the existence of wide terrorist networks in the Horn and the consequences, in the region, of the ‘war on terror’ have not prevented the US from suspecting the region of being a highly strategic region in the ‘war on terror’, nor from expanding its presence in the region, with a new military base in Djibouti (Botha, 2004) and a strengthened counter-terrorist cooperation with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania and Eritrea (Joannidis, 2004). The EU supports the US counter-terrorist and monitoring operations in the region: a European maritime force, the Euromarfor, has taken part in the ‘Enduring Freedom’ operation in the Horn of Africa (French Ministry of Defence, 2003) and member states – including the UK, France and Italy – have reportedly sent intelligence missions to the region (Crisis Group, 2005a). The EU, however, seems much more cautious when it establishes its list of terrorists since it first distinguishes terrorist persons and groups – and thereby underlines the difficulty to determine when an effective organisation is established – and restricts its list to 45 persons and 46 groups, while the US State Department lists 78 terrorist groups worldwide. Interestingly, neither al-Qaeda nor Al-Itihaad appear on the EU's list (Council of the European Union, 2004), a fact that tends to underline important disagreements between the American and European intelligence services and foreign policies.

Moreover, the EU has slowly reverted its attention from failed states supposed to be safe-havens for terrorist groups to its own domestic scene. Since the Madrid and London attacks in 2005, European policy and intelligence, which had been focusing on veterans from Afghanistan and Arab fundamentalist circles, have realised that the attacks would not be possible without the cooperation of Muslim immigrants, often having lived in Europe for many years, who are well integrated and well educated. These small groups of terrorists based in Europe do not account directly to al-Qaeda – whose survival is questioned by most European intelligence agencies (Stroobants, 2004) – but have taken up Bin Laden's idea of a ‘global Jihad’. They rely on elaborated economic networks hidden behind successful, small and quiet businesses (Gehriger, 2004), a strategy that is an exact copy of Bin Laden's own attitude in Sudan from 1991 to 1996 (Jacquard, 2002). Moreover, the European states have clearly decided to focus their attention on strengthening their own security policies and cooperation in matters of intelligence rather than on chasing supposed terrorist networks on unknown fields. Although 9/11 is mentioned in the summaries of nearly all European foreign policy and development documents, only a rather limited part of the EU's counter-terrorist agenda is now devoted to external affairs.

Conclusion

The EU's power to bring more nuances and peace onto the international scene, however, remains limited. The regional organisation is a political entity of enormous complexity which suffers from the divisions between its institutions and from the opposing positions adopted by its member-states. The EU tends to have what Charillon calls a ‘gap diplomacy’: it intervenes in complementarity with its member-states and with the US, or where they do not claim a sphere of influence (Charillon, 2002).

The EU's policy in the Horn of Africa also lacks some consistency. The EU is often eager to promote the IGAD and the African Union in the region. On the conflict resolution side, the EU seems to lack a regional vision of the Horn and has failed to offer regional solutions to the conflicts, other than encouraging IGAD mediation. Moreover, it is highly doubtful whether IGAD, or even the African Union, have the capacity to implement the very ambitious programmes the EU has in mind.⁴ It may even prove risky to push them too far too fast. The same can be said of the often emphasised link between peace and development. The EU has now introduced political conditionality in all its development programmes, arguing that an unstable political situation is not conducive to economic development. It has, however, ignored many critics’ call that its trade agreements with the ACP countries also take this link into account and be more conflict-sensitive.

Finally, the EU constantly seems to oscillate between following international trends and defining its own agenda. Its counter-terrorism coordinator, Mr de Vries, was proud to announce in June 2005, that the EU member states had pledged to increase the international aid with 20 million euro by 2010 to help the UN meet its Millennium Goals and to help developing countries combat poverty and reduce the potential for radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism (De Vries, 2005). But its potential certainly rather lies in its capacity to attract international attention to other, less topical issues. The international refusal to recognise the independence of Somaliland, the most peaceful part of Somalia, will have to be tackled and the EU – which works with the Somaliland administration as a responsible authority (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003) – could certainly play a role there and fight away the Western and African old fear of an African balkanisation.

Marie Gibert, Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of London; e-mail: [e-mail].

The urban digital divide: a comparative analysis of internet cafés in Johannesburg, South Africa

N. Hyde-Clarke

Improved interaction with the information society is thought to enhance a state's economic status in the contemporary system. Much has been written of the digital divide between countries, yet little has been researched on the digital divide within the economic capitals of countries themselves. This is particularly true of those on the African continent. South Africa is considered to be one of the most technologically advanced states on the African continent. Yet, within South African society there is a schism between those able to afford and access online material, and those who are not. Due to large income disparities, some people living in cities are unlikely to engage with the information society at all. This is particularly evident in the country's economic hub – Johannesburg.

The South African government has encouraged private business enterprises to step in and facilitate technological transfer in South African society. The introduction of internet cafés appears to offer an opportunity that could allow previously marginalised groups the ability to ‘surf’, send email and conduct research. This could mean greater participation in the information society. However, uneven growth rates within Johannesburg often means that people residing in some suburbs (often the wealthier ones) have more access and are given more opportunities to engage with the global information society than others. Although a large Black middle class is emerging, the digital divide within Johannesburg society still appears to have racial undertones. What also makes this study of interest to observers is the influx of foreigners from other African states – thereby possibly altering the nature of the division as explained by existing arguments.

This study analyses the behaviour of users in two internet caf? in the greater Johannesburg area. The two case studies operate in very different environments. Statistics SA provided the following information about the economic status of people living in these suburbs in the 2001 Census Report¹ The first, the Milky Way Internet Caf , is located in Rosebank. In 2001, it was determined that this suburb housed about 1,079 people, 20% of whom were unemployed. Of those employed, the average income per person ranged between R3,201.00² and R12,800.00 per month, and 23% earned over R26,000.00 per month, for that year. The second case study, The DM Business Centre and Internet Caf , is located in Troyeville, an inner-city suburb. In 2001, Troyeville housed 3,508 people, of which 59% were unemployed. The average income per person, for those who were employed, ranged between R801.00 and R3,201.00 per month. At that time, only 11% of the people residing in Troyeville were earning more than R3,201.00 per month.

The study should prove valuable in determining whether there are any similarities in internet use in two seemingly different sectors of South African society. It could be used to establish whether there is a narrowing of the gap within urban areas of Johannesburg. It was decided to analyse private enterprises, and not government-sponsored programmes, as private enterprises would be more likely to exist in a larger range of suburbs. Government projects are most often found in low-income areas. The data analysed in the case studies has been acquired from interviews conducted with personnel from the two internet caf? in May and July 2005.

South Africa in context

On average, approximately 1,45% of the African population has internet access. This is especially dire when one considers that this figure includes South Africa, considered to be the most developed country on the continent, which accounts for 26,2% of that figure (Internet World Statistics, 2005:1).

In developing countries, the lack of infrastructure, lack of necessary skills and literacy, and the inability to access global networks mean that the vast majority of the population continue to be excluded or marginalised. The lack of software and information about the Internet, and how to use it, is rarely available in minority languages. This hampers access in developing countries where most people are at best second-language English speakers (OECD, 2004:5). For example, in South Africa, which has eleven official languages, only 8,2% of the population are first language English speakers (SA Statistics, 2005). Yet, the majority of software is only available in English. There is an initiative to translate programmes and to create web browsers in local languages.

The World Bank classifies South Africa as a middle-income country. South Africa has a population of over 44 million. Over nine million reside in the Gauteng province, with just less than half living in Johannesburg. Johannesburg is the economic hub of South Africa, contributing 16% to the national economy, and 40% to Gauteng. The average annual income per household is R31,048.00 – generally 57% higher than that for South Africa as a whole (Integrated Development Plan, 2003/4:2).

A survey in 2000 discovered a divide within urban areas themselves. This was attributed to income disparities in cities. Predictably, people with higher incomes (especially those earning more than R20,000.00 a month) had more access to communication technologies than those in a lower economic strata. Also, it appeared that the apartheid legacy continued to influence who had access and who did not. White South Africans were more likely to have computers, followed by Indians, Coloured and lastly, Blacks (Langa, 2002:132). Given the considerable differences in income within Johannesburg society, it is expected that the gap between the two groups will grow. Interestingly, this survey concluded that there was little difference in internet access between males and females.

Internet cafés

Given the ability to use access to the internet as a business enterprise, it is not surprising that many African entrepreneurs are establishing internet cafés as commercial entities designed to offer access to both computers and the internet as a service to the public. Yet, simply by offering access to a larger population, they do in some way contribute to the growth of ICT usage in a country. Also, it should not be forgotten that this access is available at an hourly rate and may still be beyond the reach of poorer communities.

Internet cafés could intentionally, or by default, act as training centres, encouraging and enhancing computer literacy and skills. Their very existence increases awareness of the internet, although this awareness does not necessarily extend to increased use of the internet ‘for educational, commercial, social or political purposes’ (Nnafie, 2002:1).

It should be mentioned, however, that the success and viability of internet cafés could be short-lived – even in areas where they offer a vital and much-needed service. This aspect may be attributed to a variety of factors, some of their own making and others beyond the control of the businesses themselves. These may include:

• •

  Charging unrealistic amounts for services (particularly in low income areas);

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  Unreliable power supply;

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  The lack of inexpensive and high capacity connections: bandwidth available;

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  High competition;

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  A telecommunications monopoly;

• •

  Inconsistent ICT policies. (Nnafie, 2002:1-2).

In addition to these, there are two other aspects that need to be considered. The lack of security, or increase in criminal activity in certain suburbs, will also pose a challenge to new and established internet cafés in Johannesburg. Similarly, as the standard of living in certain suburbs increases, the people living there may become able to afford their own computers and access to the internet, thus the need to use the services offered by an internet café may diminish.

Case Study 1: the milky way internet Café

The Milky Way Internet Café is the oldest internet café in Africa. It opened in Yeoville on 15 December 1994. It was part of a public internet access drive, sponsored by PCB Technologies – an IT company involved in installing and maintaining PC-based systems and Local Area Networks since 1985 (Gillespie, 1999:1).

Yeoville was one of the first Johannesburg suburbs to be opened to all racial groups after the collapse of the apartheid system and the cessation of the Group Areas Act and the Black Communities Development Act.³ It therefore afforded the opportunity to engage with ICTs to a large multiracial group.

A few years later, the Milky Way Internet Café closed its branch in Yeoville. According to an interview conducted in May 2005, the cost of the services seemed to discourage local usage: ‘R35.00 an hour was deemed too exorbitant.’

The Milky Way Internet Caf is now situated in Rosebank, an affluent suburb housing a number of four or five star hotels. The caf offers the following services: 14 computer workstations; 1 multi-media workstation; laser printers; scanners; permanent internet links; LAN; four UTP port access counters; Wireless Access Points; a presentation lounge; and a committee room with a DVD Audio system. The cost to use the equipment starts at R15.00 per 15 minutes or part thereof, and thereafter R35.00 per hour. In the evenings, after 19h00, the cost is halved.

On average, approximately seventy to eighty people frequent the internet caf a day. Most are South African, although a few are foreigners (from the hotels). The number of foreigners using the caf has increased in the past twelve months, a phenomenon largely attributed to the excessive prices the hotels charge for internet access (as much as R80.00 per hour).

The patrons were described as being between 20 and 50 years of age, and all appeared to be financially secure: ‘Most of them whip out the Platinum Visa and MasterCard’.

It was estimated that 80% of the patrons were White, 10% Black, 5% Coloured and 5% Asian. Women only appeared to constitute 25% of the customers. It should be noted that all the patrons were described as ‘the corporate kind’.

More people use the caf as a means of checking emails than using the internet. However, when they do use the internet, it is usually for business purposes: internet banking, business emails, booking appointments with consulates, using search engines, and visiting news sites. It is only after 19h00, when it becomes less expensive to use the equipment, that patrons will ‘surf the net’ for social purposes, such as playing games, downloading music or visiting chat rooms.

Case study 2: dm business centre & internet café

The DM Business Centre and Internet Café is situated in Troyeville. Previously the home of journalists and artists, this suburb is now one of the less prosperous neighbourhoods near the Central Business District (CBD) or city centre. This is a low-density residential locality, often considered to be part of inner city Johannesburg. In addition to South Africans living in the suburb, there has been an increase in foreigners coming to the area. These people are mostly from other states in Africa, seeking employment in Johannesburg.

The Café has been operational since April 2002. They have 12 computer workstations with internet access using ADSL connections, scanning, printing, photocopying, and a Webcam. They also offer PC repair services and have a public telephone service. The cost to use the workstations starts at R5.00 per half hour. Approximately, eighty people use the workstations in the Café per day. The patrons are described as being between 20 and 45 years of age. They are generally unemployed, or earn less than R2000.00 a month. Few of the customers are South African or female:

Most of the people (90%) are male foreigners, and are Black as we are operating in a Black people's area.

Most people use the Café for email purposes, to communicate with relatives – mostly abroad. When they do use the internet, they tend to be looking for employment opportunities, doing research for school assignments or going to chat rooms to find overseas female companionship:

A few of them browse pornographic websites … Visiting educational sites is very rare.

Comparative analysis

First, it is interesting to note that both internet cafés have the same amount of people utilising their services on a daily basis. It is also noteworthy that they are falling within a similar age bracket. This is comparable to findings around the globe, where the online activity seems to taper off after ‘retirement’ age (60-65 years). However, although the numbers are similar, the demographics and socioeconomic status of the users in the two internet cafés are quite different. Not surprisingly, the users in the affluent area (Rosebank) are predominantly business-oriented and have a high-income status, as reflected by their display of gold and platinum credit cards and their corporate attire. In contrast, the users in the lower-income suburb (Troyeville) exhibit none of the above attributes. Interestingly, the internet café in Rosebank has a more multiracial clientele, whereas the DM Business Centre seems to cater exclusively to Black Africans.

Christopher (2001:455) attributes the continuing racial differences between suburbs in Johannesburg to the manner in which races integrated after the dissolution of the Group Areas Act in 1991. According to this argument, the first and most prominent areas where other population groups entered formerly White zones were central-city flats or apartments. In contrast, there was originally less integration in formerly White suburbs, due to the limited availability of mortgage bond finance. Thus, the centre of Johannesburg became the destination for many previously excluded people. This argument may be used to explain the different race demographics in the two case studies, as Troyeville is close to the CBD, whereas Rosebank is more of a housing suburb outside the CBD.

It is a concern that more foreigners are using the internet café in the lower income area, than Black South Africans. In wealthier suburbs, one could make the argument that this is because more South Africans own home computers and have their own internet providers; however, in lower income areas this argument is not feasible. Thus, one has to wonder about the local skills and knowledge of the benefits of access to ICTs. This trend also points to the increase of African economic refugees and foreigners with work visas in Johannesburg. It points to a possible ‘brain drain’ within Africa to South Africa. Thus, there could be an importation of ICT skills into the city. The arrival of African foreigners also changes the economic composition reflected in the 2001 Census Report. This is worth further investigation.

In both cases, the internet café is being used predominantly for commercial purposes. In Rosebank, the use is aimed at expanding existing business contacts and activities, whereas in Troyeville, it appears to be aimed at establishing business contacts and activities. The use of the computers in the DM Business Centre and internet café for employment opportunities is in accordance with the expectations of increased access to ICTs, as part of the urban regeneration in Johannesburg. As Sajin (2004:8) argues, citing Ramata (2003), that ICTs can make details of jobseekers available to prospective employers, as well as inform the unemployed of work available in their vicinity. This is pertinent in suburbs such as Troyeville, where unemployment is high. The café itself also offers a place for people to meet and discuss new business ventures.

Both internet cafés do not appear to be catering to the female population in a significant way. This is a concern as it points to the continuing gender gap within the digital divide itself. This is in contrast to other countries such as the US, the UK and parts of Asia including South Korea and Taiwan where the number of women users appear to be increasing annually. Whether this decrease in South Africa is attributed to a lack of desire to engage with ICTs, or an inability to do so due to social and economic circumstances is debateable. It is also important to realise that advertisements in South African media tend to cater to a young white masculine consumer. According to Du Preez (2004:145) this means that Black women are excluded from the technology twice: first by their gender and second by their race. Thus, the obstacles to access are not only about physical access and proximity of the internet cafés, but also about overcoming the stereotypes surrounding the use of the technology. It is also entirely possible that, in internet cafés such as the one in Troyeville, women may feel uncomfortable walking into and working in a male-dominated environment, where the main activity appears to be ‘surfing’ for female companionship. Regardless of the reason, this gender disparity must be addressed in the future in order to afford all South Africans the opportunity of participating in the information society.

These phenomena need to be closely monitored in the future, as well as government's responses to technology transfer and skill accumulation in South African society. The study could be extended to include additional suburbs across a wider economic array, allowing for more conclusive results. This research continues to be important in order to ascertain the economic benefits afforded to the majority of the population by increased access to the Internet, and whether such access assists or hampers previously marginalised sectors of South African society.

Dr. N. Hyde-Clarke, Senior Lecturer, Media Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa; e-mail: [e-mail]

Bye to all the ‘B’ stars of global pornography of poverty: Blair, Brown, Bob & Bono

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem

It is the end of one year and the beginning of another. It is customary to look back on the outgoing year, recalling the high and low points while looking forward to the New year with hope and expectations and sometimes trepidation about things foretold or just expected. Many people also engage in ritual New Year resolutions that habitually do not survive the New Year celebrations!

This column will not review the whole year. I am also engaging the good sense gear not to make any predictions for 2006 so as to save myself the trouble of verbose explanation why they did not happen, this time next year. And as for New Year resolutions, I’ll save myself both embarrassment and disappointment in one go by not making any. This makes everything that may happen a surprise, whether welcome or unwelcome, a surprise all the same. Instead of a review of the whole of 2005 I will just look at one issue that became almost obsession for me throughout the year.

The year 2005 will go down as one in which so much was promised to Africa, so little was achieved but the subterfuge helped clear any lingering scales on our eyes that foreign-do-gooders will help fix Africa. We were told several times by all kinds of do-gooders that 2005 was Africa's year. These expectations were based on a dubious coincidence outside of Africa. During 2005 the British Prime Minister, Tory Blair, assumed both the Presidency of the European Union and Chairmanship of the G8 Rich Vultures’ Club and promised to make Africa his priority. Prophet Blair, who did not officially visit Africa (except for an obligatory photo call on Mandela on his way to the holiday paradise Island of Mauritius and another holiday in Egypt) throughout his first term as Prime Minister decided that, to cleanse himself of the blood of innocent Iraqis that he helped his buddy, Bush, to exterminate, Africa was his salvation.

Leading British NGOs led by OXFAM who even had one of their former top ranking officials ensconced in Downing Street as an Adviser, saw Blair's missionary view of Africa as a wonderful opportunity for funding opportunism and willingly went to bed with Blair. Their shameless embrace of Blair is only comparable to the grotesque scandal of Western journalists becoming embedded with the Anglo-American imperialists in their illegal occupation of Iraq. These NGOs now have to search their souls during 2006 and ask if their collusion with power was worth it. But since they are not accountable to the people they serve they continue to talk up their treachery as success. What kind of success is this for Debt relief that sees Nigeria paying back over US$3 billion to Britain alone, a figure more than the total Aid budget of Britain in the same year?

What kind of opportunity for Africa is 2005 when pressures have to be dissipated on making the USA through its UN ambassador, the UN-hating Bolton, to accept not to eliminate the acronym, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set 5 years before. If it took so much effort to defend the acronym alone how much will it take to achieve the goals? If you are still in doubt how bad things are, the recent WTO meetings in Hong Kong put paid to any illusions. There was no movement on the big issues and decisions are delayed for yet another round of negotiations between the cats and mice of the global economy. The cats will not give up their right to eat the mice while the mice have to do everything to escape being gobbled up. It's a clear frontier but many Western NGOs confuse their domestic audience and their conniving Southern activists in facilitating the illusion that some cats are less greedy than others. Many Southern activists know this not to be true but carry on with their northern patrons because their jobs and careers depend on it. The campaigns offer individual poverty alleviation mechanisms without making a dent on the global and national structure of power that impoverishes the masses of their peoples. Whatever Bob Geldof, Bono and other busy-body new missionaries in the west may do, poverty can neither be danced out of town nor be talked out of existence with Prime Ministers and Presidents. It is a poverty of history to think and act as though a few rock concerts will change the situation … no matter how many billions watch the concerts.

So grim are things that Bob Geldof has now become an adviser to the new Conservative leader, newly cloned Blairite, David Cameron, on Global poverty. Having tried Blair and New Labour the patron saint of Western NGOs have gone for the conservatives! I guess after trying the fake Tory why not go for the real thing? Are Oxfam and their assorted fellow travellers in Africa now going to persuade us that Cameron is the new face of the war on poverty?

It is clear that the British and other Western NGOs make adjustments to their own political environment and find relevance whoever is in power but because our own NGOs are Donor-driven, lacking a social base in our own societies they have proven themselves incapable of doing the same. Therefore, they declare themselves only independent of African governments and are not accountable to African people but dance to the tunes of their funders. I hope that in the New Year these NGOs will start looking more to Africa and Africans rather than false prophets, saviours and messiahs from outside. The fact that the majority of our people survived to see the dawn breaking on 2006 has nothing to do with what Blair, Brown, Bob and Bono did for them or to them but is the direct result of our will to live and overcome. In saying bye bye to 2005 lets say bye bye to the B stars in the global pornography of poverty that dominated the mulimedia during the year.

Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, General-Secretuary, Pan African Movement; e-mail: [e-mail]

DR Congo: end illegal exploitation of natural resources

Government must act on parliamentary commission's recommendations

The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo must act promptly on the recommendations of a Congolese parliamentary investigation that uncovered illegal natural resource exploitation and profiteering from armed conflict, said a leading group of international human rights, environmental and aid organisations in London on 21 February 2006.

In June 2005 the Lutundula Commission, a special National Assembly Commission led by parliamentarian Christophe Lutundula, submitted a report on its investigations into mining and other business contracts that rebels and government authorities signed between 1996 and 2003 when Congo was wracked by war. The report found that dozens of contracts are either illegal or of limited value for the development of the country and it recommends their termination or renegotiation. It further recommends judicial action against a number of senior political and corporate actors involved in these operations.

After eight months of delay, the office of the National Assembly headed by Olivier Kamitatu decided last week to distribute the report to all parliamentarians, though no decision was made on when it would be officially examined by the chamber. Local sources reported the delay was due to pressure by senior politicians named in the report and leading figures of some of the main political parties who wished to bury it before elections scheduled for May. Discussion of the Commission's report by the National Assembly has already been postponed twice and due to a heavy parliamentary agenda, risks being further delayed.

‘For years, Congo's politicians have struck deals that enrich themselves but provide no benefit to the Congolese public. Profits from such deals have often come at the cost of enormous suffering and loss of human lives,’ said the coalition of non-governmental organisations. ‘Parliament must scrutinise the Lutundula Commission's findings and hold political actors accountable before the elections.’

Since the start of the transitional government in June 2003, armed groups linked to neighbouring countries and corrupt Congolese government officials have continued illicit economic exploitation in the country. In January 2006, a UN arms monitoring group reported to the Security Council that the competition for control of natural resources continues to fuel the violent conflict in eastern and southern Congo.

The Lutundula Commission report draws attention to the ongoing illegal exploitation and recommends an immediate moratorium on the signing of new contracts until after the elections. To ensure continued parliamentary scrutiny, it also calls for an expansion of its mandate to investigate contracts signed during the transitional period from June 2003 to present. These recommendations, made eight months ago, were ignored. Meanwhile, political and corporate actors have concluded new mining deals with minimal oversight.

While carrying out the investigation, some members of the commission were threatened and they found politicians, officials, and company executives unwilling to answer questions. Despite support from the World Bank for the Commission's work, a number of countries and international organisations also refused to assist the Commission. Officials from the UN and the Belgian Senate, both of which had investigated natural resource extraction in the Congo between 2000 and 2003, withheld important information regarding some of the illegal deals, citing concerns over confidentiality.

In its report, the commission corroborates the central findings of the UN Panel of Experts and other investigations, which concluded that belligerents were motivated in part by their desire to exploit Congo's mineral and economic wealth. Belligerents used some of their profits to finance further military operations that often involved widespread human rights abuses against civilians and violations of international humanitarian law. The war is estimated to have caused the deaths of four million people in Congo, the highest death toll in terms of civilian lives since World War II.

Set up by the peace accords of 2003, the Lutundula Commission includes representatives of all the major parties to the conflict. The commission assessed the legality of deals entered into by the former belligerents and their possible benefits for the nation. In its first report, the commission recommends that 16 contracts be ended or renegotiated and that 28 Congolese and international companies be investigated for violations of Congolese law. The commission also recommends that 17 persons be prosecuted for fraud, theft and other charges. A second report detailing the financial costs of the war is soon to be submitted by the commission.

‘When the peace accords were signed, all parties agreed to investigate these deals. Now that the commission has found proof of corruption and abuses, Congolese leaders must squarely address the problem’, said the coalition of international NGOs. ‘Parliament must promptly put the commission's report on its agenda and take action on its recommendations before the end of the transition period.’

For further information please contact: In London, Anneke Van Woudenberg (Human Rights Watch): [phone] and Carina Tertsakian (Global Witness): [phone]. In Oxford, Patricia Feeney (RAID): [phone]. The preliminary Lutundula Commission Report can be found at http://www.free webs.com/congo-kin shasa/

The group of international and Congolese human rights, environmental and aid organizations includes: Global Witness; Human Rights Watch; Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID); International Crisis Group (ICG); Fatal Transactions; Friends of the Earth-USA; Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (NiZA); The Rainforest Foundation UK; Broederlijk Delen; Association Africaine de Droit de l’Homme (ASADHO-Katanga); Centre National D’Appui Au Developpement et à la Participation Populaire (CENADEP); Groupe d’Appui Aux Exploitants des Ressources Naturelles (GAERN); Nou velle Dynamique Syndicale (NDS); Organisation Concertée des Ecologistes et Amis de la Nature (OCEAN).

The corner house

Corporate power never stands still. If companies are blocked from getting what they want in one arena, they quickly move to develop new ways of bypassing whatever obstacles are in their way. But they never take the framework in which they act for granted, operating as they do against an endless and varied background of resistance.

Three new articles on The Corner House website describe the new bilateral avenues that some corporations are using to push their investment interests, and some new ways that activists are using to keep them in check.

1) ‘Turbo-Charging Investor Sovereignty: Investment Agreements and Corporate Colonialism’ (written by Nick Hildyard of The Corner House and Greg Muttitt of PLATFORM, a UK NGO focusing on the oil industry) describes new Host Government Agreements that companies are using to dictate the legal framework under which their projects, such a dam or an oil pipeline, will operate. Oil and gas companies are evolving Production Sharing Agreements that effectively give them almost complete control over a country's natural resources. The article illustrates how corporations are imposing this new era of resource colonialism with examples from the former Soviet Union, West Africa and Iraq. http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=523529

2) Grassroots movements and national and international non-government organisations have long resisted corporate activities that harm local livelihoods, human rights and the environment. As a result of their activities, the majority of the major international finance institutions now promise that the projects they support – such as dams and oil pipelines – will comply with international environmental and social standards … but nonetheless those standards are frequently flouted. ‘Holding Funders and Companies to Account – Litigation and Standards’ outlines how some NGOs have documented these violations so as to publicise what's happening and to bring legal cases to court. http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=523531

3) Another of the few mechanisms available internationally to hold companies to account is the complaints procedure of the OECD's ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, a set of voluntary principles and standards for ‘good corporate behaviour’. A joint submission by The Corner House and RAID (Rights and Accountability In Development) to a UK Government consultation on the Guidelines raises several concerns about the complaints procedure and provides a number of recommendations. http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=523532.

Evidence is growing that the earth's climate could soon change abruptly and drastically. Evidence is also growing that the ‘magic bullet’ that many governments hope will cut this risk – carbon trading – is failing. Three articles now on The Corner House website present an alternative view of last year's official climate negotiations in Montreal and sketch some of the issues:

1) ‘To Keep the Oil Flowing: A Conversation on Carbon Trading’ http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/document/CarbConv.pdf

This is a rough draft of one portion of a forthcoming special issue of Development Dialogue and was distributed at the Montreal climate conference. It describes in a ‘question-and-answer’ format what is happening on the ground as the fossil fuel economy sets up ‘carbon offset’ and ‘carbon saving’ projects around the globe. The authors, many of whom are associated with the Durban Group for Climate Justice, would welcome comments from readers.

2) ‘Climate Talks in Montreal: Can We Save the Planet?’ http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=523750

This article by Brian Tokar that was published in the February 2006 issue of the US Z Magazine describes the key issues of global climate change discussed at last year's climate negotiations in Montreal.

3) ‘Climate Politics after Montreal: Time for a Change’.

http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=523748

This article by Larry Lohmann (published in January 2006 by the US online think-tank, Foreign Policy in Focus, and in another version by Development Today, Norway) argues that carbon markets are not helping to phase out fossil fuels and are not therefore helping to tackle global warming.

http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk

Nestle taken to court

On Monday, 6 February 2006, just a week before Valentine's Day, the first court hearing was scheduled for a lawsuit filed against Nestle, Cargill, and Archer Daniels-Midland for allowing forced child labour to be used on their West African cocoa farms. Human rights groups have long criticized the chocolate industry for failing to stop illegal child labour, including child slavery, on West African cocoa farms, but this is the first time the issue is going to court. The charges against the companies include trafficking, torture, and forced labour of children who cultivate and harvest cocoa beans, which the companies import from Africa.

Valentine's Day chocolate definitely isn't going to taste as sweet when consumers find out it was made with illegal child labour. The chocolate industry has known about this problem for years, and now they're facing the repercussions in court,

said Kirsten Moller, executive director of Global Exchange, a San Francisco-based human rights group that is party to the lawsuit. Global Exchange and the Organic Consumers Association will hold a creative protest outside the courthouse just prior to the hearing to demand that Nestle stop using illegal child labour and switch to Fair Trade cocoa.

The lawsuit was filed by the Washington, DC-based International Labor Rights Fund and the civil rights firm Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis on behalf of a class of Malian children who were trafficked from Mali to the Ivory Coast and forced to work 12- to 14-hour days with no pay, little food and sleep, and frequent beatings. The suit was brought under two federal statutes, the Torture Victims Protection Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act, the same laws that were used to win a settlement from Unocal for human rights violations in Burma.

According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), US Department of State and UNICEF, tens of thousands of children work on cocoa farms in West Africa, particularly in the Ivory Coast. The US chocolate industry agreed to work toward ending illegal child labour on cocoa farms through a voluntary protocol called the Harkin-Engel Protocol. But that protocol expired on 1 July 2005, and the industry failed to come up with system for monitoring and certifying that US chocolate products aren't made using forced child labour.

Global Exchange, Organic Consumers Association and the International Labor Rights Fund have been urging Nestle and other chocolate companies to address the problem of illegal child labour by buying their cocoa beans from farms that are Fair Trade certified. Fair Trade ensures that cocoa farmers receive a fair price for their harvest. Slave labour is strictly prohibited on Fair Trade farms, and farms are inspected to ensure that Fair Trade standards are being met.

Bibliographic notes

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3. BBC. . 2003. . Kenya's Terror Bill Rejected. . http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3069211.stm

4. Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle. . 1997. . Democratic Experiments in Africa : Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics . , Cambridge/New York , , USA: : Cambridge University Press. .

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6. Clinkenbeard and Steven E.. 2004. . “Donors Versus Dictators: The Impact of Multilateral Aid Conditionality on Democratisation. Kenya and Malawi in Comparative Context, 19902004. ”. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. .

7. Daily Nation, (2003), 18 November, Quote of the Day, Letters; (2003), 1 December, Bomb Hotel's Former Staff Demand Salary Arrears, News.

8. East African (The). . 2003. . Making Kenya a Police State. . 7 July;

9. Government of Kenya. . 2003. . Suppression of Terrorism Bill. . Vol. 38:

10. Kagari and Michelle. . 2003. . Anti-Terror Bill an Affront to Human Rights, Op-ed. . Daily Nation . , Daily Nation

11. Kuhenga and Makwaia wa. . 2003. . How to Get Locked up in Dar: Read “Newsweek“, Opinion. . The East African . ,

12. Majtenyi and Cathy. . 2005. . Kenya /Antiterrorism. . http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/08/sec030802-27e550fe.htm

13. Muriuki and Muriithi. . 2003. . Four Face Trial over Mombasa Bombing. . Daily Nation . ,

14. Murunga and Ambrose. . 2003. . Terror Bill Will Neuter Our Sovereignty. . Daily Nation . ,

15. Nyinguro and Phillip O.. 1999. . “United States Policy and the Transition to Democracy in Kenya, 1990-1992. ”. University of South Carolina. .

16. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. . 2004. . Patterns of Global Terrorism: Africa Overview. . http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31578.htm

17. Thuku, Wahome, Mark Agutu and David Mugonyi. . 2003. . Pressure Mounts on Anti-Terror Bill. . Daily Nation . ,

Bibliographic notes

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3. Charillon F.. 2002. . La politique étrangère de l'Union Européenne à l'épreuve des normes américaines. . Cultures et Conflits . , http://www.conflits.org/article.php3?id_article=543

4. Council of the European Union. . 2004. . Updated List of Terrorist Organisations and Persons Linked to Terrorist Activities. . http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/GA17.05.04.pdf

5. Crisis Group. . 2005a. . Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds? . Africa Report n° 95 . , Africa Report

6. de Vries G.. 2005. . World Must Keep Focus on Fight Against Terrorism’ press release. . http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/FocusOnFightag_terr.pdf

7. Duffield M.. 2002. . War as a Network Enterprise: The New Security Terrain and its Implications. . Cultural Values . , Vol. 6((1 and 2)): 153––165. .

8. European Union Website, http://europa.eu.int : ‘Somalia - Country Overview’ 18 November 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=so&lng=en&status=new (accessed on 28 June 2005); ‘Sudan - Country Overview’ 13th August 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=sd&lng=en&status=new (accessed on 28 June 2005).

9. French Ministry of Defence. . 2003. . Cinq mois dans la Corne de l'Afrique. . http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/actu/colbs/articles/f_aconit2.htm

10. Gehriger U.. 2004. . Al-Qaida ist überall. . Süddeutsche Zeitung Magazin . ,

11. Hewitt A.. 1989. . “ACP and the Developing World. ”. In The European Community and the Challenge of the Future . , Edited by: Lodge J.. p. 285––300. . London : : Pinter. .

12. International Crisis Group. . 2004. . Biting the Somali Bullet. . ICG Africa Report n° 79 . , http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/079_biting_the_somali_bullet_ print.pdf

13. Jacquard R.. 2002. . In the Name of Osama Bin Laden - Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood . , p. 28 Durham : : Duke University Press. .

14. Joannidis M.. 2004. . Corne de l'Afrique : enjeux stratégiques et conflits. . http://www.rfi.fr/fichiers/MFI/PolitiqueDiplomatie/1194.asp

15. Keane R.. 2004. . The EU's African Peace Facility Uncovered: Better Late Than Never. . European Security Review . , http://www.isiseurope.org/ftp/Download/ESR%2024%20-%20APF.PDF

16. Landgraf M.. 1999. . “Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in Africa: A View From the European Commission. ”. In Gewaltsame Konflikte und ihre Prävention in Afrika . Edited by: Engel U. and Mehler A.. p. 103––117. . Hamburg :

17. Markakis J.. 2003. . ‘The Horn of Conflict’ Review of African Political Economy. . : 359––362. .

18. Menkhaus K.. 2002. . Somalia: Next Up in the War on Terrorism. . http://www.csis.org/africa/ANotes/ANotes0201b.pdfSomalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism

19. Monaco A. and Gourlay C.. 2005. . Support for the African Union in Darfur: A Test for EUNATO Strategic Partnership. . European Security Review . ,

20. Morrison J. S.. ‘Africa and the War on Global Terrorism’. In: . Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa; . 15 November 2001. ; . http://www.csis.org/hill/ts011115morrison.htm

21. Rogier E.. 2005. . No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace . , The Hague : : The Netherlands Institute of International Relations. .

22. Rose, D. (2002), ‘The Osama Files’ Reprinted from Vanity Fair (New York) January, No. 497, pp. 50–56, on the internet: http://www.espac.org/media_pages/osama_files.html (accessed on 12 July 2004) .

23. Stroobants J-P.. 2004. . Les polices occidentales découvrent les nouvelles formes d'Al-Qaida. . Le Monde . ,

24. United Nations Action Against Terrorism. . 2005. . http://www.un.org/terrorism/

25. United States Department of State, website - http://www.state.gov : Patterns of Global Terrorism, Appendix C, Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups, 29 April 2004, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31759.htm (accessed on 02.11.2005); Somalia, October 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (accessed on 2 Novem-ber 2005); States Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (accessed on 2 November 2005); Sudan, August 2005, on internet: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm (accessed on 2 November 2005).

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10. Statistics SA.. 2005. . Table 1: 2001 Income Category by Geography per Person Weighted. .

Interviews

1. Mphahlele, T. (2005). Milky Way Café, Pedestrian Boulevard, The Zone Shopping Centre, Rosebank, Johannesburg, South Africa. 13 May.

2. Heri, D. (2005) DM Business Centre and Internet Café, 29A Bezuidenhout Street, Troyeville, Johannesburg, South Africa. 13 May.

Notes

Footnotes

1. Reports from the BBC, CNN, the Kenyan Daily Nation and the UK's Guardian newspaper all report different numbers of Kenyans, Israelis, and terrorists dead.

2. The Kenyan news media later reported that the employees of the hotel were pleading with the government to force the owner of the hotel, Mr Yehuda Sulami, to pay them their salary arrears and terminal dues. Staff Reporter, ‘Bomb Hotel's Former Staff Demand Salary Arrears’, Daily Nation, 1 December 2003.

3. Human rights groups in Kenya point to the legislations of India, Pakistan, Uganda and Tanzania as being misused for political purposes and by governments in power to persecute their political opposition which is labeled ‘terrorist’, Michelle Kagari, ‘Anti-Terror Bill an Affront to Human Rights’, Daily Nation, 18 November 2003.

4. In an interesting turn of events a local insurance company began offering ‘anti-terror’ insurance coverage to tourists and tour companies in the East African region that was now seen as highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

1. Meanwhile the US favoured sustained pressure on the Government of Sudan until peace negotiations proved conclusive. This deep disagreement subsequently led US envoy Senator Danforth to seek European support for a multilateral peace process (Rogier, 2005).

2. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the AU/EU partnership in Darfur because it is so recent. Most observers however agree that the mission remains too limited – in terms of troops, equipment, mandate and funding – in spite of the EU's considerable financial backing. For a detailed analysis of this partnership, see the Crisis Group Africa Report n° 99, ‘The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination’, 25 October 2005.

3. One main reservation concerns the full reciprocity in the tariff treatment the EPAs would grant the EU: It runs counter to the promotion of intra-African trade. Another is that it will lead to the fragmentation and weakening of existing regional organisations. For a more detailed analysis of the EPAs, see R. Gibb (2000), ‘Post-Lomé: The European Union and the South’, Third World Quarterly (31, 3) and P. Goodison (2005), ‘The European Union: New Start or Old Spin?’, Review of African Political Economy (103), pp. 167-176.

4. I am not denying the excellent results achieved by both organisations on conflict resolution issues. The very fact that IGAD has survived the multiple divisions between its member-states is in itself an achievement. But international donors have tended to focus on this aspect solely, although what is expected of the AU and IGAD is the implementation of a complete and far-reaching institutional reform programme.

1. It should be noted that concerns were raised about the 2001 Census Report. It appeared that a number of people had not been able to participate, and that some of those who those did participate were not all that forthcoming about their employment status, salary bracket or about declaring electronic equipment in their homes for a range of reasons – security being the most cited.

2. The exchange rate fluctuates between R11.00 and R12.00 to the British Pound, and between R7.00 and R8.00 to the Euro.

3. The Group Areas Act of 1951 allocated specific areas of the country to each of the races. The majority of the land (and the most favourable) was reserved for Whites. Other races were relocated to ‘reserves’. The Black Communities Development Act, introduced in 1984, zoned urban areas into exclusive group areas.