America, China & the Scramble for Africa's Oil

Abstract

After decades of Cold War, when Africa was simply viewed as a convenient pawn on the global chessboard, and a further decade of benign neglect in the 1990s, the African continent has now become a vital arena of strategic and geopolitical competition for not only the United States, but also for China, India, and other new emerging powers. The main reason for this is quite simple: Africa is the final frontier as far as the world's supplies of energy are concerned with global competition for both oil and natural gas (particularly the latter) becoming just as intense – if not even more so – than the former.

The factors behind the growing attention to African energy supplies are well known; so we will only summarise them here.¹ World oil production is only just meeting world demand and old fields are being drained faster than new production can be brought on line. Supplies will be tight for the foreseeable future, so any new source of supply is significant. Most importers are also trying to reduce their dependence on Middle Eastern oil. In the next 10-15 years, most of the new oil entering the world market is going to be coming from African fields because it is only in Africa – and to a lesser extent in the volatile Central Asia region – that substantial new fields have been found and brought into production.

Main article text

The United States & the militarisation of African Oil Production

Historically, Africa – especially sub-Saharan Africa – has been a low-priority area for the US Department of Defense (DoD). During the Cold War, of course, the DoD sought to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the area, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted covert operations aimed at undermining the pro-Soviet regime in Angola. For the most part, however, the US defense establishment devoted relatively meager resources to Africa – in comparison, say, to US military expenditures geared to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.² But now, as a result of growing US reliance on African oil and the uncertain security climate in the region, the DoD is paying closer attention to Africa, and there is a noticeable increase in US military activities in the region. These may still be modest when compared to similar activities elsewhere, but they are growing, and are sure to acquire even greater significance in the years ahead as Africa gains in importance as a source of energy for the United States.³

Although the relationship between military power and American reliance on foreign oil is a relatively new phenomenon in the African setting, it has long been a conspicuous factor in the US relationship with the Persian Gulf region. It was

President Franklin D. Roosevelt who first perceived a US national security interest in Persian Gulf oil, during World War Two, and it was Roosevelt who a established a security-for-oil relationship with Saudi Arabia. As part of this relationship, the United States helped arm and train Saudi military forces and managed their logistical services. The relationship between US security and Middle Eastern oil was further strengthened in 1980, when President Carter designated the free flow of Persian Gulf oil as a ‘vital interest’ of the United States and declared that this country would use ‘any means necessary, including military force,’ to defend that interest. To implement this policy, widely known as the ‘Carter Doctrine’, the DoD established the US Central Command (CENTCOM) to oversee US military operations in the Gulf area and built up a substantial military basing infrastructure in the region. This infrastructure was subsequently used to support US combat operations during the Gulf War of 1991, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.⁴

This trajectory of ever-expanding US military involvement is now evident in the Caspian Sea region, another promising source of new oil. As exhibited in the Gulf, this trajectory begins with the assertion of a ‘national security’ interest in the unimpeded flow of oil and is followed, in turn, by the provision of arms and military assistance, the establishment of military bases, and ultimately the deployment of US combat forces. American access to Caspian Sea oil was first couched in national security terms by President Clinton during a 1997 visit to Washington by Heydar Aliyev, then the president of Azerbaijan. ‘In a world of growing energy demand,’ Clinton told Aliyev, ‘our nation cannot afford to rely on any single region for our energy supplies.’ By helping to develop the Caspian's oil and gas reserves, he continued, ‘we not only help Azerbaijan to prosper, we also help diversify our energy supply and strengthen our nation's security.’⁵ This statement was followed by the establishment of military aid agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, along with the provision of military equipment and technical services to these countries' forces.⁶ Later, after 9/11, the DoD established military bases in the region and deployed US combat forces there, primarily in support of operations in Afghanistan. The Bush administration has also expanded the military aid programmes initiated by President Clinton.⁷Ostensibly, this aid is designed to boost the counter-terrorism capabilities of friendly forces in the region, but government documents indicate that it is also intended to help ensure the unimpeded flow of oil. Thus, in justifying a US role in creating a ‘rapid-reaction brigade’ in Kazakhstan, the Department of State noted that formation of the brigade will ‘enhance Kazakhstan's capability to respond to major terrorist threats to oil platforms or borders.’⁸

A similar trajectory is now visible in Africa. This began, as in the Gulf and the Caspian, with the assertion of a US national security interest in unimpeded access to African oil. Commenting on this development, the former US ambassador to Chad, Donald R. Norland, told the Africa Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee in April 2002,

It's been reliably reported that, for the first time, the two concepts –‘Africa’ and ‘US national security’ – have been used in the same sentence in Pentagon documents. ⁹

Michael A. Westphal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, also noted this linkage in a Pentagon press briefing on 2 April 2002. ‘Fifteen per cent of the US's imported oil supply comes from sub-Saharan Africa,’ he declared, and ‘this is also a number which has the potential for increasing significantly in the next decade.’¹⁰ Walter Kansteiner, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, acknowledged the national security implications of African oil during a visit to Nigeria in July 2002: ‘African oil is of strategic national interest to us,’ he declared, and ‘it will increase and become more important as we go forward.’¹¹

As in the Caspian, the establishment or expansion of military aid programmes in Africa and the provision of US arms, military equipment, and technical assistance has accompanied these statements. To a considerable extent, this aid is intended to enhance the internal security capabilities of friendly African states, so that they can better control (or suppress) the ethnic, religious, and factional divisions that roil many of these countries. Not surprisingly, the largest chunks of US aid to Africa are going to Angola and Nigeria, Africa's two leading oil suppliers to the United States. Total US security aid to these two countries in Fiscal Years 2002-04 amounted to approximately $300 million, a substantial increase over the previous three-year period.

In addition to the US aid programmes directed at individual countries, the United States is supporting a number of multilateral or regional initiatives aimed at enhancing African states' internal security capabilities. Typically, these programmes are described as being designed to improve anti-terrorism actions in the region or to support international peacekeeping operations, but the skills and techniques being imparted – small unit manoeuvres, counter-insurgency, light infantry operations, and so on – are of a sort that could easily be employed in the suppression of ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife. And while relatively modest in dollar terms – that is, when compared to the amounts being spent by the DoD in the Middle East and Asia – these efforts represent a significant investment in the African setting, where military expenditures are much smaller.

Washington has used a variety of US security assistance programmes to enhance its military influence in Africa, including military sales and other arms transfer programmes, military training, US Navy exercises, and the acquisition of basing rights in strategic African countries.

US arms sales & military training programmes

The main channels for US sales of conventional military equipment to African countries are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMF) programmes. These entail the sale of US arms and military equipment by the DoD to friendly powers, in some cases facilitated through the provision of credits through the FMF programme. FMS sales to African states rose from $25.6 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 to $61.5 million in FY 2005 and then fell again to an estimated $20.1 million in FY 2006. Major recipients included Djibouti ($19.4 million in FY 2005 and $8.5 million in 2006) and Kenya ($23.5 million in FY 2005 and $5 million in 2006). Other major recipients in recent years have included Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Uganda.¹²

Several African countries have also purchased US arms and equipment directly from American defence contractors through the Commercial Sales programme, overseen by the US Department of State. Major recipients in recent years have included Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda.¹³ Moreover, Algeria (a major oil producer and potentially a major supplier of natural gas to the United States) has been permitted to buy very large quantities of sophisticated counter-insurgency equipment – most notably night-vision equipment – to outfit the army and other internal security forces for operations against the Salafists.¹⁴ American firms delivered $78 million worth of military hardware to Algeria in FY 2004 and an estimated $80 million worth in FY 2005 and FY 2006.

Most African countries participate in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, under which the United States provides instruction in combat and technical skills for African officers and enlisted personnel at bases in the United States and abroad. In recent years, the DoD has allocated approximately $10 million per year to provide training to some 1,300 to 1,700 African personnel annually. Major recipients include: Algeria ($750,000 in FY 2006), Angola ($400,000 in FY 2006), Chad ($250,000), Cote d'Ivoire ($50,000), Democratic Republic of Congo ($150,000), Republic of Congo ($100,000), Eritrea ($450,000), Ethiopia ($600,000), Gabon ($200,000), Nigeria ($800,000), and São Tomé ($200,000). The DoD also plans to initiate new IMET programmes in Equatorial Guinea and Sudan in FY 2006.¹⁵

Beginning in Fiscal Year 2003, the DoD has allocated funds to the new African Coastal and Border Security Programme (ACBSP). ACBSP provides specialised training, equipment, and intelligence data to selected African countries for efforts aimed at combating smuggling, piracy, and other cross-boundary threats to internal and regional security. This effort has also included efforts to promote intelligence-sharing among the nations involved. In FY 2005, $4.0 million was appropriated for this purpose and another $4.0 million was requested for FY 2006. Among the many countries participating in this initiative are Angola, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, São Tomé, and Uganda. In 2003, the DoD also commenced the delivery of seven surplus US Coast Guard cutters to Nigeria, significantly enhancing the Nigerian Navy's ability to protect offshore oil installations and oil tankers. In addition, the FY 2006 budget request includes $9.7 million in Economic Support Funds for the Africa Regional Fund, of which 25 per cent will go to support counter-terrorism training and assistance for efforts to combat smuggling and money laundering.¹⁶

Beginning in Fiscal 2006, American funds for peacekeeping training in Africa will be channeled primarily through the new Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), replacing African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and other US aid programmes. Out of the $114 million requested for GPOI in FY 2006, African states will receive most of the $14 million requested for training, exercises, equipment; an additional $37 million is to be funneled directly to ACOTA programme accounts. The Bush administration has also requested $41 million in FY 2006 for the Africa Regional Peacekeeping account to support operations in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sudan, and to strengthen the peacekeeping forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).¹⁷

In FY 2002-03, the DoD allocated approximately $16 million in Africa peacekeeping money to establish the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). The PSI funding was used to deploy teams of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide counter-terrorism training and equipment to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. This effort entailed the provision of training and equipment to six light infantry companies in the four countries. As a result of strenuous lobbying by US military officials, PSI was transformed into the new Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in March 2004 and expanded to include the important energy-producing countries of Algeria and Nigeria, as well as Senegal and Tunisia, along with the original PSI participants. The TSCTI programme obtained initial funding of $16 million in FY 2005 and will receive $100 million annually from FY 2007 to FY 2011, for a total of $500 million.¹⁸

Expanding US naval operations in Africa

In recognition Africa's growing role as a supplier of oil to the United States, the US Navy has significantly increased its presence in African waters. Much of this activity is focused in the Gulf of Guinea, the body of water closest to the major West African oil producers and itself the site of some of Africa's most promising offshore oil reserves. The US Navy has also conducted joint training operations with the naval forces of African states and engaged them in joint discussion of security problems in the region. A number of recent naval exercises and other events are evidence of the active interest in Africa now being taken by the US Navy.

In May 2003, NATO Supreme Commander General James Jones indicated that in the future, US naval forces under his command would spend much less time in the Mediterranean. Instead, he predicted, ‘I'll bet they'll spend half the time going down the west coast of Africa.’¹⁹ The most impressive demonstration of this new posture came in July 2004, when the United States carried out the ‘Summer Pulse 04’ exercise. This exercise was explicitly designed to show that the United States could carry out naval operations simultaneously in every part of the world and, thus, that US naval forces could respond to a crisis in one part of the world even if it was already engaged elsewhere. The African element of the exercise was conducted off the coast of Morocco, where the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise commanded a US carrier battle group that led a massive joint exercise with naval forces from nine countries, including NATO counties and Morocco itself. The exercise involved a total of 20,000 personnel (both sailors and marines) on board 30 ships.²⁰

In October 2004, the US European Command (EURCOM) hosted a three-day Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Conference in Naples, Italy (headquarters of the US Sixth Fleet). Participants included naval leaders from Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, São Tomé, and Togo, along with personnel from the United States, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The conference reportedly focused on common efforts to combat threats posed by piracy, smuggling, and drug trafficking, as well as the fight against terrorism. It ended with joint statement pledging participants to engage in ongoing dialogue, cooperation, and joint activities.²¹

On 25 January 2005, the US Navy commenced a two-month Gulf of Guinea Deployment with participation by the USS Emory S. Land, carrying about 1,400 sailors and Marines. The deployment was the direct result of the 2004 Maritime Security Conference held in October 2004, and involved port calls at Douala, Cameroon; Port Gentil, Gabon; and Sekondi, Ghana. Instructors and sailors from Cameroon, São Tomé, Gabon, Ghana, and Benin also participated in the operation.²² A second Gulf of Guinea Deployment was conducted from May to July 2005, with participation by the US Coast Guard Cutter Bear.²³

From late-June to early-July 2005, the US Navy held ten days of exercises in the Mediterranean with naval forces from Britain, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The exercises, known as ‘Barbary Thunder II’, consisted of joint maritime interdiction operations by US Marines along with their counterparts from Italy, Morocco, and Algeria.²⁴

And on 27 September 2005, the US Navy commenced a five-week West African Training Cruise (WATC) exercise with the deployment of the dock landing ship USS Gunston Hall and the high-speed vessel Swift. Host nations for the WATC include Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, and Morocco. Planned activities include small boat training, live-fire exercises, and amphibious raids. At the same time, American sailors and Marines participated in Exercise Green Osprey, a British-led amphibious landing exercise on the coast of Senegal.²⁵

These operations are particularly significant because they constitute the necessary preparation for what are, in fact, the most likely scenarios for direct US intervention in Africa. While land bases would be required for large-scale ground operations – as, for example during humanitarian relief operations or to actually try to occupy and control large parts of a country like Nigeria should that ever be contemplated – they would not be needed for more focused attacks, such as air strikes or airborne assaults against insurgents who threatened to interrupt oil supplies. Not only would Washington prefer to avoid establishing a highly visible, and thus highly provocative, presence on the ground in Africa, it would actually be easier for the United States to conduct such operations from an off-shore naval armada which could be rushed to oil-rich regions of Africa at short notice in less than a week.

The search for bases in Africa

However, to ensure that the United States can deploy troops and equipment to Africa, particularly in times of emergency when even a few days might be to long to wait, the DoD is now beginning to establish a basing infrastructure in Africa, again following the trajectory first seen in the Gulf and the Caspian regions. In recognition of Africa's colonial past and likely popular resistance to anything resembling a permanent military garrison, the DoD does not seek elaborate installations but rather ‘bare-bones’ facilities – usually an airstrip, basic communications links, and a warehouse or two – that can be tended by local troops or contract personnel most of the time, until needed by American forces for particular operations. Although Pentagon officials tend to emphasise the threat from terrorism when discussing the need for such facilities, they have also expressed a need to protect the flow of oil. In 2003, for example, a senior Pentagon official told Greg Jaffe of the Wall Street Journal,

a key mission for US forces [in Africa] would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields, which in the future could account for as much as 25 per cent of all US oil imports, are secure. ²⁶

Among the countries that have reportedly been considered as a potential site for the establishment of a US military base in Africa is the island state of São Tomé e Principe. São Tomé is located in the Gulf of Guinea near the major West African oil producers, yet is conveniently distant from the ethnic and political strife that has often overtaken countries on the mainland; it is also expected to be a major oil exporter itself, in conjunction with Nigeria (with which is has established a Joint Development Zone in the Gulf of Guinea). Although the DoD has not formally expressed an interest in acquiring a base there, the Deputy Commander of the US European Command (EURCOM), which exercises command authority over much of sub-Saharan Africa, visited the islands in July 2001 to examine possible basing locations.²⁷

In its efforts to secure other basing options, the United States has negotiated agreements granting it access to airfields and other facilities in several African nations. These facilities are often referred to as ‘lily pad’ facilities, because American forces can hop in and out of them in times of crisis while avoiding the impression of establishing a permanent – and potentially provocative – presence. They include Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where the DoD has built two ‘K-Span’ steel buildings to house troops and equipment; an airfield near Bamako, the capital of Mali; an airfield at Dakar, Senegal; an airfield in Gabon; and airfields and port facilities in Morocco and Tunisia.²⁸

The DoD has also sought basing facilities in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, primarily to support anti-terror operations in the region. After 9/11, the United States received permission from Djibouti to use Camp Lemonier as the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, a multinational naval force led by the United States that monitors and interdicts possible terrorist travel routes at sea and suspected terrorist activities in adjacent countries, specifically in Somalia. Along with the headquarters element, 800 US Special Operations Forces (SOF) troops have set up base at Camp Lemonier.²⁹ Likewise, under an agreement reportedly signed in July 2003 during Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's visit to Washington, the DoD was granted the right to use the airfield at Tamanrasset, in southern Algeria, for the deployment of US P-3 Orion aerial surveillance aircraft.³⁰ (In March 2004, P-3 ‘Orion’ aerial surveillance aircraft based at Tamanrasset were reportedly used to gather intelligence on the activities of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to forward this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the Salafists³¹).

The perceived challenge from China

For the most part, US policy regarding African oil is aimed at improving the investment climate for American oil firms and strengthening the internal security capabilities of friendly governments. The DoD also seeks to establish a modest capacity for fighting any localised, indigenous forces that might threaten the free flow of petroleum exports. In the past few years, however, another perceived threat has arisen: the possibility that China will pre-empt American firms in the development of promising oil fields and compete with the United States for the loyalty of local governments – possibly through an increased level of arms sales and military assistance. Although not all American officials would put China in the ‘threat’ category with respect to African oil, there is growing concern over this development in Congress and the Department of Defense.

Before addressing this controversy further, it is useful to make a few basic points about China's role in Africa: first, China is not a newcomer to Africa, having played a significant role there for several decades; and second, China's pursuit of oil assets in Africa is proceeding along lines long trodden by the United States and the major Western European countries.

China first became a major actor in the African scene in the 1960s and 1970s, when, as part of its ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union, it supported certain national liberation movements in the area (notably those that were prepared to eschew Soviet aid, such as UNITA in Angola and ZANU in Zimbabwe) and friendly post-independence regimes. As parts of this effort, China provided arms and military equipment and, after independence, helped build roads and railroads. This aid gave Beijing a respectable stature in Africa, at least in the eyes of certain grateful liberation groups and struggling governments. As suggested by Rep. Barbara Lee of California, in recent comments before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations Committee (HIRC), China was providing arms to the national liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s while the United States was still aiding the European colonial regimes.

[Between] 1955 and 1977, while many African countries were fighting for independence and self-determination … we were not on the side of … the independence movements,' while China ‘sold $142 million worth of military equipment and support to Africans.’ Moreover, ‘China opened its universities to over 15,000 African students for free education [and] has consistently supported Africa's development and responded to emergencies.' For this reason, she argued, China cannot be considered an interloper in Africa but a legitimate player with a credible history of supporting African development efforts. ³²

An examination of China's efforts to acquire access to oil assets in Africa would reveal a pattern essentially indistinguishable those of the Britain, France, and the United States. All of the major Western powers have long used whatever means and influence is available to them to secure access to African oil, including economic incentives, diplomacy, and the provision of arms and military equipment. For example, during the 1966-69 civil war in Nigeria, Great Britain provided arms to the Federal government in Lagos while the French government, hoping to gain a foothold for French firms in the oil-rich Delta region (long the exclusive preserve of British and American companies), conspired to smuggle arms to the breakaway Biafran regime.³³

As noted above, moreover, the United States continues to provide arms and military assistance to friendly oil producers in Africa. Hence, the fact that China has aggressively sought oil assets in Africa and accompanied its efforts with deliveries of arms and other aid cannot be viewed as an innovation but as ‘business as usual.’ This is not meant to excuse Chinese assistance to regimes cited for persistent human right violations, like Sudan and Zimbabwe, but to show that China's behaviour in this regard is not markedly different from that of the major Western powers. All of these countries – the United States, the Europeans, and China – are avid participants in the ‘oil rush’ in Africa, and all are using every means at their disposal. This having been said, it is still important to note that Chinese firms, with the evident backing of the Chinese government, are avidly seeking oil assets in Africa and that some sectors of the US government view China's entry into the African oil rush with alarm.

To sustain its rapid economic growth, averaging 9 per cent per year over the past decade, China will need additional supplies of energy. According to the DoE, China's total energy consumption will rise by 153 per cent between 2002 and 2025, from 43.2 to a projected 109.2 quadrillion BTUs. This will entail increased consumption of all sources of energy, including oil: in the DoE's projections, China's net oil consumption will rise by 214 per cent over this period, from 5.2 to 14.2 million bbl/d.³⁴ Because domestic petroleum production in China is expected to remain relatively flat over this period, at around 3 million bbl/d, it will have to substantially increase its imports of oil in order to satisfy anticipated demand – much as is the case for the United States. To obtain this oil, Chinese firms are scouring the world for investment in the hunt for investment opportunities in untapped reserves. This search has taken Chinese firms to Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Indonesia, and Venezuela – and to Africa.³⁵ Chinese oil companies have already established a significant presence in Sudan – the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) now owns 40 per cent of the largest oil-producing company in Sudan, the Great Nile Petroleum Operating Company – and in January 2006, the Chinese state-controlled energy company Cnooc announced a $2.3 billion deal to acquire a 45 per cent stake in a major off-shore Nigerian oil field that is managed by the French oil firm Total; China is avidly seeking investment opportunities in Angola as well.³⁶ According to Michael Rannenberger, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, China now obtains approximately 30 per cent of its oil imports from Africa and ‘China hopes to increase this proportion in the years ahead.’³⁷

China has also strengthened its broader economic ties with a number of African countries – investing in mining projects and dam building for example – and has developed close military relations with a number of African countries, particularly Sudan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. Ties with the oil-rich Nigerian government were significantly expanded in September 2004, when the Chinese defence company Poly Technology announced that it was prepared to enter into partnership with the government-owned Nigerian Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON). After years of neglect, the Nigerian government has been seeking to revive DICON, which has recently resumed production of a wide variety of small arms, grenades, and ammunition for the Nigerian Army.³⁸

From Rannenberger's perspective, this is nothing unexpected, nor should it necessarily be considered alarming. China's pursuit of African oil ‘should not be read as a threat’, he told the HIRC in July:

Nations from every region are seeking markets in Africa and African sources of energy. In fact, this can work to advance our goals in Africa to the extent that it serves to increase prosperity and stability. ³⁹

He went on to express concern over the human rights implications of China's continuing support for the northern Sudanese government, but ended with a plea for cooperation between the United States and China in maintaining the stability of world oil markets and seeking the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa.

China should have many of the same interests in Africa as the United States, based, among other elements, on our shared desire to diversify sources of supply, our shared reliance on a global oil market, and our shared concern over volatile oil prices, [and] our share[d] interests in conflict resolution and promotion of national and regional stability,’ he declared. This being the case, the United States should ‘engage China directly, at all appropriate levels, to seek to develop new concepts of cooperation that can advance common interests. ⁴⁰

This hopeful view is not, however, shared by all US policymakers. ‘Amidst all of this hoopla over China's rapidly growing economy, there is a dark side to [that] country's economic expansion,’ Rep. Christopher Smith of New Jersey told the HIRC in July.

China is playing an increasingly influential role on the continent of Africa, and there is concern that the Chinese intend to aid and abet African dictators, gain a stranglehold on precious African natural resources, and undo much of the progress that has been made on democracy and governance in the last 15 years in African nations. ⁴¹

It is possible, of course, to take exception to Smith's interpretation of recent developments in Africa and to suggest that Beijing hardly possesses the capacity to do all he ascribes to it, but the fact is that other American policymakers hold a similar view of China's role in Africa, and this assessment will no doubt influence US policy in the years ahead.

The possibility that an alarmist view of China's role in African oil could affect US policy is raised, for example, in the DoD's 2005 report on Chinese military capabilities, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China. In an insert in ‘Resource Demands as a Driver of Strategy,’ the report notes that China's growing reliance on imported energy, especially oil and natural gas, ‘is playing a role in shaping China's strategy and policy.’ Such concerns, it continues, ‘factor heavily’ in Beijing's relations with a number of major oil producers, including Angola and Sudan, and have prompted Beijing to seek close ties with these countries. ‘Beijing's belief that it requires such special relationships in order to assure its energy access could shape its defence strategy and force planning in the future.’⁴² Left unsaid in this statement (this report, it should be noted, is intended as an assessment, not a policy document) is the belief that any such efforts on China's part could pose a challenge – even a direct threat – to US security interests. But even if the DoD did not make this point explicitly, there are others in Washington, including Representative Smith and other Republicans on the House and Senate foreign relations committees, who are certainly prepared to do so.

Conclusions

It is still early days, and American policymakers have not (so far as is known publicly) yet adopted specific policies or taken specific steps to thwart China's growing interests in African oil. The US aid programmes and military initiatives described above are aimed principally at combating terrorism and containing local threats to the safe flow of oil. But the very act of building military ties with African governments and providing them with arms and military assistance has already evolved into a kind of low-level military competition with China for the loyalty of local elites. China, too, appears to be seeking ties of this sort, through its own modest military aid programmes.⁴³ Whether all this will lead to something greater – and potentially far more perilous – is something that cannot be foreseen at this point, but it is certainly something that bears close watching, given the dangers this could pose for the states and peoples of Africa.

Although US (and Chinese) military programmes in Africa are relatively small, at least in monetary terms and in comparison to military programmes in other parts of the world, they are growing rapidly – and even relatively small programmes can have a significant impact in Africa. First, they help to encourage African regimes to continue to rely on oil-based development, rather than pursuing broader economic development strategies that promote local manufacturing and agriculture. As the work of Terry Lynn Karl and a number of analysts have shown, the possession of oil by countries in Africa and other parts of the developing world nearly always leads to political repression, corruption, and violence.

Second, US (and Chinese) military involvement often aggravates internal political conflicts over the allocation of oil revenues, particularly when the regime in power monopolises such revenues while depriving other groups in the population of the fruits of oil production. This leads to political unrest, which frequently turns violent since a resort to arms is often seen by marginalised groups as the only means of gaining a larger share of oil profits: it also encourages African regimes to rely on the use of force to constrain such challenges, with the implicit backing of the United States, to maintain control and stay in power. This in turn threatens to lead to disruptions in the flow of oil, exactly what Washington says it wants to prevent.

Third, by developing close military relationships with unstable regimes and becoming more and more deeply involved in African conflicts, the United States (and China) are provoking the spread of anti-American sentiment and promoting the growth of Salafists and other Islamic jihadist groups. This only increases the likelihood of future acts of terrorism against US targets, pro-US regimes, oil installations, and innocent civilians.

Fourth, US (and Chinese) involvement could eventually lead Washington and Beijing to use their own troops to intervene in times of crisis to protect friendly regimes and guard oil installations. This, in turn, would surely give rise to resistance movements of one sort or another and the likely outbreak of terrorism.

Finally, an escalating military competition between the United States and China for power and influence in Africa – in combination with escalating military competition in the Pacific, Central Asia, and the Middle East – will help to tilt the US-Chinese relationship in a more adversarial direction and will make it more likely that their rivalry will spiral into a direct or indirect (surrogate) confrontation. For all of these reasons, the escalating ‘oil rush’ in Africa and the growing military involvement of the United States and China deserves to be given thorough, and critical, scrutiny.

Notes

Footnotes

1. For a more detailed description of African oil in a global context, see Daniel Volman, ‘The BushAdministration and African Oil: The Security Implications of US Energy Policy, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 98, December 2003, pp. 573-584.

2. For background on the Pentagon's regional priorities, see Dana Priest, The Mission, New York: W.W. Norton, 2003; Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, The United States and Africa, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984; and Peter J. Schraeder, The United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

3. The authors first made this argument in Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, ‘Africa's Oil andAmerican National Security,’ Current History, May 2004, pp. 226-231.

4. For background on US military activities in The Gulf area, see Michael Klare, Blood and Oil, New York: Owl Books, 2005, pp. 26-55 and 74-112; see also Michael Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, New York: Free Press, 1992.

5. ‘Visit of President Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan,’ statement by the press secretary, the WhiteHouse, 1 August 1997, electronic document accessed at www.library.whitehouse.gov on 2 March 1998.

6. For background on these efforts, see Michael Klare, Resource Wars, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001, pp. 81-108.

7. For background on these efforts, see Michael Klare, Blood and Oil, pp. 132-39.

8. US Department of State (DoS), Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005, Washington, DC: DoS, 2004, p. 371.

9. Testimony of Donald R. Norland, Former US Ambassador to the Republic of Chad, HouseInternational Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline: A New Model for Natural Resources Development, Hearing, 18 April 2002, p. 8.

10. US Department of Defense News Briefing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for AfricanAffairs, Michael A. Westphal, 2 April 2002, electronic document accessed at www.defenselink.mil.

11. Quoted in Mike Crawley, ‘With Mideast Uncertainty, US Turns to Africa for Oil,’ Christian Science Monitor, 23 May 2003.

12. US Department of State (DoS), Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2006, Washington, DC: DoS, 2005, pp.199-205, 553 (hereinafter cited as DoS, CBJ-2006.)

13. Ibid., p. 587.

14. Steven R. Weisman, ‘US to Sell Military Gear to Algeria to Help It Fight Militants,’ Washington Post, 10 December 2002 and ‘US Plans to Sell Weapons to Algeria,’ Reuters, 10 December 2002.

15. Ibid., pp. 191-98.

16. Ibid., p. 316.

17. Ibid., pp. 207-17, 317-20.

18. For background on the PSI and TSI, see: Donna Miles, ‘New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focuson Saharan Africa’, American Forces Press Service, 17 May 2005, electronic version accessed at www.eucom.mil; Catherine Fellow, ‘US targets Sahara ‘terrorist haven’,’ BBC News, 8 August 2005; ‘Pan-Sahel Initiative,’ Global Security.org report, no date, accessed at http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm; ‘Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative,’ Global Security.org report, n.d., accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm

19. Charles Cobb, Jr., ‘Larger US Troop Presence May be Needed in Africa, Says NATO Commander’,All Africa News, 2 May 2003, electronic version, accessed at http://allafrica.com.

20. ‘Seven Carrier Strike Groups Underway for Exercise ‘Summer Pulse 04’,’ US Department ofDefense Press Release, 3 June, 2004; ‘Allied Countries Join Forces in Maritime Exercise,’ US Department of Defense Press Release, 1 July 2004; Sara Omo, ‘USS Enterprise Kicks Off Majestic Eagle,’ US Navy news service, 13 July 2004; Sara Omo, ‘Enterprise, Majestic Eagle Move into ‘Free Play’ Phase,’ US Navy news service, 14 July 2004; Sara Omo, ‘Enterprise Heads Home after its Final Summer Pulse Exercise,’ US Navy news service, 16 July 2004; April Philips, ‘HST Strike Group Begins Medshark/Majestic Eagle,’ Navy Newstand,13 July 2004; and April Philips, ‘Truman Returns from Summer Pulse ’04,’ Navy Newstand, 26 July 2004.

21. US European Command Press Release, ‘Maritime Security Conference Brings Navies Together,’5 October 2004, electronic version; also available as news item from American Forces Press Service, same date.

22. US European Command News Release, ‘USS Emory S. Land begins Gulf of Guinea Deployment,’28 January 2005; Terry Burnley, ‘Emory S. Land Completes Gulf of Guinea Deployment,’ Navy Newstand, 22 March 2005; US European Command News Release, ‘USS Emory S. Land stops in Douala, Cameroon,’ 9 February 2005; US European Command News Release, ‘USS Emory S. Land pulls pier-side in Port Gentil, Gabon,’ 15February 2005.

23. ‘Coast Guard Cutter Bear Kicks off 6th Fleet Deployment,’ Navy Newstand, 7 June 2005.

24. Sean Spratt, ‘Barbary Thunder II Proves to be a Success,’ Navy Newstand, 6 July 2004.

25. ‘Sailors, Marines Participate in West African Training Cruise ’05,’ Navy Newstand, 30 September 2005.

26. Quoted in Greg Jaffe, ‘In Massive Shift, US Is Planning to Cut Size of Military in Germany’, Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2003.

27. See ‘US Naval Base to Protect Sao Tome Oil,’ BBC News World Edition, 22 August 2002,electronic document accessed at news.bbc.co.uk on 6 March 2003.

28. See Vince Crawley, ‘Oil may drive troop staging: US looks at Africa, the Caspian as forward-operating locations,’ Army Times, 22 September 2003; John T. Correll, ‘European Command Looks South and East,’ Air Force, December 2003, pp. 61-64; Jaffe, ‘In Massive Shift, US Is Planning to Cut Size of Military in Germany’; Jaffe, ‘Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners,’ Wall Street Journal, 27 May 2003; Eric Schmitt, ‘Pentagon Seeking New Access Pacts for African Bases’, New York Times, 5 July 2003.

29. See Emily Wax, ‘A US Beachhead On Horn of Africa,’ Washington Post, 5 December 2002.

30. ‘US deploys further forces in Africa,’ Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 4 August 2004, electronic version.

31. See ‘US deploys further forces in Africa,’ Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 4 August 2004; ‘US to bolster counter-terrorism assistance to Africa,’ Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 October 2004

32. US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations (HIRC), China's Influence in Africa, Hearings, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 28 July 2005, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005, pp. 13-14 (hereinafter cited as HIRC, China's Influence in Africa). For background on Chinese involvement and investment in Africa, see US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China's Growing Global Influence: Objectives and Strategies, Hearings, 21-22 July 2005, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005 and Drew Thompson, ‘China's Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States,’ African Renaissance Journal, July/ August 2005, pp. 20-29.

33. For background in foreign intervention in African states associated with the pursuit of oilconcessions, see Augustine Ikein, The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria, New York: Praeger, 1990; Nafziger, E. Wayne Nafzinger, The Economics of Political Instability: The Nigerian-Biafran War, Boulder: Westview, 1982; G. Aforka Nweke, External intervention in African conflicts: France and French-speaking West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Working Papers in African studies, Boston: Boston University, African Studies Center, 1980; Robert Bruce Shepard, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: from Kennedy to Reagan, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.

34. DoE/EIA, IEO-2005, Tables A1, A4, pp. 89, 93.

35. For background on China's pursuit of foreign energy, see Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao, and Roland Dannreuther, The Strategic Implication's of China's Energy Needs, Adelphi Paper no. 346, Oxford: Oxford University Press and International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002; Erika Strecker Downs, China's Quest for Energy Security, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2000.

36. On China's investments in Sudan, see DoE/EIA, ‘Sudan,’ Country Analysis Brief, March 2005,electronic document accessed at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan.html on 14 November 2005. On Angola and Nigeria, see David Barboza, ‘Chinese Energy Giant to Buy Stake in Nigerian Oil Field’, New York Times, 10 January 2006; Peter S. Goodman, ‘Cnooc Buys Oil Interest in Nigeria’, Washington Post, 10 January 2006, and the respective DoE/EIA Country Analysis Briefs on these countries, op. cit., p. 2.

37. HIRC, China's Influence in Africa, p. 18. For further discussion of Africa's interest in African oil, see Rannenberger's full testimony, Ibid., pp. 18-24.

38. Seygun Adeyemi, Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 September 2004.

39. Ibid., p. 16.

40. Ibid., pp. 17-18; see also Walter H. Kansteiner III and J. Stephen Morrison, ‘Rising US Stakes inAfrica: Seven Proposals to Strengthen US-Africa Policy’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2004 and David L. Goldwyn and J. Stephen Morrison, ‘A Strategic US Approach to Governance and Security in the Gulf of Guinea’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005.

41. Ibid., p. 1.

42. US Department of Defense (DoD), Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, 2005, Washington, DC: DoD, 2005, p. 10.

43. For background on these programmes, see Rannenberger's 2005 testimony in HIRC, China's Influence in Africa, pp. 22-23.