Eastern Sudan (covering the regional states of the Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref) is primarily inhabited by Beja pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, although a wide variety of ethnic groups from across the Sudan can be found in Port Sudan and Kassala towns. Over the centuries the Beja and other pastoral groups in the region have devised flexible and dynamic strategies to cope with the complexity and the variability of their eco-system and to recover from droughts and outbreaks of famine. Such strategies include mobility, herd diversification and redistribution, rules for environmental protection (e.g. the prohibition of cutting live trees) and the development of a multi-resource economy where livestock keeping is complemented by a set of alternative livelihoods. The life of Beja groups has been regulated by a customary law called silif, a complex but flexible body of rules based on Beja traditional values which regulates access to and redistribution of resources, reciprocal use of environmental resources (grazing land, water points, arable land or firewood), conflict resolution and reciprocity around major social events (birth, marriage and death). Clear land rights codes embodied in the silif, supported by the mediation of tribal authorities who were entrusted with the management of land rights, have helped minimise conflict. However, the resilience of this system has significantly weakened over the last three or four decades due to a number of external factors.
Under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the Beja suffered from colonial policies which contributed to undermine the basis of their economic and social well being. A number of agricultural schemes, introduced by the Turko-Egyptian administration in the southern part of the Red Sea region (Gash and Tokar Delta) and in the nearby province of Kassala to the south, were considerably expanded by the British to increase cotton cultivation. The expansion of the schemes deprived the Beja of key pasture reserves which they had used in years of severe drought and laid the basis for the decline of their pastoral economy (Niblock, 1987:148). In the northern part of the region the Bishariyyn Beja were affected by the impact of the damming of the River Atbara for the irrigation of the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme, which reduced the amount of downstream water in the area they occupied.
Another factor which contributed to the weakening of Beja livelihoods security was the imposition of the Native Administration system on the Beja by the British colonialists. The system was hierarchical, rigid, did not reflect the established internal structure of the group and did not take into account the essential flexibility of the Beja leadership that had been adapted to the dynamics of pastoral life over the years. As a result, the newly introduced administrative policy created profound imbalances in the power system and undermined traditional leadership. The overall consequence of the British policy was the creation of an artificial ruling elite of Beja appointees handpicked from amongst the many tribal leaders, which did not truly represent the Beja and very rarely advocated for the genuine interests and needs of the tribe. This new elite ruled until the 1970s, when the Native Administration was dismantled by the Nimeiri regime, and maintained its influence until the beginning of the 1980s, notwithstanding the attempts of the Beja Congress, an indigenous political movement created in 1958, to oust them. The unrepresentative character and inactivity of the Beja elite became untenably evident during the drought of the mid-1980s when they failed to mobilise central government and international donor organisations to provide support in time to avoid disastrous losses of human life and livestock (Pantuliano, 2000:189).
Following the mid-1980s crisis the Beja Congress renewed its original efforts to draw attention to the underdevelopment and marginalisation of Beja areas and to advocate for more administrative and political autonomy. The Congress was banned in 1989 along with other political parties under accusation of fomenting political destabilisation in eastern Sudan. Repression against Beja dissidents, the execution of the former Governor of the Eastern Region, M. General Mohammad Karrar, following his participation in a coup attempt, the continued alienation of land and the reported conscription of Beja into the Popular Defence Force combined to create a resurgence of Beja resistance (Johnson, 2003:138). The Beja Congress resurfaced again in Asmara under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of northern opposition parties a well as the SPLM/A, and for the first time in its history it became involved in military operations in collaboration with other NDA forces. In 1996 the Beja Congress was charged with having backed a failed coup attempt. Fighting between the parties intensified in the southern area of Tokar and Kassala Provinces, with the NDA eventually occupying much of the border region, including the towns of Telkuk and Hamashkoreb.
Over the last few years the Congress leaders have worked to expand their political platform to other groups living in eastern Sudan. This has led to the formation of the Eastern Front in February 2005. The Front is a political alliance between the Beja Congress, the Rashaida Free Lions (the Rashaida are a Bedouin group who migrated from the northern Arabian peninsula in the 19th century) and representatives from other small ethno-political groups belonging to the Shukriya and the Dabaina. The formation of the Front is an attempt by the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions to de-ethnicisise their political agenda and appeal to other communities in eastern Sudan to unite in the fight against the marginalisation and the underdevelopment of the region.
The Causes of Tension
As with many other conflicts taking place in the Sudan, there is no single root cause for the fighting in the East. A complex set of interrelated factors is driving the war. Historical grievances, feelings of exclusion and marginalisation, demands for fair sharing of power between different groups, inequitable distribution of economic resources and benefits, underdevelopment, the absence of a genuine democratic process and other governance issues are all interlocking factors to the conflict, but none of them is a sole or primary cause. Unequal access to resources and services and disparities in resource distribution have been exacerbated by the long standing failure of national leaders to address the grievances stemming from the region since independence. Dissatisfaction about the lack of political representation for the Beja, socio-economic marginalisation, underdevelopment and lack of services were amongst the reasons which led to the formation of the Beja Congress in 1958. Today the causes of the conflict do not appear to be much different from the grievances voiced by the Beja Congress 60 years ago. One of the most recurrent complaints quoted by communities, local and political leaders and external observers alike as a cause of conflict is the socio-economic marginalisation of the people in eastern Sudan, particularly the Beja, and the feeling of social exclusion which is so pervasive within their communities. Eastern Sudan is one of the poorest regions in the country and most of the people resent the state of neglect in which its communities have been left, both in the rural areas and in the urban slums. People complain consistently and incessantly about the lack of services (education, health and water), lack of job opportunities, barriers to access to natural resources, general state of underdevelopment, extremely high rates of maternal and infant mortality, poverty, food insecurity, vulnerability and morbidity.
Most actors link the general state of neglect and marginalisation of eastern Sudan to the lack of eastern Sudan representatives, particularly Beja, in the central and to a lesser extent in the state government. During the study several people emphasised that eastern Sudan is a very rich region, considering that it has prime agricultural land, gas, gold and other minerals, livestock, fisheries, oil potential and the only port in the country, as well as being crossed by the highways to Egypt and to Khartoum, the railway and the oil pipeline. Some Beja leaders commented that the Beja occupy the most strategic piece of land in the country and one of the richest, but do not share any of the wealth which is produced by the region. Similar comments were made by Rashaida leaders who remarked that the Rashaida do not receive any services in return for the levies they pay on their livestock, remittances and trade.
The almost total absence of services and development initiatives in the rural areas has pushed much of the population to the towns, particularly Port Sudan. In town, where services are available, people complained that rampant poverty does not allow them to be able to afford school fees or pay for drugs. In Port Sudan anger was palpable amongst many communities about the mechanisation of the port, which has had a direct impact on individual and household income for thousands of families (the number of people laid off was reported by local government officials to be in excess of 28,000) and which people felt should have been compensated by parallel employment creation. The mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan has undoubtedly contributed to radicalising anti-government feelings amongst the Beja. Beja men, particularly Amar'ar/Atmaan, have been working on the docks as porters and casual labours since the early 1930s and stevedoring work was a crucial safety net for many Beja. Seasonal male youth casual labour on the port was a key source of complementary income for rural households, but the port also provided an alternative source of livelihoods for those who have lost all their livestock. Much frustration was voiced by young graduates in the towns of Port Sudan and Kassala about the general lack of job opportunities for educated people as well and about the perception that ethnic Beja were being discriminated against when applying for jobs. In Kassala Region people resented the alienation of land to non-indigenous landowners who have progressively come to own many of the large commercial agricultural schemes. A number of Beja actors claimed that their culture and their language have been discriminated against by a series of governments and that it is important for the Beja to preserve the use of TuBedawye.
The Beja youth, particularly in Port Sudan, are seething with anger and resentment and many feel that armed confrontation is the only means to reverse the situation in the region. Some of the actors observed that such feelings can be easily manipulated for political purposes. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, the feeling of desperation ran so deep amongst the communities at all levels in Port Sudan slums that the youth were prepared to do whatever they could to attract national and international attention to the situation in eastern Sudan. It is clear that the call for action has been prompted by the Naivasha process to resolve the North-South conflict in the Sudan as well as the fighting in Dar Fur. Feelings have been aggravated by the killing of an estimated 25 Beja men and the wounding of 196 others by the police during the demonstrations by a large number of Beja in late January 2005 in Port Sudan to protest against the exclusion of eastern Sudan from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The events of 29 January 2005 have become a symbolic turning point for many Beja in Port Sudan Many have reportedly started to feel that the police action was the proof that dialogue with the government is not possible.
Leaders of the Eastern Front (the political alliance recently formed between the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions and representatives of other small ethnic groups) emphasised that their demands are not any different from those of the groups fighting in Dar Fur or from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Lack of development, basic services and employment in eastern Sudan are in their opinion the direct result of the concentration of power in the hands of a restricted elite, which has resulted in political marginalisation and lack of attention to the peripheries throughout the country.
Comprehensive Peace?
There is no doubt that the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has prompted the Beja and other groups in eastern Sudan to seek redress similar to that gained by the SPLM in the South. The CPA was seen by most actors in the region as a bilateral agreement between the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, which has failed to take into account the instances of the many different groups living in the Sudan. Many people emphasised that the title ‘comprehensive’ is highly inappropriate for an agreement that has been so exclusive. Most of the people interviewed in eastern Sudan felt that the signing of the Machakos Agreement between the Government and the SPLM and the process leading to the signing of the other Protocols has led other groups to resort to armed confrontation (e.g. in Dar Fur) or to escalate fighting (e.g. in eastern Sudan). However, many actors, including representatives from the Eastern Front, believed that the CPA also represents an opportunity for stakeholders in eastern Sudan and elsewhere to address and resolve some of the grievances which lie behind the tension in the region, including issues of power and wealth sharing. One commentator emphasised that attention should be placed on the CPA as a process, rather than on its text, as the process deriving from the CPA could inform change in eastern Sudan, unlike the letter of the agreement which focuses exclusively on the North/South conflict. Some of the issues addressed in the CPA, e.g. fairer political representation and effective decentralisation are relevant to eastern Sudan and many interviewees felt that if the CPA were effectively implemented, it would definitely carry benefits for the region. In order to do so, though, the agreement would have to be ‘Easternised’, with power and wealth sharing made relevant to the different parts and groups in the region and through in-depth restructuring of local institutions. Many of the demands raised by the Front and the other groups fighting in eastern Sudan are framed along the lines of the CPA and focus on allocation of power for eastern Sudanese actors at both the national and the regional levels and fairer redistribution of wealth in the region. Many external observers saw the Two Area Protocol for the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile as a possible framework for negotiation between the government and the Eastern Front.
Many Beja youth, in Port Sudan in particular, felt that there is no real guarantee that the CPA in its current formulation will bring real redistribution of power and wealth in the country. They emphasised that the CPA process has heightened the feeling of exclusion amongst the Beja and that people have gathered together to ask for the agreement to be extended to include provisions for eastern Sudan (this is what they were demanding during the January 2005 demonstration). They remarked that the CPA could provide an entry point for the solution of other conflicts in the Sudan if the international community strongly supported an extension of the CPA process to Dar Fur and eastern Sudan that would make the agreement truly comprehensive. Some international observers commented that the CPA could provide a framework to reach a separate agreement between the Eastern Front and the government.
One obvious gap in the CPA highlighted by many of the people interviewed is that the provision envisaging the withdrawal of the SPLA from the NDA controlled areas and the handover of the region to government forces has not taken into account the presence of other armed groups in the area. Eastern Front leaders emphasised that they are not bound by any agreement to withdraw their forces and that since they do not have a cease-fire agreement with the government they will continue military operations in the area after the withdrawal of the SPLA unless an agreement is reached with the government. Representatives from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which has been militarily active in eastern Sudan over the last two years, stressed that UN monitors should wait to move in until an agreement is reached between the government and armed groups operating in eastern Sudan because the region will be the theatre of military operations until a negotiated solution is reached.
An important element which emerged throughout the assessment is that most people, particularly rural communities as well as of much of the people living in urban slums know very little about the CPA, its provisions and the implications it will have for the East and the country as a whole. An important issue for the region, for instance, is the establishment of the Land Commission envisaged in the Wealth Sharing Protocol, but it is not clear how people in remote rural areas will be made aware of the Commission in order to claim back land where they are entitled to it. The mechanisms of implementation of the agreement are not even clear to some of the leadership in the region.
Escalating Tension
While the withdrawal of SPLA forces from eastern Sudan, which was completed in June 2006, has meant an inevitable reduction of the military capacity of NDA forces in the region, other factors have surfaced in recent months that seem to suggest that the possibility of an escalation of the tension should not be discounted. The events of Port Sudan in late January 2005 have exacerbated feelings among the Beja there, particularly the youth. Many of them were reported to have joined the fighters in the NDA controlled areas in the months following the killings in Port Sudan and several others of those met during the study spoke openly about their willingness to join the fight since they felt that they had nothing to lose and, as they put it, ‘they are dying of a slow death anyway’ (Deim al Arab, Port Sudan, 31 July 2005). It was astounding to hear young Beja women, who are traditionally confined to a very secluded life away from public and political life in Beja society, speaking vehemently about their desire to ‘sacrifice’ themselves for their tribe. In addition, the presence of new actors such as the JEM has bolstered the military capacity of the armed rebellion in the East.
Despite the recent strengthening of their military capacity and the support of new allies, the Eastern Front seems to be aware that the withdrawal of the SPLA will have inevitably weakened its capacity on the ground. However, discussions with several well informed actors seem to point to a change of military strategy and an escalation that would focus on ‘hit and run’ operations and targeting of the many strategic economic installations located inside government controlled areas of the East. Beja leaders commented that the port, the highway and the pipeline could all become targets of a military escalation which would find many supporters amongst the Beja and other communities in eastern Sudan. Beja youth representatives in Port Sudan argued that so far economic infrastructure in the East have not been attacked in sign of respect for the tribal leaders who asked Beja communities to protect key installations such as the pipeline. However, they felt that now there is no alternative but to resort to new military tactics. There was awareness amongst Eastern Front leaders that resorting to unconventional military tactics and guerilla warfare may alienate the sympathy of the international community towards the plea of the Beja people. However, some of them commented that the international community has never offered any meaningful support to the Beja, so they would not stand to lose. Notwithstanding the stated intentions to escalate the fighting, all Eastern Front political and military leaders stressed vigorously that recourse to further violence would be the last option and that they are keen to find a negotiated settlement with the government. Should an escalation ever take place, some actors have pointed out that it will be important to try and prevent clashes between Beja groups, particularly between Beni Amer and Hadendowa, in the Kassala area. Other observers also saw the possibility of a split within the Rashaida, with some taking arms in support of the government along with existing Beni Amer militia.
Looking to Find a Solution
There are attempts underway by many actors to try and mitigate the tension in the East. These include government initiatives such as the launch of a recruitment drive of Beja graduates from Port Sudan, a two year project financed by the Chinese government to divert water from the river Nile in Atbara towards dry areas of eastern Sudan, and the expansion of the electricity grid in Red Sea and Kassala States. The government has also set up a Higher Committee for Eastern Sudan, chaired by the Minister of Finance and National Economy. The Committee is overseeing some of the projects mentioned above as well as others, including an intervention to eradicate the mesquite trees from the Tokar Delta in order to clear land for people to cultivate, the building of small dams in various parts of Red Sea State and the initiation of studies to explore the potential for treatment of salty water. These government efforts are not, however, being met with much enthusiasm by many community leaders and youth representatives. Importantly, both Beja youth leaders and some Beja Congress representatives have acknowledged that after the events of January 2005 there have been efforts by the government to take initial steps to address some of the main grievances in the area. However, Beja youth leaders commented that projects have been planned by the government unilaterally, without community involvement, and that some of the initiatives mentioned (e.g. the extension of the electricity grid) will not benefit the communities at the grassroots level, but only middle class urban dwellers. Much of the blame was apportioned to traditional leaders working closely with the government for not raising the issues which local people consider as key. In addition, several actors commented that much of the food for free distribution in the region went astray and held traditional leaders responsible for its disappearance.
Many Beja leaders, particularly in Port Sudan, remarked that because of the chronic neglect and marginalisation, people have completely lost their trust in the government, so even initiatives aimed at improving the situation locally are looked at with suspicion. Local leaders and external observers stressed the importance for the government to promote confidence building measures aimed at rebuilding the social contract between the government and the communities in eastern Sudan. An immediate priority area highlighted by the majority of the interviewees is that of employment for the youth, followed by provision of services in the rural areas and the initiation or rehabilitation of large scale development schemes aimed at rebuilding people's livelihoods. The implementation of real decentralisation as well as fairer redistribution of power and wealth were also mentioned. People emphasised the need for the government to open a dialogue with the communities throughout the region, not just in Port Sudan. Mention was made of the fact that Halaib mahallia has never received an official visit by the central government (or at least this was the local perception).
The Plans for Negotiations
During the study, the need for a negotiated solution to the conflict in eastern Sudan was highlighted by all actors as the key element to reduce tension. The declared readiness of the government to negotiate was seen as having contributed to prevent the immediate escalation of the conflict. Preliminary attempts in early 2005 to create a dialogue between the parties were made by the British NGO Concordis International, which organised a consultation between the government and the Eastern Front in February 2005. However, in June 2005 the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the Sudan, Jan Pronk, offered his good offices to identify a venue and a mediator for the talks, but there was no concrete outcome. Well informed observers attributed the delay to internal technicalities which had slowed the action of the UN in identifying a suitable venue and mediator. In addition, several actors commented that there was a lack of clarity as to the extent to which this initiative had been fully institutionalised within the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), given that the mission's mandate does not extend to eastern Sudan beyond the monitoring of the SPLA redeployment. The delay in starting the negotiations spread suspicions amongst Eastern Front leaders that the government was not genuinely interested to negotiate and was buying time.
In late 2005 the parties accepted the offer made by the Libyan government to open a forum between the Government of the Sudan and the Eastern Front. However, this initiative was hindered by internal differences within the Eastern Front over the suitability of the Libyan government as a mediator and later on by escalating tension around the town of Hamashkoreb on the eve of SPLA's planned withdrawal from the NDA controlled areas in January 2006. In June 2006 the parties finally came to the negotiating table in Asmara, having accepted the Government of Eritrea as a mediator. No observer from the international community had been admitted to the talks, although the Eastern Front felt that the presence of international observers would have been very useful to ensure transparency and help check against possible manipulation during the talks. By August 2006, the dynamics at the talks certainly warranted a greater involvement of the international community to ensure that the process would achieve a fair and just settlement.
Lives & Livelihoods Under Stress
It is clear from the description of people's perceptions and perspectives presented in the previous section that issues related to marginalisation and underdevelopment are key in explaining the conflict and the current state of tension. Whilst the region suffers from a chronic lack of reliable data, some indicators are available to illustrate the situation on the ground. UNICEF data presented in the World Bank Country Economic Memorandum (2003:3) indicate that neonatal, post-neonatal and infant mortality in Red Sea State are the highest in the country; Kassala State is the second worst for post-natal and infant mortality and third worst for under-five mortality. With 56 deaths for 1,000 live births Red Sea State is also the third worst state for child mortality (after the two war affected states of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan) and with 165 deaths for 1,000 live births is second only to Blue Nile for under-five mortality. In the NDA controlled areas crude mortality rates (CMR) are estimated to be at 1.01 per 10,000 per day and under-five mortality rates are reported to be as high as 2.01 per 10,000 per day (IRC, 2005:19).
The TANGO report undertaken last year in rural Kassala and rural Red Sea State uncovered severe levels of malnutrition in the two states. The same study showed that the annual income per household in rural Kassala is approximately 250,000 SD (US$156 per capita) while in rural Red Sea States is 125,000 SD (US\(93 per capita); both indicators are well beneath the international extreme poverty line of US\)1 per capita (TANGO, Ibid. p.28). In the NDA controlled areas a recent survey using a sample size of 625 children indicated that the percentage of Global Acute Malnutrition is at around 21.5% while the prevalence of wasting is 7.8% with a 2.1% prevalence of severe wasting (IRC, 2005:35). Reliable data on income levels in NDA areas are not available, but the vast majority of the population is believed to be below the extreme poverty line (IRC staff, Rubda, August 2005). The TANGO study also showed that there is a significant correlation between the illiteracy of household heads and chronic and acute malnutrition in Kassala State and Red Sea States: in rural Kassala State 43% of the household heads are illiterate, compared with 54% in rural Red Sea State; amongst the population over 15 years of age, 56% are illiterate in rural Kassala State, against the 62% in rural Red Sea State (TANGO, Ibid. p.17). Official Ministry of Education data relative to the entire region (including urban areas) show that the illiteracy rate for the over 15 is 48% in Red Sea State, 56.7% in Al-Gedaref and 62% in Kassala State (World Bank, Ibid. p.19). A survey conducted in 1999 in Halaib mahallia revealed though that the illiteracy rate is as high as 89% in Halaib mahallia, where children currently in school represent 86.7% of those educated; only 0.75% have secondary education in the mahallia, of which only 11.5% are women (Abdel Ati, 1999). During the assessment people complained frequently about the lack of school feeding and of qualified teachers and whilst they acknowledged that some nomadic communities would be reluctant to send their children to school, they also pointed out that the abolition of boarding schools has had a very negative impact on the capacity of mobile children to attend school.
| Levels of malnutrition | Red Sea State | Kassala State |
|---|---|---|
| Acute Malnutrition | ||
| Severe wasting (<-3.0 z-score1) | 3.7% | 5.8% |
| Global Acute Malnutrition (<-2.0 z-score) | 19.4% | 17.7% |
| Chronic Malnutrition | ||
| Severe stunting (<-3.0 z-score) | 15% | 19.1% |
| Global Chronic Malnutrition (<-2.0 z-score) | 38.5% | 43.8% |
| Underweight | ||
| Severe underweight | 17.0 | 17.5 |
| Moderate + severe underweight (<-2.0 z-score) | 45.4 | 42.3 |
| Note: Wasting, stunting and underweight are all expressed using z-scores with internationally defined cut-off points for normal, moderate and severe levels of under-nutrition, as follows (TANGO, Ibid. p. 43): Normal: <-2 z-scores; Moderate malnutrition: <-2 z-scores and <-3 z-scores; Severe malnutrition: <-3 z-scores. |
Health services are mostly concentrated in Port Sudan and other large centres like Sinkat or Kassala; only 20% of rural Red Sea State villages has a health centre or a clinic, while in Kassala State half of the villages have some form of health facility, although these often lack doctors, laboratories and medications (TANGO, Ibid. p.17). In the late 1990s in the whole of the then Halaib Province (80,000 km2) there were only five basic primary health care centres (Pantuliano, 1998: direct observation). Access to water is grossly inadequate throughout the region, especially in the rural areas. Drought and mesquite infestation have significantly contributed to the decrease in water levels, but generally there is a scarcity of boreholes and micro-catchments throughout the region and where boreholes exist they invariably suffer from lack of maintenance. People quoted the shortage of water as one of the key factors in contributing to push people out of the rural areas towards urban centres. In Red Sea State the urban population has grown from 38% of the total state population in 1993 to a dramatic 61.2% in 2003. The development gap and the disparity between urban and rural centres are significant. However, although in town there is a greater availability of services, people complain about the fact that very few of them can afford to pay for school fees, water or drugs. Unemployment rates have risen sharply as a result of the mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan and the laying off of many of the port workers, particularly Beja labourers who were left with very little alternatives on the market. Many people survive by resorting to charcoal making, especially out of mesquite which is said to be a very good source of charcoal. In Kassala labour opportunities are available on the agricultural schemes, but people also complained about the lack of work on the schemes, especially since the mesquite infestation has made much land uncultivable. Very few people from the region are employed in the formal sector, most likely because of the very low level of education. Constraints to livestock marketing in rural areas and restricted availability of credit for the poor make living in much of the region a survival challenge.
The mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan has created unacceptable levels of unemployment amongst the Beja. This warrants the need for interventions which can compensate for the loss of employment on the port. People feel that the government should identify ways to use the revenues from local resources, including port, gold, customs and minerals, to fund labour intensive programmes. People also observed that much money has been spent to improve the appearance of the city through increased street lights and tarring of roads, while no allocations had been made to meet community priorities. In Kassala several communities complained about the loss of land and pastoral community representatives remarked that there is no arrangement to register land for transhumance routes in the current government plan for redistribution of land in the Gash. They stressed that there is a need to engage with pastoralist communities to identify solutions for them as well, since conflict between pastoralists and farmers (both within Hadendowa communities and between Hadendowa and Rashaida) breaks out frequently in and around the Gash scheme. The loss of key land resources for many Beja because of drought, ecological degradation and land alienation, the consequent forced abandonment of the pastoral sector without alternative opportunities and inadequate service provision have played a clear role in creating resentment and tension in the region. Youth representatives in Kassala complained that assistance by the international community is mainly concentrated on IDPs and refugees from Eritrea, while no attention is paid to destitute Beja pastoralist communities whose living conditions is far worse than those of the refugees.
The Impact of International Assistance in Eastern Sudan
Communities, government officials and armed opposition alike lamented the limited involvement of the international community in eastern Sudan. UN interventions have traditionally been very restricted and have largely focused on food distribution and assistance to the refugee and IDP populations. A number of INGOs also operate in the two states, some of which have been on the ground for nearly two decades. There was strong dissatisfaction amongst communities, government and leaders about the performance of most international actors in the region. People complained that their action was mostly focused on emergency assistance and that projects were short term, small scale and often inadequate to address people's real needs. People also cited examples of resources going astray, particularly around relief distribution. There was dissatisfaction with the biases towards a few target groups, with IDPs and refugees being particular favourites and rural areas being perceived to receive more assistance than the urban slums where many of the worst socio-economic problems are found and which are also the hotbeds of discontent. When projects are undertaken, communities observed that there tends to be something of a predictable package that is offered and that many of the responses frequently do not address critical needs in a strategic fashion. Whilst recognising the contributions of INGOs particularly in the service sectors, often addressing immediate needs, people commented that there has been a dearth of interventions which have created employment or sustainable increased income. The perceived lack of appropriate programming comes despite the high number of assessments of which people are tired of being the subject and which informed observers point out have invariably been of very low quality. In addition, community leaders have noted that INGO and UN responses have tended to be scattered and isolated and that there has been a lack of co-ordination between actors. Community leaders and youth in Kassala also complained about the lack of a facilitative and coordinating role of the Government of the Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in the state, which was seen as confined to office work and ‘permits screening’ rather than facilitating co-ordination between national and international actors and supporting the harmonisation of plans to avoid duplications and share lessons. HAC officials as well as international aid workers operating in the region indicated the lack of capacity within HAC as a major constraint in playing a more productive co-ordination role.
The shortcomings of the international response need however to be contextualised. Whilst international agencies may have a number of the weaknesses described above, there is no doubt that they have been constrained by certain key factors, chief amongst which is the long standing lack of availability of donor funding for rehabilitation and development programmes in the Sudan. Furthermore, eastern Sudan has never been able to attract major donor interest notwithstanding the fact that its development indicators are amongst the worst in the country. The little funding that has been made available has often reflected donor rather than community priorities. While the overall picture is not very positive, there are a number of exceptions to this. People in Red Sea State remarked that INGOs working in their region have contributed to organise communities, build their capacities and raise their awareness about their entitlements. A notable success has been the catalytic role in bringing about changes in gender relations in Halaib mahallia. Beja women who until ten years ago could not even meet with other women from outside their immediate communities are now involved in joint project management and community initiatives with the men. Positive comments have been made concerning the life-saving impact of some of the emergency assistance, both in government and NDA controlled areas. NDA officials pointed out that mortality rates in the area had declined thanks to the support INGOs were providing in the health sector. However, throughout the region the overall feeling is that international agencies are failing to tackle the root causes of underdevelopment and poverty sustainably.
Appropriate assistance could however greatly help to mitigate the tension in the East, where the conflict is closely linked to socio-economic marginalisation and livelihoods issues. Two main areas should be prioritised by the international community and the national actors to develop a cohesive response to the deteriorating situation in the region. First of all, international agencies should better co-ordinate interventions amongst themselves and with the local authorities and focus on strategic responses to key livelihoods issues for the region, including joint advocacy to catalyse attention to the situation in the East and enlist donor support for a large scale, integrated, strategic and sustainable response to the development needs of the region, aimed at de-escalating tension. Secondly, the international community should prioritise supporting the warring parties and the mediators during the ongoing peace negotiations and support the implementation of a possible agreement with adequate resources. Rehabilitation and development assistance to the East should though start immediately to strengthen people's confidence in the peace process. A timely and informed intervention by the international community could help stem the escalating crisis in eastern Sudan with relatively little investment at this stage, while the costs of a potential humanitarian crisis further down the line would be much higher.