The 2007 general elections marked a real test for the country's nascent democratic experiment since the installation of multiparty rule in 1996. The victory of the MAIN opposition party, the All People's Congress (APC) in an election that was popularly considered as a ‘ well administered’ exercise showed the progress the country has made in the area of democracy building over the years. Though the elections provided new opportunities for elite renewal, the popularity of the newly elected government relates not necessarily to its programmatic appeal but to the unpopularity of the previous government. The electoral victory can be explained as a response of the electorates to the inability of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) government to provide concrete responses to the deepening socioeconomic malaise that plagued the country.
This briefing seeks to examine the nature of the electoral process and its democratic gains but argues that such gains cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration certain structural factors that precipitated the elections. The rest of the paper is divided into three parts. The first looks at the nature of the polls and its significance for democratic practices and elites renewal. The second part examines some of the socio‐economic and political factors that characterised the nature of the electoral process. This involves the huge development challenges facing Sierra Leone at the time of the elections, the enabling political environment and the role of the international community in the country's governance. The final aspect highlights some of the broader challenges involved to get the newly elected government to deliver on the expectations of the citizens.
The Nature of the Elections
Since 1996, Sierra Leone had organised three parliamentary and presidential elections. The first was the transfer elections of 1996 envisaged as a transition from military to democratic rule and were won by the SLPP party. The second was the 2002 general elections popularly dubbed as an endorsement of the SLPP government. The 2007 general elections are landmark elections that can rightly be viewed as a referendum on the performance of the SLPP government since they came to power in 1996. The main opposition party won both the parliamentary and presidential elections. President Ernest Bai Koroma of the APC secured 54.6 % of the votes in a run off after initially failing to secure the 55% threshold in the first round.1 The APC also won 53 out of the 112 seats thereby giving the party a comfortable majority in the national assembly.2
A total of seven political parties took part in both the parliamentary and presidential elections but SLPP, APC the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) were the three major contenders. The SLPP was the incumbent ruling party led by the former vice president Solomon Berewa. The APC was the main opposition party whose flag bearer was the opposition leader, Ernest Bai Koroma. The PMDC is a newly created party led by Charles Margai, a prominent lawyer, and a son of a former Prime Minister, Albert Margai. He was also a former minister in the previous SLPP government but decided to establish the PMDC when he lost the leadership of the SLPP bid to Solomon Berewa. Unlike the PMDC, both the SLPP and the APC have ruled Sierra Leone in the past.
As Table 1 below shows, the APC won 59 seats while the SLPP got 43 seats and the PMDC had 10 seats. The results revealed once again the predominance of ethnoregional voting preferences, as was the case in the 1996 and 2002 elections.3 The APC won 36 of the 39 seats in the Northern region, considered to be the party's stronghold, while the SLPP won only 3 seats in the North compared to 18 seats won in the 2002 general elections. Further, the APC made a breakthrough for the first time into the Southern and Eastern regions wining one seat in each region. By contrast, the SLPP garnered the bulk of the seats in the Southern and Eastern regions, which is traditionally understood to be its stronghold. The PMDC was able to secure substantial votes in the Southern and Eastern regions and won 10 out of the 52 seats. The results showed that the PMDC support base was largely confined to the Southeast. The APC equally won all the seats in the Western rural and urban areas.
| Region/District | APC | CPP | NDA | PLP | PMDC | SLPP | UNPP | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eastern Region | ||||||||
| Kailahun | 8 | 8 | ||||||
| Kenema | 11 | 11 | ||||||
| Kono | 1 | 7 | 8 | |||||
| Northern Region | ||||||||
| Kambia | 5 | 1 | 6 | |||||
| Koinadugu | 4 | 2 | 6 | |||||
| Port Loko | 10 | 10 | ||||||
| Tonkolili | 8 | 8 | ||||||
| Bombali | 9 | 9 | ||||||
| Southern Region | ||||||||
| Bonthe | 3 | 3 | ||||||
| Moyamba | 1 | 1 | 4 | 6 | ||||
| Pujehun | 3 | 2 | 5 | |||||
| Bo | 3 | 8 | 11 | |||||
| Western Region | ||||||||
| Western are rural | 4 | 4 | ||||||
| Western are urban | 17 | 17 | ||||||
| National | 59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 43 | 112 | |
| Source : National Electrol Commision |
There was also a marked difference in the electoral system that was used as compared to the earlier elections. In the 2007 general elections, a single member constituency system was used; unlike in the 1996 and 2002 where the proportional and semi‐proportional representative system – the district block system – was used in the elections. The use of the PR system then was informed by the prevailing socio‐political situation in the country at the time as it was perceived as the most suitable method to address the problems posed by the conflict and offers the best chance for broad based representation.4
With the single member constituency system (SMCS), the country was divided into 112 constituencies. This system favoured the election of younger candidates into parliament largely because the stake of the elections was shifted from the centre to the local, where their constituents directly elected candidates. Unlike the PR system where candidates are selected based on a party list system, as was the case in 2002, a system, which tends to favour the selection of older and so called experienced candidates, which had provoked serious outcry among the Youths in the past. Also, the SMCS dealt a serious blow to women's representation in parliament. As a result, only 16 female candidates were elected which is slightly below the number of seats secured by women in the 2002 general elections.5 The figures represent 14% compared to 86% for male and it is far below the expected 30% quota demanded by civil society and women's groups.6 This shortfall confirms the widely held view that ‘proportional representative system tend to create greater representation of women than do single member district systems’.7 Accordingly, as the case of the elections showed, the PR system offers a better chance for women representation in Sierra Leone. Voter turn outs in the elections were also impressive though the official national average of 68% in the run off polls was lower than the 76% recorded in the first round.8 On the whole, these figures were far lower than the 81.2% turnout rate recorded in the 2002 general elections.9
The elections were largely considered by both local and international observers as ‘relatively well administered.’10 The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was praised for the fair and transparent manner in which the polls were conducted. Certain instances of fraud and irregularities were reported particularly in the run off polls. In certain polling stations, the number of votes counted far exceeds the number of registered voters.11 As a result, 477 of the 6,156 polling stations across the country were invalidated by NEC.12 Also, instances of ballot stuffing and double voting due to poor electoral materials such as the indelible ink and fake ballot stamps were equally mentioned.13 Apart from some of these isolated incidents, the entire electoral process was considered credible and transparent. The elections were largely competitive and all the political parties who took part in the elections accepted the results. In contrast to the 1996 and 2002 general elections where donor involvement in the processes was relatively high, there was very limited international involvement in the 2007 elections particularly in the areas of funding and technical support. Much emphasis was placed on the use of local resources as a way to enable Sierra Leoneans to organise their own elections.14 Furthermore, the peaceful manner in which the polls were conducted showed the level of political tolerance given the country's troubled history. The victory of the opposition paved the way for new and much younger political elites to take over the realms of power. The smooth and successful transfer of power to an opposition party is an indication of the huge progress the country has made in institutionalising certain democratic practices and norms. The nature and outcome of the elections clearly signalled a brighter prospect for the country's nascent democratic experiment.
Conditioning Factors
A clearer understanding of the socioeconomic and political factors that precipitated the elections is necessary to fully appreciate the nature and wider implications of the electoral process. This will be discussed in view of the trajectory of the state and the democracy movement in Sierra Leone. At independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was one of the brightest stars in the galaxy of newly independent African states. With her lead in education, abundant natural resources and an effective public administration, the country was by no means a ‘candidate for state collapse’.15 Three decades of bad governance and a devastating conflict have wreaked serious havoc on a state that had all the potential to succeed as an independent African state.16 With the election of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah under the SLLP in 1996 and subsequently in 2002, the country took an important step towards democracy. For many political observers, the return to multi‐party rule not only signified a major move towards political liberalisation but the clearest means of rebuilding legitimate governance institutions capable of providing citizens with goods and services. Nevertheless, recent political developments in the country are overshadowed by immense socio‐economic challenges in spite of the modest gains the SLPP government had made as regards institution building. This background provides a deeper insight into understanding the conditioning factors that shaped the nature of the electoral process and its outcome. Such factors will be analysed under three broad headings. First are the deepening socioeconomic problems prevalent in the country at the time of the elections. Second, is the enabling socio‐political environment against which the elections took place. Finally, is the nature of the international community involvement in the country's reconstruction process?
By the time Sierra Leoneans went to the polls, the country was faced with huge development problems. The country was rated as the second least developed country in the world, ranked 176 out of 177 in the United Nations Human Development index.17 Seventy per cent of the five million Sierra Leoneans live below the poverty line while 26% live in extreme poverty.18 Though the country experienced a 7% economic growth rate in 2004/2006, the GDP per capita remained at $200 while two‐thirds of the population is unemployed particularly the youths.19 Over the years, many low income earning families found it difficult to gain access to affordable health care facilities and basic education. In 2004 alone, 286 out of 1,000 children died before the age of five while 2,000 per 100,000 women died during child birth.20 These figures are considered by UNICEF as the highest in the world. A report on basic education made mentioned of how
poor parents are taking their children out of school because of the inability to shoulder their educational needs since the burden of educating their kids have been entirely transferred to them in spite of the on‐going campaign for free compulsory primary education in the country.21
Infrastructure is also a huge problem as a large percentage of the road network in the country remained inaccessible. There is no reliable source of energy, as electricity and water supply even in the capital city remains a pressing problem.22 Added to this is the problem associated with public sector accountability which in most cases impeded the state's capacity to deliver effective goods and services. Comparatively, the SLPP government has claimed 'remarkable progress in post‐war reconstruction’ and has established institutions like the National Revenue Authority (NRA) and the National Insurance Social Security Trust (NASSIT) to improve the government's socio‐economic profile.23 Irrespective of the government's modest gains and credit for restoring peace to a war‐torn country, most political observers were convinced that the SLPP ‘is at odds with the public's demand for political change’.24 The SLPP government's poor records on issues such as the deepening socioeconomic malaise in the country and weak commitment to fight corruption appeared to shape the contours of the campaign process as well as the nature of the polls. Therefore, it was these issues that constituted the ‘enjeux’ upon which the elections were fought. Similarly, these issues will no doubt constitute the benchmarks for assessing the performance of the newly elected APC government in the near future.
Since the return of the country to multiparty rule in 1996, Sierra Leone has made immense progress in the area of democracy building. The organisation of two successive general elections in 1996 and 2002 respectively was accompanied by the establishment of a resourceful and independent electoral infrastructure. The role of civil society organisations and public involvement in these elections neatly signify a clear trajectory towards the institutionalisation of a viable electoral culture in the country.25 The establishment of institutions such as the AntiCorruption Commission, the office of the Ombudsman, the Intra‐Political Party Commission, the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) and the National Commission on Democracy (NCD), provides new opportunities to address issues of transparency, justice and respect for human rights.26
In recent years, the government has initiated a host of reforms with the objective to improve the capacity of governance institutions in the country. This includes justice, security and public sectors and the ongoing decentralisation process. Furthermore, the third wave has given rise to a democracy movement in the country which is rooted in an alliance between global forces and domestic political activists.27 This is evident in the significant number of civil society groups particularly NGOs that have sprung up over the years. These organisations have been at the forefront of the campaign for good governance, the protection of human rights and political participation and as such impacted on the evolution of certain democratic norms and practices in the country.
Today, Sierra Leone continues to enjoy a positive ranking in the Freedom House rating as a promising democracy where basic human rights and freedom of expression are widely respected.28 Added to this, is the attendant impact linked to the liberalisation of the media landscape. A survey conducted in 2004 showed that:
Sierra Leone's media sector has diversified at a remarkable rate over the past ten years. There has been a proliferation of radio stations nationwide; television service has been established in some provinces; and a plethora of newspapers are published daily and weekly in Freetown. The increase in the number of channels has changed the structural conditions for information and knowledge sharing.29
The survey also indicated that there were over 23 independent FM radio stations in the country and that they were accessible to the general public.30 These developments created an enabling political environment against which the 2007 general elections took place and, as a result, informed the remarkable role played by various actors such as policy makers, ordinary citizens and civil society groups to ensure that the elections were well administered.
Following the end of the conflict in 2002, the international community (spearheaded by Britain) assumed the huge responsibility of the state reconstruction process in Sierra Leone. At the core of this process is the ‘constructing or reconstituting institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security’.31 Represented by a multitude of agencies and organisations including the UN, European Union, World Bank, Department For International Development (DFID) and international NGOs, it has been very instrumental in the country's stabilisation process, providing security, through an 18,000 UN‐led peacekeeping force and supporting the country's post‐conflict recovery programme.32 Further, the international community continues to take the lead role in the re‐composition of the socio‐political landscape and the country's development agenda as clearly articulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).33 As a result, it has been able to shape the evolution of domestic governance structures and practices.
Sierra Leone is a typical case of a baby sitting approach to state reconstruction whereby the process is not only engineered from outside but also closely supervised and monitored through effective regulatory mechanisms.34 Such approach can be likened to a form of international entrepreneurship wherein the elements of international involvement in the reconstruction process far overshadows local ownership. Therefore, questions of democratic legitimacy as evident in the organisation of free and fair elections, accountability and respect for fundamental human rights takes precedence over attempts at building effective state capacity.35 As a result, a transparent and well administered election in a country like Sierra Leone is the minimum that is expected of the political leadership in particular where the bulk of the funds, the policy leadership as well as technical expertise for the organisation of state elections are provided by the international community.36
This is also the case in places like Kosovo, Bosnia whereby post‐conflict reconstruction processes are driven from outside, unlike places like CongoBrazzavile, Uganda and Eritrea where similar processes are driven from within.37 In a similar way, the elections raised fundamental questions regarding the relationship between local political outcomes and the nature of international involvement in Sierra Leone. In that light, one is tempted to argue whether the electoral defeat of the incumbent SLPP government as a result of its failure to provide social services does exemplify some of the limits of international entrepreneurship in Sierra Leone. This is usually the case where in the ‘international community attempt to evade responsibilities and accountability for the exercise of power’ particularly in situations where it appears to play a leading role in development processes.38 To an extent this explains part of the paradox of the 2007 general elections.
Broader Challenges
One critical challenge that is bound to face the newly elected APC government is to garner the political will to transform its electoral victory into tangible socioeconomic benefits for the citizens. This will involve moving beyond crafting institutions to ensuring that those institutions function effectively. As Francis Fukuyama noted ‘a good state institution is one that transparently and efficiently serves the needs of its clientscitizens of the state’.39 This will involve attempts to ensure that the newly elected government delivers on its electoral promises of providing social services and dealing with corruption.40 Nevertheless, such attempts will necessarily have to depend on a host of other factors such as a pro‐active civil society, an effective parliament and continued donor pressure.
Since the transition to multi‐party in 1996, civil society organisations have been very instrumental in the campaign to build a viable democratic polity in Sierra Leone. As a result of their various interventions, they have made remarkable gains in the area of human rights and civic education, the fight against corruption and institutional reforms. Irrespective of these gains, they have been very weak in the area of public policy analysis and as such, unable to force government to be more accountable to the people. This has to do with the programmatic orientation and expertise of most civil society organisations. While professional associations are in most cases interested in advancing their professional interests, NGOs are further crippled by a lack of expertise and their dependence on donors. NGOs, like the state, depend on foreign donors for finance and in most cases, donors also condition the evolution of these organisations and the nature of their interventions. Since public policy analysis has never been a priority in donor supported programmes, local organisations have not been able to build the expertise necessary to engage the state in that area. As a result, civil society organisations have not been pro‐active on public policy issues and also unable to build a strategic partnership with the state. This explains why they have not been instrumental in bridging the gap that exists between policy pronouncements and implementation which no doubt have bedevilled government performance over the years. However, these limitations points to the challenges that civil society will have to face if they are to play any meaningful role in ensuring that the newly elected government responds to the popular expectations generated by its electoral victory particularly at the grassroots levels.
‘The wave of political liberalisation and democratisation that swept across Africa during the 1990s gave rise to an expansion of legislative authority in some countries, but not all’.41 Sierra Leone appears to be one of those countries where the legislature remained very weak despite the return to multi‐party rule and the holding of two successive and transparent parliamentary elections. Both the 1996 and 2002 general elections failed to produce an effective legislature largely because of capacity problems and the nature of governance. The legislature did not really serve as an oversight institution of the executive; rather, it served a representative function in a context of client politics. The case of Sierra Leone demonstrates that elections plays very little role in the expansion of legislative authority and that such expansion depends on other factors. A study conducted on legislatures in four African countries identified two sets of variables that determine legislative behaviour and effectiveness. The first include the nature of the society and political system, the legislative rules and institutional resources available to members of the legislature. The second relates to the characteristics of individual legislators such as their level of education, occupational background and personal experience.42 One noticeable feature of the 2007 parliamentary elections is that younger and well‐educated candidates were elected into parliament.43 Unlike the previous elections, a lot of emphasis was placed on youth and quality representation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether such a trend will mark a decisive break from the past particularly as regards the capacity of parliament to hold governments more accountable and deliver services.
The donor community also constitutes another key player that is likely to influence the performance of the newly‐elected government. Since the end of the conflict in 2002, the fate of Sierra Leone has been increasingly tied to the goodwill of the donor community which has been very instrumental in shaping the contours of the country's development landscape. This relationship has favoured the evolution of a multitude of mechanisms to closely monitor the development process in the country in what David Chandler calls the politics of state building.44 In spite of this leverage, donors have not been able to influence local political outcomes. Therefore, the election of a new government thus provides the donor community with an added opportunity to play a more forceful role – particularly as it relates to the accountability of political elites. As such, the elections constitute a tool where donors will force the newly elected government to perform and deliver not only on its electoral promises but on a range of other pressing issues.
The 2007 general election points to a promising phase in the country's democratic process since the return to multiparty rule in 1996. It provided new opportunities for elite renewal and the deepening of certain democratic practices. Though the elections constitute a referendum on the records of the SLLP government to deliver social services, it also raises fundamental questions regarding the limits of international entrepreneurship. Beyond that, the newlyelected APC government will have to deal with the pressing problems of institutional capacity, ensuring that state institutions function effectively and transparently and reduce the country's dependence on the international community. Whether the government can transform its electoral victory into tangible socio‐economic benefits for the masses remains exceedingly unpredictable particularly in a situation where the gap between political liberalisation and institutional capacity appears to be widening. However, Sierra Leoneans have demonstrated a huge appetite for democracy but getting the newly‐elected government to deliver on the expectations generated by its electoral victory will depend on a host of other factors such as a pro‐active civil society, a vibrant parliament and continued donor pressure. From all indications, it is apparent that the next five years will prove decisive in unravelling the elements of change and continuity in the country's political experiment to build a viable democratic state.