Little good news has yet emerged from Zimbabwe's 2008 elections. However, the refusal by Durban dockworkers in April to unload Chinese arms imports destined for Zimbabwe was an impressive display of solidarity by unionised Africa, one that was supported by wider action by civil society throughout southern Africa and internationally. Veterans of the Anti‐Apartheid Movement will have recalled the action of unionised dockworkers in the British port of Liverpool in July 1987, who similarly blocked the export of uranium to South Africa, as part of solidarity actions against the apartheid state.
The dockworkers’ initiative provided a stark contrast to the apathy of most (but not all) southern African Heads of State in confronting the reality that the Zimbabwean elections were being stolen through a systematic process which combined bureaucratic delay and systematic, and highly organised, militia and military violence. This violence was directed by the Joint Operations Command against opposition supporters and civil society organisations, to disrupt (and even eliminate) the structures of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), by physically harming its members, supporters and lawyers, stealing ID cards necessary for voting and driving people from their localities, thus preventing them voting. Perhaps most importantly, the action against the shipment exposed the inaccurate though widely held view that Mugabe's African critics support and are influenced by pro‐western and imperialist positions, and who can therefore be characterised and dismissed as the agents of neo‐colonialism.
Whilst the movement against the arms shipment was a dramatic and, at least to some, surprising initiative, this display of solidarity did not appear out of nowhere. Rather, it can be understood to reflect a number of underlying processes which are examined here. The first is a general (although highly uneven) strengthening of independent civil society movements across the southern African region over the last decade. Secondly, it was a demonstration of the growing alienation of the South African government (although not the African National Congress as a party) from its alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), as well as much of wider civil society. Thirdly, it represented the fruits of strenuous (and, at times, apparently fruitless) efforts to build regional solidarity amongst trade unions and social movements in solidarity with Zimbabwean counterparts over the last five years. Whilst the MDC leadership has focused on gaining the support of the ‘international community’ (an effort which has enabled Mugabe to portray the MDC as the puppets of western powers), Zimbabwean civil society – particularly labour, women's and church‐based organisations – have steadily built cross‐border links that bore fruit in this campaign.
Timeline of Events
Following the first round of the Zimbabwean elections on 29 March 2008, the delay in the release of results which would have shown a victory for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) provided cover for systematic violence against opposition supporters and other critics of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Popular Front (ZANU‐PF) party. In this context, the arrival of the Chinese container ship, the An Yue Jiang, off Durban harbour on 14 April prompted fears that the Zimbabwean authorities were arming themselves in preparation for the further repression of MDC supporters during the second round of elections (fears based on historical precedence and ones which proved well founded, with widespread violence subsequently forcing Morgan Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the second round of the Presidential elections on 27 June). The ship's manifest, leaked to the South African press and the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU), the union which represents dockworkers, revealed that the An Yue Jiang was carrying 77 tonnes of armaments destined for onward transportation to Zimbabwe: these were specifically rocket‐propelled grenades, mortars and small arms, three million rounds of ammunition, 1,500 rocket‐propelled grenades and 2,500 mortar rounds.1
The reaction of the South African government was predictable: January Masilela, the South African Defence Secretary, declared that the shipment had been approved that week by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), which he chairs. Masilela concluded: ‘This is a normal transaction between two sovereign states and we don't have to interfere.' 2
In contrast, Randall Howard, General Secretary of SATAWU, publicly declared:
We do not believe it will be in the interest of the Zimbabwean people in general if South Africa is seen to be a conduit of arms and ammunition into Zimbabwe at a time when the situation could be described as quite volatile.3
Meanwhile, human rights groups in South Africa quickly petitioned the Durban High Court for a freeze on the movement of the arms. The petitioners included the Bishop of Durban Rubin Philip, supported by the South African Litigation Centre (SALC) and the Open Society Institute of Southern Africa (OSISA).4 They obtained an interim legal judgement on 18 April that the arms could not be transported overland in South Africa, by utilising the Conventional Arms Control Act of 2002. The International Network on Small Arms (IANSA) Johannesburg office supported these efforts and also mobilised the resources of its London‐based secretariat. IANSA's aim was the impounding of the ship, to stop not only the offloading of the arms in Durban, but also their movement elsewhere.5 This was not successful; although the interdict was granted, the Ann Yue Jiang left Durban harbour on the day of the court judgement.
SATAWU and the other campaigners now sought to ensure that the arms were not offloaded elsewhere in southern Africa; Howard declared:
We again strongly call on all African governments and dock workers to refuse the vessel docking access and to refuse handling the weapons with a view to ensuring that the vessel leaves African shores immediately. We call on the United Nations to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese government to practically demonstrate their commitment to recall and stop using the politics of deception … Satawu's interest only lies with the six containers of lethal weapons on board being boycotted and returned to Beijing until the political crisis in Zimbabwe is resolved, in the context of the possibility of genuine democracy reinstated based on the will of the people there. To that extent, we urge local, African and global media to ensure that this important humane story remains in the public discourse until the vessel returns with the weapons on board as the struggle did not end in Durban on 18 April 2008.6
This emphasis on in‐country activity reflected a major priority for IANSA and other organisations, that the campaign should be locally owned. As Joseph Dube, IANSA's Africa Coordinator based in Johannesburg argues, the SADC Heads of States’ reluctance to respond to ‘outside voices’ on Zimbabwe meant it was crucial that the campaign activities were reflective of the priorities and approaches of civil society in the countries involved, so that it could not be portrayed as a western‐controlled campaign.10 IANSA's London‐based Secretariat sought to ensure continued media interest in the ship's movements, linking it to its wider campaign for an international Arms Trade Treaty. Sustaining press coverage became more difficult once the vessel was out of South African waters.
On 24 April, the ship was rumoured to be heading for Lobito. The following day, the Angolan government declared that it would allow the An Yue Jiang to dock in Luanda, but that the vessel would only be allowed to offload ‘merchandise destined for Angola’.11 The Angolan Council for Human Rights was mobilised, and local trade unionists were contacted, but it proved more difficult to establish an open campaign against the shipment in Angola (for reasons examined below). At the same time, the ship was recalled to China by its owners, the state‐owned Chinese Ocean Shipping Company (Cosco). The An Yue Jiang remained in Luanda harbour for some days, offloading cement and other supplies. It was reported to have left Luanda on 6 May.
In mid‐May, there were widespread reports that the arms had in fact found their way to Zimbabwe – having been offloaded in (variously) Luanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Congo‐Brazzaville. Some civil society organisations and the ITF ridiculed these claims, whilst the Chinese embassy in South Africa explicitly stated that the weapons were being returned to China.12
Nevertheless, doubts have been raised regarding the success of the campaign, something which is addressed below.
Local & Global solidarity, Old & New Tactics
The brief and successful campaign against the arms shipment incorporated both traditional and more modern social movement tactics. On a regional and international level, email, web links and cell phones enabled the rapid sharing of information. Organisers were able to identify and contact civil society activists in particular countries where it was feared the arms shipments would be taken to next, or possibly be transported through, to reach Zimbabwe. The latest intelligence was shared in seconds with activists across the region and the world.
Important activist and campaigning networks served to coordinate the global campaign: Avaaz and the International Network on Small Arms (IANSA) both played an important role, establishing and circulating a petition, which was then posted on many websites. Meanwhile, a host of bloggers monitored the reported movements of the vessel using Lloyds of London's Maritime Intelligence Unit; this proved impossible for a couple of days, when the An Yue Jiang's transponder was temporarily turned off.13
Of course, such short‐term international campaigns, organised largely in hyper‐space, have a tendency to escape the control of their initiators. Stories, petitions and emails were forwarded continuously with little reference to their origin; blogs blend unverifiable fact with occasionally unpalatable opinion. Internet‐based techniques are undeniably useful for such urgent campaigns with specific aims, but also carry the danger of a loss of ownership and legitimacy when applied to longer‐term campaigns with more complex objectives. In this case, stories and rumours regarding the ship abounded on the internet – it was reported to have been landed in Pointe Noire in Congo‐Brazzaville,14 and rumours circulated that the ship had been ‘offloaded’ onto smaller vessels at sea, despite the technical impossibilities involved; the ITF sought to scotch such rumours, but this was not entirely successful.15
One important story which continues to circulate on the internet is that originated by Zimbabwe's Deputy Minister of Information Bright Matonga, who announced some weeks ago at a press conference that the arms shipment had in fact been delivered to Zimbabwe.16 His claim was not supported by other government officials and was specifically denied by the Minister of Defence, but it has continued to circulate. The ITF, having tracked the movements of the An Yue Jiang closely, ultimately to its return to Shanghai in mid‐June, are certain that the arms remain onboard, with no opportunity for them to be unloaded unobserved.17
If much of the campaign's international publicity and profile was generated on the internet, it was on the ground in South Africa where the campaign began. Here, it was initiated by rank‐and-file dockworkers, utilising one of the oldest forms of solidarity action – a refusal by workers to handle goods. Durban is of course a centre of working‐class action with a long and proud history; the 1973 dock strikes were central to the resurgence of the internal struggle against apartheid. SATAWU was established in 2000 to represent not only dock workers but also railworkers, who have initiated militant and sometimes violent wage campaigns in recent years. SATAWU was central to the campaign, representing the local membership which could ensure the boycott of the goods was effective, but also utilising its international linkages to the ITF in particular. The ITF, as well as monitoring the movements of the vessel, also sought to mobilise labour organisations in the region, but was hampered by both communications problems, and by the uneven development of international labour linkages in southern Africa. They worked with International Trade Union Confederation officials to identify union contacts in Angola and Mozambique who could alert local dockworkers to the issue. The ITF also worked alongside established networks of international NGOs; here, the need for consultation and coordination of activities did not always reflect the need for urgent concrete actions.
South‐South Solidarity
The campaign of solidarity in southern Africa in general, and South Africa in particular, would not have been possible without nearly a decade of patient solidarity work by a range of civil society organisations and social movements, linking Zimbabwean activists and their counterparts in the region. In a context in which the South African government has been habitually sympathetic to its Zimbabwean counterpart, the range and extent of this solidarity has generally been overlooked by observers.
Those involved in such initiatives have faced considerable challenges. In Johannesburg, the wider Gauteng province and other parts of northern South Africa, the influx of millions of Zimbabwean refugees over the last decade has fuelled the xenophobic feelings of many poor South Africans. The widespread stereotyping of Zimbabweans resident in South Africa as both criminals and as workers desperate enough prepared to undercut South African wages created significant anti‐Zimbabwean feeling, expressed in the horrifying wave of xenophobic attacks in South Africa in May 2008. Against this, organisations such as the Solidarity Peace Trust have sought to raise awareness of the oppression of Zimbabweans at home, and their suffering inside South Africa, for example their poor treatment by inadequate immigration services. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) in Johannesburg hosted many of these activities. OSISA and the Media Institute of Southern Africa played an important role in coordinating meetings in Johannesburg from around 2002, whilst Elinor Sisulu played a leading role in raising media attention of the plight of Zimbabwean refugees in South Africa.18 These groups struggled to mobilise the vast Zimbabwean exile population in the country – few were willing to draw attention to themselves, thereby risking their precarious residential status. Nevertheless, it was precisely these organisations and the networks they created which were key to the rapid organisational and legal mobilisation which took place over the arms shipment; indeed, it can be argued that such a response would not have been possible without the painstaking effort in laying the groundwork over recent years.
Sectoral solidarity has also become increasingly important. Women's organisations, particularly Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), made links with their counterparts in South Africa. Similarly, ties between particular churches with a base in both countries enabled practical solidarity efforts such as the provision of food and medicines; such activities took place below the radar of larger civil society organisations. The labour movement, in particular, has built on existing but relatively weak official linkages via the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC) to good effect, contributing to a significant estrangement between COSATU and the ANC government over the issue. For example, in the run‐up to the Presidential run‐off in June, COSATU sought to raise solidarity with the leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, who have been charged with ‘spreading falsehoods prejudicial to the state’.
Regional State‐Civil Society Relations vis‐à‐vis Zimbabwe
Nevertheless, the capacity of civil society to influence regional policy and action on Zimbabwe should not be overstated. Indeed, the influence of civil society and social movements on the policies of southern African governments remains both limited and highly uneven.
In South Africa, COSATU's backing of the new ANC President, Jacob Zuma, has borne fruit with his highlighting of the problems in Zimbabwe, declaring in late June that the situation in the country was out of control and that ‘We cannot agree with Zanu‐PF. We cannot agree with them on values.'19 Zuma's remarks were in marked contrast to the increasingly embattled complacency of government President Thabo Mbeki, who had notoriously stated during his post‐election visit that there was ‘no crisis’ in Zimbabwe.20 Zuma's credentials in the liberation struggle, and his Africanist and populist appeal, might at first glance make him an unlikely champion of liberal democracy. Whatever his personal feelings, the Zimbabwe issue has enabled Zuma to further embarrass and isolate Mbeki, reflect the concerns of his supporters in COSATU, and reach out to international opinion concerned about the prospect of a Zuma presidency. Nevertheless, during his meeting in London with UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown in April, Zuma was not prepared to publicly support a full arms embargo against Zimbabwe.
One of the demands of the Zimbabwean opposition has been the removal of Mbeki as the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) mediator on Zimbabwe, and his replacement with Zam‐bian President Levy Mwanawasa, the current head of the regional body. Following Mozambique's action in rejecting the vessel, Mwanawasa issued a specific request to SADC member states on 22 April to bar the arms shipment from their territory, arguing that the arrival of the weapons could exacerbate Zimbabwe's political crisis: ‘I hope this will be the case with all the countries because we don't want a situation which will escalate the tension in Zimbabwe more than what it is’, Mwanawasa declared.21 This created severe diplomatic tension between Zambia and Zimbabwe, with both governments trading insults in the media on an almost daily basis in May. Mwanawasa's critical stance towards Zimbabwe is undoubtedly symptomatic of his government's pro‐western leanings, but is also a reflection of the country's renewed sense of purpose and prosperity, symbolised by its achievement of debt relief and rising government revenue achieved via recent increases in mine taxes. Having previously clashed with Zambian domestic civil society over issues such as constitutional reform, Zimbabwe provides an issue around which the Zambian government and its domestic critics can unite. Despite the fact that the Chinese are major investors in Zambia, Mwanawasa also offered a mild and somewhat oblique criticism of their role, arguing that the ‘Chinese can play a very useful role in Zimbabwe without the use of arms.'22
In sharp contrast, the Angolan government remains largely impervious to both internal political pressure and, insulated by high oil prices, international donor pressure. It is evident that, without the campaign's efforts and the realtime scrutiny of the ship's movements, the An Yue Jiang would have docked in Luanda and the armaments would have been offloaded. The ITF ensured that its contacts were presented in Luanda at the time the ship docked; these individuals were able to monitor the veracity of the Angolan government's pledge that the arms would not be offloaded.23 The Port Workers’ Union of Angola appears to have been an important source of information to the campaign; in a country where independent civil society remains weak, international trade union connections appeared all the more significant. However, IANSA struggled to persuade Angolan civil society representatives to make on‐the-record statements, for fear of reprisals.24 Coverage of the Angolan situation was also severely limited by the lack of English‐speaking media in the country.
Nevertheless, the Angolan government's rapid announcement that the Zimbabwean arms shipment would not be offloaded in Luanda was perhaps also a reflection of its close and coordinated relationship with China, which has apparently distanced itself somewhat from the ailing Mugabe regime in recent months, having tired of denying Harare's unilateral declarations of Chinese investments in the country, as well as not being paid for their supplies. Characteristically, Chinese statements initially sought to defend the arms shipment as a normal commercial operation; however, as has occurred in relation to its operations in Sudan and elsewhere, the Chinese state is increasingly aware of the limitations of its attempts to deny any responsibility for the political consequences of its commercial operations in Africa.
Finally, the arms shipment campaign also provided a timely reminder that the most effective grassroots opposition to the Mugabe regime has, over the last decade, been provided not by political parties, but by civil society and social movements. Whilst the MDC has created problems for itself by its western orientation and partial adoption of neo‐liberal policies, it should not be forgotten that the party had its origins in the wave of popular discontent of 1997–99, when the ZCTU, then headed by Morgan Tsvangirai, played a central role in establishing the MDC, which initially proclaimed itself a social democratic party. In its first few years as an independent political party, the MDC alienated many of its social movement supporters by abandoning approaches based on mass mobilisation and by adopting a pro‐western stance that aided Mugabe's efforts to portray it as a neo‐colonial puppet. It was slow to realise that attempts to gain support solely on the basis of Harare's human rights record had little purchase in Africa, appearing to reflect Western concerns rather than the need to overcome the (still relevant) colonial legacy, particularly inequalities over land ownership (something which Mugabe has of course failed to overcome in his 28 years in power).
Despite this, and notwithstanding the suppression of their activities by the Zimbabwean state, the country's social movement activists have continued to play an important role in raising awareness about their plight and seeking to mobilise solidarity action in southern Africa in general, and South Africa in particular. The fruits of this ongoing activity, little noticed by the mainstream media, were realised in the successful boycott campaign against the An Yue Jiang. Following the failure of the 2008 election to realise the Zimbabwean people's hopes for political transition, it may be that a coordinated combination of local, regional and international civil society initiatives on provides an important beacon of hope in a generally bleak vista.