Despite relative political stability and low levels of crime, Swaziland has experienced a rapid expansion of the private security sector. While there are no private military companies in the country, commercial private security companies have mushroomed in urban areas as well as in rural settings dominated by agro-industrial enterprises. In rural areas where cattle and small-scale farming form the central part of the local economy, more informal types of non-state security have emerged to provide for everyday protection. This article argues that the emergence of these various private security actors has to be understood in the context of Swaziland's unequal political economy, as well as the monarchy's increasing preoccupation with regime security. The state's abdication of its responsibility to protect citizens, alongside growing corruption and inefficiency among police, have resulted in different responses from urban and rural communities, reflecting in large part their different access to wealth and resources as well as their different security needs. In urban areas, numerous private security companies (PSCs) now serve the relatively wealthy sections of the population, while people in the rural areas have formed so-called Community Police groups consisting of unpaid volunteers.
To date, the growth of private security in Swaziland has received very little attention in scholarly debates, and this article seeks to integrate the country's experience into the growing body of knowledge about security privatisation. I argue that while existing literature can throw some light on the situation in Swaziland, it is nevertheless crucial to remain attuned to the particularities of the country's economic, social and political situation. As such, the article proceeds in three parts. First, I provide an analysis of the political economy of private security in Swaziland, showing how the growth of private security actors is intimately connected to the economic disparities that have accompanied economic growth in the country. Second, the article investigates the growth and impact of PSCs in urban areas, showing both its historical roots in the colonial period as well as its contemporary implications for issues of equality and democratic oversight. Third, I discuss the rural response to the lack of state security, showing how widespread perceptions of corruption and inefficiency in the public police led rural populations to form community security initiatives to combat cattle theft. Crucially, however, the responses of both the urban and rural populations are linked to the lack of adequate state protection, and the article concludes that the growth of private security in Swaziland has a direct relation to the state's abdication of its duty to provide security to its citizens.
The Political Economy of Private Security in Swaziland
The development of the private security sector is the result of numerous and diverse economic and political factors, and consequently, different scholars have juggled with the reasons behind the emergence of private security companies in different parts of the world. Some have observed that the development of the private security sector has been influenced by a shift in international thinking and practice on security (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007). Similarly, the marketisation of the public sphere represented by the ‘privatisation revolution’ has played a crucial role in the worldwide growth of the private security sector (O'Brien, 1998). This has gone hand in hand with the principle of globalisation in which it is believed that privatisation can maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of states through comparative advantage and competition, symbolising a belief in the superiority of the marketplace over government in the provision of services. The main result has been a surge in outsourcing of service provision by the state, such that services that were traditionally provided by the state are now increasingly performed by private companies. Security provision has not been immune to these processes, and over the last few decades, private actors have come to occupy an increasingly central role as providers of security services.
While highly relevant to the growth of private security in Swaziland, such general explanations need to be complemented by a more detailed analysis of the specificity of the country's economic and political history. In the case of Swaziland, several factors help explain the growth of PSCs, all revolving around economic and political issues. In both the colonial and post-colonial periods, security was interpreted through the economic and political interests of those in power and the emergence of private security actors needs to be understood in the context of the country's unequal political economy.
The Swazi economy experienced a fundamental transformation after the Second World War. This was a product of intensive capitalisation of the Swazi economy through British and South African capital (Booth, 1983; Simelane, 2004), which resulted in the establishment of numerous industries, mainly in the areas of mining and agro-industries (Crush, 1979). This development continued into the postcolonial period as more and more industries were developed in different parts of the country. At independence in 1968, the management of the growing Swazi economy was taken over by the indigenous leadership which was a curious mixture of traditionalists and the middle class under the leadership of the monarchy (Macmillan, 1983). In terms of security, however, their approach was not all that different from their colonial predecessors. Where for the colonial administration security was primarily about ensuring the survival of colonial rule, for the new monarchy it was about protecting their own economic interests, as well as those of their supporting middle class. Thus increasingly, security came to be confined to the protection of the economic interests of a relatively small elite. The Swazi monarchy owned several economic enterprises, while the emerging middle class also owned businesses and they were the highest accumulators through the state machinery (Simelane, 2006). In this way, policing and security in Swaziland, like in many other African countries, was from the very beginning of independence focused on regime survival rather than the protection of citizens. As the growth of the economy gave rise to social classes demanding political and economic inclusion, the preoccupation with regime security intensified.
These developments were further reinforced by the increasing opposition to monarchical rule, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As democratisation spread across the African continent, the Swazi monarchy with its tinkhundla system of conservative courts and traditional advisors looked increasingly anachronistic and faced numerous internal and external challenges to its survival. Internally, different groups including students and trade unions were opposing monarchical rule which was deemed to be too dictatorial, and inspired by democratic struggles in neighbouring South Africa, opposition movements such as the People's United Democratic Movement (Pudemo) and the Swaziland Democratic Alliance posed further challenges to the traditional form of rule. Externally, the Southern African region was turning to democratisation and endorsing free and fair multi-party elections as the only form of legitimate rule (Daniel & Vilane, 1986). To the monarchy and its traditionalist supporters, such forces of transformation appeared as threats to their security and resulted in an intensification of the already strong preoccupation with regime security. What followed in this period was a systematic shifting of national resources away from the security needs of citizens and towards the security needs of the regime. With this shift, urban areas, especially higher class and middle class residential areas began to rely on private security companies, while rural areas and lower class urban residential areas were forced to dig deep into their limited resources to protect themselves and their property.
In addition to the monarchy's political preoccupations with its own survival, the growth of the private security sector in Swaziland derives its character from the economic disparities that have accompanied the growth of the Swazi economy. Only a decade after independence, Fransman (1978) observed that economic growth had not benefited the majority of citizens, but had significantly contributed to the affluence of the royal family and the middle class. Pervasive inequalities have continued, and economic disparities have reached staggering levels as poverty has become more entrenched while the rich have become richer (Times of Swaziland, 23 September, 2005). It is estimated that about 69 per cent of the Swazi population live below the poverty line, and that 400,000 (about 40 per cent) Swazis depend on food handouts. It has also been shown that 20 per cent of Swazis control about 54 per cent of the country's wealth, while the poor control only 4.3 per cent (Times of Swaziland, 3 July 2007). Swaziland is therefore a country of huge economic disparities, where the majority of citizens live in poverty and a small section of the population enjoy a life of luxury. Surprisingly, in spite of these limitations Swaziland has not be subjected to the structural adjustment programmes implemented in most African countries.
In this setting of extreme inequality, security has come to mean the protection of the economic interests of the rich and the development of the private security sector is a strategy used to achieve this goal. The state has chosen to focus its resources on regime security, rather than on economic inclusion and the redistribution of wealth.
The poor majority do not benefit from the services of private security companies and thus remain vulnerable to many security threats. In other words, the private security companies have become synonymous with the rich members of society, as these companies are driven by the demands of the rich and have very little relevance to the economic interests and security needs of the poor, whether in urban or rural areas.
Yet another factor accounting for the growth of private security is the rise – and fear – of crime. Like in most countries, the development of the private security sector in Swaziland has a lot to do with the desire by individuals to ensure the safety of themselves, and their families and property. While reliable statistics are hard to obtain, there is a strong sense that crime has escalated in recent years. As expressed by one businessman,
I have lost thousands of Emalangeni since I arrived here. There have been break-ins in both of my shops. I have experienced two break-ins at Sanibonani and the other one occurred at the main shop. What worries me is that the thugs are granted bail far below the value of the items stolen (Times of Swaziland, 27 January 2007).
Crime is shaped by the social, economic, and political context of a country, and Swaziland provides a conducive environment for the development of crime as the majority of citizens live in abject poverty, while witnessing the affluence of the few on a daily basis. The country has an unemployment rate of about 29 per cent, and a leadership that is not committed to the principles of good governance and poverty mitigation. To a large extent, crime in Swaziland has become a weapon of the poor to implement a more equitable distribution of wealth. The response of the rich has been heavy reliance on private security companies, thus further reinforcing the sense of social segregation between the rich and the poor.
The influx of small arms and the easy access to unlicensed firearms is another key factor contributing to the rise of crime. In Swaziland, the availability of firearms is often associated with and blamed on the influx of Mozambican refugees who escaped the ravages of the country's long civil war. Evidence also indicates that a large number of Swazis receive firearms from South Africa through illegal smuggling and trade. The increase in crime and availability of small arms have in turn expanded the market for private security companies, as individuals and companies feel compelled to find means to protect their homes, businesses, and livelihoods. Both local and foreign enterprises hire PSCs to protect their operations and premises, as are the foreign missions and development organisations present in Swaziland. The rise in crime – as well as the fear of crime – is accordingly a key reason for the expansion of Swaziland's expanding market for private security services.
Holmqvist has observed that the growth of the private security sector in Africa is ‘symptomatic of state weakness and the failure of the state to provide physical security for its citizens through the establishment of functioning law-and-order institutions’ (2005:11). To a certain extent this is highly pertinent for Swaziland, which since independence in 1968 has been characterised by certain administrative weaknesses which rendered the state unable to fulfil its obligation to act as a protective shield for citizens and to deal with the security concerns of both rural and urban areas. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind the extent to which significant resources have been devoted to regime protection rather than the protection of citizens. A focus merely on state weakness is thus not sufficient to capture the dynamics of the relationship between the state and the emergence of private security actors. For example, Swaziland has a relatively high police to population ratio; with approximately 5,061 public police to a population of 1 million it has a ratio of 1:200 as compared to the UN recommendation of 1:450. The police, however, have a reputation for inefficiency and corruption and are generally distrusted by the public. This sense of abandonment and distrust is expressed with striking clarity by Gawula Sihlongonyane, a community member of Matimatima:
Swaziland has been independent for close to forty years, but she is continuing to fail to look after the well being of the majority of its citizens. The state has failed to come up with appropriate policies to protect the rural dwellers physically and economically. Throughout our borders with Mozambique and South Africa Swazi citizens continue to be vulnerable to different threats that undermine their strategies for survival. The Swazi Government is aware of these problems but nothing has been done. At the same time if you look at the protection given to government officials and members of the royal family you would think the country is under good protection. I now believe that the police force and the military were not meant to protect citizens but those who are in power (Interview, 29 January 2008).
The Growth of Private Security Companies in Swazi Urban Areas
The development of the private security sector in urban Swaziland has its genesis in the colonial period from 1902–1968, and especially in the period after the Second World War until independence. However, most of the growth took place after 1968, and while there were elements of private security in the colonial period, there were no private security companies. The colonial state was organised along more militaristic lines and monopolised the means of coercion. The Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) was the only instrument of law and order, occasionally assisted by the British colonial army in times of intense conflicts. The concept of security under colonialism was defined in terms of the continuation of colonial rule and accordingly focused centrally on the prevention of revolts and opposition by the indigenous population. Thus, while the military and political power of the colonial state was considerable, the protection of the indigenous population was not considered a priority. Instead, the economic and political priorities of the colonial administration defined and shaped the texture of security.
There is, however, evidence to indicate that even in the colonial period individual white settlers and some colonial officials hired guards for their homes and economic establishments, even though it is difficult to reconstruct the extent of this practice. Oral accounts produce different views on why white settlers hired private guards. Jonathan Smith, a white Swazi whose parents came to Swaziland in 1931, said:
During the colonial period in this country white people feared that the indigenous population could perpetrate criminal acts against them. In more general terms crime was one of the most feared threats whether real or perceived. It was felt that it was much safer to hire a private guard for your home during the day and also during the night. The guards could raise an alarm in case of an attack. As a result, most settler houses had guards recruited by individual white home owners. Most whites must have copied this practice from colonial officials whose houses were always under guard. The argument was that the indigenous population was prone to criminal actions (Interview, 7 January 2007).
Although it is difficult to determine the level of crime during the colonial period, evidence suggests that the genesis of the private security sector in this period was motivated by fear of property loss or physical violence. Private security was from the very beginning a means of protecting the economic interests of white settlers and colonial officials, and its effect on the colonised population was primarily one of exclusion and segregation. In this way, private security can be seen to have contributed to the maintenance of colonial rule, albeit by non-coercive means and through the employment of local guards.
Alternatively, the hiring of guards by white settlers can be seen as related to colonial determinants of status. According to this view, the hiring of guards was more of a social issue than a security issue. Alex Forbes, a white Swazi whose grandparents arrived in Swaziland in the 1870s expresses this:
We should always be aware that colonial society was very complex. This is the case because it contained dynamics that crafted relations between the colonised and the settlers, and also between the settlers themselves. Some things were not done for financial gain or any other purpose, but for status. The manner in which colonial society was organised, I doubt if whites seriously needed security guards in their homes. Although Swaziland was somehow different from South Africa, it was still extremely difficult to find indigenous Swazis moving up and down white occupied areas. Whites derived prestige and status from hiring security guards. It gave them pleasure and satisfaction to have their home gates opened and closed by hired guards. To a large number of them it bequeathed a better social status. This sense of self-importance was even more gratifying as they called their guards ‘boys’ (Interview, 8 January 2007).
Seen from this perspective, private security was yet another marker of difference in colonial society, a means of distinguishing between the coloniser from the colonised. Taken together these two quotations also draw attention to the subjective nature of security and insecurity; what matters in the consideration of any security decision is not merely the actual level of crime and insecurity but the perceptions, fears and sensibilities of groups and individuals. In the case of colonial settlers, the utilisation of private security guards reflected as much a fear of the ‘native’ as ‘other’ as any objective knowledge of criminal behaviour or crime statistics. It also reflected a desire and need to mark difference in the colonial relationship.
While guards employed by white settlers and colonial officials can be seen as the founding blocks of the private security sector in Swaziland, the sector underwent significant changes following independence in 1968. The post-independence period was marked by numerous social, economic and political transformations, which in turn affected private security provision. Most noticeably, in the first two decades there was a gradual transition from the more informal hiring of individual guards towards the formation of private security companies, providing formal employment for large numbers of guards. There were several reasons for this transition, but they were clearly linked to the end of colonial rule and its accompanying hierarchies. As Alan Fawcett, the owner and director of Swaziland Security Services, explains:
The coming of independence came with numerous challenges for the employers. While in the colonial period settler employers had a latitude of having their way as far as labour issues were concerned, in the post-colonial period workers received a lot of sympathy from officials and labour laws changed. Security guards were challenging their employers on wages and individual employers were called upon to be conversant with the labour laws of the country. Faced with numerous disputes and having to spend a lot of time attending to these disputes and being called to the labour department created a lot of discomfort for most employers. I am not sure what happened exactly, but it appears that individual employers were ready to give this responsibility to companies. In this way they were assured that they would no longer worry with all the problems associated with recruiting and attending to the wage disputes by security guards (Interview, 19 January 2007).
The move towards formal PSCs clearly has numerous reasons, which need not detain us here, suffice to say that they are all linked in various ways to the end of colonial rule, the emergence of a more formal and complex political economy, as well as the unequal economic growth discussed above. The first private security company in the country was Swaziland Security Services (SSS), established in about 1970 by Teffy Price, an Irishman who had settled in the country in the 1940s. In 1974, Price sold the company to Allan Fawcett who still runs it today. The second oldest security company is Guard Alert, established in 1981 to provide professional security services to commercial, industrial and residential premises throughout the country. In 1985 the company developed cash-in-transit services, as well as facilities for the transportation of other valuables under armed escort. From there the number of private security companies grew and presently, there are more than fifty active PSCs employing at least 2,500 people. The industry is one of the fastest growing industries in the country. The companies are found mainly in the towns and cities, as well as in rural areas where there are commercial agricultural estates. Today, many leading international companies as well as local businesses depend on PSCs for the security of their investments, premises and employees. As such, PSCs have become a key part of the Swazi economy.
The domestic private security industry in Swaziland is dominated almost completely by the guarding sector. Just as has been the case in other parts of the world (Schreier & Caparini, 2005), these companies are now protecting public and private property in a widening variety of locations, including high-risk areas such as power plants, banks, embassies and airports. Presently, security guards are not empowered by law to carry guns. Instead, they carry knob-sticks and batons irrespective of the environment of their line of duty. This has continued despite the fact that criminals are frequently armed and all too frequently use them against security guards. As observed by the owner of a retail shop in Nhlangano:
Some of the crimes that have been occurring in this area are shocking. Some of the criminals come brandishing heavy arms and the security guards have to face them with sjamboks and knobkierries. The lives of the security personnel are placed at serious risk. At times the criminals assault and bungle them into the corner before they continue to loot our businesses. This is serious (The Swazi Observer, 2 January, 2007).
Such stories of physical violence against security guards abound. For instance, in November 2004 two private security guards were shot at by criminals who intercepted a car transporting money to the bank (The Swazi Observer, 10 November, 2004). Similar cases occur several times a year, leading the business community to call upon the Swaziland Government to allow security personnel to carry loaded firearms. However, if this were to be allowed it would require strong regulation and a mechanism for ensuring that the firearms do not end up in wrong the hands.
Presently, this is an unlikely scenario, as the private security sector in Swaziland, as in many other parts of Africa, is almost entirely unregulated (see Abrahamsen & Williams, 2004; 2005a and b; Wairagu, Kamenju & Shingo, 2004). Anybody can start a private security company in Swaziland. In the words of Mr. Fawcett, the owner-director of Swaziland Security Services, ‘there has never been any guidelines on the formation of private security firms. All you need to do is to register your company with the Deeds Office and you are in business’ (Interview, 19 January 2007). Presently, there is no regulation or policy framework relating to the legal and procedural operations of PSCs, and the absence of a regulatory framework puts the operations of these companies beyond government scrutiny. As a result, there is no provision for evaluating their service delivery, no standardisation of the quality of service, nor any oversight of their operations. In short, PSCs virtually do as they please, only circumscribed by the general laws of the country. Given their role as protectors of life and assets, this is a potentially worrisome state of affairs, as an unregulated security sector risks becoming a contributor to insecurity rather than security. While there is a strong case for regulation, concerns have been expressed elsewhere that a move for tighter regulation could lead to division within the sector (see Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005b).
Recruitment and training is another issue of concern in the private security sector. Usually, the recruitment of guards is through adverts in the daily newspapers. The recruits are from all segments of the Swazi population, but the majority are between the ages of twenty and forty. The guards are not required to satisfy any level of education upon recruitment, except that they should be able to read and write English. Some owners of PSCs actively opposed the employment of more educated security guards. In the words of Mr. Fawcett: ‘My experience has shown over the years that there is no need for having educated guards. The less educated the better’ (Interview, 19 January 2007). At the moment, there is no clear policy regarding the training of security guards. Whatever training guards receive is on the job, but in general this does not amount to much. A few companies request members of the Royal Swaziland Police to train their staff on certain issues, although such training is not accredited. Other companies have employed retired police officers to be head supervisors and thus provide training through supervision. Recently a suggestion was made that the South African Police Service should provide a short course on crime scene management for local PSCs, following a realisation that physical evidence at crime scenes plays a crucial role in securing the conviction of perpetrators in a court of law. The fact remains, however, that there are no standards for the minimum level of training required by a guard, nor any legal obligation for PSCs to train guards prior to their deployment.
The relationship between the private security companies and the Royal Swaziland Police is characterised by relatively close collaboration, despite the fact that operational areas of interaction are limited. In general, PSCs hand over all evidence and apprehended suspects to the RSP, who in turn integrate the cases into the national justice process. In this sense, the private security companies act as an extension of the public police, but with no powers of interrogation or prosecution. To a significant extent, it could be argued that the growth of PSCs has allowed the state to neglect its social responsibility of providing security to all. Such a development is by no means unique to Swaziland and has been observed in other parts of the world (see Musah, 2002; Sandoz, 1999). Most importantly, research has shown that the growth of the sector ‘alters the capacities of the state’ (Leander, 2004:6). The growth of private security has also allowed the Swazi leadership to divert resources from public security towards regime security and the safeguarding of the privileged classes in society. This has led to an uneven or biased distribution of security, where those who can afford to buy the services of a PSC are rewarded with a measure of security, whereas large sections of the population are left with the inadequate and inefficient protection of the public police. These sections of the population have little option but to devise their own security solutions, and below I examine such non-state policing initiatives in the rural areas of Swaziland.
Non-state Policing in Rural Swaziland
Already at independence, rural dwellers made up more than 70 per cent of the Swazi population (Fair, Murdoch & Jones, 1969). The main response of rural people to the failure of national security institutions has been to form Community Police (CP), that is, independent community-based security agencies that operate outside the context of the Royal Swaziland Police (RSP). The origins of non-state policing can be traced to 1996 when the community of Lamgabhi at Dlangeni formed the first group of Community Police, and from there, the process spread to include all the rural areas of the country. The formation of CP groups began as a protest against the failure of the state to protect rural communities, particularly the inability of the state police to deal with crime that was undermining attempts by rural dwellers to improve their household economies. The escalation of property crime, and especially cattle rustling, was a key problem, and was threatening to undermine the economies of rural communities (Simelane, 2005). The problem of cross-border cattle rustling was particularly severe along the borders in the southern parts of the country, where cattle were driven by thieves into South Africa. Very few cattle are recovered, and as a result many families in the region are now without cattle and their members have been forced into labour migration in search of jobs to support their families.
Loss of cattle is a fundamental issue among rural dwellers in Swaziland because cattle are the basis for their economic survival. In rural Swaziland cattle bestow economic security, prestige and status. As Low, Kemp and Doran (1980:226) have pointed out, ‘cattle are a store of wealth or savings account from which withdrawals are made only for special social or ceremonial occasions or for emergency needs such as payments for education.’ The central position of cattle compelled residents to formulate strategies to protect themselves against cross-border rustlers. The testimonies of rural dwellers indicate the extent to which cattle rustling undermines their livelihoods. In the words of Ntombi Zwane, a victim of cross-border cattle rustling:
My husband was the bread winner in the family but when he died eleven years ago we did not face too many problems because we had cattle to sell in times of need. Our fortunes dramatically changed when thieves came and stole the whole heard of cattle and it became extremely difficult for me to support our seven children. It became impossible for me to pay for their schooling and eventually they were forced to drop out of school (Interview, 26 January 2008).
A similar sentiment is expressed by Nozipho Hlongwa, a community member of Shiselweni in the southern part of the country:
I am not sure what is happening in the urban areas but in our rural area the state provides no security for the protection of our property. The lack of security has made it very difficult for people to redeem themselves from poverty, in fact most of us are becoming more poor. Our cattle are taken by cattle rustlers from South Africa and we lose hundreds of them each year. These are cattle that always play a crucial role in alleviating poverty at household level. Without them we cannot educate children and we cannot provide for the general needs of our families (Interview, 17 December 2006).
The Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) has failed to deal with the problem of cattle rustling. Each time a case of cattle rustling is reported to the RSP no positive results are realised, and the police have continued with their traditional methods of policing even though it is clear that policing strategies that worked in the past are not always effective today. For instance, the RSP continue with random patrolling, despite the very limited impact of this strategy. And while the police are caught in a state of inertia, rural communities continue to lose their cattle and their livelihoods. Consequently, the residents of the different rural areas became increasingly impatient with the inefficiency and bureaucracy of state security, including both the RSP and Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force (USDF) (Khumalo, 2004). Commenting on the failure of the state to provide security Hleziphi Shongwe, a member of Ndubazi Community Police said:
When we are faced with the problem of cattle rustling across the border to South Africa, it stands to reason that the state should protect our property. However, the Swazi state has been a disappointment on this issue and other issues of crime. The state has even failed to engage border patrols using the armed forces to curb the loss of property along the southern border with South Africa. The residents of the area are left to the mercy of South African cattle smugglers and their Swazi collaborators (Interview, 13 December 2006).
The situation is made worse by community beliefs that state security institutions are corrupt. While in some countries the growth of the private security sector appears to have been linked to the downsizing of the police force, in Swaziland the growth of the sector has to be understood in the context of increased corruption within state security institutions. Citizens feel the police are corrupt and therefore that they cannot be trusted as providers of security. As a result, many prefer not to report cases of cattle loss to state police. Allegations of corruption have become widespread, both among the general public and the business community. The sense that the police can no longer be trusted is clearly expressed by Vusumuzi Ndlela, the chairman of Matimatima Community Police:
The issue of crime in Swaziland has become a very complicated one and it has become big business in which our police officers fully participate. Today you stand a good chance of recovering your property if you do not report to the Royal Swaziland Police but to the Community Police. We believe that this is because when the police conduct the investigation they also inform the criminals about what is happening and the criminals are always ahead of the justice system (Interview, 15 December 2006).
The most vocal expressions of such allegations have come from rural communities. In discussing issues of crime prevention and the role of the RSP, Jabulani Ntuli, a community member of Gege in south-east Swaziland said: ‘We soon became disappointed because the police were failing to come up with positive results. It became a waste of time and money to report crime matters to the police because nothing would come out of such reporting’ (Interview, 13 December 2006). The general perception is that members of the RSP are too involved in corrupt acts to be trusted in the prevention of crime and provision of security, and the continuation of cattle rustling has made many rural dwellers conclude that public security institutions have failed.
The Community Police are now present in all the rural areas in Swaziland and are entrusted with the security of their communities. All members are volunteers who are not paid for their services. The communities provide them with torches and whistles and they are always on patrol during the night and alert to happenings in the community during the day. Although no reliable and accurate information exists, anecdotal evidence indicates that the system of CP has had a huge impact on reducing crime in the rural areas. Large parts of the southern parts of the country have reported a significant reduction in cross-border cattle rustling. In this region, the CP have cemented relations with their South African counterparts to curb cross-border cattle rustling. Due to a lack of statistics, however, it is presently difficult to determine the exact rate of reduction in cross-border cattle rustling.
Despite their relative success, the relationship between the CP and the Royal Swaziland Police is characterised by mutual suspicion and a lack of cooperation. From the perspective of the RSP, the Community Police are performing duties that they are not trained or qualified for. As such, the CP can be understood a vigilante structure that is operating outside the legal structures of the country, deriving their strength from the communities and their methods of operation are presently not integrated into the national security structures.
The poor relationship between the RSP and the CP is highlighted by a general refusal of the latter to hand over suspects to the police. Instead, Community Police have taken it upon themselves to investigate, interrogate and pass judgement. Most of their victims only escape punishment on the recovery of stolen items. On admission of guilt, public flogging becomes the ultimate punishment. In this way, the CP hope to curb crime through instilling fear in community members, believing that force provides the best solution to crime. Their violent methods frequently entail the blatant violation of human rights, as suspects are beaten and sometimes killed, even in instances where they have not been proven guilty. For example, in October 2004 Community Police brutally killed a 22 year-old man at KaKhoza on allegations of stealing a cell-phone. It was reported that:
Philani was dragged all over the two notorious locations, KaKhoza and Newvillage where he was moved from home to home in search of the alleged stolen items. He was subjected to huge frightening and unbearable torture for the whole night. He cried until his voice could not come out of his mouth. Residents who had a chance of seeing him in this state have revealed that they tried to talk to the community police officers into releasing him but they did not bulge claiming that they wanted to teach him one or two lessons and these lessons qualified him to his death (Times of Swaziland SUNDAY, 17 October, 2004).
What is more worrying is that the violent tactics of the Community Police have sometimes been adopted by other members of the communities. This was demonstrated recently when a man suspected of cattle rustling was brutally killed by a mob. At Tikhuba it was reported that:
An angry mob poisoned and murdered a man after he was suspected to be part of a cattle rustling syndicate. Gideon Gamedze was forced to drink a syrup of weevil tablets and later strangled to death. The 53 year old's murder has left 14 children fatherless. It comes at the height of a bitter feud over stolen cattle in the area that has also seen at least two others killed in recent weeks. He was beaten and dragged to the forest by the over 200 mobsters, who were armed with an assortment of weapons. It is alleged that they also had with them a bag filled with weevil tablets, and other poisonous farm inputs (The Times of Swaziland, 12 February, 2008).
Despite such reports of violence and human rights abuse, and despite the tense relationship between the CP and the RSP, many Cabinet Ministers and other prominent government officials continue to encourage communities to combat crime through the structure of Community Police, indicating perhaps an absence of a cohesive state able or willing to implement and uphold its own laws and regulations.
Conclusion
The emergence of private security actors in Swaziland, be they urban PSCs or rural Community Police, has to be understood in the context of the country's specific economic and political history. While private security has a long history and can be traced back to the colonial period, its recent growth is intimately linked to the failure of the post-colonial state to protect its citizens, choosing instead to focus on a narrow regime security.
Faced with an absence of public protection in the post-colonial period, the development of the private security sector took two separate but interlinked directions. In urban areas, there was a shift from the individually hired guards used by colonial settlers towards a reliance on private security companies. Today, most economic enterprises, foreign embassies as well as wealthy households depend to a significant extent on the services of PSCs for their daily protection. In rural areas, by contrast, there is little business for PSCs as the population is generally too poor to afford their services. In response to the absence of state protection, rural communities have organised Community Police structures to protect themselves against crime and in particular against cattle rustling.
Because of the failure of the state, security is a highly contested issue in Swaziland. The main actors in this contest are the public sector, community security initiatives, and private security companies. This contest may well create conflicts in the future, but presently, Swaziland is characterised by a precarious balance of power between the public security agencies as represented by the Royal Swaziland Police and the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force, private security companies, and the Community Police. The state has made several attempts to bring the CP under the arm of the RSP, but this has had very little success as most rural communities are deeply suspicious of the police and prefer to rely on their own local initiatives. In terms of developing a situation where security is equally available to all, however, it is crucial to consider how cooperation and coordination between the various security actors can be improved. One possible solution may be found in adopting a genuine community policing philosophy that will forge partnerships between all the concerned parties, although in other countries such community policing polices have been fraught with difficulties (see Brogden & Nijhar, 2005).
In contemporary Swaziland, a key question concerns the political implications of private security initiatives, whether in urban or rural areas. While PSCs have been an answer to the security needs of a small section of the Swazi population and investors, their growth and development may also have certain implications for the state. As the number of PSCs continues to grow, the state has continued to abdicate its responsibility of providing security to its citizens. An important concern also relates to the Community Police, which operate outside the country's justice system. Many residents of rural areas have lost their lives as a result of beatings they have received from Community Police. The development of non-state policing has perpetrated violence in rural communities as it encourages mob justice, and a growing concern is increasing incrimination of innocent people and severe assaults by Community Police.
The growth of private security in Swaziland has a close relationship to the economic development of the country. From the perspective of the Government, there is no doubt that the services of PSCs protect commercial establishments against crime, and may thus contribute towards making the country more attractive to foreign investors and thereby drive the Swazi economy forward. However, the sector does very little to empower the majority of the citizens economically. Instead, the private security sector has contributed towards moving resources away from the poor, and to the growth of inequalities because money buys security in Swaziland. As the rich grow richer they are able to buy more and better security, while the poor majority become more vulnerable to crime, further undermining their quality of life.