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      The Dynamics of Private Security in Senegal

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      Review of African Political Economy
      Review of African Political Economy
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            The privatisation of security has recently attracted much attention, particularly in light of abuses by private military companies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of this attention sensationalises private security by focusing on private armies unbounded by national boundaries and unencumbered by international law. Recently, however, less dramatic forms of private security such as private guarding, surveillance, alarm systems, and patrolling have become more prevalent worldwide. These more mundane forms of private security are central to the daily operations of many societies.

            The expansion of private security in the developing world is nearly always attributed to high levels of insecurity and general instability. Senegal, by contrast, is relatively safe and stable, but nevertheless has a rapidly expanding private security sector. The country is home to more than 150 private security companies that employ between 25,000 and 35,000 people, making Senegal's private security sector relatively larger per capita than those of more violent countries like Nigeria and Kenya. The vast majority of these companies operate in the informal sector where they avoid taxation and governmental regulation, and like in many other countries, working conditions in the sector are poor. Unlike many other countries, however, Senegal has made significant and successful efforts to prevent international security companies like Group4Securicor from gaining a foothold.

            This briefing is based on research conducted on behalf of the gun control organisation Le Mouvement Contre les Armes Légères en Afrique de l'Ouest (MALAO) in Senegal in the spring of 2007. It describes the private security sector, concentrating particularly on Dakar, where international businesses and international organisations (IOs) provide the largest sources of demand for private security. It includes an examination of the economic and political circumstances that have enabled the growth of private security and a discussion of the relationship between private security companies, the government, and business.

            The Growth of Private Security Amidst Stability & Peace

            In the worldwide proliferation of private security companies (PSCs), Senegal represents a unique case: the private security sector is growing despite political stability and a low crime rate. Previous briefings in this journal have attributed the growth of private security in other countries to ‘high crime rates, combined with the inability of the public security services to provide adequate protection’ (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005). Indeed, general insecurity has been a key factor driving the sector's growth in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Nicaragua, and Guatemala (Ibid; Lilly & von Tangen Page, 2002). The situation in Senegal demonstrates that the expansion of private security is not limited to countries where instability and insecurity prevail.

            Senegal has the reputation of being West Africa's most stable country. Since its independence from France in 1960, it has maintained a democratic system of government and regularly holds relatively fair elections. The Senegalese armed forces are firmly under civilian control and have never intervened in politics, making Senegal one of the few African countries to avoid a coup d'état since independence from colonial rule. The Casamance, a breakaway southern province separated from Senegal proper by the Gambia, is the only major source of instability in the country. However, since 2000 the situation has calmed, resulting in only occasional violence. Violence has been confined to the Casamance, leaving the majority of Senegal free from political strife.

            This climate of political stability has enabled Senegal to maintain a remarkably low crime rate. Winslow (2008), relying on data from Interpol, reported the total crime rate to be 64.29 crimes for every 100,000 people, compared with 1,709.88 for Japan and 5,955.05 for the United Kingdom. The same study showed Senegal's murder rate to be 0.33 per 100,000 people, or roughly one fifth that of the UK. Although the general crime statistic is surely underreported, the given murder rate is roughly accurate; because murders are rare in Senegal, the press thoroughly reports them. Though not completely reliable, these figures show that Senegal is not a country plagued by crime.

            With little else to offer – peanuts are the biggest contributor to the GDP – Senegal markets its stability and peace to attract foreign businesses and organisations. Dakar, the capital, hosts the West African headquarters for many international non-governmental organisations, research institutions, and IOs. Particularly since the war in Ivory Coast, business and organisations have flocked to Senegal. In January of this year, Dubai World paid US$800 million for the rights to administer a free trade zone within Senegal, joining the flow of businesses that see Senegal as a ‘gateway’ into the region (Flynn, 2008).

            It is primarily the presence of these businesses and organisations that generates demand for PSCs. Because demand is almost entirely fuelled by foreigners and expatriates, private guards are an almost entirely urban phenomenon. International mining activities, heavily guarded despite their rural location, are the exception. Throughout Dakar, private guards stand in front of nearly every sizable business or organisation guarding everything from banks to bookstores to offices and schools. Nearly every location an expatriate might visit is under private guard. Foreign businesses and organisations contract PSCs to provide security not only for the businesses themselves, but also for the homes of their employees. Paradoxically, then, peace, stability, and a low crime rate fuel the growth of the private security sector because they attract international businesses and organisations.

            The police are widely viewed as inept and corrupt, prompting the wealthy to turn to the private sector for security. The majority of the population, however, continues to rely on traditional methods for security. Typical neighbourhoods are some of the safest places in the country, as residents keep a watchful eye on suspicious persons and come quickly to each other's aid. While usually advantageous, at times such security networks become vigilante groups and occasionally escalate a situation. While statistics are hard to obtain, evidence suggests that vigilante groups account for most of Senegal's (low) murder rate; upon identifying a thief or criminal, mobs may beat the suspect to death. On the whole, however, traditional security methods help to preserve overall security, making most of Senegal's villages, neighbourhoods, and towns safe.

            Inequality, Exploitation & Unions

            The private security sector in Senegal mushroomed in the aftermath of the 1994 economic reforms promoted by the IMF and World Bank. Although the first private security companies were founded in the late 1980s, they did not become prevalent until the economic reforms resulted in greater levels of inequality. There are currently over 150 private security companies in Senegal, all but a few created since 1994. The sector's rapid rate of expansion makes it difficult to estimate the exact number, as new PSCs are formed with incredible frequency.

            The 1994 neo-liberal reforms involved the lifting of subsidies and price controls, a steady deregulation of the economy, and a 50% devaluation of the currency. The reforms positively affected Senegal's macroeconomic outlook; inflation was brought under control, government finances were balanced, and the economy turned around. After contracting in the early 1990s, Senegal's economy has steadily grown at an annual rate of around 5%.

            The economic gains of the 1990s were not distributed across the Senegalese economy. Living conditions for most of the population declined as prices for food and other basic goods were deregulated. The number of street peddlers exploded at this time, as unemployment forced large numbers of people into the informal economy. Today, nearly a quarter of the population survives on less than $1 a day, and more than three-fifths on less than $2 each day. Thus, despite the economic influxes caused by the arrival of international business, intense poverty and inequality are on the rise, and may potentially destabilise the prevailing security environment. As one director of a PSC remarked, the private security sector depends ‘not on a lack of security, but instead on a lack of wealth’.

            With nearly half of the workforce unemployed, private guards face a strikingly soft labour market. A typical guard is paid between US$70 and $120 each month, while the most professional companies pay their employees up to $180. In some cases, guards are given monthly transport stipends, but these almost never meet actual costs. Guards work exceedingly long hours and face very high exploitation, taking home only 3550% of what clients pay for their services.

            In my research, I found not one private security company in Senegal that did not violate national regulations in some way. The most common abuses were paying below the minimum wage, demanding that guards work for unreasonable hours, and employing guards on temporary contracts. Senegalese labour codes stipulate that after one temporary six-month contract, employers must hire a worker permanently or dismiss the employee. Even the most professionalised and the highest paying PSCs in Senegal violate this provision in the work code.

            There are no strong unions of security guards, although many guards express a desire for one. Many guards are reluctant to establish a union because they fear being laid off when their six-month contract expires. The lack of permanent contracts in the sector increases the vulnerability of guards and prevents them from taking strong positions relating to working conditions.

            Cooperation Between PSCs & the Government

            Most PSCs are managed or owned by former police and military officials. In some cases, officers will found private security companies while still holding public office, usually passing the day-to-day management responsibilities to a family member. Tightening the relationship between the state security forces and private sector, nearly all security guards in Senegal have completed military service and, for most companies, military or police service is an explicit prerequisite to employment.

            One-third of Senegal's military is comprised of conscripts, each of whom serves two years without the possibility of extension. Although conscription exists, it is not enforced against one's will. The droves of unemployed find such relatively well-paying vacancies in the military desirable, and the positions are easily filled. After serving two years, conscripts are released from the army and many find jobs in the private security sector. Many guards lament their discharge from the state security forces and some eventually find more lucrative employment with the police or gendarmerie.

            Despite the overlap in personnel, there is little overt cooperation between PSCs and state security forces. Police and private security guards hold positive views of each other but, in contrast to the situation in many countries, the police do not rely on the private sector. The government of Senegal has no contracts with PSCs and all state security functions remain under the purview of the army and police. Public-private partnerships, such as water treatment plants, La Poste, and Senelec (the national electric company), are exceptions and hire PSCs to guard their facilities.

            Two private military companies, Northrop Grumman Technical Services (NGTS) and Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), train the Senegalese armed forces as part of the US State Department's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme. The ACOTA programme, created after the US debacle in Somalia, seeks to train and equip African militaries to conduct peacekeeping missions, thereby minimising the responsibilities of the West. The US Government supplies Senegal with the bulk of its military equipment and hires NGTS and MPRI teams to conduct eight two-month training programmes, focusing primarily on peacekeeping tactics. Senegalese soldiers trained under ACOTA have served as peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Darfur.

            In addition to ACOTA, Senegal is a partner in the so-called ‘war on terror’ and currently receives aid through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a counter-terrorism effort to track activity from the Atlantic Ocean to Chad. The role of private military companies in this programme is unclear.

            Regulation & Corruption

            The most significant problems facing the private security sector in Senegal result from their poor regulation. More than 80% of PSCs are not registered with the government, do not pay taxes, and operate completely in the informal sector. In 2003, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade issued a decree mandating that all PSCs be owned and operated by Senegalese citizens or companies. At the time, Senegal's largest private security company, the American owned Sagam Sécurité, was forced to sell. This decree has kept the private security sector entirely in domestic hands and prevented multinationals like Group4Securicor from making inroads in Senegal.

            Only registered PSCs are permitted to have armed guards. Despite this requirement, some guards in the informal sector are armed. Senegal has largely succeeded in keeping guns out of the country, but steadily grants around 120 licenses each year (Agboton-Johnson et al. 2004). Private security companies win a sizable majority of these licenses, although as licenses are awarded to individuals and their affiliations are not listed, no exact figures are available.1 Personal ties are important, as companies that have the strongest ties to the state security system or to the state bureaucracy are more likely to win licenses. That said, this research found no evidence of corruption in the form of bribes at the governmental level.

            In the private sector, however, corruption is rampant. In order to be paid the amount stipulated by the contract, the manager of a PSC must frequently bribe the contracting company. Only after a bribe of $50–100, is the contracting company likely to pay the PSC. This form of corruption is worst in public-private companies, particularly La Poste.

            In 2000, the computer system that the Ministry of the Interior used to track gun licenses failed, evidently one of the few victims of the computer virus Y2K. Since then, licenses have been recorded in piecemeal fashion, and the system is largely disorganised. Every year, the Ministry of the Interior sends the possessor of a gun license a notification of the tax that is owed for each firearm. Several PSC managers reported that the lists from the government omit many of their guns, in some cases up to half of the firearms they actually own. In effect, the government has lost track of many of the arms it has licensed. The absence of state control or records of arms is a dangerous contributor to the growth of private security companies.

            The growth of private security in Senegal has been remarkably uncontroversial and has faced little criticism in the press. The majority of the population views private security as the domain of international business and as a form of employment in a struggling economy. The government should be commended for its 2003 efforts to bring the private security sector into domestic hands and under the purview of the Ministry of the Interior. Despite such efforts, however, the private security sector remains largely unregulated.

            Private security is likely to play an even more prominent role as increasing economic inequality makes the political situation more volatile. Additionally, the influx of people and arms from Senegal's war-torn neighbours threatens an already fragile stability. Dakar's riots in November 2007 are a reminder of how quickly a situation can deteriorate. Nevertheless, Senegal's stability will likely continue to attract international businesses and international organisations, and the government's adoption of neoliberalism makes it unlikely that economic inequalities will subside. These conditions virtually guarantee the continued growth of the private security sector, which already rivals or exceeds the state security forces in terms of number of personnel. The size and projected growth of private security, and its corresponding rise in influence, mandate a continuing re-evaluation of the role and scope of private security in Senegal and throughout Africa.

            Notes

            Bibliography

            1. Abrahamsen R. and Williams M. C.. 2005. . The Politics of Private Security in Kenya. . Review of African Political Economy . , Vol. 104/5:: 425––431. .

            2. Agboton-Johnson C., Ebo A. and Mazal L.. 2004. . “Small Arms Control in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. ”. London : : International Alert. .

            3. Flynn D.. 2008. . Dubai World in $800 Million Senegal Economic Zone Deal. . Reuters . , 21 January; www.reuters.com

            4. Lilly D. and von Tangen Page M.. 2002. . “Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatisation of Security. ”. Edited by: Lilly D. and von Tangen Page M.. London : : International Alert. .

            5. Winslow R.. 2008. . Crime and Society . , Senegal: : A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World. . http://wwwohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/senegal.html

            Footnotes

            Commissaire Abdoulaye Ba, Director of Armsand Munitions, Ministry of the Interior of Senegal (Interview, 26 April 2007).

            Author and article information

            Journal
            crea20
            CREA
            Review of African Political Economy
            Review of African Political Economy
            0305-6244
            1740-1720
            December 2008
            : 35
            : 118
            : 655-659
            Affiliations
            a Oberlin College; Cyrus E-mail: OBrien@ 123456oberlin.edu
            Article
            357575 Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 118, December 2008, pp. 655–659
            10.1080/03056240802574078
            cccb2411-385a-4a53-b88b-2685bb888a22

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            Categories
            Briefings

            Sociology,Economic development,Political science,Labor & Demographic economics,Political economics,Africa

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