You can watch MNET's hit soap opera Egoli in Dakar, eat South Africa's version of peri-peri chicken at Nando's in Maputo, make a withdrawal from a Standard Bank ATM in Harare, buy Ceres juice fresh from the Western Cape at Shoprite in Lusaka and do it all dangling a de Beer's diamond from Botswana on your pinkie. As the post-apartheid South African state manoeuvres to ensure the implementation of NEPAD (New Economic Partnership for Africa) and assume the mantle of peace-broker, leader of the African Renaissance and voice of the continent, its imprint stretches as far and wide across the continent as that of South African capital.
With this kind of presence of both South African capital and the state in the rest of Africa it is not surprising that the word ‘imperialism’ is on many people's lips. Whilst few deny the growing hegemony of South Africa on the continent, there is heated debate in academic and activist communities about how to characterise these developments. At one end of the spectrum Ishmael Lesufi (2004, 2006) sees them as evidence of South African imperialism; at the other end, Patrick Bond (2004, 2005, 2006) argues that South Africa is a sub-imperial agent of American imperialism.
So, what is South Africa's role within the current conjuncture? Unfortunately the burgeoning Marxist literature on imperialism provides scant insight or guidance to the South African debate. New theorisations of imperialism trace the differences between contemporary imperialism in which the American state ensures the maintenance and reproduction of global capitalism, and previous forms of imperialism that were associated with inter-imperial rivalry and the extension of formal political control over other territories. The heated debates within this literature are primarily pre-occupied with determining whether states have been superseded (Hardt and Negri 2002) or continue to play a pivotal and even increasing role in imperialist processes (Meikins Wood 2005, Panitch and Gindin 2005); whether a transnational capitalist class has emerged as the driving force of empire (Sklair 2001, Robinson 2004); and whether the actions of the US are driven by hegemony in decline (Arrighi 2005, Harvey 2005) or its relative dynamism and strength (Panitch and Gindin 2004). When Third World states are considered they are generally constructed as objects of imperialist expansion and control and sites for accumulation by dispossession. Issues related to the agency of regional powers have received particularly scant attention. For example, although Harvey notes the rise of ‘sub-imperial’ states in East Asia (and Europe) as a result of their pursuit of spatio-temporal fixes (Harvey 2005, p. 186) he does not theorise their relationship to American imperialism. Therefore, coming to grips with South Africa's role can make important contributions to broader debates on the dynamics of contemporary imperial processes.
However, the question of how to theorise South Africa's role is not merely of academic interest. Arguing that South Africa must be seen as a sub-imperial agent acting as a ‘proxy’ or conduit for American imperial interests has one set of political implications for those engaged in anti-imperialist struggle. Casting it as an independent imperialist force suggests, on the other hand, radically different targets for, and forms of mobilisation.
This article argues that the ways in which Bond and Lesufi conceptualise imperialism and sub-imperialism lead to problematic silences and exclusions and as a result neither theorist succeeds in capturing the nuanced social processes through which South Africa's current role is constituted and contested. Ironically, neither refers to Ruy Mauro Marini's initial conceptualisation of Brazilian sub-imperialism (1965, 1972) which, it is argued, provides a useful starting point for addressing the weaknesses and gaps within their frameworks. This article therefore seeks to reintroduce Marini into the South African debate and identifies how more recent writing from South Africa, as well as other contexts, can be drawn on to begin to build a new approach to theorising South Africa's role.
The article begins by providing a brief overview and critique of the ways in which imperialism and sub-imperialism have been employed in the current South African debate. It then explores how Marini's theorisation of sub-imperialism can overcome the rigidities and divisions in the current debate. The final section identifies additional elements which must be incorporated into a theorisation of sub-imperialism in the current conjuncture and avenues for future research.
Ishmael Lesufi and South African Imperialism
Lesufi seeks, in a 2004 article published in Current Sociology (Lesufi 2004) and a 2006 expanded, popularised version of his arguments (Lesufi 2006), to explain the South African government's active promotion of NEPAD, a neo-liberal continent-wide development plan. He argues that after the democratic elections in 1994 South African monopoly capital was finally able to use investments in other African countries to help address a persistent crisis of over-accumulation (Lesufi 2004, pp. 814–817, 2006, p. 28). In his view, the development and implementation of NEPAD followed in capital's wake and ‘simply rubber-stamps a process that was already underway’ (Lesufi 2006, p. 25).
Lesufi's explanation of the state's willingness to legitimise and meet the needs of South African capital hinges on his theorisation of the class-based nature of the state. For him, the working class experienced major defeats during the transition to democracy. He therefore asserts that with the transition, ‘the capitalist classes had achieved what they had failed to do over decades of struggle. They managed to secure a black, legitimate government to preside over their own programme’ (Lesufi 2006, p. 19).
Lesufi adopts an explicitly Leninist theorisation of imperialism as ‘capitalist accumulation in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself’ (Lesufi 2006, p. 33). He asserts that ‘South African capital bears all the essential features of imperialism as conceptualised by Lenin’ (Lesufi 2006, p. 37) and that NEPAD is an expression of South African imperialism.
He tackles arguments that the South African state is sub-imperial head-on. For him:
The idea of sub-imperialism is firmly located within the tradition that [erroneously] views imperialism as economic and political relations between advanced, less advanced and backward countries. In this context, the less advanced countries like South Africa are seen as conduits for the advanced countries' access to backward countries. Countries defined as sub-imperial are then described as sub-ordinated to advanced imperialist countries. There is also a sense in which imperialism is defined in geographic terms as a phenomenon that can only occur in the North, with everything in the South being victims of the northern monster…There is also a sense in which South Africa is seen as playing the role of a comprador state to US imperialism. (Lesufi 2006 , pp. 34–35)
He rejects the position that South Africa is sub-imperial, both because he believes that such a position is based on an incorrect understanding of the nature of imperialism, and because it ‘exonerates states like South Africa from their role in imperialism’ (Lesufi 2006, p. 25).
Lesufi makes important contributions to the debate by deploying a theoretical framework that emphasises the role of internal class forces and the expansive needs of what he refers to as ‘South African capital’. However, despite his theoretical emphasis on class struggle, he provides a crude analysis in which the working class has been so defeated that it ceases to exert any influence on the interests and actions of either the state or capitalists. This is a gross misrepresentation of the position and power of organised labour, the South African Communist Party and emerging social movements in contemporary South Africa. It grants no autonomy to the state and no agency or interests to the ruling ANC. Somewhat problematically, within Lesufi's account, the state simply executes the will of monopoly capital. Nor does he problematise ‘South African capital’, either by exploring the implications of the move by key ‘South African’ multinationals such as DeBeers and AngloAmerican to London, or by acknowledging the presence of foreign capital within South Africa.
Furthermore, although noting that neo-liberalism was implemented in a range of countries in response to the crisis of over-accumulation, Lesufi attributes this to the actions of ‘capitalists throughout the world’, even while overlooking the critical role of the American state in the advent of neo-liberalism (Panitch and Gindin 2004, pp. 20–23). Despite noting similarities between the government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, NEPAD and the policies of the IMF and World Bank, he does not consider that either institution, or American imperialism more generally, influenced the South African state's policy choices. This is linked to his retention of a classical Leninist definition of imperialism, and the related notion of inter-imperial rivalry, in which each imperial state functions independently. Failing to heed Ellen Meikins Wood's (2005) cautioning against adopting ahistorical theorisations of imperialism, Lesufi neither historicises the context within which Lenin was writing, nor explores the implications of the transformations in the international political economy, coupled with the rise of US imperialism, for the form and nature of ‘imperialist’ actions by the South African state.
Patrick Bond and Sub-imperial South Africa
By contrast, as a leading proponent of the ‘South-Africa-as-sub-imperial’ thesis, Bond has sought in a series of publications (cf. Bond 2004, 2005, 2006) to analyse the relationship between US imperialism and the South African state's agenda in the region. In his view, investment in African infrastructure projects, and Cecil Rhodes' attempt to ‘paint the map British imperial red from Cape to Cairo’, provided important outlets for over-accumulated European capital in the first period of inter-imperial rivalry (Bond 2004, pp. 149–150). Africa's ‘looting’ through uneven and combined development played an important role in that period and continues in the present day (Bond 2006). However, Bond argues that there has been a substantive shift in the form and nature of imperialism, which is now characterised by the hegemony of American imperialism. Following Harvey (2005) he argues that, ‘modern imperialism necessarily combines neoliberalism and ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in peripheral sites like Africa along with increasing subservience to the USA's indirect, neo-colonial rule …' (Bond 2006, p. 59).
Bond argues that liberalisation of trade and finance have cheapened Africa's products for northern consumption and drawn the continent ‘deeper into global circles of crisis management’ (Bond 2005, p. 221). He elaborates a number of crucial, unmediated engagements between American imperialism and Africa, including increased deployment of US troops to the continent, the recruitment of African mercenaries, boosting funding to establish an African peacekeeping force, and using conditions attached to Millennium Challenge Account aid to advance America's imperial interests (Bond 2005). Bond also meticulously details how the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank have re-oriented African states to facilitate accumulation by dispossession, the adoption of neo-liberal policies and the implementation of the American imperialist agenda across the continent (Bond 2006).
However, Bond notes that military spending alone cannot secure the imperial agenda of the US; and that, as so few countries qualify to receive Millennium Challenge Account aid, this has proven an ineffective imperial tool (Bond 2005, p. 27). Perhaps most significantly, he argues that:
… thanks largely to capitalist crisis tendencies and the current orientation to accumulation by dispossession, imperialism can neither deliver the goods nor successfully repress sustained dissent in Africa, not least in sub-Saharan Africa, rife with ‘state failure’ and ‘undisciplined neoliberalism’ (witnessed in repeated IMF riots). The ideological legitimation of ‘free markets and free politics’ requires renewal, therefore. For this, the US needs a subimperial partner … (Bond 2005 , p. 223)
Bond argues that despite their ‘cheekiness’ the politicians in Pretoria have proven to be ideal sub-imperial partners (Bond 2006, p. 100). In direct contrast to Lesufi he locates the genesis of NEPAD in the need for a ‘homegrown Washington Consensus’ (Bond 2006, p. 11) and South Africa's fulfilment of its sub-imperial role.
Bond leaves no doubt as to whether there is a hierarchy of beneficiaries of sub-imperialism, or who resides at the pinnacle, asserting that
… if Mbeki and his colleagues are benefiting from the high profile provided by NEPAD and all the other global-managerial functions discussed above, the real winners are those in Washington and other imperial centres who, increasingly, require a South African frontman for the ongoing super-exploitation and militarization of Africa. (Bond 2005 , pp. 232–233)
Although Bond is clear as to who benefits from sub-imperialism, he does not explicitly elaborate a theorisation of sub-imperialism. As an aside he asserts that, in the earlier imperial period analysed by classical theorists, imperial capacity was ‘reproduced through subimperial processes’ (Bond 2004, p. 163). He also notes continuities in South Africa's sub-imperial project in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the apartheid and post-apartheid eras (Bond 2004, p. 165). Despite his careful elaboration of the changing nature of imperialism, Bond presents an ahistorical, unchanging conceptualisation of sub-imperialism.
Bond's analysis is also hindered by his implicit assumption that the South African state's engagement with the rest of Africa can be understood by focusing solely on the relationships between Pretoria and Washington and the multilateral institutions. Despite noting the important role played by South African capital in exploitative processes of capital accumulation in the continent, in his texts on sub-imperialism, Bond does not explore the relationship of South African capital with the state, while the state's interventions across the continent are presented as being rooted solely in its acting as a ‘proxy’ (Bond 2006, p. 104) for the US. Moreover, whilst the South African state plays a critical role within his framework of sub-imperialism, Bond does not provide a theorisation of the state, referring most often to the actions of particular politicians as proof that the state is playing a sub-imperial role.
Whilst Bond focuses mainly on external relations between Pretoria and Washington to support his position that the South African state is sub-imperial, Lesufi (despite theoretical pretensions that he is looking at class struggle and the social relations underpinning the capitalist state) looks only at the state's fulfilment of the presumed needs of South African ‘monopoly capital’ to argue that it is, contra Bond, imperial.
Ruy Mauro Marini and Brazilian Sub-imperialism
Clearly, what is needed to bridge the divide between Lesufi and Bond, and their respective frameworks of enquiry, is a theoretical approach capable of grappling with the nuanced interrelation of internal and external factors and social relations. This, as Simon argued in 1991, is a strength of Marini's theorisation of Brazilian sub-imperialism, which Simon correctly notes is a more useful conceptualisation of sub-imperialism than the structuralist approaches rejected by Lesufi (Simon 1991, pp. 23–24).
Writing in the mid-1960s and early 1970s Marini developed the concept of sub-imperialism to analyse transformations in Brazilian foreign policy and, in particular, the collaboration between Brazil and the US in their intervention in the Dominican Republic. His argument is that this cannot be understood by focusing solely on either the US or Brazil in isolation, or only on internal or external factors (Marini 1965).
Marini explores the impact of American investment within Brazil and seeks to trace its effect on Brazilian foreign policy and the export of Brazilian capital. He argues that American imperialism influenced Brazil from within the Brazilian social formation through its effect on internal social relations. In many ways his analysis prefigured Nicos Poulantzas's later, and better known, theorisation of the ways in which American imperialism is reproduced within other social formations (Poulantzas 1974).
Marini is careful to note that Brazil was not a passive recipient of American investment or mere object of American imperialism. He argues that, due to the class alliance between the Brazilian bourgeoisie and the latifundists, when Brazil encountered a crisis of realisation it could not rely on redistribution and sufficient domestic demand to resolve the crisis (Marini 1965, p. 23). Therefore, internal class relations determined that the only alternative was for the dictatorship to attempt foreign expansion and to export industrial products. However, this required increasing Brazil's technological level, which Brazilian industry was incapable of doing on its own due to low levels of development. Therefore, the adoption of this model was dependent upon foreign capital. As Marini notes:
imperialism accepted participation, but it imposed its own conditions. Big industry was denationalized; the exploitation of raw materials such as iron was monopolized; the plan to electrify received considerable contributions from the international finance agencies…However, foreign capital declined to promote the development of those sectors reserved for the advanced nations, such as the aeronautic industry. Furthermore, the North American government stymied Brazilian attempts to master nuclear technology. (Marini 1972 , p. 17)
Thus, foreign capital significantly shaped and influenced the nature of Brazilian industrialisation and played an important role in its ability to pursue an export-oriented strategy.
This increased alliance with foreign capital also led to a shift in foreign policy away from the more independent approach that had been followed by previous governments towards the barghana leal or loyal bargain in which Brazil became ‘tightly bound’ to the US (Marini 1965, p. 19). Marini is careful to emphasise that this was not just a regression to the acquiescence to the will of the US that had previously characterised Brazilian foreign policy:
For many, what is involved is simply a return to the Brazilian policy of submission to Washington (which was the rule in the period preceding Quadros), and the definitive conversion of Brazil into a colony of the United States. This is not correct. What we have, in reality, is the evolution of the Brazilian bourgeoisie toward the conscious acceptance of its integration with North American imperialism, an evolution resulting from the very logic of the economic and political dynamics of Brazil, and having grave consequences for Latin America. (Marini 1965 , p. 12)
Thus, Marini argues that Brazil did not necessarily and automatically pursue the interests of American imperialism. Rather than being a simple ‘proxy’ for the US, the Brazilian state carved out its own role on the continent based on class struggles and class compromises within Brazil (which, as noted above, were imbricated with US imperialism), as well as it's own ‘ideological premeditation’. In this respect, Marini ‘appears to have anticipated the Marxian state-centred approach stressing the “relative autonomy of the state” ’ that later emerged in the debate between Poulantzas and Miliband (Zirker 1994, p. 115). The particular approach chosen by the Brazilian dictatorship was to position itself as:
the center from which imperialist expansion in Latin America will radiate … It is not a question of passively accepting North American power (although the actual correlation of forces often leads to that result), but rather of collaborating actively with imperialist expansion, assuming in this expansion the position of a key nation. (Marini 1965 , pp. 21–22)
It is on this basis that Marini argues that the Brazilian dictatorship was ‘sub-imperial’. Whilst in his original article on the subject Marini described sub-imperialism simply as ‘the form which dependent capitalism assumes upon reaching the stage of monopolies and finance capital’ (emphasis in the original, Marini 1972, p. 15), he later expanded on this, noting that:
subimperialism implies two basic components: on the one hand, a medium organic composition on the world scale of national productive apparatus, and, on the other, the exercise of relatively autonomous expansionist policy, which is not only accompanied by a greater integration in the imperialist productive system, but also is maintained under the hegemony exercised by imperialism on an international scale. (Marini 1978, pp. 34–35, cited in Zirker 1994 , p. 117)
Within Marini's formulation, therefore, a sub-imperial state is neither simply a ‘conduit’ (Lesufi 2006, p. 34) nor a ‘proxy’ (Bond 2006, p. 104) for American imperialism. The significance of Marini's contribution thus lies in his focus on the dynamic interplay between the influence of American foreign policy, the role of American multinationals within the Brazilian social formation, class struggle within Brazil, the dynamics of capitalist accumulation, and a state rooted in capitalist social relations which retains some autonomy. Drawing on Marini's analytical approach can, therefore, help to overcome the solitudes that plague the current literature on South African imperialism vs sub-imperialism.
Sub-imperialism in the Current African Context
However, this is not to suggest that Marini's theoretical framework can simply be transported across time and space and applied ready-made to the African context. Some key issues which require updating, theorising and further empirical exploration relate to Marini's focus on industrial exports, his economism, the concept of ‘South African capital’, the regionalisation of class struggle, issues related to race and gender, and the contested and differentiated nature of the African continent.
Capital versus Industrial Exports
The export of industrial goods assumes a central role in Marini's conceptualisation of sub-imperialism. While he observes that such exports are not a sufficient condition for sub-imperialism (as the key issue is the mode of export), he recognises that they are integral to the sub-imperial process (cited in Zirker 1994, pp. 117–118). However, this is at odds with classical theories of imperialism that focus on the export of capital (Zirker 1994, p. 117). It is also out of synchronisation with the emerging South African reality in which capital exports play an increasingly significant role (Bond 2004). Marini's specific formulation of sub-imperialism as grounded in industrial goods export is perhaps more relevant to analysis of South Africa's industrialisation drive (and the role played by both multinational companies and the South African Customs Union within it) in the inter-war and post-war years (Gibb 1997, Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 1998).
However, it should be noted that Marini himself is careful to locate his emphasis on industrial exports within a detailed analysis of the specific political and economic context and level of development of Brazilian industry in the mid-1960s. Whilst he erroneously builds this solution to a specific crisis in a particular historical conjuncture into the definition of sub-imperialism, it is arguable that his method of analysis can be fruitfully employed to explore the relationship between current material conditions, class relations, American imperialism and the form, nature and composition of exports from South Africa.
‘South African Capital’
As far back as the 1970s, Seidman and Seidman (1977) and Makgetla and Seidman (1980) highlighted how multinationals from the US and other countries were using South Africa as a base to launch their products and operations into the rest of the continent. In keeping with Marini's understanding of the role played by imperial capital within the dominated social formation, this early research demonstrates the integral role played by these corporations in South Africa's industrialisation, domination of the region and in securing support from the American state for a less critical stance on apartheid.
Most current literature on South Africa's role in the region focuses on ‘South African capital’ and fails to explore the activities and influences of foreign capital based in South Africa. It is noted there is scant attention to the differential nature and activities of these companies and how they are shaping South Africa's engagement with the region. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China's (ICBC) purchase of a 20 per cent stake in Standard Bank for R36.7 billion drives home the impossibility of focusing exclusively on something called ‘South African’ capital when analysing South Africa's relationship with the rest of Africa. It highlights the utility of supplementing Marini's analytical framework with Poulantzas's insight that due to interpenetration of capital national bourgeoisies have been replaced by an ‘internal bourgeoisie’. The challenge remains to identify the particular composition of that internal bourgeoisie within contemporary South Africa, and to trace the influence of its different parts on South Africa's continental engagements. The ICBC investment also raises the important question as to whether South Africa's regional activities are shaped primarily by relations with the US.
Overcoming Economism
Simon observes that despite the nuanced way in which Marini conceptualises sub-imperialism, his ‘definition is still too economistic, in that it implies that domestic capital formation and accumulation, and attendant class struggles are the sole cause or rationale for sub-imperial action. While there is obviously a high degree of interdependence between economic and political interests – the essence of political economy – a distinction is necessary’ (Simon 1991, p. 24). Therefore, Simon argues that ‘an essential characteristic of sub-imperialism is having both the economic and political/military power to dominate the surrounding periphery with a degree of autonomy’ (Simon 1991, p. 24). The apartheid state's intention to preserve white minority rule is a clear example of how factors not strictly limited to capital accumulation influenced sub-imperial activities.
Moving away from economism also requires exploration of how US imperialism shapes the policy and practice of the state and capital other than through direct presence in the South African economy via investment activities. Bond (2000) and Marais (1998) both provide detailed and insightful analyses of the role played by American consultants, the international financial institutions, and the hegemony of neo-liberal ideology in influencing the ANC's adoption of the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution macro-economic policy. Further detailed analyses of the processes through which South African economic and foreign policy towards the continent are developed, including a focus on contestations within the state as well as the influence of external factors could deepen our understanding of the mechanisms and processes of sub-imperialism.
Regional Class Struggle
Marini focuses primarily on the ways in which class relations within the sub-imperial power shape sub-imperial processes. Darlene Miller's (2004, 2005a, 2005b) analysis of the move by South African supermarket multinational Shoprite into southern Africa alerts us to the importance of having a broader, regional perspective on class struggle. Miller reveals how the mobilisations of workers employed by a South African multinational in Zambia and Mozambique are informed by their ‘regional imaginaries’, which are based on their interactions with South African workers, company information, shop floor experiences and their general understanding of the southern African region. Importantly, she demonstrates that ‘regional working-class formation not only reflects…cross-national flows of capital, but also shapes the way the region is formed’ affecting the investment strategies of Shoprite and other multinationals (Miller 2005a, p. 121).
Race, Gender and Class
When analysing how contested social relations underpin sub-imperial processes it will be important to be attentive to race and gender, and the ways in which they are intimately related to class formation. Historically race has played a critical role in South African sub-imperialism. Simon (1991) highlights how the objective of preserving white minority rule was a central driving force of South Africa's sub-imperial regional strategy during apartheid. The South African state was willing to act with a high degree of autonomy and defy international opinion to pursue this goal. The specific regional strategies adopted were further shaped by race and class dynamics within particular social formations in the region (Simon 1991, p. 40). Within literature on the current period there is frequent reference to the fact that the end of white minority rule has facilitated increased South African investment in other African countries. Miller highlights how South African capital consciously represents itself as ‘African’, and as bearer of the African Renaissance, to legitimate this process (Miller 2004). She also explores how racial hierarchies within managerial structures in South African multinationals in the region, combined with racist stereotypes on the part of white South African managers, affect labour relations and managerial strategies within companies (Miller 2005b). A further area for research could include assessment of the relevance of black economic empowerment and efforts to create and consolidate a black bourgeoisie for investment strategies and priorities within South Africa and across the continent.
Analysis of the relationship between gender, class and regional processes has been conspicuously absent from research on South Africa. With respect to the Asian experience Burkett and Hart-Landsberg (2000, pp. 111–112) have demonstrated that the gendered exploitation of women workers in Japan's early export industries played a pivotal role in enabling and facilitating the success of its specific export model and sub-imperial domination of other South East Asian countries. There is a pressing need for research to interrogate and unearth similar connections between gender and sub-imperialism in the South African context. The differentiated ways in which South African investment in other African social formations is affected by and contributes to a re-articulation of local gender, race and class relations is also in need of scrutiny.
Contested Terrains
Alden and Soko (2005) caution not to treat Africa as a homogenous sphere when grappling with South Africa's role in the continent. They differentiate between three spheres of South Africa's economic engagement with Africa: the South African Customs Union (SACU) countries, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, and Africa north of the Zambezi. They argue that South Africa's hegemony is ‘manifested’ in SACU due to deeply entrenched structural inequalities created by the historically unequal nature of the SACU agreements (Alden and Soko 2005, p. 370). Within SADC they contend that South Africa's hegemony is ‘contested’ due to lower levels of trade and South African investment, the significant institutional problems encountered by SADC and the ways in which internal South African politics are creating barriers to developmental regional integration (Alden and Soko 2005, pp. 374–379). Most significantly, they argue that north of the Zambezi River, although South African investments have increased substantially and the banking and financial sectors have begun to make significant inroads, South Africa's hegemony is ‘unrealised’. They argue that this was demonstrated by the fact that, unlike all other African countries, Nigeria, Egypt and Tunisia all had trade surpluses with South Africa (Alden and Soko 2005, p. 382).
Alden and Soko further note that, ‘beyond its own region, a key determinant will be [South Africa's] relations with the other leading African power, Nigeria, as well as its ability to compete with other external actors’ (Alden and Soko 2005, p. 36). Within literature on South Africa's role in Africa surprisingly little research has taken up this challenge and explored in concrete terms the strength and influence of South African investment and foreign policy relative to that of other African and international powers. Such research will prove invaluable in assessing the extent and indeed existence of South African sub-imperialism in various parts of the continent.