The 2008 elections in Ghana took place in a very uncertain economic and political environment. On the positive side, the prospects for oil production off the coast of the Western Region offered hope for a new era of prosperity, but this contrasted with the everyday experiences of urban populations in particular, faced with the impact on prices and jobs of the global financial crisis. In the rural areas some of the economic projects of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) Government were improving the infrastructure in such areas as transport and irrigation, while long-standing local and ethnic conflicts were again rising in intensity. Interest in the elections was consequently at a very high level, with The Ghanaian Times stating that ‘election fever grips the nation’ (6 December 2008). NPP supporters felt generally confident of a victory, while the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) expressed fears of ballot-rigging and suggested that dire consequences could follow if it felt cheated of the election. Broadcast debates consistently pressured the participants to commit themselves to peaceful behaviour before, during and after the elections, reflecting real concerns that peace and stability were under threat.
Following the terms of the 1992 Constitution, the presidential and parliamentary elections were conducted on Sunday 7 December, but the electoral process and the declaration of a presidential victor had to wait for a further three and a half weeks, owing to the closeness of the contest. In the parliamentary elections two results had to be declared late because of stolen ballot boxes, and there were several petitions to the High Court over alleged electoral irregularities in particular constituencies, but basically, of the 230 constituencies, the former opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) won 114 seats, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) 109, the People's National Convention (PNC) two seats, and the Convention People's Party (CPP) one. The other four seats were won by Independents, all of whom had been NPP supporters who objected to the particular choice of candidate.
The closeness of the result reflects the intense competition that characterised the election, but it, together with the eventual victory of the erstwhile opposition party, indicates the general ‘freeness’ and ‘fairness’ of the process. There were allegations of threats and intimidation in the Ashanti and Volta Region heartlands of the two main parties, and rumours abounded of fake identification cards and attempts to register minors and other ineligibles. One report was of groups of Togolese citizens being taken to the Volta Region attempting to register to vote, in the belief that they were arranging to attend the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca (interview, David Adeenze-Kangah). In terms of financial support, the high levels of activity of the NPP and NDC indicate there was no major disparity between them, but of the minor parties only the CPP was able to launch anything resembling a national campaign, and this was organisationally very limited in most areas of the country. Relative access to finance remains a concern for democracy in Ghana as in so many other states.
Thirty-two sitting members of parliament lost their seats. These included several important figures from the outgoing regime:
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the Minister of Women and Children's Affairs, Hajia Alima Mahama, in Nalerigu, Northern Region;
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the Minister of Works, Housing and Water Resources, Alhaji Malik Yakubu, in Yendi, Northern Region;
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the Minister of Information and National Orientation, Alhaji Saddique Boniface, in Salaga, Northern Region;
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the Minister of State at the Presidency, Charles Bintim in Saboba, Northern Region;
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the Deputy Upper East Regional Minister, Agnes Chigabatia, in Builsa North;
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the Minister for Public Sector Reforms, Samuel Owusu-Agyei, in Effutu, Central Region;
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the Deputy Minister for Education, Angelina Amissah in Shama, Western Region;
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the Deputy Minister of Health, Gladys Ashietey, in Ledzokuku, Greater Accra (Daily Graphic, 13 December 2008);
| Presidential candidate | Party | Result (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Nana Akufo-Addo | NPP | 49.13 |
| John Atta-Mills | NDC | 47.92 |
| Paa Kwesi Nduom | CPP | 1.34 |
| Edward Mahama | PNC | 0.87 |
Four other candidates shared the remainder (The Ghanaian Times, 11 December 2008).
The PNC campaign had been lacklustre with few electoral posters being visible outside the home area of Edward Mahama in Walewale in the Northern Region and in the Upper Regions, and there was a distinct lack of financial and administrative support for its parliamentary candidates (interview, Moses Baah). On the other hand, the eventual poor result for the CPP belied a great deal of effort on behalf of its presidential candidate in particular to re-establish itself as a potent force in Ghanaian politics, with posters displayed throughout the country and confident television performances, but reflected the actual organisational and financial deficiencies at local level. In the event it seems that divisions within his own party, together with Nduom's participation in the NPP Government after 2000, took their toll, with the NDC being viewed as the obvious vehicle of change for those critical of the regime.
This result triggered a run-off three weeks later, on Sunday 28 December. The new results are shown in Table 2.
| Presidential run-off candidate | Party | Result (%) |
|---|---|---|
| John Atta-Mills | NDC | 50.23 |
| Nana Akufo-Addo | NPP | 49.77 |
However, this too proved inconclusive, as voting had been unable to take place in the Tain constituency in Brong Ahafo Region because of a shortage of ballot papers, and the 53,000 registered electorate there outweighed the declared Atta-Mills majority (Voanews). As the Tain constituency had been won by the NDC candidate in the parliamentary election and by Professor Mills in the initial presidential election, the final NDC victory was probably a foregone conclusion, but the NPP did not admit defeat, and the re-run took place in Tain on 2 January. In the event the NPP activity on the day of the election was minimal, and Professor John Atta-Mills was finally declared the victor of the presidential election.
Despite apprehension from many quarters that the election could lead to violence, particularly if the results were disputed, it was peacefully conducted. While there were some radio and newspaper reports of scuffles and rowdiness in various parts of the country, both the immediate build-up to the election and the polling days themselves generally went off without the loss of life and destruction of property that had been present, if very limited and sporadic, in recent previous elections (see for example The Ghanaian Times, 9 December 2008). In 2004, for example, a number of violent attacks on polling officials were reported and several people died in Tamale both before and immediately after the election (Kelly 2005). Ghanaian police had been on the alert for potential violence in a number of hot-spots where the earlier build-up to the elections had led to a resurfacing of local tensions. Earlier in the year, for example, there had been killings in Bawku in the Upper East Region and Gushiegu in the Northern Region. Following the election some of the latent tensions did erupt, with the stabbing of an NPP supporter at Agbogbloshie market in Accra during NDC victory celebrations (Ghana Review International, 8 January 2009) and the burning of a number of houses belonging to NPP activists in Tamale (The Statesman, 12 January 2009).
The success of the NDC can be taken to provide important evidence that Ghana has established itself as a functioning democracy. Its victory marked ‘the second turnover’ of power (the first being the victory of the NPP over the NDC in the 2000 elections) identified by Huntington as indicating the commitment of two major groups of political leaders as being sufficiently committed to democracy to surrender office and power; that both the elite and the public recognise that when things go wrong in a democratic system, the need is to change the rulers and not the regime (Huntington 1993, p. 267).
So what factors lay behind the opposition's success? During the build-up to the election the NPP was quite confident that the international aid it had obtained, the developmental projects it had undertaken and a general optimism created by the discovery of oil in large quantities off the coast of the Western Region would guarantee a third term of office. The party could point to the great advances in freedom of the media, with a wide range of newspapers and radio stations offering alternative views and opening up political discussions, in contrast to the heavily government-controlled pattern under previous regimes. NPP supporters and non-partisan officials alike pointed to the many developmental improvements in the various regions of the country. In the Northern Region I was urged to note the improvements to street lighting, roads and the new sports stadium in Central Tamale, the building of a new bridge in Yagba constituency which would prevent many villages from being cut off from their nearest town (Walewale) during the rainy season, a new hospital at Gushiegu in Dagbon, and the creation of new districts with their own developmental budgets in Karaga and Central Gonja (interviews: Alhaji Yahya and Adam Cockra). In the Upper West a new district had been created in Lambussie, and the road links between Wa and Kumasi/Accra had now been greatly improved, with only a short stretch of the main road near Bamboi needing to be tarred. In the Upper East, new dams had increased agricultural production, new healthcare facilities had reduced infant mortality, a new district had been created for Chiana-Paga, and the liberalisation of trade with Burkina Faso had greatly benefited Bolgatanga and the border town of Paga (interviews: A.A. Luguterah, Issaka Sagito and Kofi Adda). In election posters across Ghana there were photographs of life ‘before and after’ the acquisition of NPP rule, stressing the improvements and developments that had taken place.
The figures in Table 3 show that in terms of parliamentary constituencies the NPP actually strengthened its position in Brong Ahafo, Upper East and Upper West, but in addition to the four seats it lost to NPP rebels standing as Independents it had a net loss of three seats in Northern Region, seven in Greater Accra and eight in Central Region. This would indicate a regional difference in the factors at play. In Greater Accra the increasingly difficult economic situation led to disenchantment with the government's economic performance, and this coincided with the completion of the expensive new presidential palace and increasing allegations of corruption against some prominent figures in the regime. As one commentator put it, a new presidential palace costing over US$30 million coincided with ‘the fact that the majority of our people exist in stinky poverty’ (Doris Yaa Dartey in The Spectator, 16 November 2008). In the Central Region, strong campaigning by the NDC to regain support for Professor Mills in his own region, largely lost to the NPP in 2004, enabled the party to make much of the plight of fishermen whose livelihood was becoming increasingly threatened by the activities of Chinese and Japanese fishing fleets. It was in these two regions that the NPP essentially lost the parliamentary elections. In the presidential elections the NDC's largest increases in vote were in the Central and Western regions, while the NPP actually increased its percentage of the vote in the Northern and two Upper Regions.
| National result | Constituencies | Presidential (%) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2004 | 2008 | 2004 | 2008 (run-off) | |||||
| NPP | NDC | NPP | NDC | NPP | NDC | NPP | NDC | |
| 128 | 94 | 109 | 114 | 52.45 | 44.64 | 49.77 | 50.23 | |
| Regions | ||||||||
| Greater Accra | 16 | 11 | 9 | 18 | 51.99 | 46.37 | 45.54 | 54.46 |
| Ashanti | 36 | 3 | 34 | 3 | 74.61 | 24.06 | 74.39 | 25.61 |
| Eastern | 22 | 6 | 20 | 7 | 60.27 | 38.38 | 57.47 | 42.53 |
| Central | 16 | 2 | 8 | 16 | 58.57 | 39.21 | 46.20 | 53.80 |
| Western | 12 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 56.64 | 40.89 | 48.08 | 51.92 |
| Volta | 21 | 1 | 21 | 1 | 14.26 | 83.83 | 13.94 | 86.06 |
| Brong Ahafo | 14 | 10 | 16 | 8 | 51.96 | 46.05 | 48.71 | 51.29 |
| Northern | 8 | 17 | 4 | 21 | 36.20 | 56.94 | 38.39 | 61.61 |
| Upper East | 2 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 31.66 | 53.90 | 34.45 | 65.55 |
| Upper West | 1 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 32.23 | 56.67 | 37.68 | 62.32 |
| Source: Adapted from Ephson 2008,myjoyonline.com, and The Spectator, 13 December 2008. |
In the interior of the country a mixture of ‘traditional’ and modern factors was at play. The developmental improvements mentioned above certainly played a role in sustaining and even enhancing NPP support. As the Daily Graphic (13 December 2008) put it, the ‘people of Lambussie in the Upper West Region showed their appreciation to the ruling NPP for giving them a district’, and strong candidates in Lawra (UW), Bawku Central and Binduri (UE) also helped the party overturn NDC majorities. In the Northern Region the ongoing Dagomba chieftaincy dispute almost led to a clean sweep for the NDC in that area (in Nanton the anti-NPP vote was split by the presence of a strong CPP candidate), while the selection of John Mahama, son of Kwame Nkrumah's former minister E.A. Mahama, as vice-presidential candidate helped to win two Gonja seats previously held by the NPP. The choice of Muhamadu Bawumia as NPP vice-presidential candidate for the NPP (also the son of a former Nkrumah minister) failed to save the single Mamprusi seat held by the party in Nalerigu and did not lead to the expected victory in Bawumia's home constituency of Walewale and adjacent Yagba/Kubori. Indeed, the limited impact of his candidature is shown by the fact that the NDC actually gained a 1 per cent higher vote in the presidential over parliamentary election in Yagba (54 per cent vs. 53 per cent) while in Walewale the NPP presidential ticket only reached 39 per cent – 7 per cent less than the NDC (myjoyonline.com).
One key factor in many areas was the role of primary elections, and this affected both the NPP, which held them, and the NDC, which did not. NDC thinking was that this was such a crucial election that any sitting MP should automatically be chosen this time around. This meant that some candidates who were not seen to be particularly active in their constituency's interests or whose continued tenure was resented by local notables were confirmed in their candidacy, but were then subject to a local backlash – this can largely explain the failure of NDC candidates to hold their seats in Lambussie (UW), Builsa South and Binduri (UE). It is interesting to note that while these NDC MPs lost their seats, in the latter two constituencies the presidential vote went to the NDC and in Lambussie that result was very close, with the NDC gaining a majority for Mills in the presidential run-off election. In the case of the NPP, disaffected losers in the primary elections played an important part in the loss to Independents of two Ashanti seats (Bekwai and Bosome-Freho), one Northern (Wulensi) and one Eastern Region (Nkawkaw) seats, with all four voting for the NPP presidential ticket. In Yendi in the Northern Region the vote was split by an erstwhile NPP supporter standing for the Democratic Freedom Party, whose capture of 3 per cent of the vote enabled the NDC to take what should have been a relatively safe NPP seat.
So can any general trends be deduced from the campaigns and their results? I would suggest that several significant points emerge:
The choice of candidate: This has become more important as the number of potential opinion leaders in rural areas has expanded from the local chiefs to the range of educated and successful individuals. Given that in the rural areas any ideological difference between the parties is largely invisible, it is important that the candidate is well connected within the constituency, is known and is seen to be locally active. The lack of activity of a number of sitting MPs has been noted above as a source of their failure, but this was also used to explain the defeat of the sitting NDC MP in Bawku Central, Mahama Ayariga, who was criticised for spending too much time with the presidential and vice-presidential candidates on their tours of the country, and insufficient time looking after his own constituency (interview, Adda). Any MP who is seen to develop his own village while neglecting others in his constituency may also feel the wrath of the electorate, and this was used partly to explain the defeat of the PNC MP for Sissala East, Moses Baah, who allegedly in election year put up electricity poles near his home in Tumu while leaving them lying unconnected on the ground in Wallembelle.
Ethnic rivalries: All parties in Ghana are keen to play down this aspect of political rivalry, with leaders and candidates exhorting the electorate to vote on the basis of policies rather than ethnicity. However, for many voters the identification of the NPP with the Asante and related Akan-speaking groups and the NDC with the Ewe remains strong, and is displayed by the continued success of the NPP in Ashanti, central Brong Ahafo and the western and central parts of the Eastern Region. The approximately 25 per cent won by Professor Mills in Ashanti in both the initial and run-off elections is not significantly different from the 24 per cent won in 2004, indicating little reduction of the impact of this identification and possibly of the ethnic rivalry. Likewise, the NDC carried all the Volta Region seats, with the exception of the Akan-dominated area of Nkwanta North, and achieved over an 86 per cent vote for its presidential candidate in the run-off election. In Wa Central the candidature of Clement Elade, a Dagaaba for the NPP, was probably more a reason for his defeat by the NDC's Wala candidate than was the issue of personality, despite the claim of the Daily Graphic (12 December 2008) that he had ‘poor human relation’ (sic) when compared to the ‘the more affable Rashid Pelpuo’. In Bawku Central the Kusasi vs. Mamprusi dispute was played out again, with the election of a Mamprusi/Mossi candidate showing a return to the 2000 pattern of an NPP victory, although this was one of the results subject to a High Court challenge. In the Nanumba/Konkomba constituencies of Bimbilla and Wulensi the rivalry between these two ethnic groups greatly contributed to the defeat of the incumbent NDC candidate in Bimbilla by the NPP and the incumbent NPP candidate in Wulensi by an Independent. In Bimbilla the numerically dominant Konkomba elected a Konkomba candidate, while in Wulensi a Nanumba standing as an Independent defeated the NDC and NPP candidates who were both Konkomba. The results of the 2008 elections show that ethnic rivalries remain as considerable problems for Ghana, but at present the key Akan–Ewe divide only manifests itself in electoral rather than violent rivalry, and regime changes enable this to be contained with each ethnic group having an opportunity to benefit from periods of being in government.
Local developments: When asked, most voters are clamouring for local development, and this is of potential significance. The creation of a new district based on Funsi before the 2004 election certainly contributed to the NPP victory in Wa East, and in 2008 this was repeated in Lambussie. However, local developments are not always clearly attributable to one party. If a constituency is held by a member of the opposition party then the relative roles of the MP and the District Chief Executive (DCE) appointed by the President can come into play, with both claiming credit. In addition, local developments do seem more visible to the government supporters than to those of the opposition. NDC supporters across the country were very willing to complain about the lack of any real development in their areas, while NPP members could point to specific projects that had come to fruition.
Traditional disputes: In some areas these coincide with the ethnic rivalries mentioned above, but in others they are distinct. In the Dagbon area of the Northern Region the intra-Dagomba dispute between the Abudulai and Andani families remains very important. All Dagombas feel allegiance to one of the families even though they themselves are not of royal (Na Bihe) blood, and the failure of the NPP Government to charge anyone with the murder of the paramount chief (Ya Na) and some 30 of his followers in March 2002 has strengthened the link between the NDC and the Andani ‘family’. The NPP's one safe Dagomba seat of Yendi was lost through a splitting of the vote, but the party gained Nanton in compensation through the splitting of the Andani vote there. In many parts of the Upper East and Upper West Regions the disputes are not really ethnic but are village rivalries. In the Upper West rivalry between Lawra and Nandom (both are largely Dagaaba towns) remains significant, while in Chiana-Paga in the Upper East, Kassena Chiana is resentful of the dominance of Kassena Paga both economically and in terms of representation, while Nankanni Sirigu feels totally excluded but does not get support from Nankanni Mirigu – hence candidates from each of the first three villages fought out the 2008 election (interviews, Luguterah and Rudolf Amenga-Etego).
Party allegiance: This has long been a factor, with some families being allied with the Nkrumah or Danquah ‘traditions’ since the early days of politics in the 1950s (for details see Nugent 1995 and Oquaye 2004). On a more limited term basis, party loyalty remained strong across the election period in 2008. There was very little change in the voting between the presidential and parliamentary elections, and even less between the presidential and run-off elections. The limited differences in parliamentary and presidential results in the 2008 elections involved the four successful Independent candidates and the three representing the minor parties. In each case the presidential vote was won by either Nana Akufo-Addo for the NPP or Professor Atta-Mills for the NDC. The changes are shown in Table 4.
| Region | Constituency | Parliamentary | Presidential | Run-off |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greater Accra | Ablekuma South | NDC | NPP | NDC |
| Ayawaso Central | NPP | NPP | NDC | |
| Ashanti | Bekwai | IND | NPP | NPP |
| Bosome-Freho | IND | NPP | NPP | |
| Brong Ahafo | Asutifi South | NPP | NPP | NDC |
| Nkoranza South | NPP | NDC | NDC | |
| Central | Agona East | NPP | NDC | NDC |
| Eastern | Nkawkaw | IND | NPP | NPP |
| Northern | Nanton | NPP | NDC | NDC |
| Wulensi | IND | NPP | NPP | |
| Yendi | NDC | NPP | NPP | |
| Upper East | Binduri | NPP | NDC | NDC |
| Builsa South | PNC | NDC | NDC | |
| Chiana-Paga | NPP | NDC | NDC | |
| Navrongo | NPP | NDC | NDC | |
| Upper West | Lambussie | NPP | NPP | NDC |
| Lawra-Nandom | NPP | NDC | NDC | |
| Sissala East | NDC | NPP | NPP | |
| Sissala West | PNC | NDC | NDC | |
| Western | Bibiani/Anhwiaso | NPP | NPP | NDC |
| Jomoro | CPP | NDC | NDC | |
| Mpohor-Wassa | NPP | NPP | NDC | |
| Prestea-Huni Valley | NPP | NPP | NDC | |
| Source: Adapted from myjoyonline.com |
From Table 4 it can be seen that even including the four parliamentary seats won by Independents (who were all NPP dissidents) only four constituencies changed their vote between the presidential election and the run-off (Lambussie, Bibiani/Anhwiaso, Mpohor-Wassa and Prestea-Huni Valley). It can also be seen that the NPP did distinctly better in the parliamentary than the presidential elections where there was a divergence between the two. This to some extent reflects the effect of the NDC failing to hold primary elections in seats that they held where it was the parliamentary candidate rather than the presidential candidate or party that lacked local support.
Active support: In the past one of the key elements of this was the backing of local chiefs. While this has greatly reduced (see Kelly and Bening 2007) and chiefs' participation in elections is actually banned by the 1992 Constitution, this still remains of some significance in rural areas. As Tufuor states, in many areas candidates ‘have a political responsibility to woo the chief and his elders’ (Tufuor 2008, pp. 28–29). In Lambussie, the chief's car was seen campaigning for the successful NPP candidate, while the Chief of Kayoro in Chiana-Paga constituency pledged the support of his people to the NPP (Daily Graphic, 19 November 2008). However, of much greater importance is the support of the youth, with candidates mobilising large groups of young supporters to mobilise support for them (interviews: Baah and Adda). The resources of the local party are also important, with effective campaigning leading to NDC victories over sitting Independents, PNC and CPP members in Bolgatanga (Upper East), Bunkpurugu (Northern), Ellembelle (Western), Sissala East (Upper West) and Zebilla (Upper East). Divisions within the NPP and consequent lack of active support from senior party members contributed greatly to the loss of Nalerigu and Yendi in the Northern Region (interviews: Adda and Alhaji Ibrahima).
The high electoral turnout of almost 70 per cent, although it was 85 per cent in 2004 (Ghana Electoral Commission), and the victory for the opposition, are very positive signs for Ghanaian democracy. However, the closeness of the results offers a more ambiguous message. On the positive side it should encourage cooperative working across parties, and the PNC quickly responded to NDC overtures by allowing Azong Alhassan, the newly-elected MP for Builsa South, to become Minister of State at the Presidency (Daily Guide, 3 February 2009). On the negative side, it is possible that the outcome of a handful of court disputes and by-elections could create a situation where the President lacks parliamentary support. Before the election some leading members of the NDC were showing frustration at lack of power and were very fearful of election-rigging, and so a small change in the balance of power could lead to more tension and instability. Since the election there have been a number of reported incidents of NDC supporters harassing members and supporters of the former government and this could polarise divisions in the country. The demands for justice conflict with the needs for reconciliation. The election results themselves do not offer solutions to the various ethnic and local disputes that threaten Ghana's peace and stability, but the ‘foot soldiers’ of the NDC in Dagbon, for example, now expect their government to deal with the murderers of the late Ya Na. Similarly, the NDC victory does nothing to alter the dependency of Ghana on international finance, and the hopes of the poor and disadvantaged are unlikely to be met.
The peaceful handover of power does however show that there is a general commitment to democracy and a desire to preserve the image of Ghana as a democratic and stable state in a continent that often lacks these features, and the continued high turnout shows the population retains a belief in the efficacy of the electoral system. The desire of the relatively neglected regions of the country to make progress through a government largely representative of them needs to be balanced with policies that will keep the relatively affluent areas ‘on board’ to avoid the polarisation that characterises so many African states. This is particularly important in Ghana, as areas of relative affluence to a significant extent coincide with the areas inhabited by Akan-speaking groups. This will require astute statesmanship from Professor Mills and his government to avoid the twin dangers of resentment from his opponents and disillusionment among his supporters.