Introduction
The current literature on the Niger Delta has highlighted the consequences of the violence that has engulfed the region for nearly two decades. Concern focuses mainly on the armed dimension of the conflict, the disruptions in oil production and the internationalisation of oil theft that have endangered the economy and security of Nigeria and other parts of the world. For example, Watts (2007, p. 63) has noted that the country lost US$6.8 billion between 1994 and 2004 due to attacks on oil installations and infrastructure, and has incurred an annual loss of US$4.4 billion since 2004.
The conflict in the Niger Delta has also been noted as a threat to the energy security of the United States of America (Lubeck et al. 2007), and the Nigerian Government is concerned about this and other Western interests (Obi 2008, p. 428). The February 17 2009 attack on the presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea by Niger Delta militants (Akinsanmi 2009) has further heightened the security concerns of the conflict in the Delta.
However, the internecine conflict and its impact on sustainable development in the Niger Delta appear under-emphasised in the analysis. This study intends to fill this gap.
The Niger Delta region has been engulfed by a pattern of conflicts that have taken different forms: community–state (security operatives); community–oil company; intra-community; inter-community and inter-ethnic conflicts. The examples are many: Umuechem and the state (1990); Obagi and the state (1993 and 1994); Odi and the state (1999); Ijaw and Itsekiri (1997–2003); Ogoni and Andoni (1993 and 1994); Ke and Bille (2001).
These conflicts share experiences similar to warfare and have caused destruction in varying dimensions. For example, Alapiki (2001, p. 185) writing about Umuechem stated that a total of 495 houses in the community were totally destroyed with blast grenades. The Umuechem community in (Rivers State) had mobilised its people in a protest against the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), alleging environmental damage and neglect. The Nigerian Mobile Police, a paramilitary arm of the police under the direct orders from the government, were drawn into the conflict, leading to the destruction of the community.
The Odi community in Bayelsa State shares a similar experience. In search of some militant youths who killed eight policemen, federal troops invaded the community in November 1999 and completely destroyed it. The Bayelsa Voice (25 November 1999, p. 10) reported that only two primary schools, the secondary school, the First Bank of Nigeria building and some churches were left as signs to indicate that a community once existed. Inter-ethnic, intra-community, inter-community and oil company – community conflicts have also caused destructions of the same kind in the region.
This study seeks to determine the impact of violence on the potential for sustainable development in Bayelsa State, in the centre of the Niger Delta (Alagoa 1999). It will examine questions such as: what impact does the violence have on the environment? What are the implications of violence on sustainable development? These questions necessitate the investigation of issues including: the interconnectedness between the environment and conflict; essential issues in sustainable development; and the determination of the impact of violence on sustainable development.
This last point shows the need for an empirical study, and such a study was carried out in 30 communities. Questionnaire and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to collect data. A total of 600 questionnaires were administered, while 30 FGDs were conducted, each bringing together ten persons. The data from these is presented below in the form of charts.
Theoretical and conceptual analysis
Sustainable development
The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the establishment of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987, and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (more formally the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) brought to the fore of national and international discourse the interconnectedness between the quality of the environment and development. Essentially, sustainable development implies the guarantee of development for all generations (WCED 1987, Pearce et al. 1990, Ibiam 2002, The Economist 6 July 2004). This is predicated on the achievement of three objectives: wealth creation, environmental protection and enhancement of production capacities.
Figure 1 demonstrates the relationships that ensure the attainment of sustainable development. The development of productive forces is fundamental to the attainment of sustainable development, given that wealth creation depends on it. However, the development of productive forces involves the improvement of natural assets such as the irrigation of arid land (Ake 1981, p. 11), which can distort the environment. There is thus a dialectical unity between the environment and development. This explains one of the fundamental objectives of sustainable development, which seeks to balance the objectives of development with the environmental costs (Ucheghu 1998, p. 109).
The non-depletion of the natural resource base and maintenance or improvement in environmental quality constitutes the fundamentals of sustainable development. Pollution prevention and control, sustainable exploitation of natural resources and poverty reduction are therefore essential to sustainable development. However, there are a number of factors that constrain sustainable development. These include the widening wealth gap among people and countries, increasing conflicts, pressure on resources and over-consumption (International Institute for Sustainable Development – IISD).
This article focuses on the role of conflicts as a limiting factor to sustainable development. Conflict impedes sustainable development in five ways (see IISD website1):
This makes conflict prevention and control a fundamental requirement for the achievement of sustainable development.Violent conflict
Conflict, the pursuit of incompatible goals and interests (Berelson and Steiner, cited in Anikpo 1998, p. 7, Otite 1999, p. 1) is a characteristic feature of society, given that people have varied interests that criss-cross each other. This suggests that conflict is either peaceful or violent, as societies are not always engulfed by violence. Violent conflict, the use of force or arms in the resolution of differences, is therefore not inevitable (Francis 2006, p. 20).
Why do conflicts turn violent? Psychologists have noted that conflict turns violent when the anger and worries that result from frustration (the source of conflict) are not resolved (Ibaba 2001). Similarly, the avoidance or denial of conflict can render conflicts violent, as the ignored group seeks to redress the issue of contention (Albert 1999, Francis 2006).
Conflict in society is blamed on a number of factors: greed (Collier and Hoefler 1998, 2002); economic deprivation and social disorganisation (Ikporukpo 2003); grievance (Ikelegbe 2006, Ukiwo 2007); frustration and aggression (Faleti 2006); conflicting interpretations of rights and responsibilities resulting from different values and ethnic principles (Olokesusi 1996); exploitation resulting in domination and exploitation (Anele 1999, Ibaba 2001); and the failure of social contract (Murshed and Jadjoedin 2008).
It is a noteworthy fact that all the perspectives of conflict noted above capture the Niger Delta condition. The region is characterised by different conflict settings, and thus the use of a single conflict theory cannot adequately explain the total picture of conflict in the region.
However, it is certain that material contradictions and deprivations triggered the conflict. The oil multinational corporations (MNCs) and the people of the Niger Delta depend on the same environment for production. The lands, waters (creeks, lakes, etc.) and mangrove forests are used by the oil MNCs and the communities for production. However, the oil industry is associated with oil spillages and gas flaring that impact negatively on the environment (see Table 1).
| Activity | Impact | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Exploration | |
| (a) Geophysical investigation | Destruction of vegetation, farmlands, human settlement; clearing agricultural land and damaging the soil | |
| (b) Geology survey | Disturbance of fauna and flora habitat | |
| (c) Drilling | Accumulation of toxic waste materials with the effect of: | |
| (i) oil pollution of the land, sea or beaches | ||
| (ii) pollution of underground water for plants | ||
| 2 | Production process | |
| (a) Flat and tank farms | Land pollution from long-term cumulative effects | |
| (b) Gas flaring | Water and land pollution from solid waste: | |
| (i) air pollution from gas and oil processing evaporation and flaring | ||
| (ii) killing of vegetation around the flare area | ||
| (iii) production of heat | ||
| (iv) suppressing the growth and flowering of some plants | ||
| (v) reduction and diminution of agricultural production | ||
| (vi) destruction of mangrove swamps and salt marsh | ||
| (c) Tanker loading locations | Spillage during loading operations with all its accompanying effects on the fauna and flora | |
| (d) Storage depots | Land pollution from effluent waste and solid wastes of chemical cans and drums for the establishment of the storage depots | |
| (e) Transportation | Destruction of farmlands and environmentally sensitive areas | |
| (f) Refinery | Land pollution from effluent discharge which contains wide range of organic pollutants such as phenol hydrogen, sulphide, ammonia and gas | |
| Source: Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment (1983). |
Oil spills and gas flares have weakened those local economies based on fishing and farming. The nutrient value of affected farmlands has been reduced, leading to poor crop yields. Similarly, marine life has been destroyed, and this makes fishing a fruitless exercise (Ikein 1991, World Bank 1995, Adeyemo 2002, Ibaba 2005, UNDP 2006). Gas flaring destroys vegetation and reduces crop yield. A study of the Izombe flow station in Imo State revealed that crop yield reduces by 45 per cent at 600 metres and by 10 per cent 1 kilometre away from the flow station (Salau 1993, Adeyemo 2002).
Furthermore, land take for oil production activities also reduces available cultivable land. A study on Okrika Local Government Area in Rivers State shows that a total of 820 farmers lost 818.4 hectares of farmland to the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) of Nigeria (Adeyemo 2002, p. 73). Land take for oil industry activities induces the fragmentation of farmlands, which in turn leads to over-farming and poor nutrient value of the soil (see Table 2).
| No. of persons affected | Name of oil field | No. of wells | Land area per well | Land area lost to oil wells | Land area for other Shell activities around the well | Helicopter landing area | Land area lost to flow station | Total land area lost to oil exploitation activities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 72 | Bolo | 10 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 6.3 | 71.9 |
| 66 | Iwokiriki | 9 | 6.3 | 53.7 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 6.3 | 65.6 |
| 61 | Mbiriki | 8 | 6.3 | 50.4 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 6.3 | 60.5 |
| 226 | Agokien | 34 | 6.3 | 214.2 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 6.3 | 225.7 |
| 81 | Ele | 11 | 6.3 | 69.3 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 6.3 | 80.8 |
| 141 | Oraberekin | 21 | 6.3 | 132.3 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 6.3 | 141.2 |
| 173 | Wakama | 26 | 6.3 | 163.8 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 6.3 | 172.7 |
| Source: Adeyemo (2002, p. 72). |
The implications for agriculture can be clearly appreciated when it is noted that the country has over 600 oilfields, 5284 oil wells, 7000 kilometres of pipelines, ten export terminals and 275 flow stations (Lubeck et al. 2007, p. 5).
The backlash of this includes occupational displacement, an increase in poverty due to reduced income or total loss of income, and forced migration contributing to population displacement (Opukri and Ibaba 2008). This suggests that the oil industry has not improved the material well-being of the people, made worse by the personalisation of the Nigerian state, and its subsequent use for the pursuit of private and sectional interests (Aaron 2006).
One of the fundamental outcomes of this is an oil politics which ensures the transfer of the oil wealth out of the Niger Delta for the benefit of the political elites of the ethnic groups that control the Nigerian state. This is largely manifested in the manipulations of the derivation principle of revenue allocation. From 1960–1970, the derivation principle was 50 per cent. However, this was reduced to 45 per cent (1970–1975), 20 per cent (1975–1980), 2 per cent (1980–1983), 1.5 per cent (1984–1992), and then increased to 3 per cent in 1992 and 13 per cent in 2000 (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1998, Ibaba 2005, Jega 2007).
The increase from 1.5 per cent to 3 per cent and later 13 per cent followed agitation and protests from the people. Paradoxically, this has become an incentive for violence, as it is expected that it will lead to further increase in the derivation component.
The other consequence of the personalisation of the state is the use of the state as instrument for primitive accumulation of wealth (Ekekwe 1986), leading to corruption. Between 1960 and 2006, the country received US$509.56 billion in oil revenues (Nafziger 2008), the trend of which can be seen in Figure 2.
Similarly, the Niger Delta States have received huge sums of money since the year 2000, when the 13 per cent oil derivation fund was implemented. For example, in 2007 alone the six Niger Delta States received US$4 billion out of the total of US$11 billion that was allocated to the 30 states of the federation (SPDC 2008). However, these huge oil revenues have not benefited the people adequately; because of corruption, budgetary appropriations are often structured to enrich those who control state power (Enweremadu 2008, p. 450).
‘White elephant’ projects such as airports and new government lodges are given more importance than the social and economic infrastructure. Expenditures for travel and entertainment benefiting government functionaries receive huge allocations. For example, in 2006 the Rivers State Government budgeted US$21.6 million on transport and travel allocation to the office of the governor and US$5.4 million for travel expenses of the legislature. Similarly, the legislature received US$2.8 million as sitting allowances, excluding salaries (Enweremadu 2008, p. 453).
The experience of the Rivers State can also be seen in Bayelsa State, with the budgetary allocations in the 2008 budget set out in Table 3.
| Government house | Amount US$ | Other Sectors | Amount US$ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overhead cost | Capital expenditure | |||
| (i) | Travel and transport | 250,000.00 | (i) Energy | 62,158,333.30 |
| (ii) | Governor's tour | 5,000,000.00 | (ii) Water | 3,633,333.30 |
| (iii) | Utility services | 833,333.30 | (iii) Health | 84,229,166.70 |
| (iv) | Telephone services | 250,000.00 | (vi) Commerce & industry | 33,333,333.30 |
| (v) | Stationery | 166,666.70 | (v) Education | 78,433,333.30 |
| (vi) | Maintenance of furniture and equipment | 166,666.70 | (vi) Works & transport | 29,541,666.70 |
| (vii) | Entertainment/ hospitality | 833,333.30 | ||
| (viii) | Maintenance of vehicles/ capital assets | 333,333.3 | ||
| (ix) | Consultancy service | 58,333.30 | ||
| (x) | Training and staff development | 83,333.30 | ||
| (xi) | Miscellaneous | 92,878,333.30 | ||
| Total | 100,853,333.20 | |||
| Source: Bayelsa State, Nigeria, approved budget for 2008. |
The consequence of this pattern of budgetary allocations and the corruption underlying it is that the ordinary citizens derive very few benefits, which manifests itself as limited access or unavailability of basic social amenities. For example, the UNDP reported in 2006 that only 24 per cent of the people have access to clean water.
This contradiction has raised political consciousness because hitherto dormant sections of the population develop critical attitudes towards the polity. Elements of this consciousness include an awareness that the oil industry has devastated the environment; that the local economies have been destroyed without the provision of viable alternatives; that the oil industry threatens the continued existence of the people; that the oil wealth has been transferred out of the Niger Delta for the benefit of other groups; that the political leadership of Nigeria and Niger Delta have squandered development funds through corruption; and that community chiefs, elites and youth leaders collaborate with state officials and the oil MNCs to cheat the communities. Fundamentally, it also includes the perception that the condition of the people can only improve through agitation and resistance.
The Kaiama Declaration (1998)2 highlighted this consciousness when it made the following observations:
- •
that the quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter neglect, suppression and marginalisation brought to bear on the people by the alliance between the Nigerian State and oil MNCs;
- •
that the political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of oil mineral resources;
- •
that uncontrolled exploration of crude oil and natural gas has destroyed the environments and health of the people;
- •
that the degradation of the environment by the oil MNCs is attributable to state laws (Land Use Act, etc.) that have robbed the people of their land and natural resources;
- •
that the Principle of Derivation in revenue allocation has been whittled down by several regimes;
- •
that intra- and inter-ethnic conflicts in Ijaw land are sponsored by the Nigerian State and oil MNCs; and
- •
that the revelations of the looting of the national treasury by the Abacha regime is only a reflection of an existing and continuing trend of stealing by public office holders in Nigeria.
The conflict in the region has led to the loss of group control over the individual, which has resulted in deviant behaviour and criminality (Ikporukpo 2003), manifest as the sabotage of oil installations, hostage-taking for ransom and oil theft (bunkering, piracy and waterway robbery) (Ikelegbe 2006).
Mapping the conflict: the dynamics of violence in the Niger Delta
This section of the article attempts to capture the trends and changes of the conflict in the Niger Delta. Using the criteria of non-violent and violent conflict, conflict in the region is categorised into four phases, which are set out in Table 4.
| Period of conflict | Nature/type of conflict |
|---|---|
| Pre-independence | |
| 1965 | Peaceful |
| 1966 | Violent |
| 1967 to early 1990s | Peaceful |
| Mid-1990s to 2009 | Violent |
| Source: compiled by author. |
Pre-independence to 1965
In the period immediately preceding Nigerian independence, people in the Niger Delta, based on perceptions of domination by the major ethnic groups in Nigeria and the particular geographical terrain of the region, pushed for special development attention. The Willink Commission, set up to address the fears of minorities and propose means of allaying such fears, responded to the demand from the Ijaws, but not in its totality. The Ijaws, the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria (Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008) and the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta (Willinks Report 1958), had demanded more state support for development. The report concluded that:
We cannot recommend political arrangements which would unite in one political unit the whole body of Ijaws; we do however consider that their belief that their problems are not understood could be largely met without the creation of a separate state, which we have rejected. … The declaration of the Ijaw country as a Special Area would direct public attention to a neglected tract and give the Ijaws an opportunity of putting forward plans of their own for improvement.
The Board was under-funded, thereby stifling its developmental objectives. In 1976, it was renamed the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) following the creation of the ten new River Basin Development Authorities (OMPADEC Report 1993, p. 82). With this proliferation, the funding problems became worse. The agency lost its relevance as a body established for the special development needs of the Niger Delta, and therefore was unable to have a positive impact on the development of the region.
The 1966 period
Militant insurgence engagement led by Adaka Boro characterised this period (Ikelegbe 2006). Under the auspices of the Niger Delta Volunteer Services (NDVS), Boro declared the Niger Delta People's Republic on 23 February 1966. The rebellion lasted 12 days, ending on 6 March (Tebekoami 1982). Even though this event jolted the nation (Okonta 2006), the Nigerian state avoided the fundamental issues of domination and deprivation that had triggered the rebellion.
The creation of Rivers State in 1967 did not meet the expectations of the people, as the Ijaw territory, located mainly in the wetlands, continued to experience neglect. Because they are mainly found in the wetlands, nearly all Ijaw communities are rural, and thus suffer from neglect, a consequence of urban bias in resource allocation. This difficult geographical terrain (that makes development expensive), together with corruption, makes Ijaw Land the least developed in the Niger Delta (Ibaba 2009) and partly explains the dominance of the Ijaw in the ‘militianisation’ (Simiyu 2008) of the Niger Delta conflict.
1967 to early 1990s period
This period was essentially characterised by oil company conflict with the communities. Communities demanded adequate compensation for damaged properties, including scholarships, employment and social amenities such as potable water, school buildings, health facilities and electricity (Okoko 1998). Litigation, peaceful demonstrations and occupation of oil production facilities were the means of engagement (Owugah 1999).
However, the oil MNCs sometimes called in security operatives (particularly anti-riot police and soldiers) to keep order. The brutality of the security forces, as earlier noted in the Umuchem case for example, led to the loss of lives and destruction of property. This repression led to the emergence of a plethora of civil, community, ethnic and regional groups that mobilised the people against the state and oil MNCs (Ikelegbe 2006). Examples include the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw National Congress (INC) and Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities (FNDIC).
Mid-1990s to 2009
At the end of the third phase discussed above, the state and oil MNCs responded to community protests with force, but without any response from the communities. In this fourth phase, however, the people responded. The period is thus characterised by civil mobilisation and militant action against the state and the oil MNCs (Ikelegbe 2006). The killing of MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, the violent response of the state to the 1998 Kaiama Declaration and the destruction of Odi town3 by federal troops in 1999 led to armed conflict against the state.
Several militia and cult groups emerged to challenge the Nigerian state. Some of these groups are listed in Table 5.
| Cult Groups | Militia groups | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Green Landers | Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) |
| 2 | Deebam | Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) |
| 3 | Bush Boys | Niger Delta Militant Force Squad (NDMFS) |
| 4 | K.K.K. | Niger Delta Coastal Guerrillas (NDCGS) |
| 5 | Black Braziers | The Mein Butus |
| 6 | Icelanders | ELIMOTU |
| 7 | Vikings | Arogbo Freedom Fighters |
| 8 | Germans | Iduwini Volunteer Force (IVF) |
| 9 | Mafia Lords | The Niger Delta People Salvation Front (NDPSF) |
| 10 | Vultures | The Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA) |
| 11 | Niger Delta Volunteers (NDV) | |
| 12 | Egbesu Boys of Africa | |
| 13 | Adaka Marine | |
| 14 | Martyrs Brigade | |
| Source: Complied from Watts (2007, p. 656); Agba (2004, pp. 29–32); Joab-Peterside (2005, pp. 40–45); Okonta (2006); Human Rights Watch (2005, p. 4). |
The emergence of these groups increased the use of violence in the Niger Delta, as violence is now seen as a necessary weapon to resolve the crisis. Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), one of the prominent militia groups in the region, alluded to this when he noted that:
I have always said that peaceful agitation would not achieve anything, but one gunshot is worthier than a thousand years of sermonizing, because the enemy you are going to confront is going to use all weapons at his disposal, all weapons of coercion and oppression to come down. … Armed struggle is the only thing. (The Punch, 27 April 2009, p. 11)
Violence and sustainable development in Bayelsa State
The nature of conflict
The data collected highlights the widespread nature of conflicts in the state, as 90.6 per cent of the respondents in 27 of the 30 sample communities noted that their communities had been involved in conflicts. The conflicts in 21 (77.8 per cent) of these communities were violent.
Inter-community conflicts are more widespread, contrary to the dominant view that the conflicts are between the people, on the one hand, and the oil companies/federal government on the other hand. Inter-community conflicts ranks first with 44.3 per cent, followed by community–oil company conflicts (25.9 per cent), intra-community conflict (19.8 per cent) and community–state conflicts (9.9 per cent). The conflicts are caused by a number of factors:
Inter-community conflict: This is mainly caused by inter-community struggle over benefits from the oil industry, such as award of contracts, employment and payment of compensation for damage to property. Because of the high value placed on land due to oil industry activities, land disputes have featured as a dominant cause of inter-community conflicts.
Intra-community conflict: This is usually triggered by disagreement between community factions. The issues in contention include ownership of land and the equitable distribution of oil industry benefits such as scholarships, employment, contracts, and monies paid as compensation for damages. Okoko (1998) identified six intra-community factions and their role in intra-community conflict, as demonstrated by the study and shown in Figure 3.
Oil company–community conflict: This is blamed on a number of factors including oil spills and the associated ecological devastation; delays in the clean-up of areas impacted by oil spills; delay in the payment of compensation for damage to property; refusal to pay compensation for damage to property; payment of inadequate compensation; breach of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the oil MNCs; and the patronage of community factions by the oil MNCs.
Community–state conflict: Perceived neglect and deprivation is central to this type of conflict. Whereas this started the conflict, the violent response of state security operatives and the insensitivity of the government has sustained the conflict.
The impact of violent conflicts on environment and the economy
The data indicates that violent conflicts in the state have impacted negatively on the environment (see Figure 4).
The pollution of land and water and unsustainable exploitation of resources are noted as the specific effects. One of the strategies of engagement in inter-community conflicts is the destruction of the fishing grounds (lakes, rivers, streams and ponds) of opposing communities. Dynamite and dangerous chemicals such as Gamalin-20 are used to pollute the water, with the intention of destroying marine, and consequently local, economies that are based on fishing. This is seen as a means of weakening the other communities. The destruction of marine life displaces those in the fishing sub-sector of the local economy, leading to loss in income and the aggravation of poverty. Similarly, the insecurity associated with such actions forces fishermen and women to concentrate their activities in fishing grounds that are near to their communities as a safety measure. However, this results in over-exploitation and diminishes fish yield.
Insecurity is one of the most pervasive problems created by violent conflicts in the communities, and is prolonged when the conflict is intra- or inter-communal. However, it is short-lived with community–oil company or community–state conflicts. The feeling of insecurity ends once security operatives (police/army) withdraw from the community in the case of oil company conflict or community–state conflict. This is not so with intra-community or inter-community conflicts, as opposing factions and communities continue to hunt each other, thus sustaining insecurity.
Due to insecurity, farmers are forced to cultivate farmlands near to their communities, the effect of this being the abandonment of shifting cultivation which allows for a fallow period. The fallow period enables the soil to replenish its nutrient value, and this enhances crop yield. The abandonment of shifting cultivation therefore diminishes crop yield and the productivity of farmers. Significantly, bush fallow is a traditional system of environmental conservation that enhances sustainable exploitation of farmlands. Thus, the insecurity resulting from violence undermines the traditional systems of environmental conservation.
Displacements lead to the abandonment of farms and fishing ponds. Abandoned farms are not tended, and are consequently overtaken by weeds. This affects crop yield, particularly yam and cassava, which require intensive care. In some of the communities, farmers noted that before the conflicts the usual yield of yam was an average of three baskets per square metre. Following the displacements and the subsequent limited attention for the farms, the yield of yam declined by about one-and-a-half baskets per square metre. Similarly, abandoned fish ponds are not tended, thus leading to poor harvest. Related to this is forced migration caused by insecurity and the drifting away of the agricultural labour force to the urban areas.
Environmental quality is also affected by the sabotage and vandalisation of oil installations and the resultant oil spillages that add to the problems of environmental degradation. The sabotage of oil instillations is an act of aggression against the oil MNCs, just as it is also used as a criminal means of acquiring wealth (Okoko 1998). The incidence of sabotage has increased as the conflict deepens. For example, out of a total of 1,243 oil incidents that were recorded in the Shell Petroleum Development Company's (SPDC's) area of operations between 2003 and 2007, 832 (66.2 per cent) were caused by sabotage (SPDC 2008, pp. 18–19). Figure 5 demonstrates the trend.
The resulting oil spills pollute land and water, destroy fauna and flora, and decrease the nutrient value of the soil. The effects are made worse by the refusal of communities to allow oil company personnel on their land, and the contractors abandon oil spill sites or locations as soon as conflict erupts; thus the spilt oil is left not dealt with, leading to the expansion of the area affected.
The impact of conflict on infrastructure and community development
A significant impact of conflict is the destruction of infrastructure, as noted by the respondents in Figure 6.
In the conflict between Odi community and the Nigerian soldiers in 1999 for example, the entire community was destroyed. Similarly, during the inter-community conflict between Nembe Ogbolomabiri and Nembe Bassambiri (1998), between Opuama and Ofonobiri (2002) and between Okpoama and Ewoama (1995), there was total or partial destruction of the communities involved. Residential buildings, schools, hotels and bridges were among the properties destroyed. The insecurity associated with conflicts also scares contractors away from project sites, thus leading to the abandonment of development projects.
The destruction and displacements that follow conflicts, particularly intra-communal conflicts, have created social dislocation and the subsequent destruction of the social structure of affected communities. This impedes community development, as the self-help approach to community development is a major strategy for community development in the state. However, its success is predicated on social cohesion or unity.
The generation of funds is made easy when community members share common goals and destiny, but social disintegration undermines this. The most evident effect is the emerging trend where community members cannot sit together to plan their development, due to community factions and the underlying hatred.
Most destructive type of conflict
Inter-community conflict was identified by respondents as the most destructive type of conflict. This is followed by community–state conflict, intra-community conflict and community–oil company conflict (see Figure 7). Cross-tabulation and analysis of responses from communities that have experienced inter-community conflicts and other forms of conflicts show the same trend.
The responses of six communities that have experienced intra- or inter-community and community–oil company conflicts rank which they consider most destructive as follows: inter-community conflict (62.4 per cent); intra-community conflict (24.7 per cent) and community–oil company (12.9 per cent). Respondents from the only community involved in intra- and inter-community conflicts agree that inter-community conflicts are more destructive. This is also true of the communities that have experienced inter-community and community–oil company conflicts. Their ranking is as follows: inter-community conflict (58.4 per cent) and community–oil company (41.6 per cent). It is proper to conclude that inter-community conflicts are more destructive. This may be because conflicting communities see themselves as enemies and therefore seek to destroy each other.
Three reasons account for the destructive potential of inter-community conflict. First is the fact that this is the dominant form of conflict. Second, it prolongs insecurity. Third, conflicting communities may see themselves as enemies in a war-like situation, and therefore seek to destroy each other.
Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that violence endangers sustainable development in Bayelsa State. Although environmental protection and development attention are the goals of demonstrations, the resultant violence constrains their goals.Table 6.
| Measure/indicator of sustainable development | Impact of violent conflicts | |
|---|---|---|
| (i) | Environmental protection | |
| (a) Pollution control/ prevention | Pollution of land and water through oil spills caused by sabotage and vandalisation of oil equipment/ installations | |
| Use of dangerous chemicals such as dynamite and Gamalin-20 as instruments of aggression, leading to destruction of fishing grounds – stream, river, lake, creek, pond | ||
| (b) Sustainable exploitation of natural resources | Oil spills resulting from sabotage and vandalisation of oil installations destroy marine life and plants, and reduce nutrient value of affected soils | |
| Insecurity associated with conflicts limits fishing and farming to particular areas, leading to overuse or exploitation of farmlands and fishing grounds | ||
| (ii) | Enhancement of production capabilities | Conflicts create insecurity, which limit trade and investment, undermine the viability of the means of production and stagnate the development of agriculture and aquaculture |
| Destruction of social and economic infrastructure | ||
| Unfavourable environment for teaching and learning; people are forced out of school, and others denied the right to enrol in school | ||
| (iii) | Creation of wealth and poverty reduction | Destruction of local economies, lives and properties |
| Widening of the income inequality gap | ||
| Creation of insecurity, inhibiting access to means of production | ||
| Worsening of poverty and unemployment due to the destruction of lives and property; stagnation of infrastructural development and weakening of people's main livelihoods – fishing and farming. | ||
| Source: compiled by the author. |
The negative impact of violence on the environment and on human lives and property impedes the development of production capabilities, wealth creation and poverty reduction. Violent conflicts have undermined the growth of local economies in a number of ways – loss of working hours, loss of productive labour through forced migration, pollution of fishing grounds and farmlands and the disruption of farming and fishing. This constrains the development of present and future generations, and thus calls for peacebuilding to end the violence and secure sustainable development.
This means that the objective conditions of despair and frustration that triggered the conflict will need to be tackled. Governance based on accountability, transparency and the pursuit of public good or the common interest is the most likely means to end the violence.