Introduction
The Misseriyya are a pastoralist group belonging to the Baggara Arabs2 who live in the areas of south-western Kordofan and south-eastern Darfur. The area is customarily referred to as Dar Misseriyya, and it is internally defined by three long transhumance routes called murhals (the western, central, and eastern murhals), along which the two main sub-groups, the Zuruq and the Humr, have traditionally been moving with their livestock. Misseriyya's transhumance extends into the Dinka Ngok-dominated region of Abyei, one of the most sensitive in Sudan. The Misseriyya and the Dinka Ngok have long had competing claims over cattle-grazing areas and water sources in Abyei. Environmental degradation (also as a result of oil explorations) and climatic changes have exacerbated conflict over land. Tension has also been heightened by the legacy of war which has polarised Dinka and Misseriyya identities, particularly as a result of the Misseriyya having been used by the government of Sudan as proxy militia in the Popular Defence Force (PDF) against the Dinka in the North–South war. The creation of militia was made possible by a number of local and national factors, including the poverty of Misseriyya and other herdsmen following the 1984–85 famine and government attempts to protect Chevron's oil concessions. Both Gaafar Nimeiri and Sadiq al-Mahdi, heads of state in Sudan in the 1980s, wanted to avoid unpopular conscription in the North, so recruiting rural militiamen became an attractive alternative (Keen 1994). Moreover, in a state in economic crisis tribal militia were seen as an inexpensive defence force. The political implications of supporting tribal militia have been grave, resulting in the retribalisation rather than the modernisation of the political process in Sudan (Pantuliano 2004). Ethnic cleavages have been used to obtain short-term political gains, but the creation of tribal militia has fostered deep-seated enmities which are coming to the fore today.
There is an unresolved history of contention over the region of Abyei which dates back to the transfer of the area from Bahr el Ghazal Province in South Sudan to Kordofan Province in the North during the colonial administration in 1905. The demarcation of the boundary of Abyei has proved to be the most intractable issue in the implementation of the Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to date. The Misseriyya see the CPA in general and the Abyei Protocol in particular as being against their interests. The agreement stipulates the merger of West Kordofan, which was essentially a Misseriyya state, into South Kordofan, de facto removing Misseriyya's formal political base and leaving them as a minority group within another state. More importantly, the provision that southern Sudan can secede – and that Abyei can choose to go with it – leaves Misseriyya's migration routes potentially cut into two by an international boundary. Although those migration rights are acknowledged in the CPA, no mechanisms have been set up to guarantee them. This has left the Misseriyya with a widespread sense of having been betrayed by the government after the many years of loyal service as PDF frontline troops in the war.
The CPA determined Abyei to be the ‘territory of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905’ and set up the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to delineate the boundaries of that territory, given that no maps exist of the area transferred at that time. The ABC report was rejected by the National Congress Party (NCP) and by the Misseriyya in 2005. After a three-year deadlock and renewed fighting in Abyei in 2008, the question was eventually referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which ruled on the boundaries in July 2009. The Misseriyya have rejected the PCA decision as well, as they fear that bestowing the ownership of the Abyei area to the Dinka Ngok would restrict their access to critical livelihood resources during transhumance, especially near the Lol and Bahr al-Arab/Kiir rivers.
There are different interests between actors at the local (tribal) and national levels (NCP and Sudan People Liberation Movement [SPLM]), with local actors being more concerned about the land issue than oil. While for the NCP the question is where the line is drawn, given the very considerable oil wealth lying underneath it, for the Misseriyya the very fact of drawing a line is itself a problem, given the rights of secession accorded to the inhabitants of Abyei. The Misseriyya see their traditional way of life as being under threat. This has implications for both their livelihoods and their cultural identity. Because it is also bound up with their loss of political power and their feelings that they have not been rewarded for their role as frontline troops in the war, this is leading to high levels of tension and a high risk of conflict breaking out.
This article presents the findings of a study into the current evolution of Misseriyya livelihoods undertaken in 2008 by a five-person team (four Sudanese and one international) with extensive knowledge of Sudanese politics and expertise in pastoralism, range management, animal production and agricultural economics as well as in-depth knowledge of Dar Misseriyya. Two team members hailed from the region itself, a factor which facilitated access to stakeholders in many of the areas visited. The field study took place over two months. The team interviewed a wide range of stakeholders (including local leaders, administrators, elders, youth, women, pastoralists, ex-pastoralists, farmers, traders, para-vets, and aid workers) in nomadic furqan (sub-units), small settlements and larger towns along the three Misseriyya transhumance routes. Data collection and field analysis focused on assets, livelihoods strategies and outcomes, which were examined within the broader environmental, social, political, and economic context to take into account the institutions, policies, and processes affecting the changes Misseriyya livelihoods are undergoing. Special attention was paid to the relationships between different interest groups in the area, to map evidence of competition over resources, and to identify other points of possible conflict.
Livelihoods under stress: chronic vulnerability and adaptive changes
The ecosystem of the Misseriyya can be defined as a non-equilibrium environment, with no long-term balance between populations, available resources and other elements of the ecosystem. Misseriyya areas are characterised by high rainfall variability, scarce water, low natural biological productivity, and extreme temperatures. The two main livelihood systems in Dar Misseriyya have traditionally been pastoralism and subsistence farming. Pastoralist communities in the region include both nomadic and semi-nomadic (transhumant) camel and cattle herders (El Sammani 1985). Although nomadism was the dominant system prior to the mid-1980s,3 an increasing trend towards transhumance was registered in 1985 by El Sammani, with pastoralists maintaining a home base and only migrating seasonally. The trend towards transhumance was attributed to a growing tendency to spend the dry season at government-provided water sources in the Muglad area (ibid.). Settled communities engaging in farming activities include smallholders, the vast majority of farmers and owners of large mechanised farms. Whilst in most of Southern Kordofan mechanised farms are mainly owned by merchants and civil servants from the North or Khartoum, in the western sector almost all scheme owners are local, usually hailing from the main centres (Muglad, Babanousa, al-Fula, Debab, Sitaib, Kilo 50, Nama, and al Jadeed). It is important to note that there has never been a clear division between the two livelihood systems: many households engage in both, combining pastoralism and farming.
The Misseriyya livelihood system has been systematically weakened by a series of external shocks. These include restrictive land policies for pastoralists both during colonial times and post independence, agricultural expansion, the weakening of local governance structures with the attendant reduced capacity to manage local conflicts over resources, and climatic changes. The two most recent and significant factors are insecurity in the Bahr al-Arab area and the damaging impact of the oil industry. Conflicts sparked by competition among local groups over natural resources have been a long-standing characteristic of the region. In recent decades, however, additional factors such as civil war and, later, oil exploration have exacerbated tensions and weakened livelihood systems. Misseriyya pastoralists have responded to these pressures through a process of adaptation, which for most households has resulted in greater settlement and the cutting short of transhumant movement south of the Bahr al-Arab area.
Migration
The annual migration of the Misseriyya takes place between the wet-season grazing areas (makhraf) in the North and the dry-season grazing (masiaf) towards the South. There are three main livestock routes (murhals), each divided into three sub-routes followed by one or two of the Ajaira and/or Fallaita sub-tribal groups. While the western and central murhals are inhabited by the Ajaira, the eastern murhal is shared by the Fallaita and some Ajaira sub-tribes (Awlad Omran and Fadleya). All routes terminate in the South, the western murhal in Aweil, the central murhal in the Toj and the eastern murhal in Bentiu, where the Misseriyya traditionally spend the dry season between December and May.
In addition to the search for adequate pasture, this long migration is driven by the fact that providing water to large herds is both tedious and expensive. Moreover, although water may be available from large bodies such as Lake Keilak, check dams like Abu Allikri and Kijera or from hafirs, the surrounding grazing becomes extremely scarce towards the end of the dry season as a result of overuse.
Households with smaller herds now spend the dry season within the boundaries of Dar Misseriyya. Insecurity and access restrictions in the South oblige them to depend on water from shallow wells, water yards and other sources such as dams and lakes. Women and children spend most of their time in the Ruqab, while young men take the animals across the Bahr al-Arab. The concentration of people in the middle section of the murhal has reduced the amount of available water and people struggle to survive the dry season in places like Abu Qadama and Muqadama, where many Misseriyya congregate. All communities interviewed complained about the absence of hafirs, boreholes, and water yards in the Ruqab.
Where water has been provided, as in Sitaib, the population has sharply increased over the past few years. In Meiram the population doubles during the dry season. Small and medium-sized herds stay in and around the town, while others go beyond the river. The distance between Meiram and Bahr al-Arab is short, so many families stay in town. The concentration of livestock around limited water sources has helped degrade the range and reduce its nutritional value. The increasing number of pastoralists that settles in small towns for most of the year is forced to abandon cattle-rearing and reduce their herds, with many eventually dropping out of the pastoral sector altogether.
The overall livestock population remains high, however, especially since large livestock owners continue to use herd multiplication to insure against losses caused by disease, drought, or insecurity. Overall, the number of animals in Dar Misseriyya has been estimated at 10.2 million head, equivalent to 4.8 million Tropical Livestock Units.
Markets
Selling livestock constitutes an essential component of the Misseriyya household economy. Markets are seasonal and follow the annual rhythm of migration. The only permanent market in the area is Muglad. This is where large traders from Khartoum and El Obeid come to purchase livestock for sale in urban centres or for export to the Gulf, Egypt and Libya. Most traders buy one or two murahs (one murah equals 50 cattle or 200 sheep), but some buy as many as 40. Traders confirm that there has been an overall increase in livestock numbers in the last ten years, with sheep numbers growing more rapidly than cows. Despite this, trade has been very weak in the last few years, partly as a result of the export ban imposed on Sudan by neighbouring countries because of a suspected outbreak of Rift Valley fever. Livestock traders and community leaders attribute the collapse of the livestock trade in Muglad to increasing insecurity, deterring middlemen from coming to the region. Although cattle and sheep prices have fallen steeply as a result, many remain unsold. The export ban was lifted in December 2008, but traders were still reluctant to travel to insecure areas with large amounts of cash.
There is limited trade in livestock by-products, largely because the milk output of Misseriyya cows is very low (ten pounds a day, as opposed to the 60–70 pounds a day produced by the cows used by milk factories such as Capo in Khartoum), and would not sustain a dairy economy. Attempts to introduce improved breeds such as Kenana local breeds in Debab have shown these species to be too sensitive to biting flies. Northern Sudanese species have been more successful.
Agriculture
Crop cultivation has become increasingly important in recent years as a result of the decline in mobile pastoralism. The area under cultivation increased by 37.2% between 2001 and 2007. Cultivation of watermelons expanded by 687%, and millet by 80.1%; the area given over to sorghum fell by 9% and groundnuts decreased by 53%, while the area under hibiscus and sesame production stayed more or less the same. Watermelons, a recent innovation, have emerged as the major cash crop, especially in western areas such as Meiram, Tibon, Debab, and Mugaddama which double as major watermelon-marketing centres from where the crop is exported as far afield as El Obeid and En-Nahud in North Kordofan and Kosti in central Sudan.
The area cultivated by individual households varies considerably, from around five mukhamas 4 in Mugaddama (west of Muglad) to nine mukhamas towards the North, in Umm Osh to the west of Babanousa. Some households cultivate up to 20 mukhamas depending on the availability of labour and financing. As a general rule, half of the area is given over to food crops, mainly millet, and the other half to cash crops, especially groundnuts and hibiscus. Sesame tends to be cultivated in very small areas. Intercropping of cash crops is common. Crop yields in 2007 averaged three or four sacks (270–360kg) per mukhama for millet, compared with around eight sacks (720kg) a decade ago. Reductions in crop yields are attributed to lower rainfall and declining soil fertility caused by continuous cultivation.
In 2003, semi-mechanised rain-fed farming was introduced in three areas covering 260,734 feddan 5 in Northwest Lagawa (Block 1: Khallis and Umm Guluud, demarcated mechanised farms; Block 2: Al Nabag and Millais, undemarcated schemes and West Wadi Shalongo). The third area accounts for almost 82% of the mechanised schemes in the western sector of Southern Kordofan, with the average scheme size (1000 feddan) more than twice that in the other two areas. The introduction of mechanised farming was described as having significant implications for Misseriyya pastoralism and its future prospects as well as on peace and stability in the area because of the attendant reduction of grazing land and fiercer competition over resources. Wadi Shalongo is an important summer grazing and watering area. The schemes may block routes to watering points.
Most of those who have dropped out of the pastoral sector are now engaged in farming. In Meiram, 10–20% of the population is said to have abandoned pastoralism for agriculture in the last three to five years. Agricultural practices and skills are rudimentary and people lack the knowledge and technology to make farming more productive. Agricultural labour is provided by a combination of family and hired labour.
Off-farm activities
The Misseriyya pastoral economy has traditionally been supported by numerous off-farm activities. The most important are discussed below.
a) Hired livestock labour
This activity traditionally involved a considerable number of people, especially youth from poor families, who were hired by rich livestock owners. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, the role of hired livestock labour in the household economy declined significantly as young people were recruited into the Popular Defence Force (PDF) militia, a paramilitary group created during the war against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Today, insecurity along the border with the South limits the number of Misseriyya youth willing to work as hired herders. Hamar youth from En-Nahud are said to have started filling this gap, but lack cattle-herding skills and are only entrusted with the care of sheep. Payment is usually in kind, a process which traditionally enabled recipients to build up their own herds.
b) Hired agricultural labour
Farm labour was traditionally provided by Dinka men in the western part of the state (Muglad area) and by Nuba in eastern parts (Keilak and Lagawa). The number of Dinka, Nuer and Nuba labourers has declined considerably following the signing of the CPA, and more Misseriyya now work as hired agricultural labour. The gap left by Dinka and Nuba labourers has not however been filled, and the size of plots has declined, from ten to three mukhamas on average, leading to a consequent fall in annual yields. The Misseriyya see the refusal of Dinka, Nuer and Nuba to continue to work on their farms as being politically motivated. Whilst this is certainly true, it is also true that many Dinka and Nuer labourers returned south because they did not feel safe in Dar Misseriyya, especially since the clashes between the SPLA and the Misseriyya in May 2008. Clashes in es-Sunut in 2007 also pushed Nuba away.
c) Forestry, fishing and wild-game hunting
Forestry, fishing and hunting constitute an integral part of the Misseriyya economy, both as a source of subsistence and for cash income. Activities include collecting and selling wild fruit (balanites aegyptiaca, ziziphus spina-christi and papaya), honey, gum arabic, firewood and charcoal. According to Ministry of Agriculture estimates in 2001, forestry activities accounted for approximately 10% of household income. The trade in charcoal and firewood is flourishing, and large amounts of charcoal were observed at the side of roads throughout the study area. Whilst charcoal-making is a subsistence activity for many impoverished households, the larger-scale trade (with charcoal being sold to merchants for the Khartoum market) is in the hands of the army and other security forces. The depletion of forest resources is particularly evident near army outposts. People report that security personnel justify tree-cutting on the grounds that the areas affected have been earmarked for oil extraction. Youth groups in Muglad said that they had reported the destruction to the Forestry Department, but to no avail.
d) Petty trade
The Misseriyya engage in a wide range of petty trade, selling locally produced grains, forestry products, animals, animal products and handicrafts, as well as imported manufactured goods. Most sellers are young people who have dropped out of the pastoral sector. Food selling and other petty trade, traditionally stigmatised in Misseriyya society, have become important activities, and are increasingly taken up by Misseriyya women.
Weekly rural markets still provide valuable opportunities for exchange and small business, but the best trade opportunities are found in the new markets along oil roads. A typical example is Al Kharasana market, on the road between Keilak and Higleig. Al Kharasana started to develop as a market in 1997, with the first stirrings of the oil industry, and by 2007 the population had mushroomed to 15,000, mostly former pastoralists. Some 1100 shops and trade licences are registered in the locality. Wealthy traders come from Khartoum and Gezira in central Sudan. The livestock market provides valuable opportunities for Misseriyya, who work either as middlemen or small traders. Trade in wood, the most profitable commodity in the market, is controlled by the Jallaba (formerly pastoralist) group, while the clothing market is dominated by Fur and Zaghawa groups.
Urban migration
The large number of rural markets and the increasing mobility of people between these markets have created strong trade links between rural and urban areas. The concentration of services, especially health, education and governmental services, in the main urban centres of Muglad, Babanousa, El Fula and Debab has made these centres magnets for migration from rural areas. This mobility has been enhanced by improvements in the road system made by the oil industry. Although people complain bitterly about the poor quality of the roads, there are now, for the first time, daily buses linking Muglad and El Fula to Khartoum. Developments in telecommunications and satellite systems have drastically improved links between rural communities and the wider world.
Whilst movement to local urban centres has increased, migration abroad appears to have fallen off substantially in the last decade. During the 1980s and early 1990s, migration to Saudi Arabia and Libya in particular was common among the Misseriyya, who mostly found work as camel-herders in these countries. Consultations with communities indicated that, in the 1990s, membership of the PDF provided a viable economic alternative for the majority of such migrants, and migratory flows declined as a result. The end of the war has however curtailed this critical source of income for the Misseriyya.
The war economy
The war economy constituted an important part of the Misseriyya livelihood system for nearly two decades. Although it is difficult to assess the number of Misseriyya youth in the PDF and the economic gains they attained thereby, throughout the fieldwork it was stressed that the great majority of youth were involved in the PDF and were highly paid. PDF militias were also involved in a wide range of legal and illegal trade, including a flourishing trade in weapons, smuggling and looting of animals and goods.
The signing of the CPA cut short the war economy. The PDF has been formally dismantled, although militiamen have not been disarmed or helped to re-enter civilian life. As a result, many are now resorting to crime. The lack of employment opportunities in the oil sector has added to the frustration among this group, and is at the heart of the insecurity affecting the region.
The oil industry
Extensive petroleum exploration began in Sudan in the mid-1970s, but it was not until October 2000 that commercial quantities of oil began to be exported. Today, oil is the single most important export industry in Sudan. Available data suggests that oil accounts for more than 90% of Sudan's total exports, with the primary importers being Japan, China, South Korea, Indonesia and India. Between 2001 and 2005, oil exports grew at an average annual rate of 32%. Exports of other commodities grew on average by only 18.6%.
Most of Sudan's oilfields and known reserves are located in the Muglad and Melut rift basins. Commercial reserves were estimated at 3 billion barrels in December 2006 (Table 1). Oilfields are linked to the country's refineries via pipelines. The largest pipeline belongs to the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). It runs across the Misseriyya area from Heglig to Port Sudan. The pipeline was opened in 1999 and is operated by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has a 40% stake in the GNPOC. The other two lines are the Petrodar pipeline, which extends 1380 km from the Palogue oilfield in the Melut Basin to Port Sudan, and the El Fula pipeline (428 km), which connects the El Fula oilfields in Dar Misseriyya (Block 6) to the refinery in Khartoum.
| Total | Remaining | |
|---|---|---|
| Blocks 1, 2 & 4 (GNPOC) | 1,686,000 | 983,000 |
| Blocks 3 & 7 (PDOC) | 803,000 | 779,000 |
| Block 5A (WNPOC-1) | 175,000 | 168,000 |
| Block 6 (CNPC/S) | 331,000 | 299,000 |
| Total | 2,995,000 | 2,229,000 |
| Key: GNPOC is the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company; PDOC is the Petrodar Operating Company; WNPOC is the White Nile Petroleum Operating Company; CNPC is the China National Petroleum Company. | ||
| Source: European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), 2007. |
The Muglad Basin is located in the heart of the Misseriyya area and covers approximately 120,000 square kilometres. It contains a number of hydrocarbon accumulations, the largest of which are the Heglig and El Fula oilfields. The first discoveries were made by Chevron near Muglad town in the 1960s and 1970s. After Chevron suspended its activities in the mid-1980s, oil exploration in the Muglad Basin was halted until February 2008. Like other communities affected by oil exploration, there is profound, pervasive unhappiness in Dar Misseriyya about the impact of the industry on the local economy, and the marginal benefits received from oil extraction, both in terms of labour opportunities and development inputs. Oil extraction has generated competition and disputes over land, and has contributed to large-scale deforestation. In the hope of receiving compensation from the oil companies (so far paid largely on an individual basis), a number of people around El Fula have started to cut down vast tracts of forest and fence the empty areas with zaribat hawa (literally ‘air fences’: fenced off enclosures usually created by settled farmers on grazing land either as new farm plots or as a reserve pasture for their animals or for the sale of the grasses). This has destroyed grazing resources and led to tensions with pastoralists.Figure 1.
Pastoralists believe that the oil industry has contaminated water supplies and pastures, and say that their cattle are suffering as a result, especially as regards fertility. Their anger is palpable. So far, the authorities have refused to allow studies to determine the environmental impact of the oil industry, despite repeated requests by local people. Spontaneous efforts by local government technical departments to analyse the environmental impact of oil extraction have been immediately and robustly halted. Despite the absence of hard data, locals are convinced that oil companies have destroyed rangeland, and that most cattle losses experienced in the last few years are due to oil pollution. Polluted water is said to have become a threat to animal health in Heglig, Defra and Sitaib, with livestock numbers decreasing steadily since drilling began. Community leaders in Muglad stated that representatives of the oil companies had publicly admitted that the water in these areas was not good for animals. A local, unauthorised study conducted in 2008 (Khaleel 2008) listed 21 negative impacts of oil on the environment, livestock and human population in the area, including signs of boreholes drying up, water becoming toxic and malodorous (e.g. in Defra, Firdos and Abu Gabra, as reported during the study), large-scale deforestation, contamination of pastures and soil, the dispersal of naphtha, a by-product of the oil industry which is toxic to humans and animals, the emergence of complex and previously unknown diseases among livestock and increased conflict between pastoralists and farmers due to reduced access to land.
People are also angry about the impact of the roads built by the oil companies, alleging that water accumulates on roadsides because of poor drainage, creating swampy areas. They say that oil is having a deleterious effect far outside the actual concessions, with the alteration of the drainage system caused by oil drilling and road construction drying up even Lake Keilak. Depressions such as Abu Kadma and Danbaloiya, used as seasonal water sources, are also said to be endangered.
Communities feel that they have not been adequately compensated for the damage the oil sector has inflicted on their economy. A common complaint is that the few boreholes drilled by the oil companies amount to ‘peanuts’. Compensation is seen as paltry and wholly incommensurate with the resources extracted and the environmental damage done. The few awards that have been made are said to have more to do with patronage than any genuine effort to redress grievances. Misseriyya youth say they have not been given the educational opportunities and technical training that would give them access (in theory) to jobs in the oil sector. This is one of the most important grievances, as will be discussed later.
Services
Despite some recent investment in service infrastructure by oil companies and government departments, access to services remains extremely limited in Dar Misseriyya, especially in rural areas.
Health facilities in the five Administrative Units of Abyei mahallia are limited to a single hospital in Muglad, with limited capacity and a lack of trained personnel. Most Primary Health Centres (PHCs) are not functioning or, if they are, have no drugs. There are no doctors at all in Sitaib Administrative Unit. At 98 deaths per 1000 live births, rates of infant and maternal mortality are far higher in Southern Kordofan than in neighbouring Northern Kordofan (and Sudan as a whole). Mortality among under-fives is estimated at 142/1000. In Muglad, where soldiers, militiamen and traders come into contact with a large number of commercial sex workers, people fear what they say is the growing incidence of HIV and AIDS. Neither testing nor treatment is available.
In towns such as Debab, greater investment in school facilities is apparent and the number of children enrolled, including girls, has been steadily increasing. Few permanent buildings however were observed outside the main centres of Muglad, Debab, Keilak, Meiram and Sitaib, and, even where they were evident, problems were reported with high fees and inadequate nutrition. Outside the towns, education services are very limited and illiteracy rates high, especially among pastoralists. Enrolment levels are low, and most nomadic children are de facto denied access to education. This is becoming increasingly problematic as pastoralist communities develop a strong new interest in education, aware that they have no alternative but to prepare their children for new livelihoods. While wealthier pastoralists have started to invest in their children's future, paying for the brightest to be schooled away from home in urban centres, middle-income and poor pastoralists cannot afford the loss of labour within the household. Many children enter school late, around the age of eight or nine years old, when they are considered old enough to walk the long distances from nomadic camps to towns or villages, and drop out after a few years when they fail to catch up with their peers. The closure of boarding schools for nomadic children in the late 1970s is blamed for creating two generations of illiterate youth. The piloting of nomadic schools by UNICEF and the Ministry of Education has had limited success because of a lack of teachers and teaching materials. People believe that more could be done to make mobile schooling more viable, but the overwhelming preference is for the reopening of boarding facilities in key locations. The two are not mutually exclusive: primary education could be provided through a greater number of mobile schools or the establishment of schools in key locations along transhumance routes, with a special school calendar to suit pastoral movement.
The greatest number of complaints concerned the absence of sufficient and sustainable water development in the region. Many of the wells drilled by the oil companies to compensate for the damage allegedly caused by their activities are reported to have a short operational life. At the most basic level, boreholes are being built to the wrong specifications. Compounding the problem, the community development projects implemented by oil companies are seldom coordinated with the technical departments of the ministries in El Fula. As a result, boreholes and other services are not maintained and quickly collapse. The potential for water harvesting (micro-catchment dams), a more sustainable and environmentally friendly solution than boreholes and hafirs, is grossly underexplored.
The lack of animal health services is another source of significant frustration. This includes vaccination services, which are said to be unreliable, veterinary clinics and drugs. Clinics are particularly important to fight the diseases allegedly generated by the contamination of water and pasture. In Sitaib, for instance, no vaccination campaign has been conducted for the last two years because of insecurity (last year the campaign was halted because the ministry vehicle was attacked), and no livestock vaccines are available in the market. This also has an impact on trade, as uncertified livestock cannot be sold.
The lack of services has a particularly severe impact on women, especially nomadic women, whose lives are particularly hard. In towns, women have better access to water, firewood and grinding mills, and many have become engaged in petty trade to complement household income. Illiteracy rates among women are extremely high both in rural and urban areas despite the increasing enrolment of girls in urban centres. Women comment that greater access to education for girls has already had a positive impact by helping to reduce the incidence of early marriage. The lack of boarding facilities in Muglad prevents girls from progressing to secondary education.
Women in urban centres and small towns expressed a strong desire to improve their skills in agriculture and other income-generating activities, to have access to adult literacy ‘so that we can write our names’, and to be supported with credit to set up or expand their businesses. In rural areas, nomadic women emphasised the critical importance of increasing access to all basic services, particularly health and water. In both rural and urban centres a high incidence of female-headed households was reported, as many women had lost their husbands during the war. Many stressed that they felt threatened by increasing insecurity in the region, and feared a return to war.
Evolving tensions in Dar Misseriyya: current dynamics
The crisis experienced by the Misseriyya livelihood system is driving new political developments that are increasing tensions in the area. The area is currently in political turmoil. The Misseriyya perceive themselves as the victims of both war and peace. Their recruitment into the PDF during the war, as the backbone of the force, is widely seen to have eroded their historical relationship with the Dinka, while increasing militarisation among their youth. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is said to have increased insecurity and unemployment by depriving people of access to key resources in the South (pasture, water and the war economy) without any concomitant political gain. Among youth, the government's dismantling of the PDF without any compensation is seen as an act of betrayal, leaving former members unable to provide for their families. People see access to employment in the oil sector as a right, and are angered by the lack of labour and economic opportunities in the sector.
The Misseriyya are also suffering a leadership crisis. There is palpable mistrust both of traditional leaders and Misseriyya political leaders. Misseriyya society appears to be highly fragmented and people are uncertain about their future. There is an overwhelming feeling of helplessness across most sectors of society, and a widespread perception that only a return to armed confrontation will improve their lot. Signs of insecurity and instability are apparent across the region. If the Misseriyya predicament is not seriously and energetically addressed, the possibility of another ‘Darfur-like’ descent into violence cannot be discounted.
Main actors
The Shahama
The Shahama movement – Shahama means ‘valiant’ in Arabic – emerged in 2004. It is largely made up of young people, including those from nomadic communities. The Islamist-oriented group appears to have a substantial following. Shahama was founded by Musa Ali Mohamedain, a Misseriyya and a member of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) of Hassan al-Turabi. The government claims that Shahama is part of a strategy of destabilisation, and has from the outset accused the Darfur rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of being behind it. After Musa Ali's death in November 2004, his younger brother, Mohammed Bahr Ali Hamadain, took over the leadership, and soon after was named head of JEM's Kordofan ‘sector’ and deputy to JEM Chairman Dr Khalil Ibrahim. Hamadain was arrested and sentenced to death in May 2008, following the JEM's attack on Omdurman, although it is thought that the government will not carry out the sentence in order to avoid a backlash in Dar Misseriyya. Most Shahama activists followed Hamadain in joining the JEM. Many, reportedly including Hamadain himself, were however soon disappointed by what they saw as a lack of genuine concern by the JEM for the Misseriyya.
There are no clear boundaries between Shahama and other militarised groups. Most of its adherents are said to belong to the Awlad Kamil Darin Sheba Zarqa wa Hamra, one of the most militant groups in Dar Misseriyya. During the civil war they were the backbone of the PDF. Almost all are said to be illiterate. A number of Misseriyya leaders are thought to want to isolate Shahama for fear of seeing Dar Misseriyya become ‘a second Darfur’. At the local level, however, Shahama remains both strong and popular.
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
From its inception JEM has had a presence outside Darfur, in Kordofan, East Sudan, Gezira and Blue Nile. Interviewed early in 2008, shortly after his selection as JEM deputy chairman, Hamadain claimed that the majority of Misseriyya supported the JEM, arguing that the government had abused the Misseriyya in 20 years of war in southern Sudan, and that the SPLA had no clear vision about Kordofan.
The JEM has been active in Dar Misseriyya since 2005, with a strong presence in the weekly markets along the border with South Darfur. In December 2006, the group (under the name National Redemption Front) attacked the Abu Jabra oilfield on the Darfur–Kordofan border, assisted by local Misseriyya with knowledge of the area. The following August, the group attacked a police barracks in Wad Banda, killing 41 people. In September 2007, armed men attacked three Ministry of Agriculture vehicles south of Muglad, instructing their passengers to convey the message that their group was affiliated to the JEM. In October 2007, the Chinese-run Hajlil oilfield in the Defra concession was targeted in what Hamadain called a message to the Chinese companies in particular. Another Chinese-run oilfield was attacked in December 2007.
Although recruitment among Misseriyya has been significant, the JEM's presence in Kordofan has divided the Misseriyya. Following the attack on the police barracks in August 2007, the Misseriyya Union condemned the action as ‘barbaric’, demanded that JEM confine its war to Darfur and called on all Misseriyya to oppose it. In November 2007, a new group calling itself the ‘Army of the Revolutionary Movement for the Restoration of Justice in South Kordofan’, headed by a Misseriyya government supporter, Abdu Adam Al Ansari, said that rebellion in Darfur had caused huge destruction, and warned the JEM against conducting military activities in Kordofan. The group said that it was ready to confront any aggression against Kordofan in collaboration with other national forces.
Non-aligned ex-PDF fighters
An unquantifiable (but reportedly high) number of former PDF fighters is becoming increasingly organised. This group is armed and fiercely critical of the government for exploiting Misseriyya youth during the war and leaving them without compensation or alternative livelihoods in its aftermath. They have a number of key grievances, chief among them the government's refusal to acknowledge membership of the PDF as meeting the requirement for military service. Without a military service certificate it is impossible to access jobs, and oil companies exploit this loophole to justify their refusal to employ local youth in any significant numbers. PDF veterans were promised involvement in the disarmament and demobilisation programme in March 2007, but in early 2009 they were still waiting to be included. Veterans, a well-trained group, have claimed responsibility for attacks on roads from Muglad and El Meiram to Debab.
The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
Attracted by the prospect of regular salaries, a number of ex-PDF fighters joined the SPLA, including several young officers, some of them from wealthy backgrounds, as well as the impoverished rank and file. According to some reports, around 13,000 Misseriyya fighters joined the SPLA in 2006, with a further 10,000 joining from the Debab camp. It is believed that the SPLA sought to recruit Misseriyya and Rizeigat militia as a fifth column or advance guard in the event of a resumption of hostilities with the National Congress Party (NCP). The SPLA used Debab as a recruiting station, aiming for one battalion (600–800 men). Thousands turned up, chiefly because of the US$150 monthly pay on offer. The NCP argued that the recruitment was a violation of the CPA and sent an army unit to confront the SPLA, which eventually backed down. In September 2007, around 1500 prospective recruits were accepted and moved to the Pariang area, just south of the North–South border. Led by Hassan Hamid, a former PDF commander from the Misseriyya Humr sub-tribe, they were told that they would be trained and integrated into the SPLA.
Some observers explain the movement towards the SPLA as a tactic by the Misseriyya to strengthen their position rather than as a principled commitment to the group. The prime interest of the Misseriyya is to preserve their cattle wealth and access to critical resources, and to this end alliances are reportedly being used strategically.
Shamam
The Shamam movement originated in El Fula, the former capital of West Kordofan before it was merged with South Kordofan. It largely comprises opposition party members (Umma Party, Popular Congress Party, Ba'ath Party, Communist Party of Sudan, and others) and intellectuals, and seeks a peaceful resolution of the issues at stake. The movement is seen as elitist, and is thought to have links with Turabi's Popular Congress Party.
The Native Administration
The Native Administration is criticised by all parties for being excessively politicised and no longer reflecting tribal structures and interests. Native administrators are today seen as government officials who are more accountable to the government than the people. Mostly based in towns, including Khartoum, they are criticised for ‘not being with their people’ and failing to represent their interests, in particular those of the nomads. Youth representatives in Muglad accused the Native Administration of looking down on them and referring to them in disparaging terms. They believed that the Native Administration did not represent the views of the tribe, but felt that it could have an important role to play if it were neutral and apolitical. Young people felt that the role of the Native Administration should be enhanced and administrators given a greater say in social and tribal matters. To ensure impartiality, all interviewees felt that administrators should be selected by communities democratically, rather than, as at present, being appointed by the government – a radical change the government is currently unwilling to contemplate.
‘Youth’
‘Youth Mechanism for Development and Follow Up’ (known as ‘Youth’) emerged in 2008. It claims to comprise educated Misseriyya youth, including lawyers, government officials, and business people. In late 2007 its leaders presented President Omar al-Bashir with a list of 52 demands focused on the lack of services and employment opportunities. Bashir pledged support and set up a body to follow up on their requests, chaired by the then head of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in Khartoum. With very few of their demands met, however, the rank and file of ‘Youth’ felt that their leaders had capitulated to the government and were rethinking their stance. Mistrust of the government, described by one supporter as a ‘vulture which comes to you only when it sees carcasses’, is widespread, and most believe that ‘the gun is the only choice’. Many are reportedly ready to take up arms, arguing that they have tried to solve their problems peacefully and now have no option but to seek a ‘Darfur-like solution’. ‘Youth’ militants are seeking alliances both with the SPLA and the JEM. There is a widespread feeling that ‘Youth’ would win the backing of PDF veterans and nomads if its members turned to armed confrontation. The perception is that political parties and tribal leaders could not afford to oppose a popular groundswell and would be compelled to support an action by a group that enjoys more legitimacy than the illiterate militiamen of the old PDF.
The government/National Congress Party
Resentment against the government is so widespread that it is common to hear even children chanting anti-government slogans. There is a general collapse of governance, with the government unable or unwilling to ensure security. In protest, the Misseriyya have refused to pay livestock taxes since 2005 and the government has been unable to force them to do so. In October 2008, the civil service went on strike because their salaries were not being paid. There is a widespread perception that corruption is rife. Allegations of corruption have also undermined the Western Kordofan Development Authority. This body, created in the wake of the CPA, is based in Khartoum and has no presence or impact on the ground. There is no clarity about its annual budget, income or expenditure.
The failure to honour the wealth-sharing stipulations in the CPA has become a major source of discontent and frustration, and Misseriyya communities are demanding the 2% share in oil revenues that should be allocated to Southern Kordofan State. According to the 2007 wealth-sharing report, Southern Kordofan State's share for January–April 2007 was US$5.39 million. Very little of this appears to have been spent on initiatives to improve the livelihoods of the Misseriyya (or other groups in the state, for that matter).
The impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
The demarcation of the boundary of the Abyei area has proved to be the most intractable issue in the implementation of the CPA until the recent decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in July 2009, which has been upheld by both parties. Dinka Ngok leaders in Abyei welcomed the PCA decision, and they now refer to the Abyei area as ‘Dinka Ngok’ territory. Misseriyya leaders have also officially accepted the decision despite protests in Muglad by a number of Misseriyya. In August the Presidency issued five decrees promulgating the decision of the Court. The implementation of the PCA decision by the National Congress Party and Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Abyei Administration and tribal leaders however presents significant challenges.
The Misseriyya fear that the implementation of the ruling will endanger their livelihood strategies even further. They maintain that the SPLM has already sought to restrict or complicate their traditional movement to the south across the Bahr al-Arab by imposing time restrictions, requesting that they travel unarmed, blocking migration routes and levying taxes. As the Misseriyya see it, the CPA strengthened the Dinka and gave them a government which speaks on their behalf. Although the CPA guarantees the right of the Misseriyya to access pastureland south of the Bahr al-Arab, in the last two years they have had to pay heavy taxes to access the South. In 2008, most Misseriyya cattle stayed north of the Bahr al-Arab, where they suffered from a shortage of water and grazing. Although large livestock owners have managed to access the river in recent years by paying taxes to SPLA troops, having to pay taxes to the SPLA (or the government of Southern Sudan [GOSS], the boundary between the two being unclear in the fields of Abyei) is a sore issue for the Misseriyya. Misseriyya pay SPLA soldiers one to two calves per herd, depending on negotiation and acceptance of the offer by the soldiers. In 2007 Misseriyya crossing Bahr al-Arab through Unity state reported paying the SPLA SDG15,000 (Sudanese pounds). The Misseriyya Fallaita sub-tribal group already pays taxes to the government of Southern Kordofan State in El Fula, while the Misseriyya Ajayra sub-group has been refusing to pay taxes because of the lack of services. Neither group wants to incur double taxation by paying taxes to GOSS, but livestock owners are resigned to offering some payment in the interim in order to be able to access the river while a more acceptable solution is sought.
Traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution can no longer be relied upon in negotiating with the Dinka for access to the South. With the Native Administration so politicised, the old ways would now require the involvement of senior NCP and GOSS representatives. The Native Administration would not be accepted as a credible mediator. The government is aware of the tensions and is concerned that the situation may get out of hand. Despite a number of violent attacks along the main roads, it has however chosen not to react violently and to invest in dialogue, which seems to have led to some progress with some groups. There are reports of a rapprochement between elements of the NCP and former Misseriyya PDF groups (including renewed military support). There is a danger that these groups may exploit the general feeling of uneasiness about the 2011 referendum in Abyei amongst Misseriyya groups.
Relations with neighbours
Despite a renewed dialogue with the centre, there is a feeling of deep insecurity in much of Dar Misseriyya. Tension is particularly high between the Misseriyya Feyarin Awlad Jibril and the Rizeigat on the Southern Kordofan/South Darfur border, where clashes between the two groups left hundreds dead in May 2009. Relations between the Misseriyya and the Nuba to the east of the state are also strained, with sporadic clashes between Misseriyya Zuruq and Abu Junuk Nuba in the Lagawa area and tension in the Shatt ed-Dammam, Keiga and Buram areas. To the south, relations are difficult with most of the neighbouring tribes, though interaction with the Nuer and the Dinka Malwal is said to be less confrontational than with the Dinka Ngok.
There is deep concern about the easy availability of weapons (beyond those carried to protect livestock). Weapons are on wide display among communities in the Sitaib Administrative Unit, especially in areas bordering Darfur and in market towns like Sammoa. Links with the rebellion in Darfur are evident, and in several quarters considered desirable. Given this background, together with the JEM's activism and the deep and widespread grievances among the Misseriyya, it is critical that all possible efforts are made to prevent another escalation of violence.
Conclusions
While the process of livelihood adaptation described above has been under way since the early 1980s, the pace of change has accelerated dramatically since the signing of the CPA. Misseriyya pastoralists continue to consider their mobility of paramount importance, but some of their leaders stress the importance of settlement. It is important to note that such statements seem to prevail among leaders who are furthest removed from the grassroots. The characteristics of the ecosystem in which the Misseriyya live would not make settlement feasible or sustainable without substantial investment in the medium to long term. Experience from other dryland areas in Africa shows that settlement strategies are only successful if they are developed as part of a long-term process involving a gradual shift away from a cattle-based economy and lifestyle brought about by education and the development of other livelihoods opportunities for succeeding generations. But time is a luxury the Misseriyya do not have: 2011 gives southern Sudan the right to secede, and the Misseriyya fear that this could deprive them of large areas of land central to their livelihoods. It is essential to put in place, now, a number of interventions to address their immediate concerns, sustain a process of diversification in the medium to long term and lessen the likelihood of conflict.
Urgent action is needed to provide assistance on the scale required to help restore confidence in the peace process, both in Dar Misseriyya and in Abyei. Interventions should focus on pastoralist livelihoods and on alternative strategies for those who have abandoned the livestock economy, risk dropping out of the sector or willingly pursue alternative livelihood strategies, in an effort to support the transformation and adaptation of Misseriyya livelihoods in a sustainable manner and avoid the risk that frustrated and destitute youth could be further manipulated for political gain.