Introduction
At the time of writing this piece in early 2010, Ethiopia's next general election, scheduled for May 2010, is only a few months away. As a result, this article is a pre-electoral assessment, written in the knowledge that the piece will appear shortly after the elections. However, even at this time it is clear that tensions are extremely high in the run-up to the election. Numerous opposition politicians have recently been arrested, with one facing life in prison, accused of plotting against the state. Both government and opposition leaders are expressing concern about the potential for election-related violence. As one of the vaunted ‘third wave democracies’, Ethiopia's democratic tradition is not only historically shallow, but also largely procedural. Like so many post-1991 democracies, Ethiopia occupies a political middle ground, caught between old authoritarianism on the one hand, and a robust democracy, with its checks and balances, on the other. Ethiopia's 2010 election will either allow for the consolidation of this democratic transition, or, as is much more likely, will prove to be an empty exercise serving only to reverse the democratic gains of the last 19 years.
Ethiopia's last general election in 2005 was a sobering experience for the ruling party. At times it looked as though the government would be the latest regime to fall victim to one of the ‘colour-coded revolutions’ so fashionable at the time, such as Georgia's red, Ukraine's orange or Kyrgyzstan's pink revolutions. The aftermath of the disputed election was also an eye-opener for Ethiopia's opposition coalition. The weeks following the election saw nearly 200 protesters killed in the streets by security forces, and more than 40 opposition leaders arrested, convicted of taking part in ‘acts against the constitutional order’ and sentenced to life in prison, including the mayor of Addis Ababa, Berhanu Nega. Most were pardoned months later. The two main opposition coalitions quickly collapsed due to differences between the leaders and, more importantly, due to differences in their visions of how to move forward politically. Even without the backdrop of the 2005 election protest and subsequent deaths the 2010 election would have been problematic; however the events five years ago make the likelihood of a truly free and fair election minimal.
A history of uncontested elections
Ethiopia's political transition, like that of so many other African states, began in the early 1990s. With the defeat of the Marxist military dictatorship of the Derg, the country entered a new era, full of democratic promise. Under both the imperial government of Haile Selassie and the Derg, the ruling elite closely stage-managed electoral processes, despite efforts by students and grassroots movements to bring about meaningful social and economic reforms (Smith 2008, p. 7). After 1991, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), dominated by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), made radical changes to the Ethiopian state, culminating in the drafting of a new constitution and the implementation of a federal state structure, based on ethno-linguistic affiliation. At its inception the Experiment with Ethnic Federalism was a novel approach to democracy and power sharing; however accusations of corruption, gross human rights violations and ethnic politicking have detracted from the system's appeal.
Despite the establishment of a multiparty system, the TPLF/EPRDF has remained the pre-eminent political force in Ethiopia for the past 19 years. This in of itself is not a problem; however, the manner in which the TPLF/EPRDF maintains this position is. Since coming to power in 1991 the TPLF/EPRDF has conducted three general elections, in 1995, 2000 and 2005. Unsurprisingly the ruling party won each contest by a landslide, with the exception of the more competitive 2005 election. However, it must be acknowledged that when it came to power in 1991, the TPLF/EPRDF coalition was popular. The 1995 election was largely uncontested, with the most significant national parties withdrawing due to claims of intimidation and electoral irregularities. Harassment and intimidation of opposition supporters occurred throughout Amhara, Oromiya and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR). In its heartland in Tigray, the TPLF recruited ‘independent’ candidates to avoid the impression of a non-competitive election (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2009, p. 8).
The 2000 election marked a watershed in the growth of organised political opposition. Although several opposition parties boycotted the election, 17 parties including the All-Amhara People's Organization (AAPO), the Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) and the Oromo National Congress (ONC) did participate (US State Department 2002). In 2000 the TPLF/EPRDF won majorities both at the federal and all-regional parliaments (African Elections Database 2000).
Opposition parties also won approximately 30% of the votes in the Addis Ababa region council and 9.5% the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS). According to international and local observers, the 2000 national elections were generally free and fair in most areas; however, serious election irregularities were reported in numerous opposition strongholds (US State Department 2002).
As support for the TPLF/EPRDF dwindled, particularly in urban areas, due to perceived favouritism and divisive politics, the TPLF/EPRDF began to crack down on opposition and revoked the few privileges they had. Numerous opposition figures were detained, and human rights monitoring bodies and journalists were also targeted. Naturally, as their support withered so too has TPLF/EPRDF's confidence in winning free and fair elections. During the build-up to the May 2005 election, under intense pressure not only domestically but also internationally, the TPLF/EPRDF was forced to open up the political space. In this way the May 2005 election was an unknown for the government. Sources within the ruling party stated that they expected to win the election with a reduced majority, but a majority nonetheless.
The 2005 election
The May 2005 election represented a substantial change. By 2004, opposition political parties had formed several coalitions. The TPLF/EPRDF allowed a more open process than in 2000 – a gamble on their part, based on the belief that more competitive elections would showcase democratic credentials for the donor community (ICG 2009, p. 8). The TPLF/EPRDF had cast itself as a rural party representing the interest of rural Ethiopians, who made up the vast majority of potential votes, in the hopes that strong rural support would win it the election. The gamble failed spectacularly, as two major opposition coalitions were able to capitalise on discontent with the regime. The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), established shortly before the election and chaired by Hailu Shawel, a well-known engineer, former politician and leader of the All-Amhara People's Organization (AAPO), united a number of parties.1 It fielded candidates nationwide but drew its strength primarily from urban, educated Amharas. The opposition United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) was a coalition of five domestic2 and nine exiled parties.3 Led by Addis Ababa University professors Merera Gudina of the Oromo National Congress (ONC) and Beyene Petros of the Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party (ESDFP), the UEDF domestic parties (but not their more radical exiled members) endorsed ethnic federalism and state land ownership. Its member parties had their stronghold in SNNPR and to a lesser extent Oromiya (ICG 2009, p. 8).
The main political parties, TPLF/EPRDF, UEDF, CUD, and the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) campaigned on specific policy positions (Smith 2008, p. 8). The relative success of opposition political parties (largely owing to the performance of these parties in the inter-party debates with the incumbent that were transmitted live on radio and TV) after a relatively short organising period indicated not only openness in the political process, which to the credit of the TPLF/EPRDF was unprecedented in the country's modern history, but also the growing resentment toward the TPLF/EPRDF which had been building for some time (Smith 2008, p. 8). Although the latter still exists, the political space in Ethiopia is more closed than it was in 2005. In 2005, EPRDF and opposition parties reached an agreement on a formula to allocate access to important state-controlled media sources, including TV and print media. In the days before the election, large political rallies were well attended and peaceful. None of these provisions have been repeated in the run-up to the 2010 election.
Despite the expulsion of several international-observer missions, the African Union, the European Union, and the Carter Center observers strengthened the hand of local observers and added legitimacy to the exercise. Voter turnout was unusually high, and observer missions reported only minor irregularities, particularly in urban areas. The opposition was able to win 172 seats in the 547-seat House of Peoples' Representatives, while the EPRDF took 372 seats (African Elections Database 2000). By all accounts the scale of the urban setbacks in 2005 was unsurprising to the ruling party, but the rural swing to the opposition did cause surprise. The main opposition parties disputed the final results and the National Election Board investigations. With the ruling party and the main opposition parties all claiming victory, violence became widespread. Demonstrations in early June and again in late October and early November led to violent crackdowns by security forces and the deaths of 193 civilians and six security officers, and the arrests of tens of thousands of others.
A key factor in the 2005 election was donor community assistance to the electoral process. In fact in the period between the 2000 and 2005 elections, the donor community poured more than US$20 million into democracy and democracy-related projects. This was on top of the more than US$6 million in direct assistance for the 2005 election (Fikreyesus 2007). In this way the donor community played a critical role in levelling the playing field and creating a democratic environment under which the 2005 elections were contested. In recognition of the fact that the Ethiopian government passed a host of new legislation aimed at not only closing the political space, but also curtailing the ability of NGOs (known in Ethiopia as civil society organisations [CSOs]) to operate and receive funding. To this end on 6 January 2009, the Ethiopian Parliament voted 327 to 79 to pass the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO Law) limiting foreign funding for NGOs working in areas related to human and democratic rights, child and disability rights, gender equality, support to the justice sector and conflict resolution, to less than 10%, and banning lobby groups from certain activities. Although the bill has been revised twice since it was first proposed in May 2008, the version that became law still retains many of the most controversial provisions. Of particular note are the regulations regarding the nationality of CSOs. According to the new law, a charity/society is deemed Ethiopian only if three conditions are fulfilled:
- 1.
It should be formed and controlled by Ethiopians;
- 2.
It must get at least 90% of its assets from Ethiopians;
- 3.
It must be formed in accordance with Ethiopian Law.
The 2010 election
Parties are now preparing for the June 2010 federal and regional elections. A key difference between the 2005 and 2010 election has been the relative political openness which characterised the run-up to the former. Unprecedented levels of voter interest were stimulated by live televised debates, also broadcast on the radio and reported in the state-owned and private press. The debates, organised by the Inter-Africa Group, offered new sources of information for voters. Civil society organisations (CSOs) were quite effective during the critical pre-election phase, through general voter education and information dissemination about the political parties and candidates as well as the electoral process (Smith 2008). The run-up to the current election has seen many of the measures that levelled the playing field between the opposition and government rescinded, and restrictive and in some cases draconian measures imposed.
While support for the TPLF remains relatively high in their Tigrayan stronghold, the TPLF has come to realise that it cannot rule the country with only Tigrayan backing. As a result it has come to increasingly rely on the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF) to govern. Aware of their increased importance within the EPRDF, the OPDO and SEPDF are resisting TPLF interference in their regional states. The Prime Minister has publicly hinted that he has considered stepping down after 2010; however at the seventh party congress, in September 2008 in Awassa, Meles was re-elected, and no official hint was given about a possible successor in 2010 (ICG 2009, p. 14).
As was the case after the 2005 election, splits within the opposition have proven easy to exploit. The most serious fissure is between the ethnic Amhara nationalist bloc and the more federalist Southern and to a lesser extent ethnic Oromo bloc. Attempts to establish a more unified opposition began in earnest in June 2008, with the creation of the Forum for Democratic Dialogue (FDD). The main objective of the movement is to create joint policy goals for a united opposition platform ahead of the election. The FDD was later registered as a political party and united some of the main opposition forces in Ethiopia. Parallel to the formation of the FDD was the creation of a new political alliance by veteran of the 2005 election, Birtukan Mikdesa, a 34-year-old lawyer, single mother and vice-president of the CUD. As the CUD name and symbol were claimed by a competing faction, Birtukan registered a new party under the name Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) in August 2008. The UDJ grew in strength when ex-President Negaso Gidado and veteran TPLF military commander and former Defence Minister Siye Abraha both joined as vice-presidents. Later that year the UDJ joined the FDD, making the FDD perhaps the most important opposition platform.
In the build-up to the election, the TPLF/EPRDF has continued to vilify opposition members. Opposition leader Birtukan Mideksa was rearrested on 29 December 2008, when the presidential pardon that released political leaders from prison in July 2007 was revoked. In April 2009, the authorities issued arrest warrants for 35 people and charged them with conspiring to overthrow the government. In July, the parliament adopted a draconian anti-terrorism bill with a broad definition of terrorist activity that gives security forces extensive powers.
In early 2009, Merera Gudina's OPC left the UEDF and established the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), a coalition with Bulcha Demeska's OFDM. These parties have also joined the FDD. Hailu Shawel's return from exile has also added to the choices voters will have in 2010. Hailu succeeded Professor Asrat Woldeyes as leader of the AAPO in 1999; however a few years later the party split into two factions – the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Party–Medhin. Hailu, who retained control of the AEUP, was instrumental in the formation of the CUD coalition, in which AEUP was a major player. After the post-election violence, Hailu Shawel was one of a host of opposition leaders arrested. He was later released after a public confession and apology. He then became embroiled in a leadership struggle in the CUD, the end result of which was the government-run National Election Board awarding the CUD name and party symbol to a dissident faction, after which he left Ethiopia for the United States. Many thought that this move would signal the end of his political career, but, ever the consummate politician, Hailu returned to Ethiopia and registered his All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), which will contest the 2010 election on its own. The AEUP, CUD and other smaller parties signed an election code of conduct with the TPLF/EPRDF in late 2009. The code of conduct was enacted as a law, but FDD was not involved in the negotiations.
The Forum for Democratic Dialogue, like its predecessors and constituent parts, is riddled with personal rivalries and political differences. Currently the UEDF, CUD, UDJ and OFC and OFDM parties have been able to hold the unwieldy FDD alliance together. For the time being, however, the FDD is a consortium united more by antipathy to the TPLF/EPRDF than by joint positions. The parties cannot even agree on their stance on what are seen in Ethiopia as the Big Three political issues:
- 1.
federalism;
- 2.
relations with Eritrea (some would frame this as access to a port);
- 3.
state ownership of land.
The 2010 election is likely to be a contest of the visions:
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the status quo – represented by the ruling TPLF/EPRDF coalition;
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a reorganised federal state with more powers given to the regional states – UEDF and OFDM;
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a return to a centralised state (for many non-Amhara this is interpreted as a return to an Amhara-dominated centralised state) – represented by elements of Shawel's CUD and the now outlawed Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy, formed in May 2008.
Conclusion
When grouped with similar states, Ethiopia in 2010 looks less like a member of Huntington's vaunted Third Wave of Democracies (1991) and more and more like Fareed Zakaria's semi-democratic Illiberal Democracies (1997). Like other Illiberal Democracies, Ethiopia's most problematic period is the election cycle. During this time the regime is open to higher levels of national and international scrutiny and opposition forces are able to use this to their advantage.
In this way elections have been an ever-present powder keg at the centre of the Ethiopian political scene for some time now. Ethiopia's anciens régimes, from Emperor Haile Selassie, to the Derg and the EPRDF, have utilised elections to add the veneer of credibility and popular support to their governments. Ethiopia's electoral problem, like that of so many other partial democracies, is not the process of balloting, but rather the run-up to the election itself (Diamond 2002, Lust-Okar 2006). Disenfranchisement of large blocks of voters and the absence of the basic elements of free and fair elections have been and will continue to be two major similarities between the 2010 and 2005 elections.
Important social divisions exist alongside policy divisions in the opposition and the ruling coalitions. There is a divide between rural and urban communities, as well as a division among ethnic and religious communities. Thus, it is fairly pointless to speak of the ‘Ethiopian Electorate’ at this juncture; rather one must be cognisant of views of several electorates. While this level of fracture is not unique in Africa, the Ethiopian elections show its potential for violence when combined with winner-take-all political systems, the exact system that federalism was supposed to replace.
The 2010 election will not see national dialogue on contentious issues, particularly those related to specific controversial provisions of the Constitution, such as ethnic federalism and state ownership of land. Pre-election debates in 2000 and 2005 showed the extent of dissatisfaction with, and at the same time support for, the post-1991 governance structures. However the election results and the subsequent crackdown by security forces served only to stifle that dialogue and debate critical to Ethiopia's future. The ruling party has become increasingly authoritarian, reversing previous democratic gains. The implications for the 2010 election are not promising.
Note on contributor
Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge is Research Fellow in the Peace Studies Department of Bradford University. His research interests are the Horn of Africa and the Caribbean coast of Latin America, and the themes of ethnic conflict; traditional political entities; refugee/IDP and host community issues; indigenous peoples' rights and political participation; decentralisation and issues around power sharing.