Introduction
Analysis of the African state has often placed a great deal of reliance on ready-made categories; state failure has been seen as endemic, with the polarity being an over-optimistic belief that sustainable new forms of democracy are emerging. While there may be agreement on the largely negative role the state has played in development, often this masks the belief that outside intervention is the key to overcoming such fragility, i.e. how to police the ‘badlands’, and who is best equipped to do it using a combination of soft and hard power.
Many African states struggle to reconcile traditional social institutions with the precepts of nation-state democracy within previously colonial borders. Because the colonial state was primarily concerned with maintaining the domination of colonial authority, post-colonial states have inherited associated doctrines of impersonal sovereignty, but without the concomitant limitations on state power that have accompanied the evolving metropolitan state structures of the ex-colonial powers themselves. Instead, African states have been bequeathed ‘non-rational’ borders which bear little relation to pre-colonial power or to kinship structures based on a moral universe acknowledging blood ties. Such states have attempted to compensate for underdevelopment, reliance on primary commodities and lack of nationhood or legitimacy by over-centralising political power. Many leaders have used political power to gain economic advantage and deny any spoils to their opponents. Consequently, commitment to basic human rights and tolerance of diversity tend to be severely compromised, and consequently foster polarised resistance and violent conflict. In many instances, these processes have become institutionalised over some five decades of post-colonial political evolution, with a ‘winner-takes-all’ approach entrenching elite-based power struggles that have come to typify the approaches of ruling parties and rebels alike.
This can be analysed as the result of colonial exploitation and inevitable corruption of kinship relations which predated the colonial era and were understood by foreign powers only insofar as they could be used to maintain their external hegemony. But neither the pre-colonial nor the colonial authorities felt the need to justify their existence in terms of meeting the needs of the majority of the population. The corruption of those institutions became particularly important when the initial mobilisation for the nationalist project faltered. Post-colonial political legitimacy then had to be purchased from key constituencies, kinship networks had to be assuaged and the acquiescence of other groups assured by force. The resources of the state became a means to maintain a hold on power through patrimonialism and clientelism. Given the inevitable lack of internal legitimacy, external sources of patronage such as aid and cheap loans became vital. The Cold War saw the opposing powers sustain a large number of dictatorial polities as pawns in a larger game. At times in this era, Somalia saw some of the highest levels of per capita foreign aid from both Soviet and US sources in the world, and it was no coincidence that they, among numerous similarly authoritarian regimes, collapsed when that support dried up.
It is often assumed that this post-colonial history of the state, coupled with subsequent twin processes of structural adjustment and globalisation, fundamentally disabled the African state through the removal of significant instruments of economic sovereignty. In fact, though, the picture is far more complex than this. Both states and peoples have in some instances proven an ability to adapt to these forces in a variety of survivalist ways, rather than simply succumbing to them. The problem persists, and even such adaptive patterns are unlikely to be developmental in the sense that they could devise or support intentional programmes aimed at bringing significant benefit to most of a given population. As the state is unable to provide any meaningful economic relationship with its citizens, so its legitimacy is challenged amid a growth of intrastate conflicts involving racial, religious and ethnic dimensions stemming from fragmenting individual and group identity.
Although African civil society has been important in the unsteady and highly reversible movement towards democratisation, it is a complex phenomenon incorporating both democratic and anti-democratic forces and seems shallower and shorter-lived than hoped for. The same elites have remained in power under the same or slightly wider political and socio-economic arrangements, a situation evidenced in, among other locations, Kenya and Zimbabwe, with possibly Côte d'Ivoire to follow.
The Somali territories, ‘polarities’ and external actors
It is against this background that we examine the view that the unrecognised country of Somaliland bucks these trends with a uniquely home-grown African solution to the problems of the state. Can there be chances for development, the entrenchment of human rights and possible state transformation? During his November 2010 visit to the UK, the newly elected (fourth) President of Somaliland, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud – universally called Silaanyo – leader of one of the former opposition parties, Kulmiye, was questioned by many inside and outside the diaspora about his vision for the development of his country, his plans for further democratisation and for gaining recognition as an independent sovereign state (the latter given some impetus by the South Sudan referendum). His decisive election victory in June 2010 was declared free and fair by international and domestic observers, and the subsequent peaceful handover of power set an important benchmark in how a discursive democratic custom is being gradually melded with the representative institutions of the nation-state. Hopes were high not just that the new government would effect a change from the securocratic and non-transparent practices of former President Rayaale, but also for a change in the nature of the state towards a more interventionist and pro-poor model.
Many see the Somali areas in the Horn of Africa as archetypes of state collapse, insurgent activity and conflict between ‘traditional’, external and Islamist elements. A slightly deeper analysis notes regional differences and particularly the successes of Puntland and Somaliland in securing greater stability than is present in the south. At its most optimistic, this alternate perspective sees Somaliland as an example of successful, indigenous state-building against the chronic failure of externally sponsored initiatives in the south. Indeed such proponents have suggested that lessons from Somaliland could not only be applied in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, but further afield. Much of this is based on easily packaged polarities. In terms of Somali conflict and state-building, the fundamentalist Islamist militia of al-Shabaab is contrasted with the more mercenary forces of warlords and those of the internationally supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). State consolidation in Somaliland, and to a lesser extent Puntland, is contrasted with failure in the south. So what are the potentials for legitimate Somali state formation and how much do outside interventions help or hinder these processes?
Socio-political norms that emphasised the importance of negotiation and compromise have averted a number of crises in recent years. Meanwhile, cautious and fully engaged external interventions have, in marked contrast to efforts in southern Somali areas, been successful in supporting this process, building on local initiatives, resources and traditions and breaking through roadblocks where local negotiations have stalled. Somali custom explicitly creates space in which outsiders may assume constructive roles, with such activities periodically playing a decisive part in resolving significant difficulties (see Walls and Kibble 2010 for more comment on this). Indeed, it is notable that, successful as they have been, the indigenous patterns that provided the basis for both Puntland's and Somaliland's achievements remain incomplete and, despite mythologies to the contrary, continue to rely on external inputs from both non-Somali and diasporic agents. Conversely, it is hard to argue that external interventions in the south have served as anything other than a cumulatively malign influence over the long-term. While external interventions have been spectacularly unsuccessful in some instances, a measured reading of processes to date nevertheless undermines the oft-stated conclusion that ‘Somalis will succeed if only they are left to themselves.’ There is in fact real and substantial evidence that external engagement plays an extensive, varied and sometimes pivotally important role in the Somali context.
In Somaliland's case, the recent presidential elections have increased the likelihood that external powers will grant greater legitimacy to the state as donors and powerful international actors seek to reward the country for a significant consolidation of past democratic gains. There is potential for that role to be positive, provided the Somaliland state proves itself capable of negotiating robustly and in the interests of a broad domestic polity.
Background to Somaliland
The Republic of Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991, after a civil war caused the collapse of the dictatorial Siyaad Barre regime. In doing so, they were announcing the restoration of the independence they enjoyed for several days in 1960, and which was itself based on colonial borders. This represented an end to the territory's allegiance to a greater Somalia. In the late 1990s, Somaliland's political leadership declared a commitment to representative democracy, with local elections in 2002, a presidential election in 2003, and parliamentary elections in 2005 all contributing to that process. This process of representative democratisation has, unsurprisingly, faced numerous problems and obstacles, not least of which was the crisis precipitated by the previous government in attempting to cling to power after 2008 without a legitimate political mandate. The government failed to prepare for elections in a timely fashion, and engaged in blatant politicking aimed at extending the president's term through questionably constitutional avenues. The opposition on several occasions added to the crisis by playing their own political games, and seeming to push the country towards a stand-off that held many of the attributes of the factionalised politics described above. Eventually, though, a return to the discursive traditions of the post-1991 period, assisted by opportune external engagement, enabled a notably successful election.
As constitutionally stipulated, three parties contested the vote: the incumbent presidential and vice-presidential team standing for the United Democratic Peoples' Party (UDUB, the governing party); ex-Somali National Movement (SNM)1 Chair, Ahmed Mohamed ‘Silaanyo’, standing with a new vice-presidential candidate for the opposition party Kulmiye; and Faisal Ali Waraabe leading a ticket put forward by the third party, the Party for Justice and Welfare (UCID).
In spite of a number of relatively minor incidents – the most major of which was a conflict that led to the death of an election official near the village of Kala Baydh in Sool region – the election was a notable success. Turnout around the country varied, and the unreliability of the new voter registration system makes it difficult to give a figure, but polling stations in many locations were busy and were largely peaceful.
The Kulmiye team secured a convincing victory with a margin of 88,000 votes over the incumbent team, fractionally failing to secure a full 50% of the votes cast. The UCID candidates were disappointed with their 18% share of the vote, but all parties accepted the result. The transition from President Rayaale to President Silaanyo took place within the time frame specified in the Constitution, and in remarkably positive mood.
Much of the process that enabled this success, including retreat from serial political crises, has been enabled by an overwhelming public desire to avoid a return to conflict and an accompanying urge to win international recognition (although yoking the two has also proved problematic). The nascent state remains weak and poorly funded, but paradoxically has enjoyed a degree of popular legitimacy exceeding that of many African and other governments. However, until the recent elections, the institutionalisation of a system that combines elements of traditional ‘pastoral’ male democracy in the context of the Westphalian and Weberian nation-state seemed to be starting to unravel. In its place, a personalised ‘securocratic’ approach was gaining the upper hand, with a concomitant fear of debate and criticism. This intolerance of dissent is at odds with Somali tradition more generally, and can be seen as a legacy of the Siyaad Barre regime. However, it remains to be seen how deeply embedded it is as we move into the era of a new government and implementation of new approaches to overcoming the previous stasis in the arenas of justice, further democratisation and development.
Early performance and policy possibilities
There are a number of questions that will determine fundamentally the ways in which traditional institutions interact with the (Western) norms of nation-state democracy. Clan will continue to play a significant yet dynamic role in the political realm, while external actors, from private, public and non-governmental sectors, must also expand their involvement.
On the first day of the new regime, the government delivered on a pledge to abolish the unpopular security committees. Originally established to address urgent issues of security in the wake of the civil war, these committees had been permitted to imprison without trial, and they lay outside any due judicial process. A new National Security Board was established, to provide security, defend borders and fight against terrorism.
There has as yet been no effect on other parts of the judicial system. The judiciary remains ineffective and subject to executive pressure arising from its lack of independence. It is also alleged to be corrupt and non-professional with untrained clerks acting as judges. A seasoned observer described the system as ‘a hell of a mess which will take a lot of cleaning up. It's still based largely on judicial practice under Siyaad Barre – i.e. who has the most money wins.’
The position of women has been another key element in the fight to further and deepen democratisation, and Kulmiye has, as well as its clan base, majority support among women, youth, civil society and diaspora. Activists cautiously welcomed the increase in female cabinet ministers from 5% to 20% but pointed out this still only means two ministers and an assistant minister (although the cabinet has shrunk in size). There is also a woman commissioner on the Human Rights Commission. The new (female) minister for labour and social affairs is, unlike her predecessor, open to dialogue with civil society. Women's groups welcomed these developments, with the umbrella network, Nagaad, promptly submitting an advisory paper on gender issues to the government. However, women's groups are looking for much more tangible progress and this still appears largely distant. There is, for example, little movement on key issues such as proposed 30% quotas for women in parliament.
There has been an improved relationship with civil society. A new Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Act defining roles and responsibilities for NGOs as well as giving them legal protection was signed into being, while a number of new ministers have civil society backgrounds. These include one of the female cabinet members, Zamzam Abdi, now Minister of Higher Education and formerly Executive Director of the Committee of Concerned Somalis (CCS) and ex-Chair of the Somaliland Human Rights Network (SHURONET). The new minister of planning was himself a founding member of the NGO Somali Relief Association (SOMRA) in the UK in the early 1990s, and has spent the past few years working with the private sector hawala (money transfer company), Dahabshiil. Early in his new ministerial role, he held his first coordination meeting with the United Nations and international NGOs, and presented new guidelines for aid coordination. In addition, there is the promise of forums for domestic civil society to engage with government and to monitor performance, including input into the budgetary process.
However, there has also been disquiet over the new NGO law, with aid workers and donors expressing concern that it could undermine international humanitarian work. While the objectives of establishing a legal framework for NGOs, ensuring that their activities are in line with the government's own development priorities and improving accountability and transparency, are sound, much of the wording of the law is ambiguous. Foreign agencies working in Somaliland are particularly worried about Article 35(3), which states: ‘International NGOs shall not become implementers for other international NGOs and UN organisations working in the country.’
While the aim of encouraging international NGOs and UN agencies to work with local partners on projects designed to build domestic capacity is laudable, there are fears that a blanket application of the principle, rather than a case-by-case approach, could drastically restrict overall donor funding. In addition, some programmes require specific technical expertise that is not easily available in-country, meaning that the partnership model is not always realistic.
Before the elections, the (then shadow) foreign minister spoke of taking a far more nuanced approach to Somaliland's neighbours, including pursuing reconciliation with Somalia and Puntland, as well as with other Somali groups and neighbours in the Horn in general. This necessarily requires that Somaliland address specific sensitivities on the question of recognition, on which neighbours remain the key.
In a recent talk in London, one of the authors of this briefing floated the concept of ‘incremental recognition’, in which we suggest that Somaliland leaders engage in confidence-building measures, such as pursuing the possibility of greater engagement with regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) forum. The premise is that this would allow Somaliland itself to assume a more active and self-directing role in the pursuit of recognition, setting modest incremental objectives that are nevertheless achievable and should one day lead to a situation in which full recognition represents mere acceptance of an ipso facto condition. Such an approach would contrast with past tendencies to emphasise recognition as a one-stop solution requiring a single, substantial policy shift on the part of other nations. The new policy seemed to reap rewards with the unexpectedly positive presidential visit to Djibouti, in which President Silaanyo was awarded red-carpet status as if he were a recognised head of state. The long-closed Somaliland Liaison Office in Djibouti was also reopened, marking a shift from the rocky relations between Djibouti and the Rayaale regime. It may be that this change is linked to the new fibre-optic cable coming into Somaliland via Djibouti. A number of government advisers themselves have links with Djibouti, and there were accusations within Somaliland that the agreement had favoured Djibouti against Somaliland interests.
Having initially viewed the new Somaliland government with suspicion, Ethiopia also hosted a Somaliland delegation led by Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. In so doing they indicated a willingness to work with the new administration. Hargeisa has also seen a visit from the new UN Envoy to Somalia, apparently at the invitation of the Norwegian Refugee Council. Significantly, the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub Maalim, also visited Sheikh Veterinary School and met the president, noting that his visit marked a new era in the relationship between IGAD and Somaliland.
However, relations with Puntland have continued to be tense, with the contested sovereignty of areas of Sanaag and Sool complicated by recent accusations from Puntland that Somaliland was harbouring and indeed promoting the ‘terrorist’ Mohamed Said, known as ‘Atom’. Puntland forces had clashed with Atom in the mountainous area of Galgala, and accused Somaliland variously of sending militia to fight alongside him and of sheltering him when he fled. The Somaliland account inevitably differed from this, with senior politicians declaring Atom a terrorist and insisting that the two territories were cooperating over terrorism. These claims were repeated to us when we spoke to the Somaliland president and the foreign minister in London in November 2010. They suggested that the dispute was essentially between the Puntland administration and local clan groups. Since that date, the situation in the border areas with Ethiopia near the town of Buhodle has also deteriorated, with renewed fighting between Somaliland forces and those of a breakaway militia titling themselves SSC (referring to the areas of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, portions of which are claimed by clans opposed to Somaliland) early in 2011, resulting in significant fatalities. The same group was responsible for the election-day clash near Kala Baydh.
A further significant problem lies in the seeming continuation of a position of the Rayaale government in the form of suspicion of and attacks on press freedom. This started with the suspension of the right of the popular Somali cable broadcaster Universal TV to work in Somaliland in retaliation for having ‘treated Somaliland unfairly’. That suspension was subsequently lifted, but was renewed when the broadcaster was caught displaying bodies from southern Somali areas and claiming that they were fatalities of the SSC clashes. The chief editor of the partisan Yool daily newspaper was also threatened by ministers and security personnel for unfavourable coverage. A further instance saw Mohamud Abdi Jama, the editor of the daily newspaper Waaheen,2 sentenced to three years' imprisonment for publishing articles which accused the government of nepotism and an official of having appointed his own clan members to posts.
After spending over a month in prison and as a result of global pressure on the government, Mohamud was granted a presidential pardon and released. He was then awarded the Free Press Africa Award for 2011 at the CNN Multichoice African Journalist of the Year ceremony. However, this did not end condemnation from the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) over continuing intimidation of journalists in Somaliland. On 10 May, a reporter from the Hargeisa-based Haatuf daily newspaper Ahmed Adan Hirsi (known as Ahmed Dheere) was arrested in Berbera, apparently as a result of a complaint against him from the Berbera district commissioner.
Other journalists from the Saxafi, Hargeisa Star, Ogaal and Yool newspapers are also facing charges of criminal defamation – all of which has attracted local and international criticism.
In spite of the fact that the new government media spokesperson is himself an ex-journalist, hopes have now begun to fade that the new administration will fully reverse the tendency of the prior regime to lock up perceived opponents, including journalists, on spurious grounds and for lengthy periods. There remains a significant need for work to fully institutionalise freedom of the media. Specifically, defamation should be reclassified as a civil rather than a criminal offence, while it should be much harder for local governors to initiate the arrest of journalists. Even though the new government is so far less guilty of unreasonable media suppression than its predecessors, some of the actions they have taken still amount to undue harassment.
Further than that, it must be said that hopes for a more intuitive state understanding of the importance of an independent judiciary, press and civil society in comparison to the more securocratic mindset of the last regime have not so far been fully vindicated.
This relates to the wider worries that commentators and people on the street see little evidence of a unifying vision. In the seven months since taking power, the concentration appears to be on reshuffling the institutions and getting rid of supposedly corrupt civil servants, while creating new agencies such as the Anti-Corruption Commission. Essentially some people make the charge that Kulmiye did not have a plan for governing. This line of argument holds that they concentrated too hard on winning the election on an anti-government platform and, despite the high expectations of the population, they are now weighed down by the day-to-day job of governing. One commentator opined that the president seems to be overwhelmed and that he lacks the stamina for the job, relying instead on others to do the work for him.
It is still too early to tell whether such criticism is well founded. Complaints about a lack of vision and unnecessary levels of negativity seem to hold some validity. Too many civil servants were fired for what appeared no fault of their own, other than (inevitable) ties to the prior administration. In the process, competent as well as less-able individuals were lost. Equally, there have been concerning indications that the government has lacked a consistent agenda, with ministers too willing to embark on action at odds with the positions of other members of the executive. It is possible that the anti-media moves described were a manifestation of this tendency.
There is nevertheless donor goodwill. In September 2010, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs announced a new policy on Somaliland that would see ‘aggressive’ engagement with the administrations there and in Puntland (Carson 2010). Given that such engagement is likely to be highly focused on an anti-terrorist/anti-political–Islamist agenda, these words are not necessarily reassuring for Somalis with echoes of the previous use of surrogates to ‘police the badlands’. Can Somaliland try to use this to its own advantage? As it attempts to reach out more actively and to establish a more nuanced approach to international and regional players, increasing international acceptance of Somaliland as an autonomous political entity could assist significantly. The US shift is part of a ‘dual-track’ strategy which will see the United States continue to support the Mogadishu-based Transitional Federal Government (TFG), but which will also result in an increase in direct aid to Somaliland, so the possibility for this and similar adjustments in attitude to result in tangible benefit for Somaliland is real.
Donors have promised to channel an increased proportion of aid directly to Somaliland amid talk of direct budget support for the government. If implemented, which has not yet happened, this would mark a significant shift in donor engagement with Somaliland, contributing materially to the process of incremental recognition mentioned above.
Somaliland has a significant opportunity, given the impending expiry of the mandate of the TFG in the south. The TFG has long represented an explicit obstacle if Somaliland is to extend the depth and breadth of its formal engagement with the international community. Negotiation with donors over their future therefore presents a very real opening for Somaliland, along with those among the international diplomatic community who would like to see a change in the nature of that engagement, to leverage a further and more substantial enhancement in international acceptance of Somaliland.
Conclusion
The election of a fresh administration in Somaliland promised much, and in the first part of its term, the new administration has delivered on some of that promise. Early moves to disband security committees and to improve relations with civil society were welcome, and some successes have been achieved in foreign policy. Set against these advances have been continued harassment of media representatives. Similarly, a policy of unnecessary replacement of civil servants provided fuel to those complaining that the administration was too narrowly focused on clan and political appointment.
There is also some merit to the criticism that the government has failed to display a genuinely coherent leadership for the country. Again, this is an area in which the previous administration was signally poor, so set a low benchmark. It is small comfort therefore that the new government has at least improved on that record. In future, it will need to be far more clear-sighted and long term in its vision if it is to maximise its potential in garnering outside support and in sustaining the momentum for democracy and development.
In terms of understanding the potential and nature of the Somaliland state as a catalyst for transformation, we need to note that in general there has been little perception of the state as a developmental entity. The recent promise, however, of free primary and intermediate education and doubling of teachers' salaries along with those of other public servants, marks a move in that direction, although questions remain over the availability of resources. The focus hitherto has largely been on internal survival in the context of perceived external threat. Such a focus provided the previous regime with a seeming legitimacy to concentrate on stability and use the great desire of the population for post-civil-war peace to entrench itself in power and use that for economic gain – similarly to much of the above analysis of the predatory state. Clan has been the basis of social networks and safety nets, and largely the state has not attempted to capture that role in contrast to the ‘flight from the state’ elsewhere, meaning greater space for social and economic interventions from citizens. Ideas emanating from time to time in the diaspora on the more developmental and interventionist role of the state (but without the resources) may lead to contrasting views within the new government. There is, despite the lack of recognition, a greater than usual internal and external acceptance of the legitimacy of the state and an identification of the great mass of citizens with it (with the exception of the areas bordering Puntland). To that extent, in contrast with large areas of Africa, there does appear to be greater congruence between identity, legitimacy and territory. Rather than the clichéd ‘hybrid’ state combining ‘traditional’ and modernising forces, Somaliland has been shaped by a combination of and conflicts between ‘nightwatchmen’ and securocrats, and democratising and traditional or patriarchal forms. The balance of different social forces that underlie them is also shifting. The support base of Kulmiye appears progressive and developmental, but the moves against the media show that it is entirely possible that state organs can too easily reflect the structural inheritance of the previous regime.
Notes on contributors
Michael Walls's research, consultancy and teaching interests lie in the related areas of development management and governance. He is Director of Research at the Development Planning Unit, University College London, and his doctoral research was in political governance in Somaliland. He is Chair of the Anglo-Somali Society, Somaliland Focus (UK) and Kayd Somali Arts and Culture Ltd.
Steve Kibble works on issues concerning Southern Africa and the Horn for Progressio (formerly the Catholic Institute for International Relations), an international development agency working for justice and the eradication of poverty. He has observed several Somaliland elections as a member of Progressio as well as of Somaliland Focus (UK), of which he was a co-founder. He holds a doctorate on African politics from the University of Leeds. Walls and Kibble were joint coordinators of the international presidential election observers in June 2010, reprising a similar role in 2005. They have written extensively on Somaliland, as well as lobbying for greater recognition of its achievements, but also with awareness of the obstacles facing the country.