Once upon a time there was a Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), who was elected into office during the Cold War era because the big powers believed he was just a humble servant to their interests. They were wrong. Even-handedness, integrity, moral leadership, respect for otherness, loyalty to principles and ethical values, as enshrined in the UN Charter, were among the core values he represented. Dag Hammarskjöld held a firm belief in the autonomy of the office of the UN Secretary-General and the Secretariat, which ought not to be degraded to a mere instrument and conference machinery serving the interests of the powerful states. Hammarskjöld was determined not to surrender the power of definition to individual member states.
During his term in office from April 1953 until his untimely death in September 1961, Dag Hammarskjöld (who succeeded the Norwegian Trygve Lie) was also heading the world organisation during the period that its transformation from an almost exclusively Western, post-Second-World-War body towards a more global governance institution took place. This was due to a growing number of newly independent countries, not least from the African continent, which impacted on the international policy and geostrategic interests during the bipolar times of the so-called superpower rivalry.
Half a century and six secretary-generals later it is opportune to recall some of the virtues and convictions uniquely represented among those in this office by the Swedish diplomat. Against all odds, and at times bordering on stubbornness, he defended the autonomy of the office vis-à-vis the efforts by the big powers to execute their dominance through the UN. This is in marked contrast to the role the world body has played since then in many international conflicts and subsequent interventions. Hence, revisiting the role of the Secretary-General as defined and practised by Hammarskjöld during the initial years of Africa's decolonisation is not purely an exercise in cultivating historical reminiscences.
Given the current shifts in the global policies and interventions in which the UN is even more involved than it was during Hammarskjöld's times, it is worthwhile recalling what the cosmopolitan Swede represented during his time in office, not least for those in the global south and in particular the former African colonies struggling for sovereignty and self-determination. It is more than a mere coincidence that the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN, Li Baodong, during a debate in the UN Security Council on 26 August 2011, demanded that the peacekeeping operations of the organisation ‘should adhere to the Hammarskjöld principles’ (People's Daily Online 2011). In a similar vein, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis stressed in a speech on the occasion of a United Nations Day event on 20 October 2011 that ‘especially small states like Cyprus would like to see the United Nations acting more solidly and with consistency to defend international law when it is being violated’ and praised Dag Hammarskjöld ‘as the dove of preventive diplomacy’ (Famagusta Gazette 2011).
Integrity, colonialism and solidarity
On 31 October 1956, during the Suez crisis, Hammarskjöld stated before the Security Council in no uncertain terms that ‘the discretion and impartiality … imposed on the Secretary-General … may not degenerate into a policy of expediency’ (Falkman 2005). He reiterated this point in his introduction to the Annual report of the UN for 1959–1960:
It is my firm conviction that any result bought at the price of a compromise with the principles and ideals of the Organization, either by yielding to force, by disregard of justice, by neglect of common interests or by contempt for human rights, is bought at too high a price. That is so because a compromise with its principles and purposes weakens the Organization in a way representing a definite loss for the future that cannot be balanced by any immediate advantage achieved. (cited in Falkman 2005, p. 71)
During an intermission in a debate in the Security Council, Dag was talking with the British Ambassador Sir Pierson Dixon in the corridor behind the podium. Sir Pierson suggested that the Secretary-General should make a statement in support of the British position. Dag refused. The ambassador insisted that, ‘After all, there is something called political sense’. I stood there together with Dixon's assistant, Douglas Hurd (later to become Mrs Thatcher's foreign secretary), when Dag, stressing each syllable, declared, ‘And there is something called integrity’, turned around and closed the door behind him. (Wachtmeister 2011, p. 82)
I would say that this experience over this long journey makes me less inclined than ever to generalize, less than ever willing to say this or that about Africa or this or that about the Africans, because just as there is very much in common, especially the aspirations, there is also an enormous diversity of problems, of attitudes, and of traditions. In such a way, the journey makes me both a little bit wiser and a lot more humble.1
You can say that to stay in a country one night or two nights cannot give much of an experience. Well, first of all, it can. It can because, if you break through the walls and if you have the necessary background knowledge, even a talk of one hour can tell you more than volumes…. It is not in particular what you can learn in this or that city or from this or that man that gives you valuable understanding of the situation. It is what he says and what you see in one city seen in the light of what you have heard others say and what you have seen in other cities.2
I do not think that the rights of man is a foreign ideology to any people and that, I think, is the key to the whole ideological structure in Africa at present. It may be that the most eloquent and the most revolutionary expressions of the rights of man are to be found in Western philosophers and Western thinking, but that certainly does not make the idea a Western idea imposed on anybody.4
Partnership and solidarity are the foundations of the United Nations and it is in order to translate these principles into practical measures of economic cooperation that we are gathered today in this hall…. The emergence of Africa on the world scene, more than any other single phenomenon, has forced us to reappraise and rethink the nature of relationships among peoples at different stages of development, and the conditions of a new synthesis making room for an accelerated growth and development of Africa.5
Commenting on the Western perspectives of the early twentieth century, Hammarskjöld found it striking ‘how much they did not see and did not hear, and how even their most positive attempts at entering into a world of different thoughts and emotions were colored by an unthinking, self-assured superiority’ (Cordier and Foote 1974, p. 382; original emphasis). For Hammarskjöld, the ‘richest satisfaction’ lay in ‘meeting different spiritual traditions and their representatives’, provided one ‘approaches them on an equal footing and with a common future goal in mind’ (Ibid.). He was confident that this approach would ensure progress ‘in the direction of a human community which, while retaining the special character of individuals and groups, has made use of what the various branches of the family of man have attained along different paths over thousands of years’ (ibid.).
He clearly dismissed any claims to superiority over others based on any kind of naturalist concept of dominance rooted in supposed biological advancement and also questioned the legitimacy sought by dominant classes to justify their privileges:
The health and strength of a community depend on every citizen's feeling of solidarity with the other citizens, and on his willingness, in the name of this solidarity, to shoulder his part of the burdens and responsibilities of the community. The same is of course true of humanity as a whole. And just [as] it cannot be argued that within a community an economic upper class holds its favored position by virtue of greater ability, as a quality which is, as it were, vested in the group by nature, so it is, of course, impossible to maintain this in regard to nations in their mutual relationships. (ibid., p. 383)
We thus live in a world where, no more internationally than nationally, any distinct group can claim superiority in mental gifts and potentialities of development…. Those democratic ideals which demand equal opportunities for all should be applied also to peoples and races … no nation or group of nations can base its future on a claim of supremacy. (ibid., p. 384)
Social and economic justice
Hammarskjöld also had a strong sense of the need for economic justice. In his last address to ECOSOC, he linked the principles of national sovereignty to the belief that international solidarity and social consciousness must go hand in hand by
accepting as a basic postulate the existence of a world community for which all nations share a common responsibility … to reduce the disparities in levels of living between nations, a responsibility parallel to that accepted earlier for greater economic and social equality within nations. (quoted in Fukuda-Parr 2005, p. 222)
the main trouble with the Economic and Social Council at present is that, in public opinion and in practice, the Council has not been given the place it should have in the hierarchy of the main organs of the United Nations. I guess that we are all agreed that economic and social problems should rank equal with political problems. In fact, sometimes I feel that they should, if anything, have priority.7
the absence of a framework of international policy that compels the underdeveloped countries each to seek its own salvation in its own way without reference to wider horizons. How often have we not heard the voices of those who bewail the fact that this underdeveloped country is moving along the slippery path to autarky, that that country is neglecting its exports, whether agricultural or mineral, or that yet a third country is manipulating its exchange rates in a manner contrary to the letter and spirit of the Bretton Woods agreements? And yet how many of those who belabor the underdeveloped countries in this fashion have given adequate thought to the structure of world economic relationships which has forced these countries into unorthodox patterns of behavior?8
In the Preamble to the Charter, Member nations have reaffirmed their faith ‘in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’, a principle which also has found many other expressions in the Charter. Thus, it restates the basic democratic principle of equal political rights, independently of the position of the individual or of the Member country in respect of its strength, as determined by territory, population or wealth. The words just quoted must, however, be considered as going further and imply an endorsement as well of a right to equal economic opportunities.9
So as to avoid any misunderstanding, the Charter directly states that the basic democratic principles are applicable to nations ‘large and small’ and to individuals without distinction ‘as to race, sex, language and religion’, qualifications that obviously could be extended to cover other criteria such as, for example, those of an ideological character which have been used or may be used as a basis for political or economic discrimination…. The demand for equal economic opportunities has, likewise, been – and remains – of specific significance in relation to those very countries which have more recently entered the international arena as new states. This is natural in view of the fact that, mostly, they have been in an unfavourable economic position, which is reflected in a much lower per capita income, rate of capital supply, and degree of technical development, while their political independence and sovereignty require a fair measure of economic stability and economic possibilities in order to gain substance and full viability. (Cordier and Foote 1975b, p. 545)
If the Secretariat is regarded as truly international, and its individual members as owing no allegiance to any national government, then the Secretariat may develop as an instrument for the preservation of peace and security of increasing significance and responsibilities.11
The UN, big powers and the Congo
Hammarskjöld's steadfastness when navigating through the manifold international interests vested in the Congo, all seeking to influence his policies, was exemplary. Despite all efforts he resisted the pressure from the hegemonic states both in the East and the West to give in. When the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, following the coup against the government of Lumumba, accused Hammarskjöld of being a lackey of Western interests and demanded his resignation at the UN General Assembly in early October 1960, the Secretary-General responded with the following historical words:
It is not the Soviet Union or indeed any other Big Power who needs the United Nations for their protection, but all the others. In this sense, the Organisation is first of all their Organisation, and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to use it and guide it. I shall remain in my post during the term of my Office as a servant of the Organisation in the interest of all those other nations, as long as they wish me to do so. (cited in Falkman 2005, p. 86)
For seven or eight months, through efforts far beyond the imagination of those who founded this Organization, it has tried to counter tendencies to introduce the Big-Power conflict into Africa and put the young African countries under the shadow of the Cold War. It has done so with great risks and against heavy odds. It has done so at the cost of very great personal sacrifices for a great number of people. In the beginning the effort was successful, and I do not now hesitate to say that on more than one occasion the drift into a war with foreign-power intervention of the Korean or Spanish type was avoided only thanks to the work done by the Organization, basing itself on African solidarity. We effectively countered efforts from all sides to make the Congo a happy hunting ground for national interests. To be a roadblock to such efforts is to make yourself the target of attacks from all those who find their plans thwarted…. From both sides the main accusation was a lack of objectivity. The historian will undoubtedly find in this balance of accusations the very evidence of that objectivity we were accused of lacking, but also of the fact that very many Member nations have not yet accepted the limits put on their national ambitions by the very existence of the United Nations and by the membership of that Organization.13
I do not intend to give way to any pressure, be it from the East or the West; we shall sink or swim. Continue to follow the line you find to be in accordance with the UN Charter. (Linnér 2008, p. 26)
The Congo crisis could easily have provoked armed conflicts in other parts of Africa, even led to a world war. It was Dag Hammarskjöld and no one else who prevented that. And it is certain that for a suffering people he came to be seen as a model; he brought light into the heart of darkness. (ibid., p. 29)
The Hammarskjöld legacy
The legacy Dag Hammarskjöld created during his lifetime remains unsullied by continued speculation regarding the circumstances of his death. Suspicions centre on the idea that Western and settler-colonial interests, in alliance with big mining companies operating in the region, could have played a role in orchestrating the plane crash. This in itself points to the outstanding relevance attached to Hammarskjöld's anti-hegemonic convictions and role as second UN Secretary-General, as summarised in this paper. Hammarskjöld's principles have renewed significance when the world body has become an increasingly integral part of interventionist strategies, often pursuing the interests of the powerful.
Hammarskjöld's ethics, his concept of solidarity, his sense of fundamental universal values and human rights in combination with his respect for the multitude of identities within the human family, as well as his responsibility in assuming global leadership as the world's highest-ranking international civil servant, set standards that have to this day lost none of their value and relevance. The way he defined and executed his duties, particularly with regard to the people of Africa, can undoubtedly be seen as an act of international solidarity of a nature that is often lacking today.
The most comprehensive examination of documentation relating to Hammarskjöld's plane crash to date has provided a new perspective on the evidence, suggesting that the crash was anything but a straightforward pilot's error:
Hammarskjöld's unswerving high principles and his determined search for peaceful solutions contributed to his death. A different Secretary-General, faced with the Katanga crisis in 1961, might have found an easier option than flying, exhausted, to a small town in central Africa to negotiate with an enemy of the United Nations. (Williams 2011, p. 240)
chafing at the detail, hungry instead to know more about the ideological convictions and strategic calculations that set Hammarskjöld, his Irish deputy Conor Cruise O'Brien and others at the UN on their high-risk course of geopolitical confrontation. Hammarskjöld once said ‘It is better for the UN to lose the support of the US because it is faithful to law and principles, than to survive as an agent whose activities are geared to political purposes never avowed or laid down by the major organs of the UN.’ I would have liked to know what UN officials in New York think of such sentiments today, whether they regard Hammarskjöld as dangerously naïve or superbly high-minded, and how UN policy since then has been influenced by the sneaking, terrible suspicion that a former boss paid for such defiance with his life. (Wrong 2011)
Note on contributor
Henning Melber is Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala, Sweden, and Research Fellow at the Department of Political Sciences/University of Pretoria, South Africa. He was Director of the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) in Windhoek (1992–2000) and Research Director at the Nordic Africa Institute (2000–2006). He is co-editor of the Africa Yearbook and managing co-editor of Africa Spectrum.