Introduction
The African National Congress (ANC) won the May 2011 South African local government elections with 63.65% of the total votes. Despite this victory, the ANC was left in deep political introspection because, unexpectedly, its support declined in eight out of nine provinces. This ANC loss of votes was to the Democratic Alliance's (DA) gain. Historically and predominantly white-led and supported, the DA registered growth garnering 21.97% of total votes nationwide (Independent Electoral Commission [IEC] 2011) and won Cape Town municipality with an outright majority vote. It also managed unexpected ward victories in poor black townships which have no white, mixed-race or Indian voters. This growth in DA support – beyond its traditional white and mixed-race support base – came as a surprise not just to the DA itself, but to the ANC and the broader South African political establishment. As this paper maps the 2011 municipal election results, it argues that the DA's emerging ideological movement towards the ‘left-of-centre’ as captured in its ‘open opportunity society’ policy position which claims to ‘care by doing’, and its exemplary service delivery record in places it governs such as the Cape Town metropolitan area (metro) and small municipalities like Midvaal (in Gauteng Province) are some of the reasons that explain its growing popularity, even among black voters. The paper however cautions that it is premature to imagine that these DA gains signal the demise of the ANC. This is because despite its contested service delivery record, endemic corruption within party and government structures, a predatory elite with an appetite for conspicuous consumption and capital accumulation at the expense of the poor, the ANC remains hugely popular on the back of its liberation credentials, social investments in public infrastructure and transformative agenda.
Results: a predictable ANC victory, but…
The first full local government electoral test for the ANC under Jacob Zuma's presidency has come and gone. The 57% turnout – an 8.6% increase from the 2006 turnout (Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) 2006) – was unprecedented in democratic South Africa's municipal election history. Predictably, the ANC won with 63.65% of the total votes (IEC 2011). In distant and perennial second place was the DA with 21.97% of the total vote, followed by Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) with 3.94%, newly formed IFP breakaway party National Freedom Party (NFP) with 2.58%, ANC breakaway party Congress of the People (COPE) with 2.33%, and the United Democratic Movement (UDM) with 0.68% of the vote (IEC 2011).
Although the margin of the ANC victory compared to second-placed DA and the other parties is huge, it is actually a decrease from the 66.3% total votes it won in 2006. This decrease in support is worrying for the ANC, given that this was the trend in eight provinces out of nine. Except in KwaZulu-Natal where it improved its share of the vote (from 2.4 million votes in 2006 to 4.2 million in 2011), the ANC lost support to other political parties – especially the DA – in all other provinces (Malefane and Ngalwa 2011). This loss of support was more noticeable in large metropolitan areas (big cities or metros). For example, in Johannesburg, its support was 58.56% which is 3.76% down from the 62.32% it garnered in 2006; while in the capital Tshwane (Pretoria) it was 55.32%, which is 1.12% lower than the 56.44% of 2006 (Basson 2011). Its growing unpopularity in metros was also witnessed in Nelson Mandela Bay Metro in the Eastern Cape Province which until the last election had been one of the ANC's traditional strong support bases. The ANC narrowly won this metro, scraping through with a 51.9% majority, while the DA which campaigned hard to wrest the city from the ANC increased its support from 27% (2006) to 40.24% (2011) (Kgosana 2011). Consequently, the ANC's seat count in this metro went down from 80 to 63, while the DA's increased from 30 to 48. Its support also shrunk by over 5% in the Free State Province and Northern Cape Province (Basson 2011). In the Western Cape, while no one – including the ANC itself – expected them to win Cape Town metro (a traditional DA stronghold), a large vote swing from 37.76% in 2006 down to 32.8% (drop of 4.96%) (Basson 2011) is perhaps one of the best illustrations of the ANC's growing unpopularity among the urban electorate.
Unexpectedly, some of the voters the ANC was losing voted DA. This is unexpected because voting trends indicate that for the first time a large number of black people voted for the DA, which until now had been seen as a party largely focused on preserving and advancing middle-class white capital and privilege. Due to this vote swing, the DA is the only party which registered growth in all provinces; its capture of 21.97% of total votes nationwide was a 7.17% increase from its 14.8% in 2006 (IEC 2011). In the capital Tshwane (Gauteng Province), its support increased by 8.03% from 30.62% (2006) to 38.65% (2011), while in Johannesburg it increased by 7.61% from 27.01% (2006) to 34.62% (2011). It further strengthened its position in its traditional stronghold – the Western Cape – growing by a massive 17.8 percentage points, increasing its share of the vote in Cape Town metro from 41.96% (2006) to 60.92% (2011) thereby winning the metro with an outright majority vote (IEC 2011).
As a sign of its growing popularity, and in a historic first for the DA and the South African political establishment, the DA won in a number of black-dominated voting districts and wards across the country. For example, it won a ward in Lady Frere in the ANC heartland of the Eastern Cape and for the first time it has councillors in Port St Johns and Matatiele. It also won predominantly black voting districts in Mpumalanga, Limpopo and North West. Its biggest political ward victory was in Frischgewaagd, North West Province. Frischgewaagd ward – without a single white voter – was won by the DA with the least visible, low-profile campaign led and run by now-councillor Dan Malo. In view of historical racial contestations in South African politics, this victory and others in predominantly black voting districts are historic and significant. As Helen Zille (DA leader) correctly observes, the Frischgewaagd victory ‘was the first time the DA had ever won a ward where there is not a single white, coloured or Indian voter; just black South Africans freely making a choice for the DA’ (Sapa 2011). While the politics of race and identity are still an important determinant of political choices in South Africa; this DA victory in an all-black ward (Frischgewaagd) and other predominantly black wards signals an emerging appeal for the party across the black–white racial divide and concomitantly an embryonic new voting trend. As Habib and Naidu (2006) have argued, such voting behavioural change suggests that significant sections of the electorate make rational choices during elections and decide on the basis of information available to them which party most closely represents their material and other interests. The link between racial/tribal identities and electoral behaviour is slowly being dismantled and politicians who do not recognise this will continue to make the mistake of basing their electoral campaign on crude racial assumptions about the South African electorate, resulting in failure to attract the support of a cross-section of the electorate (Habib and Naidu 2006). It appears the DA has taken heed of these changing voting patterns: hence its change in electoral campaign strategy culminating in vote gains among a cross-section of the electorate. These emerging changing voting patterns should serve as a warning to all the major political parties that the electorate can no longer be simply pigeonholed in yesteryear racial boxes when being black meant (in all probability) that you would vote ANC and being white, mixed-race or Indian meant you were DA.
Lessons in campaign strategy: how the DA set the campaign tone and won votes
One of the DA's election strategies was to pitch a positive campaign. This election strategy hinged on showcasing the DA's service delivery record in areas it governs, alongside advancing the substance of their policies and vision as alternatives to those of the ANC. The logic was to convince voters that they are a credible alternative government; not just a noisy opposition party that opposes almost everything said and done by the ANC. Its largely good governance record in the Western Cape, its well-known, established good track record of service delivery in most areas of Cape Town metro and in small municipalities such as Midvaal in Gauteng anchored this positive campaign. It used these as major campaign weapons and evidence that given a chance they can deliver social services to the people. This was captured in its lead campaign slogan ‘DA: we deliver for all’. This was a catchphrase designed to convince voters that the DA delivers for all people (regardless of race) and is a party capable of achieving and also attentive to people's everyday socio-economic needs. This new approach was a far cry from the old customary DA strategy of negative campaigning which involved attacking the ruling party and ‘fighting back’ without offering credible alternatives. Some of my interviewees acknowledge that this positive DA campaign based on evidence of service delivery posited as the future under a DA local government system made them consider it as a serious alternative.
The DA's positive campaign was clearly targeting the ANC's traditional black support base. Its main focus was not on trying to lure die-hard ANC loyalists, but rather on winning over and keeping those black South Africans who were still to decide which party to vote for (Jonathan Moakes, DA campaign manager, Sunday Times, 1 May 2011). One of the strategies to achieve this was to project the DA as the party to take forward the ‘struggle’ for black freedom. Efficient local service delivery and development were projected as central elements of this advancement of black freedom. In various campaign forums, Helen Zille drew on liberation struggle songs which remind people of their history while arguing that the DA was leading the ‘new’ struggle against poverty and unemployment among the black population. Her party paraded its good service delivery record in areas it governs to augment this strategy. Even Zille's Freedom Day speech delivered at Solomon Mahlangu Freedom Square in Mamelodi – Solomon Mahlangu was an Umkhonto weSizwe cadre who was executed by the apartheid regime in 1979 – was designed not only to make a symbolic connection with the country's general struggle history but an all-important emotional component of it (Thamm 2011). Her ‘A Luta Continua’ speech delivered on the day was also an attempt to connect with struggle history. The contents of the speech drew on symbolic accoutrements of the struggle with a reconciliatory and transformative tone emphasising that while apartheid oppressed and scarred everyone in South Africa, it was now time to consolidate South Africa's constitutional democracy, economic growth with redistribution and associated poverty reduction among previously disadvantaged predominantly black communities. Late and living ANC struggle heroes were strategically fitted into this campaign narrative. In television and radio interviews Helen Zille argued that the vision and principles of struggle heroes such as Chief Albert Luthuli, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela (former ANC presidents), Walter Sisulu, and Chris Hani (former SA Communist Party leader) around issues of poverty alleviation, economic freedom and human dignity belonged to all South Africans (including the DA) not just the ANC. As a party delivering services in municipalities it governs, it was fulfilling this vision of ANC struggle heroes, restoring human dignity and self-esteem among black poor communities. This message resonated in some predominantly black communities, as witnessed in some wards in Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Eastern Cape, North West and Western Cape which voted DA. Perhaps this strategy also partly explains the increase in DA's share of black voters to ±6% overall (Ryan Coetzee, DA strategist, 2011).
Another significant milestone in the recent election season is that it marked a turning point for DA socio-economic ideology and direction as it attempted to secure ‘left-of-centre’ ideological ground (Tham 2011). Through its ‘open opportunity society for all’ policy which claims to ‘care by doing’ (Democratic Alliance 2011) – a reference to its service delivery record – it acknowledged that South Africa's apartheid history (which left feelings of resentment towards whites, emotional and psychological scars among blacks as well as widespread poverty) cannot be erased. These apartheid-created socio-economic deficits can however be alleviated through an ‘open opportunity society’ premised on redistributive growth, job creation, enhancing people's capabilities and choices, inclusiveness and non-racialism. Such an ideological shift by the DA was in direct competition with ANC socio-economic policy as encapsulated in the ‘distribution through growth’ neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan (Maré 2003) and its current flagship the New Growth Path (NGP) which commits to addressing remnant material inequities and black unemployment from the colonial and apartheid past.
In contrast to a well-organised DA campaign with a clear local service delivery message, the ANC campaign was beleaguered by problems from the outset. Its initial stages of the campaign were low profile with no clear rallying service delivery message to persuade the electorate. This was a sign of complacency, probably because the party had easily and overwhelmingly won all previous local government elections since 1994. Internal turmoil was also a major problem for the ANC during the campaign period. There was disgruntlement and infighting in some of its ward, district- and provincial-level structures over the selection of candidates. In regions such as OR Tambo (which includes Mthatha) in the Eastern Cape, 54 would-be party candidates who failed to make the candidate list revolted and took the ANC to court. Although their court action was eventually dismissed, it caused fissures in the OR Tambo region with energies directed towards fighting internal factional wars instead of campaigning.
The ANC campaign only gained more visibility and momentum a few weeks before election day as it became clear that the DA was going to pose a serious challenge in some municipalities. In an effort to cover lost ground, some ANC leaders resorted to what DA MP Lindiwe Mazibuko described as ‘racial nationalism’ that sought to divide South Africa on racial lines in an attempt to shore up the ANC's declining support base. Mazibuko's assertion was correct because some high-ranking ANC leaders such as ANC Youth League president Julius Malema and cabinet minister Blade Nzimande were at the forefront of this negative racially divisive campaign tactic. Some of their campaign speeches were laden with racial slurs, especially against white people, as the following extracts confirm:
Helen Zille and the DA, they are racists. They represent apartheid. There is nothing democratic about them, and voting them means you will experience exactly what we have experienced, open toilets. They have no respect for black people. They have no respect for Africans in particular. (Julius Malema, ANC Youth League president addressing supporters outside the Cape High Court on 29 April 2011)
[The DA] is trying to project a non-racial image with that serial opportunist [Patricia De Lille] and a born-free, Model-C-school pupil [Lindiwe Mazibuko] and the boss lady. Two stooges and a madam. (Blade Nzimande addressing the Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU] Workers' Day celebrations, 1 May 2011, at Athlone stadium in Cape Town)
The poor pace, nature and quality of the ANC's service delivery record in many municipalities is one of the reasons it found it difficult to use it as a campaign anchor. Granted, the ANC has delivered many basic socio-economic services such as low-cost housing, water, health facilities, electricity, refuse collection, sanitation facilities, road networks, education and skills training, employment and economic opportunities to the majority since 1994 (Lodge 1999, 2003) through programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and GEAR. However, in many municipalities it governs, inefficient corrupt bureaucrats and political appointees (so-called cadre deployees) have been obstacles to efficient and effective service delivery. Buffalo City Metro in the Eastern Cape and Johannesburg Metro in Gauteng are frequent headline-grabbing examples of poor service delivery in some ANC-run municipalities. Their poor performance is linked to corruption, political interference in administration, internal political power struggles, lack of political will and weak administrative systems (Mathoho 2011). Such poor service delivery is an antithesis to the ANC's vision of a South African developmental state since one of the most important duties of a developmental state is to ensure that all citizens – particularly the poor and other vulnerable groups – have access to basic services (Mathoho 2011). The ANC admits it has failed many citizens in some municipalities. Even its national organiser and head of campaigns, Fikile Mbalula, acknowledges that ineptitude in service delivery by some of its councillors explains its declining support base in the last election:
The problem is our councillors who failed the communities. Let us leave Helen Zille out of the picture and inspect the damage that has been done by our own councillors. If we do not have decisive leadership, we will have the same problems in the next local government elections. (Sunday Times, 22 May 2011)
What next for the DA and ANC as 2014 approaches?
For the DA, rethinking and rebranding the party in an attempt to shed its historical image as a party that exists principally to defend white capital and privilege made a difference in broadening its support base. Snippets of initial ideological movement towards ‘left-of-centre’ as encapsulated in its ‘open opportunity society’ policy and the diversification of leadership structures through the infusion of capable, emerging black leaders was also central in luring black voters, more whites, mixed-race people and Indians. Although the increase in DA black voters is not indicative of a major swing, it does show the party is making inroads in previously ANC ‘racial strongholds’. This is a good foundation which the DA is already building on in anticipation of national elections in 2014. The election of Lindiwe Mazibuko, a 31-year-old woman as the first black DA parliamentary leader – replacing Athol Trollip, a middle-aged white man with vast political experience and pedigree – signals the DA's future leadership and racial transformation aspirations. Mazibuko's election is instructive when seen alongside the DA's Young Leaders' Programme which scours the country for predominantly young, black emerging leaders with an interest in and excellent grasp of current affairs. Graduates of this programme such as DA youth leader Mbali Ntuli, and the 2011 Johannesburg mayoral candidate, Mmusi Maimane, are some of the ‘black diamonds’ the party hopes will spearhead their appeal and continued growth among black voters. Although radical detractors argue that these ‘black diamonds’ sometimes find it difficult to connect with township and rural youths who often detest their privileged upbringing and posh English accents, the DA strategy is to have ‘black diamonds’ lead its growth in black communities as the party knows it will only become accepted as a mass party when it is identified with a critical mass of black leaders. At this stage, judgement and conclusions on the success or failure of this strategy can only be hypothetical.
For the ANC, complacency, internal turmoil, factionalism and poor service delivery are some of the major factors which cost the party thousands of votes in the election. As ANC heavyweight Fikile Mbalula mentions above, the party's main problems are internal and are principally about lack of principled and decisive leadership. Inevitably, Jacob Zuma's ‘collective leadership’ style comes under scrutiny within that context for it is under his leadership since 2007 that the ANC began losing support, whereas his predecessors,Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, stewarded party growth. This relentless examination of his leadership is understandable because even though Zuma is an affable man and politician with decades of political experience, his ability to lead the ANC and the country has always been contested and subject to question by many among the electorate who believe he is not ‘presidential material’. His low level of formal education, previous rape allegations (of which he was acquitted) and the corruption allegations, which were later withdrawn by the National Prosecuting Authority, continue to soil his integrity, compounding doubts about his ability to lead the ANC and government. Given these doubts about Zuma's leadership, serious introspection is thus required within the ANC. Party structures should begin to ask; is Zuma the best candidate to lead them in the 2014 national elections or do they need to look for another charismatic and visionary leader within the party?
Revisiting the party's leadership structures should not be confined to the presidency; low-level local government leadership revitalisation should also be a priority for the ANC. Among other corrective measures, the ANC has to revisit its cadre deployment system in local government so as to invigorate its support base and regain the confidence of the electorate. This is necessary because the appointment of inefficient party apparatchiks without relevant qualifications and experience as key municipal bureaucrats is one of the causes of poor service delivery which cost the ANC votes in the last election. To address this, the party has to ensure that only qualified and experienced personnel are appointed to these municipal positions. Although this sounds like a long shot, such an approach will not only ensure the appointment of skilled key personnel into municipalities, it will also obliterate the blurring of lines between the ANC as a party and the administrative arms of local government.
A clear developmental vision must also be articulated by the ANC in order to win back the confidence of some voters who abandoned it in the last election. It is only an inconsequential few who doubt or question the ANC's liberation history and the benefits of its reconciliatory, reconstructive and redistributive growth programmes under the RDP and GEAR. Equally, progress made by successive ANC governments in addressing the socio-economic deficit left by the colonial and apartheid regimes is noteworthy. However, if the party is to remain a relevant driver of South Africans' socio-economic development aspirations it should not be fixated with these past achievements to a point where these are used to deflect criticism of current ineptitude in service delivery. Its current socio-economic development policy flagship, the NGP, which outlines an economic growth and job creation ‘wish-list’ by 2020 is an indicative operational framework which provides a starting point. Cognisant of COSATU and other stakeholders' criticism of the neoliberal inclinations of the NGP, this framework is however an imaginative socio-economic policy with bold strategies that aim to create millions of jobs for South Africans. If and when these jobs are created, this will be politically expedient for the ANC towards 2014, but the tangible benefits for ordinary South Africans will last beyond the vote count.