Introduction
‘How do Rwandans envisage their future? What kind of society do they want to become? What are the transformations needed to emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory social and economic situation?’ These are the promising opening words of the Rwandan Vision 2020 document, which was finalised in July 2000 (Government of Rwanda (GOR) 2000). The text outlines the main ambitions of the Rwandan government and the strategic pillars for achieving the envisaged objectives. Halfway through the implementation of the programme, the question that logically comes to mind is whether Rwanda is ‘on track’ to realise its ambitions.
At first glance, the overall picture seems quite promising. In terms of macroeconomic stability, Rwanda has performed extremely well. Indeed, as noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘growth has averaged about 8 percent a year’ over the last decade, which is in line with the general goal of Vision 2020 (IMF 2011a). There has been a slowdown in recent years in consequence of the global financial crisis, but Rwanda seems to be recovering well, as growth for 2010 was 7.5% (IMF 2011b), and is estimated at 8.8% for 2011 (IMF 2011c). The Rwandan case is also quite encouraging in terms of the UN's Millennium Development Goals. In 2007, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report asserted: ‘[A]chieving the Millennium Development Goals in Rwanda is possible, even with reasonable assumptions of economic growth and development assistance. Rwanda presents all the necessary fundamental attributes to showcase the potential of the new Post-Millennium Declaration’ (UNDP 2007, p. 1). Rwanda has, furthermore, received wide praise for its effective technocratic governance. The 2010 World Bank's Doing business report notes that ‘for the first time a Sub-Saharan African economy, Rwanda, led the world in Doing Business reforms’. It commended the Rwandan government for its overhaul of commercial laws, its facilitation of access to credit, and its measures aimed at speeding up trade and property registration (World Bank 2010). The latest good news is the spectacular decrease in poverty rates of nearly 12% that the government of Rwanda reported for the period 2005/6–2010/11 (GOR 2012).
So can we speak of a ‘new Rwanda’, a ‘Rwandan renaissance’? It would certainly appear so at first glance. However, on closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that there are two sides to the story. Indeed, despite its positive assessment of achievements in the fields of education and health, the UNDP feels Rwanda is unlikely to reach the goal of eradicating extreme poverty by 2015 (UNDP 2010). Strong economic growth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite, resulting in a highly skewed developmental path. The majority of smallholder farmers appear not to fit into the government's vision of a ‘modern Rwanda’. Moreover, the country remains highly dependent upon aid, while the evolution of political governance indicators is also less promising. Each of these aspects requires more in-depth analysis.
The present paper therefore examines whether Rwanda is on track to meet the ambitions formulated in its Vision 2020 document as elaborated in 2000. First, it provides a general assessment of evolutions in poverty, inequality, and international aid. Then the focus shifts to the six pillars of the Vision 2020 programme: (1) promoting good governance and a capable state; (2) investing in human resource development and a knowledge-based economy; (3) stimulating a private-sector-led economy; (4) investing in infrastructure development; (5) promoting productive and market-oriented agriculture; and (6) engaging in regional and international economic integration (GOR 2000). To conclude, the paper provides an overall critical assessment of the Rwandan development model and puts forward some alternative strategies towards more inclusive development.
Evolutions in poverty, inequality, and aid dependency
Before considering each of the Vision 2020 objectives in detail, this section provides a general outline of evolutions in poverty, inequality and international aid. The Rwandan economy is highly dependent upon aid money (Zorbas 2011). Although the relative dependency of the Rwandan government's functioning on financial aid has decreased from 85% in 2000 to 45% in 2010 (Action Aid 2011), the budget at its disposal for investment in development initiatives has increased substantially with the rise in aid allocated to budget support (50% rise between 2007 and 2010). Overall, the total amount of net official development assistance and official aid grew by over 45% between 2006 and 2009 (World Bank 2011). These aid flows are generally considered to be important for creating a positive economic climate (Marysse et al. 2007).
On the whole, the Rwandan government has performed excellently in respect of information and communication management for the purpose of ensuring the continuity of aid flows. The government itself points to its efficient allocation of aid:
We have shown donors that when we are in the driving seat – deciding how to allocate aid money ourselves – we spend donor money more effectively. Donors have responded to the results we have delivered by giving us more and more say over how we use their aid. (Ronald Knusi, Director of the External Finance Unit in the Finance Ministry, quoted in Action Aid 2011)
Some donors (or influential actors within donor countries) have adopted more critical attitudes, including France, where the Bruguière report indicted Paul Kagame of the murder of President Habyarimana,1 and Spain, where judge Merelles issued arrest warrants against RPF officers for genocide, crimes against humanity and acts of terrorism committed in the 1990s (Reyntjens 2011a). When touching upon such taboo topics, donors are tackled aggressively by the Rwandan government. Other donors have raised criticism at specific occasions, for example in response to Rwanda's involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2004 and following a United Nations (UN) report documenting Rwandan support to the Nkunda militia in eastern DRC (Zorbas 2011).2 Most recently (summer 2012), donors such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands have held back or withdrew (part of) their aid budget in reaction to the UN's accusation of Rwanda's support to renewed rebel activity in eastern DRC. Other donors have raised concerns about controversial policies pursued by the Rwandan government in relation to ‘the handling of refugees, resettlement, justice, elections and regional security’ (Hayman, 2007, p. 2).
However, the lack of consensus and coordinated action amongst donor nations has resulted in altogether mixed messages, allowing the Rwandan authorities to push through their own vision and priorities. ‘A strong discourse of national unity and moral authority [serves to demonstrate that the Rwandan government] will not compromise on certain core objectives regardless of international pressures’ (Hayman 2007, p. 20). At the same time, the Rwandan government has enhanced its control over donor inputs through a ‘traffic light system’ that scores donors on the degree to which they provide budget support and on their use of the government's own financial systems. While this may indeed reduce duplication and avoid certain transaction costs (Action Aid 2011), it also enhances the government's control over the allocation of aid money and loosens the ties of donors with projects on the ground. This partly explains why donors' criticism – if at all present – focuses mainly on macro-level issues that are apparent from an office in Kigali, while very little concern is raised over the situation at the local level.
That very situation on the ground is often assessed on the basis of national poverty statistics. As such, trends seemed to be worrying. Whereas the proportion of people living below the national poverty line decreased from 59% to 57% between 2000/1 and 2005/6 (GOR 2012), the absolute number of poor individuals increased by 560,000, while the number living in extreme poverty grew by 190,000. Almost 90% of these additional poor were living in rural settings (GOR 2006). However, on 7 February 2012, the Rwandan government launched the results of its third Household Living Conditions Survey. The evolution since 2005/6 seems to be spectacular: poverty decreased by 11.8%. Moreover, this seems to be mainly explained by improved living conditions in rural settings. In the Northern Province, poverty decreased by a spectacular 17.7%. And in the Southern Province – the only province with an increase in poverty between 2000/1 and 2005/6 – poverty decreased by a still spectacular 10.2% (GOR 2012).
Next to poverty, rising inequality seemed to be a major problem. In the mid 1980s, Rwanda qualified as a low-inequality country, with a Gini coefficient3 of 0.29. Due to a lack of nationally representative data, no Gini coefficient is available for the period between 1985 and 2000.4 However, by 2000/1, the Gini coefficient had risen substantially to 0.51, well above the UNDP Gini ‘alarm boundary’ of 0.40, and corresponding to a situation where the richest 20% enjoyed the same consumption level as the poorest 80%. Inequality continued to increase quickly over the 2001 to 2006 period, as the Gini coefficient soared to a problematic 0.52 (2005/6), implying that Rwanda ranked as a country with extremely high inequality.5 , 6 However, recent data show an improvement, with inequality supposedly decreased to a Gini coefficient of 0.49 in 2010/11 (GOR 2012).
These recent trends are extremely surprising. They are explained by the Rwandan government as being the result of improved agriculture production, agribusiness, farm wage employment, increase in non-farm wages, income transfers, slowing population growth, and improvement of infrastructure (roads, electricity and markets) (GOR 2012). Below, however, we will illustrate that accomplishments in terms of small-scale farmers' participation in agricultural production, realisations in terms of employment creation for non-skilled labourers, and impacts of ‘infrastructure-improving policies’, are highly questionable from the perspectives of local rural people. In addition, we will shed light on achievements and challenges in terms of governance, private-sector involvement, human resource development, and regional integration.
| Poverty incidence (%) | Extreme poverty incidence (%) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000/01 | 2005/06 | 2010/11 | 2000/01 | 2005/06 | 2010/11 | |
| Kigali City | 22.7 | 20.8 | 16.8 | 14.5 | 12.9 | 7.8 |
| Southern Province | 65.5 | 66.7 | 56.5 | 44.7 | 44.9 | 31.1 |
| Western Province | 62.3 | 60.4 | 48.4 | 40.4 | 37.7 | 27.4 |
| Northern Province | 64.2 | 60.5 | 42.8 | 46.5 | 39.1 | 23.5 |
| Eastern Province | 59.3 | 52.1 | 42.6 | 39.4 | 29.9 | 20.8 |
| Urban | 28.5 | 22.1 | 16.0 | 10.4 | ||
| Rural | 61.9 | 48.7 | 39.5 | 26.4 | ||
| Total | 58.9 | 56.7 | 44.9 | 40.0 | 35.8 | 24.1 |
| Note: The national poverty line represents RWF64,000 per adult equivalent per year for 2001 prices, RWF90,000 per adult equivalent per year for 2006 prices, and RWF118,000 per adult equivalent per year for 2010 prices. For ‘extreme poverty’, the national poverty line represents RWF45,000 per adult equivalent per year for 2001 prices, RWF63,000 per adult equivalent per year for 2006 prices, and RWF83,000 per adult equivalent per year for 2010 prices. | ||||||
| Source: Government of Rwanda (2012). |
Objectives and achievements of Vision 2020
The overall aim of Vision 2020 was to ‘transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by the year 2020’ (GOR 2000, p. 9). To achieve this objective, it was specified that gross domestic product (GDP) had to grow annually by 8% in order to halve the proportion of people living in poverty (from 64% to 30%). On this basis, Rwanda outlined its first Poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) in 2001 (GOR 2002), which was implemented between 2002 and 2005. In early 2006, the Rwandan government started to elaborate a follow-up PRSP policy, which became known as the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), finalised in 2007 and to be implemented between 2008 and 2012 (GOR 2007). The next sections provide an assessment of the major achievements and shortcomings of Rwanda's development path over the past decade.
Good governance and a capable state (Pillar 1)
When evaluating governance, due account must be taken of two key components: technocratic governance, linked to public management and control of corruption; and political governance, related to the space for democratic dialogue and freedom of expression. In its Vision 2020 document, the Rwandan government clearly emphasises the technocratic governance aspect, focusing on the importance of a capable state that stimulates economic development. However, it also asserts that good governance, next to ‘accountability, transparency and efficiency in deploying scarce resources’, must entail ‘a State respectful of democratic structures and processes and committed to the rule of law and the protection of human rights in particular’ (GOR 2000, p. 12).
As indicated above, Rwanda has done well in the domain of technocratic governance. It ranked 67th out of 143 countries in the Doing business report for 2010 and was lauded as the world's top reformer (World Bank 2010). The 2010 World Bank governance indicators (World Bank 2011) reflect a similar trend. Rwanda figures among the top 30% best-performing countries in terms of control of corruption, and more than 50% of all countries perform worse than Rwanda in terms of government effectiveness, which measures the competence of public service delivery and state bureaucracy. Both indicators have, moreover, shown considerable improvement since 2005. This is also the case for the rule-of-law indicator, an index for the efficiency and independence of police and justice, the quality of contract enforcement, and crime (in 2010, Rwanda's performance in this field was on a par with China's). The evolution in terms of regulatory quality – an indicator measuring the presence, absence and impact of market-unfriendly policies – has been more volatile, but has been improving steadily since 2007. However, whereas it may have become easier for large-scale investors to do business, small-scale actors operating in the informal sector often face multiple constraints (such as environmental rules, formal requirements, excessive taxation) that prevent them from engaging in trade and off-farm business (Gökgür 2011, Ansoms and Murison 2011). It seems that the business-facilitating policies – inspired by Vision 2020 – are mostly oriented towards the operation of large-scale capital-intensive projects. In their attempt to formalise the informal sector, those same policies have often blocked or even counteracted local-level investment in small-scale initiatives (see below).
When considering political governance, several problems can be identified. It is clear that democratic freedom is far from achieved in Rwanda. In terms of voice and accountability – related to civic and political liberties – Rwanda figures among the 10% worst-performing countries, and there has been no marked improvement since 1996 (World Bank 2011). The 2003 national and parliamentary elections, the 2006 local elections, the 2008 parliamentary elections and the 2010 presidential elections were all marred by the discrediting and sabotaging of opposition candidates, the manipulation of electoral lists, and the intimidation of voters to ensure that the RPF's control over the political system would be enhanced (Longman 2011). The previously cited 2007 UNDP report reflects on the difficult trade-offs with democracy in the long term, and short-term concerns of political stability and national unity. However, the tightening control of the RPF-led regime and the resulting lack of voice and accountability might also affect political stability in the medium or even short term. Hence, it seems doubtful that the World Bank's political stability governance indicator improved between 2010 and 2011 after stagnating in 2008 and 2009.
A further cause for concern about future stability is the ambiguous outcome of the justice and reconciliation process. So-called Gacaca courts were put forward as an alternative to the conventional justice system, which failed to deal with the numerous genocide suspects. Gacaca are popular courts whose jurisdiction is based on a combination of customary approaches to conflict resolution and the conventional legal system. Overall, however, the Gacaca experiment has been found to have yielded ambiguous results (for some recent sources, see Ingelaere 2009, Rettig 2008). In addition, nationally and internationally, a taboo appears to rest on the consideration of RPF war crimes. This is illustrated by the government's successful attempts to manipulate the international justice mechanism of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) so that it would turn a blind eye to alleged RPF atrocities (Peskin 2011). The RPF's impunity has seriously hampered the reconciliation process. Moreover, initiatives to reinforce reconciliation, such as the ingando re-education camps for ex-prisoners (see Thomson 2011), the rituals for the ‘memorisation’ of the genocide (see Meierhenrich 2011), and the proscription of ethnicity in combination with the promotion of a meta-narrative reinforcing the idea of a collective identity7 (see Eltringham 2011, McLean Hilker 2011) have been used to tighten social control on public life. Instead of contributing meaningfully to national unity and reconciliation, they have repressed dissident voices, which holds a danger of radicalisation and the incitement of violence.
The Rwandan Patriotic Front scored overwhelming victories in the legislative elections of 2008 and the presidential elections of August 2010. In fact, there has not been an effective and legally registered political opposition in Rwanda for years (on oppositional party bans before 2010, see Niesen 2010). In the run-up to the 2010 elections, opposition parties were formed, but none were given permission to register and take part in the electoral process. Members of these parties were intimidated and in some cases attacked or arrested (Longman 2011). Since the elections, the attacks and pressure on opposition parties have continued, in spite of Paul Kagame's re-election as head of state with 93% of the vote (Reyntjens 2011a). An often-used tool to silence dissident voices is to accuse them of ‘ethnic divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’, both of which are punishable under the 2003 revised constitution (Desrosiers and Thomson 2011, Waldorf 2011) and a 2008 law prescribing sentences of between 10 and 50 years (Waldorf 2011).
There is also very little room for dissent at the level of civil society. In fact, ‘the current regime's preferred modus operandi for civil society remains service delivery and gap filling’ (Gready 2010, p. 641, see also Longman 2011). Consultation and participation of civil society in policy processes mostly takes the form of sharing information that should be passed on to local levels (Gready 2010). Moreover, the Rwandan government exerts extensive control over the management, finances and projects of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and it also uses co-opted umbrella structures to keep a handle on smaller organisations (Gready 2011). Although there can be some room for active involvement in policy processes, this is usually granted on an ad-hoc basis and through personalised networks (Gready 2010). There is however no channel for open and organised dissent against government policies. Organisations and individuals who step out of line are expelled or, in the case of international NGOs, immobilised. Domestic dissident voices are neutralised through co-optation or they are intimidated, imprisoned, forced into exile, and in some instances even eliminated (Longman 2011, Reyntjens 2011a).
The exclusion of the political opposition from the country's public life and the ruling party's attempts to keep a grip on Rwandan society, in combination with a total lack of press freedom (Longman 2011, Reyntjens 2011a, Reyntjens 2011b), could lead to a further polarisation and radicalisation of a large section of that society, as ‘it prevents the public from expressing its interests through productive, peaceful political means’ (Longman 2011, p. 27). Such a scenario would undermine what are generally considered to have been encouraging achievements by Rwanda in the field of socio-economic development.
In fact, democracy and a democratic culture is narrowed down to ‘the active involvement of citizens at all levels of governance and in government initiatives’ (Desrosiers and Thomson 2011, p. 445). One of the key aspects in the domain of governance is therefore the decentralisation policy (2003) that the Rwandan government has been implementing in recent years. In 2006, it adopted a new and simplified administrative structure comprised of four provinces and Kigali City (rather than 12 provinces), 30 districts, 416 sectors, and 2148 cells. The Rwandan government sees a key role for authorities at decentralised levels (most importantly the district and sector-level authorities) in the implementation of its strategies. Overall, the decentralisation policy is presented as a way to ensure ‘participation at the grassroots level, whereby local communities will be empowered in the decision making process’ (GOR 2000, p. 12).
In practice, however, ‘the chain of accountability goes upwards towards higher authorities and not downwards towards the population’ (Ingelaere 2010b, pp. 288–289). Ingelaere shows how key local authorities are appointed rather than elected. Moreover, decentralised authorities are bound to reach targets specified in public performance contracts (imihigo) that set the local-level objectives in line with national priorities. These contracts have to be rigidly implemented and function as de facto mechanisms to control the local level (Ingelaere 2010b, Ansoms 2009a). The achievements are closely monitored and evaluated by the Rwandan government at all administrative levels. Interestingly, this rigid and target-driven policy implementation is appreciated by international donors in their aid effectiveness assessments. However, performance targets may be unrealistic (Holvoet and Rombouts 2008); they may be totally unsuitable within a particular local context (Ansoms and Murison 2011);8 or policies may be enforced without giving consideration to local needs (Ansoms 2009a).
Vision 2020 is supposedly based on a strong decentralisation process. Ten years on, the institutions have indeed been decentralised, yet overall power lies even more with the central authorities. In reality, then, decentralisation has been mainly a top-down process and it has not allowed for a bottom-up translation of the local needs to the national level (Ingelaere 2010b).
A private-sector-led economy (Pillar 3)
Another pillar of Vision 2020 consists in private-sector-led development, more specifically through the emergence of a local business class. The principal aim is to strongly involve the private sector in the growth process and to assign it a key role in the poverty reduction policy framework. Between 2006 and 2011, private investment indeed grew to over 12% of GDP, a six-fold rise compared to a decade ago (IMF 2011a). However, a recent consultancy report concludes that there is a high economic concentration in the modern formal sector. First and foremost, a considerable part of the formal sector is dominated by an extensive portfolio of public enterprises in the hands of the Rwandan government. Moreover that same government has indirect stakes in three big holding companies. Second, market concentration and highly imperfect capital markets result in a situation where ‘competition is effectively limited to larger firms and to new conglomerates already in operation and expanding’ (Gökgür 2011, p. 8). Small players, on the other hand, are confronted with tax regulations that disproportionately favour their larger competitors, which impedes the former's entry into the market (Gökgür 2011).
With such a high degree of economic concentration, the extent to which private capital injection into the Rwandan economy has contributed to poverty reduction is debatable. Vision 2020 highlights the ‘pivotal role’ of the private sector in creating non-farm employment and it puts forward the goal of an additional 1.4 million jobs outside agriculture. Employment creation by formally registered companies was however limited to about 8810 jobs per year between 2006 and 2010, far less than the 120,000 to 125,000 jobs (World Bank estimates) needed to absorb a growing labour force (Gökgür 2011). ‘This suggests that the bulk of the new entrants will most likely be absorbed into the informal sector – micro and non-farm household enterprises’ (Gökgür 2011, p. 9).
There is indeed a highly fragmented and strongly competitive informal sector, with 115,279 informal microenterprises and 615,108 non-farm household enterprises. However, despite this sector's capacity to absorb labour force, the aforementioned report points to the fact that its recent growth has been ‘far from poverty reducing’. Jobs created in this sector are often insecure and poorly paid. Moreover, government policies to respond to the challenges imposed upon this sector are largely absent (Gökgür 2011). Worse still, there are several examples of regulation that impedes local actors' ability to engage in small-scale informal activities. Sommers (2012), for example, illustrates how a prohibition on street vending, defined as ‘unorganised commerce’, impacts negatively on the livelihoods of youth in Kigali. He notes how ‘what has ensued is a kind of economic cat and mouse involving people trying to hawk goods without getting caught and government officials on the lookout for precisely this sort of economic behavior’ (Sommers 2012, p. 36). The recent prohibition on cycling on asphalted roads (reported by Syfia Grands Lacs in October 2011) is another example of how regulation can be detrimental to the ability of local-level traders to reach markets, and Ansoms and Murison (2012a) discuss the case of traditional brick- and tile-firing to illustrate how government regulation banned one of the most important labour-absorbing off-farm income-generating activities in rural Rwanda. Gökgür suggests that it is necessary to ‘change the mindset of the tax authorities’, given that ‘taxing [small-scale household enterprises] or forcing them to comply with government regulation would likely put them out of business with dire economic and social consequences for their employees and their proprietors including their families and even relatives’ (Gökgür 2011, p. 27).
In the early years of the new millennium, ambitions for private capital investment were primarily directed at the service sector. The first Rwandan PRSP actually contended that there was a window of opportunity ‘to leap-frog the stage of industrialisation and transform [Rwanda's] subsistence economy into a service-sector driven, high value-added information and knowledge-based economy that can compete on the global market’ (GOR 2002, p. 69). Indeed, currently over 93% of all formal businesses focus on commerce and are thus active in the service sector. Also in the informal sector, the bulk of micro- and household enterprises are active in trading and commerce (Gökgür 2011).
With time, however, policymakers have become increasingly aware of the small likelihood of a knowledge-based service sector absorbing a massive unskilled labour force previously employed in agriculture. Hence, the Rwandan government has upgraded the role of the primary sector and is increasingly focusing on the role that the private sector can play in a productive and market-oriented agriculture. Currently, less than 1% of all formal business is concentrated in farming, although this proportion is expected to grow. However, caution is called for in the implementation of policies aimed at facilitating large-scale private investors' involvement in agricultural activities, given that the latter must inevitably compete over land with small-scale peasants (see below). Ansoms (2009b), for example, illustrates how a private-capital injection in the sugarcane business had a net negative impact on employment. Despite the fact that the investor cited ‘job creation’ as a major benefit of the project, the jobs in question were badly paid and highly insecure. Moreover, the concession on more than 3000 hectares of marshland dispossessed thousands of households and destroyed (part of) their income-generating strategies. The negative effect of the latter more than offset the positive impact of the project as a whole. On this basis, one could argue that, overall, much more attention needs to be paid to the social costs of private-capital initiatives and to whether or not they outweigh the benefits.
Productive and market-oriented agriculture (Pillar 5)
As such, the renewed attention of Rwandan policymakers to the agricultural sector is to be applauded. However, all depends on how the ambition of agriculture-led growth is put into practice. The Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (SPAT) outlines an operational framework for agricultural sector development within the EDPRS. The document focuses on agricultural modernisation, intensification, professionalisation and enterprise development (GOR 2004a). The government has worked out policies for promoting monocropping and regional crop specialisation, land registration and the consolidation of plots (see also below), as well as market-orientation in all production activities. These policies are inspired by a concern for improving efficiency and realising economies of scale in food production, with the ultimate goal of contributing to poverty reduction.
However, problems arise at two levels. First of all, goals are set in the absence of any plans for a realistic transition. Farmers are thus expected to adapt overnight to new rules, new targets and new policy demands. In fieldwork (Ansoms and Murison 2011), one of the authors came across examples where farmers were obliged from one day to the next to adopt certain crop types, certain seeds, certain modes of organisation (particularly in swampland areas). But regardless of the transition challenge, this type of growth model in any case appears to be inherently flawed: the proposed modernisation does not match with the priorities and needs of smallholder farmers. Indeed, the SPAT strategies seem to be tailored to large private investors whose capital-intensive farm structure and risk-coping abilities allow them to invest in new high-potential production systems. However, the rural sector is predominantly populated by ‘small family farms (over 90% of all production units) … with an average of less than one hectare in size, integrating polyculture – animal production systems’ (GOR 2004a, p. 10).
Access to such modernised and enhanced techniques is not self-evident for risk-averse small peasants (Ansoms 2010). Cropping techniques based on monoculture, for example, pose significant risks to their fragile livelihoods. Moreover, cultivating one or just a few crops in a given region during a given season can hold a real danger of food insecurity. Furthermore, while farmers are obliged to concentrate on particular crops, their bargaining power on local markets – with a view to generating an adequate monetary income through trade – is generally restricted. Indeed, local markets are poorly integrated, which results in low prices for what is locally produced and high prices for crops that are relatively scarce. Joining forces in co-operatives does not necessarily offer a solution to smallholders, as the management structure of such organisations is very often out of their hands and instances of blatant corruption have been documented (Ansoms and Murison 2012b, Ansoms and Murison 2011). Moreover, smallholders are increasingly confronted with the insertion of large modern factories owned by national and international private investors (see below). Such installations are often presented as showcase projects of modern agriculture and they tend to receive considerable subsidies and governmental support. In comparison to the capital-rich and influential actors involved, smallholders have very little or no bargaining power in price negotiations (Ansoms and Murison 2012b).
The preference of policymakers for large-scale agriculture with a strong role for private investors is not self-evident, for two reasons. First, there is an overall inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity (Ansoms et al. 2008). While this should not be automatically interpreted as a reflection of small-scale farmers' greater efficiency, it is indicative of the significance of land to small-scale actors, who strive to make the best possible use of every available acre. Second, it remains unclear why and to what extent the involvement of the private sector in agricultural growth should result in a massive trickle-down effect to the poorer strata of society. After all, the profits generated through such policies remain firmly in the hands of a limited group and do not translate directly into either agricultural or non-agricultural investment that massively absorbs a growing group of unskilled labourers (Ansoms 2008).
It is the aim of Vision 2020 to reduce the proportion of people whose livelihood depends on agriculture to 50% of the population by the year 2020. And, indeed, it seems likely that the current rural policies are pushing smallholders out of the agricultural sector. This will de facto decrease the number employed in farming. At the same time, however, it will create a group of unemployed and often unskilled workers who are unlikely to be absorbed by other sectors of the economy. In a country where the livelihood of over 80% of the population depends on agriculture and where land and natural resources are scarce, there is a strong need for unequivocal strategies to accompany the transition from agriculture to other economic activities. However, such an approach should be implemented in a realistic way, with a strong role for smallholder and labour-intensive agriculture on the one hand and investment in capacity building for labour-intensive non-farm sectors on the other. The development of training centres focusing on non-agricultural artisanal specialisations should be made a priority, in combination with a facilitation of local-level investment in small-scale industries by actors operating within the informal economy.
3.4. Infrastructure development (Pillar 4)
As outlined in the Vision 2020 document, ‘the rehabilitation and development of infrastructure is a crucial aspect in lowering the costs of doing business in Rwanda’ (GOR 2000, p. 15). Indeed, in the field of infrastructure development, the Rwandan government seems to have opted for projects offering a potential for attracting private entrepreneurs, though quite often at the expense of more deprived population groups.
One of the objectives put forward in Vision 2020 is the elaboration of a ‘modern land law providing security of tenure and freedom of exchange’. The land law, which was adopted in 2005 after a lengthy process of drafting and negotiation, seeks to formalise land rights through official titling.9 Although customary land rights are recognised as a basis for acquiring official titles, registration of ownership has been made compulsory, and the law states that formal legal procedures are to be established for the acquisition and leasing of land (Article 26). It was the Rwandan government's hope that the security of official land titles would encourage more investment in land conservation and quality improvements (GOR 2004b). However, in line with the new law, official titles can only be acquired through a formal procedure of registration with proof in the form of a certificate. People have to pay for a registration certificate for each of their parcels. In this sense, financially more privileged individuals clearly enjoy an advantage, as they are able to rely more readily on this additional tool for claiming land – particularly in the case of contested land rights. Moreover, Article 20 of the law prohibits the division of land parcels of one hectare or less. This rule, if implemented, is a major constraint for the majority of peasant households, given that average landholdings are only 0.71 hectares (2000 figures; Jayne et al. 2003). The law does not set maximum sizes for landholdings. The ceiling of 50 hectares, which had been included in an earlier draft of the new land law, was omitted from the approved version. Hence, the land law provides extensive opportunities for large-scale investors and enhances their bargaining power in the field of land acquisition.
In addition to introducing changes to the management of agricultural land, the Rwandan government also strives to control how farmers live. According to Rwandan tradition, people do not group together in clearly identifiable villages, but live scattered in the hills. Young men must traditionally ask their fathers for part of the family's land in order to build their own homes, a crucial condition for marriage and the transition to adulthood (De Lame 2005). Subsequently, male heads may – in accordance with their needs and financial resources – expand and improve their homes as they see fit. However, this pattern of scattered living does not tie in with the government's vision of the spatial organisation of a modern state. Its aim is to rehouse the rural population in delimited settlements by 2020 (GOR 2000). The EDPRS put forward the target of constructing an additional 5700 imidugudu sites (grouped settlements) by 2012 to complement the 5486 already in existence (GOR 2007).
This ‘villagisation’ approach was introduced in the aftermath of the war for the purpose of resettling refugee households. Subsequently – particularly in the eastern part of the country – it was used to forcefully rehouse people. Families were made to burn their houses and move, often to dwellings or shelters of an inferior quality. Several authors have analysed the perverse effect of this policy upon the livelihoods and social relations at the local level (Newbury 2011, Leegwater 2011, Human Rights Watch 2001, Van Hoyweghen 1999). The more recent version of the centralisation approach is less strict: only newly established households are required to settle at specified sites within centralised communities. However, land prices and construction costs at such sites are often prohibitively expensive for rural youth. As noted by Sommers and Uvin (2011, p. 3): ‘regulating the standard size of an umudugudu house helps make the quest toward completing a house virtually impossible for nearly all poor male youth in rural Rwanda’. Many young men have no choice but to live with their parents, so that they are effectively unable to make the transition to adulthood. This phenomenon is closely connected with the increasing incidence of unmarried young mothers, resulting in growing social exclusion and marginalisation (Ansoms and Murison 2011).
A similar evolution has unfolded in the capital city. The population of Kigali quadrupled to over 923,000 people between the early 1990s and 2006. After 1994, the city was confronted with a massive return of refugees who had lived in neighbouring countries for decades or even generations. Moreover, Kigali has attracted a considerable influx of rural migrants in search of a livelihood. These new residents often settle in small, poor-quality houses or makeshift dwellings. In an attempt to get a grip on urban land-use practices, the Rwandan government has, over the years, implemented several urbanisation policies. In Vision 2020 it already expressed the ambition to improve its handling of the rapid and non-coordinated urbanisation trend. The 2006 EDPRS document goes into greater detail regarding the reorganisation of the urban living space: ‘These sites and zones selected will be surveyed, demarcated and sub-divided into building plots. These sites and zones will be provided with relevant infrastructural services. The process will involve the clearance and upgrading of unplanned urban areas. Partnerships between government and the Private Sector will be of essence’ (GOR 2007, p. 60). However, as demonstrated by Durant Lasserve, this policy has resulted in many urban dwellings being labelled ‘illegal’ for not meeting the prevailing building standards. In fact, the required standards for legal housing within the urban perimeter of Kigali are unattainable for 75% to 80% of all households (Durant-Lasserve 2006). Moreover, residents are also chased away to make room for public infrastructure projects or for large-scale developments by private investors. There are several neighbourhoods in Kigali where people have already been evicted (Nyarutarama), or are either in the process of being evicted (Gacuriro, Kiyovu – near Muhima, Rugando – Kimihurura) or about to enter that process (Muhima, Kagugu, Kimicanga) (Ansoms and Murison 2011).
Human resources development and a knowledge-based economy (Pillar 2)
Vision 2020 unequivocally puts forward the goal of investing in education and public health. The first PRSP likewise focused mainly on education and the health sector, and significant progress was indeed made. In the realm of public health, the infant mortality rate decreased from 106 to 59 infants per 1000 births between 2000 and 2010. The maternal mortality rate was halved from 1100 to 540 cases per 100,000 births between 2000 and 2008. In both instances, the figures attained surpassed the 2010 objectives formulated in Vision 2020. HIV/AIDS prevalence declined from 3.8% to 2.9% in 2007. Rwanda invested in malaria prevention, so that by 2008/09 some 56% of all children under five were sleeping under mosquito nets, compared to just 4% in 2000 (for the relevant data sources, see the Table 2 in Appendix 1). Rwandan policymakers also focused heavily on expanding the insurance system: for a fee of 1000 Rwandan francs (RWF), individuals could take out coverage against pregnancy or illness under the mutuelle system.10 More recently, however, the government has decided to increase the fee to RWF3000 per person for most people living in rural settings (Ansoms and Murison 2011). This will no doubt make it financially problematic for a large majority of the rural population to take out insurance.
The Rwandan government has also invested massively in education. With the introduction of free and compulsory primary education, the net enrolment rate increased from 75% (2001) to 96% (2008). On the other hand, the pupil-to-teacher ratio in primary schools rose concurrently from 54 to 68, with a possibly negative impact on the quality of education. Nonetheless, the primary completion rate rose from 22% in 2000 to 54% in 2008 and, according to the minister of education, it subsequently continued to rise to 78% by 2010. Gross enrolment rates in secondary education improved from 11% (2000) to 27% (2009); and gross tertiary enrolment increased from 1.4% (2000) to 4.8% (2008) (for data sources, see Table 2 in Appendix 1). It is however unclear to what extent the sudden switch from French (and Kinyarwanda) to English as a classroom language has impacted on quality. After all, many teachers barely speak English. Moreover, the government's recent reform (October 2010) of the system of study loans to students in tertiary education has affected some 24,000 students, or 70% of beneficiaries (EurAc 2011, p. 4). Students are now categorised as well-off, quite well-off, quite poor, poor, or vulnerable. Study loans are available only to students belonging to the latter category. In reality, this implies that a large proportion of students from middle-class and poor households who are not classified as vulnerable are pushed out of the tertiary education system, since the cost of education is beyond the disposable resources of these households. Hence, even more than in the past, tertiary education risks becoming a privilege of the elite. Equally importantly, it remains to be seen what progress can be made in improving the quality and accessibility of technical training. Access to vocational and training centres may offer a different window of opportunity to young people who would otherwise be restricted to daily searching for non-skilled work, primarily in the agricultural sector.
The reality of young unskilled and unemployed youth is most probably one of the most pressing challenges facing Rwanda in the near future. Sommers (2012) observes how the requirements for youth to make the transition to manhood (having access to an income, land and a house, and getting married) are becoming increasingly hard to meet for a growing group of young men. Faced with such self-perceived failure, many young males feel a need to move away from their familiar environment and to try their luck elsewhere. Moreover, ‘delayed adulthood for men means delayed adulthood for women. Marriage and giving birth to children are prerequisites of socially acceptable womanhood’ (Sommers and Uvin 2011, p. 3). Girls – unable to find a suitable ‘adult’ partner – may become pregnant without being married, with all the socially detrimental consequences that this entails. Uprooted youth who are ‘stuck’ (see the title of Sommers's book 2012) in their childhood may feel increasingly frustrated by the contrast between their self-perceived personal failure and the government-fed image of Rwanda as a development success story.
Regional and international economic integration (Pillar 6)
In terms of economic integration, Rwanda focuses most intensely upon its immediate neighbours. Rwanda joined the East African Community (EAC) on 1 July 2007. Other member countries are Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. The EAC aims to ‘widen and deepen economic, political, social and cultural integration’ through ‘increased competitiveness, value added production, trade and investment’ (East African Community 2006). One of its strategies is to integrate all member states into a customs union. In this way, the EAC could provide Rwanda with access to the sea. At the same time, however, Rwanda's relatively weak economic position in comparison to the other EAC members could have negative consequences: it remains to be seen whether the Rwandan economy is competitive enough for it to be able to compete with its neighbours.
Rwanda's focus on the EAC seems to have dampened its interest in the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). The CEPGL was originally founded in 1976 to promote economic integration between the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. In 1994, the community collapsed in consequence of the continuous violence in the region. Rwanda's active involvement in the regional wars (see Reyntjens 2009) and its role in causing human suffering in eastern DRC, as documented in a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) report (2010) that is contested by the Rwandan government, was obviously not conducive to building constructive economic partnerships between the countries of the Great Lakes region. In 2008, the CEPGL was revived, but it has hitherto failed to yield truly concrete results. An economic rapprochement between the aforementioned countries could represent a concrete step towards more constructive relationships.
However, economic integration alone will not suffice to solve the problem of regional instability. The states concerned are involved in a highly complex regional process characterised by divisions and conflicts at the national level which nonetheless assume a cross-border dimension (Reyntjens 2009). Any sustainable solution must therefore be based on a transnational approach whereby political integration is attributed a vital role. In this respect, the creation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR, established in 2003 under the auspices of the UN and encompassing 11 countries) has played a constructive role in forging regional relations.
One consequence of Rwanda's improved diplomatic relations with its neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo, was its willingness to participate in joint military operations against the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in eastern DRC, Kimya I and Kimya II. Although the rapprochement was extremely important and necessary under the Nairobi Joint Declaration of 9 November 2007, the military operations in question had a devastating humanitarian impact, with growing numbers of displaced people in eastern DRC, killings, looting and destruction, and a deplorable increase in the incidence of sexual violence against women (EurAc 2009). Such human rights violations are diametrically opposed to the notions of political dialogue and negotiation with FDLR groups, while they have done very little to restore peace. Furthermore, the renewed violence in eastern DRC (summer 2012) and Rwanda's support to the M23 rebellion again threaten regional stability.
Cross-cutting issues: gender equality
Vision 2020 identifies three cross-cutting issues: (1) gender equality, (2) protection of the environment and sustainable natural resource management, and (3) science and technology, including information and communications technology (ICT). In what follows, the focus is on the gender aspect. Vision 2020 stresses the importance of integrating gender as a cross-cutting issue in all development policies and strategies. Indeed, the government of Rwanda has created a favourable environment for enhancing gender equality. An often-cited achievement is that Rwanda has the most gender-equal parliament in the world, with 56.3% female members (see Appendix).
The principles of gender equality are also embedded in laws, policies, and governance (Burnet 2008). The country has a gender-sensitive constitution (2003); women enjoy equal inheritance rights (see the 1998 amendments to the civil code governing marriage and the 2003 inheritance law); and there is a law on the prevention, protection and punishment of gender-based violence (2006) (Devlin and Elgie 2008). Furthermore, the Ministry of Gender and the Promotion of the Family enjoys sufficient legitimacy to ensure that the gender aspect is taken into account in the country's development process and that the gender perspective is mainstreamed in all development policies. The government adopted a national gender policy in 2009 with the aim of clearly defining the process of integration of gender issues into the various development sectors (Holvoet and Ingberg 2010).
This seems to have paid off. Indeed, Rwanda performs relatively well in terms of the UNDP's Gender Inequality Index (see UNDP 2011). The country exhibits a relatively low maternal mortality ratio (540 versus 619 per 100,000 births in sub-Saharan Africa in 2008); a low adolescent fertility rate (lower, in fact, than that of the United States in 2011); an extremely high percentage of pregnant women paying at least one visit to a prenatal care unit (96% in Rwanda versus 74% in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005–2009); and a relatively high number of births attended by skilled health personnel (52% versus 48% in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005–2009). Further achievements taken into account in this index are the high number of seats in national parliament held by women (highest worldwide; see above), and a high female labour-force participation (higher for women than men in the case of Rwanda in 2009). Rwanda performs less well in terms of its high overall fertility rate (5.3 children in comparison to 4.8 in sub-Saharan Africa in 2011), and the percentage of women having received at least secondary education (7.4% compared to 22.2% in sub-Saharan Africa in 2010).
Yet there are other issues still to be tackled. Despite the recognition of female inheritance rights, formal rights that define access to land often clash with informal customary arrangements (Ansoms and Holvoet 2008). Moreover, the law ignores the rights of a sizeable and vulnerable group of wives in non-legal polygamous marriages. Another piece of legislation, the 2004 land law, does recognise women's land rights. Women have the right to be mentioned by name on land ownership certificates, but, again, this is not necessarily the case for second and third wives in polygamous marriages. Furthermore, quite a recent issue with major gender implications is the observed increase in unwed mothers. When girls become pregnant outside of marriage, the fathers often fail to acknowledge their responsibilities (see above). The imidugudu policy prevents young men and women from making the transition to adulthood without the necessary resources for the acquisition of land and a home that meets the official quality standards (Sommers 2012).
Burnet (2008, 2011) highlights both sides of the coin, at both the micro and the macro levels. At the micro level, women have been obliged in the aftermath of the genocide to take up new roles within their private and public lives. This was often merely a survival strategy as, with deceased or imprisoned husbands, they could no longer rely on traditional types of protection. On the one hand, Burnet warns against excessively rosy interpretations of this societal shift, pointing to the vulnerability of women who must secure the livelihoods of themselves and their families. Moreover, the inclusion of women in local governance structures also adds to an already high workload. On the other hand, the new roles have at once allowed them to take up more active roles. At the macro level, increased female political participation has paved the way for a more active role of women in Rwandan society. In practice, however, their influence within an authoritarian state structure often remains limited, while their presence may be used to legitimise the RPF's political agenda.
The Rwandan development model: maximal growth versus broad-based development
The recently reported spectacular decrease in poverty is surprising. Not least because many of Rwanda's poverty and inequality issues are inherent in the growth model applied, and this model has been rigidly implemented between 2001 and 2006. With its focus on large-scale investment and disregard for the potential of local-level (and often informal) entrepreneurial activities, the Rwandan government aligns with a traditional neoliberal policy agenda that aims for maximum growth, while largely ignoring the question of how this growth should be redistributed. In practice, the concentration of strong economic growth in the hands of a small elite results in a highly skewed developmental path with limited trickle-down potential. The problems inherent in the neoliberal growth model are aggravated by the manner in which it is implemented on the ground. The rigid top-down implementation of imihigi (performance contracts) at all levels of the administration does not allow for bottom-up feedback on the appropriateness of policy measures and targeting.
For smallholder farmers – the majority of the population – this results in two main problems. First, they have to insert themselves in a stringent programme aimed at a modernisation of the agricultural sector (monocropping, regional crop specialisation, market orientation). In practice, this exposes them to excessive risks that do not align to their risk-minimising priorities. Second, farmers are confronted with a multitude of financial obligations (mutuelle de santé, costs to register landholdings, cost for young households to build houses in the agglomeration) and fines (fines for not keeping cows in stables, fines for not reaching targets from local authorities, fines for not having decent roofing, etc.) (Ansoms and Murison 2011).
Furthermore, the concentration of power and wealth in the agricultural sector contributes to the expansion of a class of landless unskilled labourers in a context of limited employment opportunities; of poor youth without access to advanced education who feel increasingly ‘stuck’ and cut off from forms of upward social mobility. Moreover, the constant confrontation between the sense of failure among these groups and the narrative of national success only aggravates the underlying societal tensions. A comparison of the prevailing ‘sentiments’ in six rural villages during fieldwork by one of the authors in 2007 and 2011 revealed a worrying rise in feelings of frustration and anger. Such rising tensions risk destabilising the country. It seems only a matter of time before the currently unbalanced and skewed growth model will itself become ‘stuck’.
This gives rise to the question of an alternative. Rather than to focus on maximised growth, concentrated in the hands of just a few, perhaps one should work towards broad-based growth founded on small-scale agricultural activity. The Rwandan authorities should evaluate the productive and entrepreneurial potential of various socio-economic peasant categories, and analyse how this potential is best activated. International literature points to viable policy alternatives to the large-scale farmer-biased model and highlights the way in which such alternatives have been ‘sabotaged’ in the recent past. Akram-Lodhi (2008, p. 471), for example, denounces that smallholder agriculture is now declared unviable, after ‘smallholders [have been systematically undermined] by disinvesting and exposing them to ‘free’ market forces on an uneven playing field'. Cribb (2010) observes how a shift from public- to private-sector investment in agricultural innovation has stimulated the development of a technology that is tailor-made for a high-energy (large-scale) model of farming. He further notes how ‘science has largely neglected the equally promising but far less understood low-input systems [that characterise smallholder agriculture]’ (Cribb 2010, p. 133). Moyo (2008, p. 23) argues in the same vein that ‘the concentration of public resource allocations for agricultural technological progress as well as for market protection has been directed at [large-scale agrarian capitalist farming], particularly the export farmers’. He concludes that ‘this is at the expense of broad-based transformations of farming techniques and institutions’. Therefore, the choice for an agricultural model based on smallholder farming is not just a matter of short-term fixes, but also requires a profound investment in the restructuring of production relations and public institutions.
How to translate all this into practice? A first pro-peasant policy initiative might shift the focus of research and policies to techniques that lower the capital-to-labour ratio (for example by introducing new land/financial capital-saving techniques that allow smallholders to increase their productivity; by introducing labour-intensive crops where small-scale farmers enjoy a comparative advantage, etc.). Indeed, broad-based agricultural growth should be based on the acknowledgement of the low opportunity cost of labour and the high opportunity cost of capital that small-scale peasants face. Another possible way forward is to identify and remove the institutional constraints that prevent smallholders from accessing capital at a relatively low cost. Providing access, at the (most) local level, to credit and risk-insurance mechanisms could enhance peasants' capacity for coping with risk and uncertainty related to new types of agriculture. The ambition of the Rwandan policymakers to strongly involve the private sector in local credit mechanisms may restrict accessibility to these resources for many small-scale peasants with an unfavourable risk profile (i.e. those unable to provide collateral as a guarantee). A third key strategy element is to facilitate smallholders' access to markets and to improve their bargaining position. In this respect, co-operatives often function poorly and at times adopt coercive methods to oblige farmers to sell their crops collectively (Ansoms and Murison 2012b). Instead, smallholders should have ownership over the collective mechanisms whereby they may profit from exchange opportunities in the market. Policy measures such as prohibiting bicycles on asphalted roads (reported by Syfia Grands Lacs in October 2011) impede farmers and make it physically more difficult for them to reach markets; instead, policies should promote all means that facilitate market access for smallholders. A fourth path to progress is to allow local small-scale entrepreneurs to invest accumulated surpluses from agricultural production in off-farm enterprises. Although often unfolding in the informal sector, such initiatives create employment and ensure that money is reinvested in the rural economy at the very local level. At this point, the heavy regulation and taxation procedures impede local actors to engage in small-scale informal activities.
Last but not least, there should be sufficient room for bottom-up voices. The extensive control of the central level over local settings has resulted in ‘a far-reaching practice of self-censorship among the population with regard to elements that do not fit into the official public transcript’ (Ingelaere 2010a, pp. 52–53). However, despite the authoritarian repression of local-level dissent, people have developed hidden transcripts of what they perceive as disruptive policies. During one of our field trips, an individual noted the following:
In this country, people live in poverty but, in the name of modernisation, this is not acknowledged. You are not allowed to be poor in this country. People are asking themselves if this is how Vision 2020 is being achieved.
Hence, in the current Rwanda, with policymakers focused on technocratic performance targets, there is a crucial role to be played by the international donor community. In fact several international donors, injecting major aid funds into the Rwandan state budget, are reinforcing the current tendency by adopting a ‘narrowly defined technocratic vision of monitoring and evaluation’ (Holvoet and Rombouts 2008, p. 577). At the same time, they have refrained from criticising the political governance aspects out of a historically rooted sense of guilt (see Desrosiers and Thomson 2011) that has been cleverly amplified through the current regime's spin (Reyntjens 2011a). Instead, international donors should make more pressing demands for channels that allow silenced voices from below to be heard. Indeed, a genuine appreciation and political representation of smallholder peasants is a first step in turning Vision 2020 into more than a cosmetic strategy for the purpose of enhancing the negative reputation of a post-genocide country.
Notes on contributors
An Ansoms is assistant professor in Development Studies at the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. She holds a PhD in Economics and is involved in research on poverty and inequality in the Great Lakes Region. She pays is interested in the challenges of rural development and pro-poor growth in land-scarce (post-)conflict environments.
Donatella Rostagno is a human rights advocate and has developed an in-depth knowledge on development, gender and security issues. Since January 2007 she has been a political analyst for the European Network for Central Africa (EurAc), where she has developed work on issues such as democratisation, security sector reform, and gender and security.