Development ethics: means of the means?

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Development ethics at work: explorations – 1960–2002, by Denis Goulet, London and New York, Routledge, 2009, 282 pp., £26.00, ISBN 9780415494045

Development ethics, edited by Des Gasper and Asuncion Lera St Clair, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010, 541 pp., £160.00, ISBN 9780754628385

New directions in development ethics: essays in honor of Denis Goulet, edited by Charles K. Wilber and Amitava Krishna Dutt, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2010, 495 pp., £50.83, ISBN 978026802598

Ethics of global government: agency, capability and deliberative democracy, by David A. Crocker, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 416 pp., £26.99, ISBN 9780521117388

Global poverty, ethics and human rights: the role of multilateral organisations, by Desmond McNeill and Asuncion Lera St Clair, London and New York, 2009, 192 pp., £25.99, ISBN 9780415445948

The last few years have seen a growth of interest in development ethics that has been reflected in the recent publication of several important volumes. This indicates the increasing significance of a consideration of ethics not only for development theory, but also for development practice. Given the well-known depredations and ill effects that have often been associated with development policy in general as well as with specific development programmes and projects, it might well be argued that the incorporation of ethical considerations is welcome, if not long overdue. The obvious proviso to such an argument would pertain to the character and form such an ethics might take. An ethics founded in Western principles and justifying Western development practices might be expected not to have universal appeal for example.

The five volumes that will be discussed here represent an excellent cross-section of the development ethics literature that one can use to begin to assess the character of any emergent ethics of development. The first is a collection of papers by the man generally recognised as the founding father of development ethics, Denis Goulet, representing every stage of his career. As we shall see, it is an impressive testament to a diverse and radical mind, as well as an essential chronicle of the development of Goulet's ethics. The substantial volume edited by Gasper and St Clair is a comprehensive survey of the emergence of development ethics that is essential to attain a sense of the breadth and diversity of writing in the field. The volume edited by Wilber and Dutt is a Festschrift in honour of Denis Goulet compiled to mark his death in 2006. It assembles a set of papers giving contemporary views of potential directions in development ethics. Crocker's volume is a monograph setting out a detailed and ambitious agenda for the development and global practice of an ethics founded in an idea of deliberative democracy. The volume by McNeill and St Clair is a valuable and informative study of various initiatives attempting to introduce development ethics into the practice of a variety of international development organisations, including the World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). As such, it provides us with important indications as to the form and character development ethics might take if it is ever embraced by mainstream development agencies. This review endeavours to bring out some of the main themes that characterise this literature as well as making some observations as to what this literature indicates about the nature of the emergent field of development ethics. Particular attention will be given to assessing its prospects for implementation in development policy.

Goulet lays radical foundations

Goulet's Development ethics at work provides a comprehensive overview of his work that helps to identify many of the key themes associated with development ethics. Crocker provides a useful preface in which he focuses on three themes in particular: solidarity, non-elite participation and a principle of a decent sufficiency of basic goods for all. It might be argued that solidarity lies at the foundations of Goulet's ethics. Crocker glosses Goulet's concept of solidarity as entailing ‘the idea that those individuals, groups and nations who are better off have obligations in relation to those worse off’ (p. xxiii). He goes on to point out that this means developed countries have obligations to help and not to do harm. Whilst this is accurate, if anything it underestimates the radicalism of Goulet's appeal. In discussing the global economy, Goulet wrote:

Any new ‘global bargain’ must … avoid merely dividing the world into donors and recipients of ‘charity’. A new understanding of structural justice will need to state as its initial postulate that the rights of human societies and their members are founded on the requirements of integral development for all. Effective solidarity will need to become the operative value; this means institutionalizing the principle that the world's wealth belongs to all its inhabitants, on the basis of priority needs, not on geographical accident or on differing technological abilities to extract or exploit resources that some groups enjoy over others. (pp. 166–167)

In other passages Goulet expands on the implications of this vision to argue that rich countries need to practise austerity in order to free the resources to help the global poor and to prevent their own societies becoming subject to an overriding materialism.

This anti-consumerist vision is entwined with Goulet's approach to the issue of sustainability, which he identified as seeming ‘to require simple living in which consumption is limited’ (p. 177). It also dovetails with the principle that everybody should have a sufficiency of basic goods. Goulet envisaged that austerity would liberate the resources needed to ensure that everybody received the basic minimum of goods needed to stay alive, including food, lodgings, access to education and medicine.

The third theme emphasised in Crocker's preface, non-elite participation, reflects the influence of Freire on Goulet's thinking in its emphasis that development should empower the poor. Goulet argued that ‘the poor must gain access to resources early in the decision-making process regarding the use of resources, and not merely as a corrective afterthought to vitiated distribution systems’ (p. 166). Development was not to treat poor people as objects to be manipulated for development purposes, but as subjects capable of making their own decisions and taking their own actions to help themselves. Whilst there is much criticism of participation, we may note that Goulet provides numerous case studies throughout the volume to illustrate how participatory ventures can help to improve peoples' lives and empower them. As Crocker points out, such ventures constitute what Goulet terms authentic development, which enables people to act for their own development as subjects. This is to be contrasted with inauthentic development, which Goulet characterises as follows:

It is necessary to reject false or spurious forms of development which assign greater importance to the accumulation of goods than to the ‘essential good’, or which subordinate the value of the human person to mere material goods. Embracing spurious development would eventually lead to the acceptance only of values measurable in monetary terms; doing so would simply ‘materialize’ human beings, treating them simply as instruments of production, units of consumption, voters, or bearers of arms. (p. 5)

This passage illuminates an area that Crocker does not emphasise, namely an intrinsically anti-capitalist strand in Goulet's ethics. The critique of accumulation of goods leading to materialistic values that subordinate humans to commodities is itself redolent of socialist, if not Marxist, critiques of capitalist development. This stance becomes even clearer in the following passage where he approvingly refers to the arguments of Barbara Ward (1976):

Markets respond to purchasing power: a market system wholly uncorrected by institutions of justice, sharing, and solidarity, makes the strong stronger and the weak weaker. Markets as useful tools in a functioning social order have a positive and decentralizing role to play. Markets as masters of society enrich the rich and pauperize the poor. (p. 180)

If Goulet's critique of neoliberalism does not emerge clearly enough from the above statement, it becomes self-evident within his disagreement with the views of Stinson (1993), as follows:

Neoliberal free trade policies are being pushed by a worldwide corporate elite bent on defining the environment as a trade barrier expressed in dollars. Governments have abetted this transformation by forging agreements that ensure a nation's powerlessness to defend itself against commercial activities that harm its citizens or the environment. (p. 154)

This not only indicates that Goulet's ethics stands firmly against the predominant capitalist philosophy that underpins globalisation, but also shows an appreciation of the way in which powerful economic and political elites are pushing the neoliberal agenda at the direct cost of the global poor. In this sense Goulet's ethics is a radical development ethics.

Ethics as means of the means

The substantial volume edited by Gasper and St Clair, and to a lesser degree the Festschrift for Goulet edited by Wilber and Dutt, both provide comprehensive surveys of how numerous scholars have built on the foundations constructed by Goulet. Gasper and St Clair in particular have compiled a comprehensive and systematic survey of several main trends in development ethics, focusing on the needs, capabilities and human rights approaches, but also paying attention to questions of implementation and to policy issues. The book contains important texts by Sen and Nussbaum (on aspects of capability theory), Manfred Max-Neef (on human needs), Beetham and Hansen and Otto (on rights-based approaches), as well as pieces by such authors as Penz on displacement, Hanlon on debt, Stiglitz on economic policy, and several pieces by Goulet which mostly complement rather than duplicating the contents of his Development ethics at work. Gasper and St Clair have compiled an essential volume for anybody who wishes to get a sense of the reach of the development ethics literature.

An important theme in Goulet's work that is emphasised in the Gasper and St Clair volume concerns his ambition to make development ethics ‘a means of the means’. In other words, ethics must not simply take the form of an abstract moral code, but must inform the actions and operational methods of development policymakers and personnel. He elaborates on this as follows:

Any moral judgement must relate to the technical data pertinent to the problem under study in realistic terms. Moreover, such a judgement must utilize those data in ways which professional experts can recognize as faithful to the demands of their discipline. This is the sense in which ethics must serve as a ‘means of the means’, that is, as a moral beacon illuminating the value questions buried inside instrumental means appealed to by decision-makers and problem-solvers of all kinds. (Goulet 1988, in Gasper and St Clair 2010, p. 56)

Goulet was determined that the work of development policymakers and field workers should be informed by ethical principles. As Gasper notes, ethical considerations could be introduced into the instruments and techniques used to make development policy through ‘incorporation of ideas in movements, incorporation in methods, and incorporation in education and training’ (Gasper, in Gasper and St Clair 2010, p. 76). In this way ethics would become embedded in the means of action and influential with development actors such as aid agencies and international organisations. It would endeavour not only to identify ethical goals, but also ‘to affect the processes and instruments through which the goals are, in practice, respecified and marginalized or given real weight’ (ibid.).

However, the literature indicates that there are problems with this ambition. In writing about how the capability approach might be mobilised as a field application, Gasper notes that:

The operationalization of an approach includes its institutionalization and its conversion into feasible procedures of application, sometimes including quantification. Both institutionalization and application involve adaptations to fit specific contexts. Sometimes adaptation involves simplification but equally often it requires complication, instead or in addition. (Gasper 2007, in Gasper and St Clair 2010, p. 231)

Gasper quotes McNeill to identify three ‘standard dangers’ in this process:

First, fatal conceptual fuzziness may emerge as all and sundry take up and twist the approach's terms. Second, sometimes in reaction, academics far from the policy frontline can over-refine the approach and the debate, rendering it arcane and remote to potential users. Third, as ‘practical men’ go their own way in operationalization, the approach can become bastardized and lose its rationale. (p. 231)

With regard to the capability approach in particular, Gasper notes that its vagueness and flexibility leaves it open to risks such as ‘failure to develop and refine theory, and proneness to operationalise by reversion to familiar, conservative forms that are not consistent with the approach's rationale’ (p. 231). This could lead to a field approach that is formalistic, economistic and overly concerned with quantification.

The ambition of operationalising development ethics raises the very real possibility of co-optation by agencies that do not believe in the idea, but wish to enhance their credibility through association with it. That Goulet was cognisant of such dangers is evident in his aforementioned references to global elites pushing inegalitarian neoliberal policies. A further gloss is provided by his thoughtful meditation on gradualism and violence when he observes:

Two opposing kinds of incrementalism can be identified: the one palliative, the other creative. Palliatives prevent deep change by lulling people into accepting minor gradual improvement instead of adequate responses to fundamental problems. As time passes, however, palliatives always worsen the condition they mean to cure – by raising hopes they cannot satisfy or tinkering with defective social mechanisms, thereby postponing treatment until the disease becomes incurable. Creative incremental measures on the contrary are designed to open new possibilities for subsequent radical change even though at the moment of adoption they appear modest. (Goulet 2009, p. 77)

It is clear that Goulet's preference is for gradual change as opposed to violent change, but he is well aware that elite groups are prone to try and buy off the repressed with palliatives that will not change the essential working of the system.

This leads Goulet to address the question of whether or not there can be a legitimate use of violence. In one paper written at the height of the Cold War he noted that the demands of peace and justice might be in conflict in a world order that is peaceful, but based on inequity. In a situation where the power holders are prepared to unleash catastrophic violence to repress the just demands of the excluded untold damage could be done. Goulet's response to this is as follows:

The long-term mission of the peacemaker, from the perspective of developmental justice, is to destroy the prior legitimacy enjoyed by the forces of institutional violence. Those who make this their priority can then, without losing their moral credentials, engage in the task of devising revolutionary strategies whose use of destructive violence is truly minimal. (Goulet 1976, in Gasper and St Clair 2010, p. 125)

This indicates that despite his clear preference for peaceful methods of promoting development ethics, Goulet is aware that power holders may resort to violence in defence of their interests and that the pursuit of justice may require that violence be answered with violence, although it should be kept to the minimum. More generally, this might be taken to justify resort to illegal, or forceful action that departs from the democratic ideal that differences should be settled through peaceful negotiation.

Development ethics in practice?

Problems of operationalising development ethics are highlighted by McNeill and St Clair in their volume examining the responses of the various multilateral organisations to such demands as the need to incorporate a human rights agenda in their work and to promote growth with equity. McNeill and St Clair start from the proposition that international institutions such as the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have a moral duty to address the need for global justice:

International organizations are what we call ‘response-able’; they are particularly well placed to act by virtue of the powers that the people of the world have given them: the economic resources and expertise that enable them to change the world and the political legitimacy they enjoy by virtue of their mandates. (p. 10)

However, they also indicate that such institutions have ‘been hesitant to embrace the discourse of ethics and human rights’ (p. 10).

The World Bank has made gestures towards responding to public, United Nations and non-government organisation pressures for reform. Notably, it launched a Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values in 2000 and created the post of adviser on human rights to the president of the bank in 2003. There were also attempts to introduce issues related to development ethics into significant bank publications such as the 2006 World development report, which was sub-titled Equity and development and sought to integrate a human rights perspective into the bank's analysis. McNeill and St Clair were actively involved in the process of preparing the report and were clearly in support of the position of many lobbyists that the bank ought to incorporate a human rights perspective because rights were intrinsically valuable as they are based on the ethical principle that all lives are of equal worth. However, this was not well received by representatives of the bank:

Some argued very vehemently that it was not the role of the Bank to address questions of human rights … the major concern here derived from the discomfort with the ‘intrinsic’ argument for equity, which does not fit well with the dominant economic perspective. One of the key cognitive values of economics is the notion of a trade-off – whether in seeking to understand people's behavior, or to advise on policies. This leads to serious incompatibilities with ethical argumentation based on intrinsic values. By definition, something that is intrinsic is non-tradable. (p.101)

It would appear that bank staff regarded economics as more intrinsic than ethics inasmuch as many of them expressed the view that ‘one of the problems of rights perspectives is that it was not empirically proven to be economically sound to implement, say, the right to education, or the right to health for all’ (p. 101). In the final instance the World development report for 2006 did not employ the intrinsic argument and human rights were tangential to its core arguments. Overall, human rights approaches have not had much of an impact at the bank, not only because of its economic ethos but because of opposition from some board members, both from donor and recipient countries. McNeill and St Clair examined a similar initiative to promote ethics as a component in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)'s development activities only to find that:

The Initiative could not risk entering too manifestly into the realm of politics and ideology, since this might appear threatening to those who actually controlled the organization. (p. 142)

These included a number of countries in the Americas represented on the IDB's board. Similarly, a UNESCO project to examine human rights approaches to the abolition of poverty met with internal resistance because it was seen as politically risky. A central problem was that any contention that poverty was a breach of the rights of the poor could give rise to a legal claim and as McNeill and St Clair note – ‘such ideas are anathema to the rich and powerful’ (p. 126).

In explaining the failure of multilateral organisations to live up to their ‘moral duty’ McNeill and St Clair mobilise the concept of Gramscian hegemony over the development discourse, appealing to the following passage from Bøås and McNeill:

Powerful states (notably the USA), powerful organizations (such as the IMF) and even, perhaps, powerful disciplines (economics) exercise their power largely by framing: which serves to limit the power of potentially radical ideas to achieve change. A successful framing exercise will both cause an issue to be seen by those who matter, and ensure that they see it in a specific way. And this is achieved with the minimum of conflict or pressure. For the ideas appear to be ‘natural’ and ‘common sense’. (Bøås and McNeill 2004, p. 220, quoted in McNeill and St Clair 2009, p. 16)

St Clair makes it clear that the bank frames development in such a way as to favour neoliberal ideas, arguing that whereas modernisation theory represented the development myth of last century, neoliberal globalisation is the myth of this century. Elsewhere she argues that:

Development is being discursively transformed into a tool for ‘helping out’ those left out of the presumed economic bonanza of free trade and liberalization, and the means for appeasing our sense of conscience (or our sense of guilt). It thus tends to act as a legitimizing strategy for neoliberal restructuring. (St Clair 2006, p. 142)

Thus, aid is reduced to the status of a temporary relief measure to compensate for the worst effects of neoliberalism, a prime example being the social emergency funds used to mitigate the adverse social effects of structural adjustment programmes. Of the World Bank she notes that ‘many of the proposals coming from this global institution serve to justify an unfair global system’ (ibid.).

St Clair insists that it is important to note that poverty is increasing in many European countries as well as in the developing states. In the wake of the 2008 financial meltdown this seems all the more relevant as governments across Europe have responded to the need for financial sector bailouts with welfare cuts that threaten to raise unemployment (see BBC News 2010). St Clair also cites the argument that ‘the free market needs those at the very bottom’ (St Clair 2006, p. 146). She further writes of the bank that ‘(u)nder the leadership of Wolfovitz and the political and economic interests this represents, it is important to consider the extent to which this institution may become even more a tool for the justification of neo-liberal restructuring as well as a machinery for collective charity’ (ibid., p. 153). In recognising that neoliberalism is increasing inequality throughout the world and not just in the South, that the impoverishment of a section of the world's populace is integral to neoliberal restructuring, and that identifiable political and economic interests underwrite this process, St Clair is coming very close to the position of analysts such as David Harvey (2005) and Immanuel Wallerstein (2003), who explicitly see neoliberalism as a class project to enhance global capitalist accumulation at the direct expense of subordinate classes.

Deliberative democracy?

In the face of evidence suggesting that ethics is likely to be trumped by a neoliberal discourse of power it becomes all the more salient to enquire just how development ethics is to be made practically relevant, a means of the means. Crocker takes on precisely this project in his volume Ethics of global development: agency, capability, and deliberative democracy. Crocker argues that Sen's goal of enhancing well-being and capabilities is best accomplished through promoting agency by means of deliberative democracy. This would entail the establishment of mechanisms for deliberative democracy at all levels of development ‘from small villages, through development-planning ministries, to the World Bank’ (p. 95).

There is an extensive literature about deliberative democracy as a key to ethical egalitarian political discourse, which Crocker explores in some detail. Sen and Crocker follow Rawls arguing that democracy is about more than elections, and should be understood as ‘the exercise of public reason’ (Sen 2003, p. 29, cited p. 299), which involves opportunities for citizens to participate in political discussions, influence public policy, and also enhances their ability to hold policymakers and implementers accountable. Crocker observes that democracy must allow widespread participation, whilst providing opportunity for free discussion and argumentation. The modus operandi for actualising such reforms at different levels such as villages, ministries and international institutions would vary, as Crocker elaborates in Chapters 9–11.

Crocker acknowledges that there are obstacles to the enhancement of developmental agency through deliberative democracy. Most fundamentally, he notes that ‘the freedom of agency that we individually have is inescapably defined and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities available to us’ (p. 151). Crocker elaborates on this basic point to observe that democracy as actually practised can be limited in terms of restricting participation to elections, or by limiting who can participate. He also notes that economic inequality limits the ability of the poor to participate due to lack of education, leisure time and access to political institutions. This point is emphasised by noting the extent of world inequality (p. 384). Crocker acknowledges that this raises a question of whether or not a strategy based on deliberative democracy implicitly assumes a greater level of equality than is extant in the world. He answers this by arguing that only rough equality is necessary to allow most people the possibility of participation and to prevent the rich from completely dominating the political process (p. 367).

This contention seems at least questionable if one accepts the evidence gathered by McNeill and St Clair to the effect that the World Bank and other international organisations are committed to a neoliberal globalisation project that worsens global inequality. Crocker tends to be dismissive of the leftist critique of predatory globalisation. Whilst he acknowledges the critique and also acknowledges the growing inequality of global society, he does not put these two factors together. Crocker gives little if any consideration to the possibility that such inequality might be a product of globalisation, specifically in its neoliberal capitalist form. It follows from this that he gives no consideration to the view that those who are committed to neoliberalism (either for ideological or economic reasons) have little or no interest in promoting the agency of the Southern poor through deliberative democratic reform (as distinct from governance reforms), whilst those who are excluded have limited power to force reforms.

A major problem in Crocker's argument is that although he is aware that development cannot be treated as a depoliticised, technical exercise, he seems to underestimate the level of (sometimes absolute) commitment a socio-political group/class can have to its perceived interests. None of this is to dispute Crocker's contention that an effective well-being strategy would be enabled by a global move towards deliberative democracy. Nor does it suggest that such an objective should be dismissed as utopian. However, it does indicate that any such reform will be a good deal more problematic than Crocker seems to think and has conflictual implications. All this is suggestive that committed neoliberals in organisations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation will be far from receptive to reforms that threaten to radically transform the working of said institutions. And to the extent that they are willing to give such ideas a hearing it is likely to be with a view to co-optation.

How then does Crocker deal with the issue of violence? He draws on the work of American analyst Archon Fung to argue as follows:

The deliberative democrat seeking to advance the prospects of deliberative democracy in an unjust world may choose non-deliberative methods but only when he (1) initially acts on the rebuttable presumption that those opposing deliberation are sincere, (2) reasonably exhausts deliberative methods, and (3) limits non-deliberative or nondemocratic means by a principle of proportionality…. The more extreme the hostility to deliberative democracy and the more entrenched the power asymmetries, the more justified are political mobilization and even coercive means, such as political pressure and public shaming. (p. 364)

It is clear that Crocker continues the preference for peaceful and legal means implicit in much writing on development ethics. Non-deliberative methods are to be a last resort and are to be used in a strictly graduated manner against opponents that may not be so scrupulous. This conclusion is cast into doubt by none other than Archon Fung, who observes of situations where obstacles to change are particularly high:

The space to act on deliberative faith in such encounters is severely cramped. One might, for example, act in confrontational ways in the hope that, in the long arc of history, those that seem now incorrigible will embrace deliberation eventually. (Fung 2005, p. 412)

Fung goes on to observe that:

The governance arrangements that set the terms of world trade and international finance among states, are not now, nor will they become in the foreseeable future, fair and inclusive deliberations. Activists in social movements who view the decisions of these bodies as unjust seek primarily to influence them through coercive pressures that increase the costs to those bodies. (Ibid.)

Clearly Fung regards the issues central to development as constituting a space in which the opportunities for deliberative democratic action are severely limited, a situation legitimising if not necessitating more confrontational and coercive action. This suggests that the relegation of force to the status of last resort is at the very least precipitate.

The risks of respectability

This discussion has attempted to underline the significance of the volumes under review, and to engage with some of the issues that have a bearing on the directions that might be taken by development ethicists as their approach becomes more influential. That development ethics is becoming more influential seems clear as reflected in the growing number of publications on the subject and the growing attention paid to ethics at academic conferences and development institutions. This might well be seen as a hopeful sign that development ethics is reaching what analysts like Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) would term a ‘tipping point’ where enough influential forces in the international system accept its importance for it to be accepted as a legitimate influence in development policy-making. The achievement of Goulet's ambition to make development ethics a means of the means would appear to be in striking distance.

However, some of the themes highlighted in this review suggest that achieving acceptance or respectability may not be without its problems. We have seen that Goulet's development ethics is radical, incorporating an understanding of how the present unequal global system is underwritten by interests that benefit from that system. We have also seen that he critiques the current development hegemony of neoliberalism as serving the interests of the rich at the expense of the poor. His analysis of the danger of palliatives reflects his awareness of the dangers of co-optation of any attempts to reform the present system. The findings of McNeill and St Clair bear out Goulet's fears. The first response of hegemonic development organisations (notably the World Bank) to the challenge of development ethics has been to attempt to co-opt it and defuse its radicalism. The entrenched nature and radical injustice of the present system raise questions about the efficacy of reform strategies that attempt to relegate extra-legal and coercive action to the status of a last resort.

There will be those who are eager to make development ethics respectably apolitical and moderate in the hope that aid agencies will integrate at least some ethical guidelines into their operating procedures. Others may seek to render ethics safe enough for mainstreaming and adoption by aid agencies if only to take advantage of the professional and consultancy opportunities thereby afforded. To the extent that achievement of respectability involves eliding the intrinsically political analysis integral to Goulet's vision, it raises the danger of reducing development ethics to a formalistic technical process, or even worse, a rubber stamp for agencies whose activities remain fundamentally unchanged. If development ethics is to ethically represent the interests of those who lose out from neoliberal globalisation it cannot afford to lose the radical edge that is evident in Goulet's work. In that sense it must remain confrontational, political and unrespectable.

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