Do elections matter?
Presidential and legislative elections took place on 28 November 2011. They were immediately followed by claims of manipulation, fraud and human rights violations. Congolese and international observers first suspected, and then documented, numerous irregularities in the electoral process. The very influential National Conference of Catholic Bishops was outspokenly critical of the electoral chaos and explicitly condemned the government, referring to ‘treachery, lies and terror’.1 Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, the politically engaged father of the church, described the results as ‘illegitimate’, saying they ‘conformed neither to truth nor to justice’.
President Kabila campaigned under the slogan ‘for a united Congo’. But the country remains divided between those who believe his re-election to be legitimate and those who do not. Veteran political opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi rejected the results, proclaiming himself to be ‘the people's choice’. We will never really know who won because ballots and results reports were lost or destroyed. Neither Kabila nor Tshisekedi consider the other as political rival but as an enemy to combat at all costs. This extremism from both camps precludes any hope of agreement or settlement.
Do elections matter? In some respects they do. Elections are part of the democratic process, they are a manifestation of national sovereignty and electoral mobilisation contributes to political awakening. There was significant voter registration and polling which confirms the political maturity of ordinary Congolese. This round of elections, which was paid for in large part by the Congolese themselves (in contrast to the 2006 polling), shows that the government was able to respect international commitments.
A stronger case, however, could be made that the elections did not mean much. Most importantly, registration, voting and results reporting were chaotic. The 2006 electoral cycle was unfinished as local-level voting never took place. This deprived the population of proximity with locally elected officials, which is the best way to establish relationships of trust between people and government in true democratic spirit. There was also significant pre-electoral manipulation: the constitutional amendment that replaced the two-round system of voting with a single round (favourable to the incumbent) and the top-down appointments of National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) members are two striking examples. These problems led to a loss of local and international credibility and significant social frustration. President Kabila is consequently still in a phase of marginalisation and vulnerability. Until recently, Congolese critics complained of Kabila's democratic vacuum. Since the M23 debacle, they sardonically refer to his dictatorial vacuum.
This article presents the pre- and post-electoral landscape while developing analysis along two overlapping challenges. One is the context of overwhelming political uncertainty. Who really won the elections? Who is in control? Can parliament function as an effective counter force to the executive? What is the social and economic future of ordinary people? The second challenge is the powerlessness of all stakeholders to present convincing and workable strategies to overcome the blunders of the elections and move forward with much needed reform. The conclusion will show that a year after the elections, the government has made minor progress in addressing some macroeconomic priorities but has failed to bring peace to the country or improve social conditions for ordinary people for whom 2012 was a year of betrayal.
Elections background
The electoral process initiated in 2006 legitimised poor leadership. President Kabila used his first five-year term of elected office to consolidate power at the expense of the people. A Congolese opposition academic is categorical on this point: ‘The Congolese who turned out in large numbers in 2006 to vote for change and a new political dispensation now view the process as a sham’ (Mvemba 2010, p. 156). Kabila's position as incumbent, plus the money generated by the selling off of state assets at bargain prices, enabled him to dominate the campaign landscape.2 Candidate Kabila had a disproportionate access to government media and he illegally used state planes, jeeps and helicopters while on the campaign trail. The security forces under his control systematically obstructed opposition candidates from campaigning – notably Etienne Tshisekedi.3
Although 32 million people registered to vote in 2011, less than 19 million (or around 59%) actually cast their ballots. This contrasts with a 70% participation in the first round of presidential elections in 2006 and 65% in the second round (de Saint Moulin 2012, p. 91). The gap between registration and voting is best accounted for by the tardy arrival of ballots in many of the 63,000 polling stations and the difficulty people had in locating the stations where they were supposed to vote. Another factor is the desire of people to acquire their voter registration card as proof of identity: national identity cards do not exist and very few people can afford the luxury of a passport. The Belgian company Zetes organised the high-tech services needed for voter registration. Zetes reported that hundreds of thousands of voters were registered twice – notably in territories favourable to Kabila.4
In pro-Kabila Katanga, registration and voting was officially highest. Not surprisingly, in the pro-opposition provinces of Equateur, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, it was low. Resistance to the entire electoral process in areas dominated by UDPS (Union pour la Démocratie et Progrès Sociale) also explains low registration. Many UDPS supporters were convinced the elections would be rigged or that they would not take place. There were similar low levels in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo where Kabila is widely disliked. Pastor Ngoy Mulunda, head of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) was partisan, not independent. CENI manipulation was manifest in the capital where reports from 2000 polling stations were lost!5 Fictitious polling stations and pre-marked ballot papers were discovered. Stuffing the ballot boxes is not uncommon in Africa, but inventing fictitious polling stations seems to be a new twist on Congolese creativity.
A major obstacle to free and fair elections is the absence of reliable demographic data. It is assumed that Congo's population is 67.8 million, that there is a 2.6% growth rate and an urban population of 35%.6 But these figures published by the United Nations Population Fund are only rough estimates. The last population census in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) dates back to 1984 so no one really knows. What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS? The two Congo wars are reported to have resulted in an estimated 5.4 million ‘excess deaths’ according to the International Rescue Committee. But how accurate are these casualty counts? Again, we simply do not know. According to Congo's leading demography expert, Kinshasa's population was 9.7 million in 2010 (de Saint Moulin 2010, p. 142). The CIA world factbook placed it at 8.4 million (2011).7 When it comes to voter registration and constituency-forming in a hotly contested arena like that of Kinshasa, this discrepancy is not trivial.
Political maturity
While the electoral chaos has been widely decried, examples of political maturity on the part of ordinary Congolese were under-reported. I spent a good part of March 2012 in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo asking people what they consider to be evidence of political maturity. Informants complained that authorities (particularly those at the CENI) proved to be brilliant in their ability to cheat and manipulate the electoral process. But there was also a clear sense of awareness, patience and good judgment on the part of ordinary people. They claim to be informed of what is happening on the political landscape and are committed to keeping Kabila under scrutiny saying things like: ‘That guy has to be careful because we are watching his every move.’
Despite the huge potential for post-electoral violence, people did not express strongly felt political frustration through violent means. There were incidents but these were relatively limited. Most of the violence that did take place was carried out by the police and military who were massively deployed – not by the people. The discourse of violence has also mutated. Heeding the lessons of the Arab Spring, Kinois claim their cell phones are their weapons and text messages their bullets. This was a concern to Kabila's security and intelligence services which consequently shut down SMS transmission from 3 to 28 December.
Another example of maturity is voting patterns. Of course, we don't really know who won the presidential vote but the legislative results are remarkable. The vast majority of MPs who sat in the previous legislature – approximately 90% – were not re-elected. On the contrary, they were sanctioned for not delivering on their 2006 promises. They voted themselves US$6000 per month salaries and perks while neglecting social priorities. People also said that the free tee-shirts and tins of sardines that were distributed on the campaign trail were not going to influence their vote as in the past. Important political figures – even some influential ministers (such as José Endundo – Environment, Alexis Tambwe Mwamba – Foreign Affairs, Martin Kabwelulu – Mining, Raymond Tshibanda – International Cooperation) were not re-elected. Even Matata Ponyo, the man eventually named prime minister, lost in his bid for election to the national assembly in his native Maniema. This proves that a well-financed campaign is not enough to maintain the trust of a frustrated electorate.
Alphonse Awenza Makiaba, a man with no political experience who feeds his family by transporting bags of rice and manioc on his bicycle, was elected to represent the city of Kisangani at the national level. This candidat des pauvres generated massive popular support precisely because voters could empathise with him (Obotela 2012, p. 140). While ethnicity structures Congolese society, last year's voting was not always tribal. The election of Désiré Khonde Vila-ki-Kanda is a case in point. Originally from Bas-Congo where he ran and lost in 2006, he won a seat in the North Kivu city of Goma where voters remembered his accomplishments as provincial governor during the Mobutu years (ibid., p. 141).
Dictatorship, war and social stagnation have taught Congolese to be patient. And patience is another sign of political maturity. While some people say that the election fiasco has discouraged them from participating in the voting exercise, others are already gearing up for the next round in 2016.
Who's in control?
My opinion is we don't really know. While there are some obvious heavyweights, relations between them are unclear. There seems to be little coordination between key sectors such as security, internal affairs, macrofinance, natural resources and foreign relations. A coup d'état in this context of political uncertainty, grumbling by the military, social frustration and regime isolation really would not come as a surprise. Shadow advisers and associates from the inner circle wield far more power than many official figures even at the ministerial level.
Joseph Kabila, his family members and political supporters, strategic allies and business associates – in the Congolese tradition of extreme political secrecy – govern by networks, not by institutions. ‘These networks overlap and often seek to neutralise each other to protect vested interests’ (Nlandu 2012, p. 37). The first most powerful network is the one comprised of ethnic Katangese. It controls the Republican Guard and the Simba special forces battalion and has close ties with South African and Zimbabwean partners who run the minefields of Katanga and the two Kasaïs. The ‘Banyamulenge–Rwandese axis’ is the second important network, particularly active in the illegal exploitation of the Kivus' mineral wealth (ibid., p. 38). This axis exerts power over the security and defence sectors, which puts it in competition with the Katangese network.
Kabila suffered a major setback in February 2012 when Augustin Katumba Mwanke died in an airplane crash in Bukavu. Although Katumba never held an official position in the Kabila cabinet, he was clearly the president's éminence grise. Already close to Kabila père, this Katangais was behind the Congo–China deal, he was very influential in the mining sector and his voice in economic matters was taken seriously. Ministerial appointments and dismissals are believed to have been decided by him. When Katumba was alive, he called the shots. His reign overlapped with – and maybe was the cause of – a dysfunctional government. During the last few months of the Muzito government, for example, practically no Council of Ministers' meetings took place.
Given the post-election chaos, it took nearly six months to form the new cabinet which was officially announced on 28 April 2012. Headed by Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo who was able to hold on to his previous Finance Ministry portfolio, it is a streamlined version of the previous one with 36 ministers compared to 46. It is promoted as a cabinet of technocrats opposed to one of political cronies – admittedly there is a bit of the two. The double appointment of Japanese-speaking Daniel Mukoko Samba as vice-prime minister and minister of budget testifies to the government's technocratic inclination. Six women were appointed as ministers and vice-ministers. The unfaltering spokesperson of the regime, Lambert Mende Omalanga, was returned as information minister. There has also been some injection of new blood in critical ministries. Alexandre Luba Tambu was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of defence and Raymond Tshibanda was designated to head Foreign Affairs.
Parliament hobbled
The incapacity of parliament to help shape political debate in DRC is another important but understudied problem. Like elections, establishing parliaments in Africa is another avatar of Western fantasy of the state-building process. Neither elections nor parliaments bring about real democratisation. In a strong presidential system like that of Congo under Kabila where power is concentrated at the top, MPs do not throw much weight in influencing policy, accessing resources or mediating between people and the executive.
Parliamentary work and oversight is not a meaningful political force because it has little currency in institutional frameworks and in Congolese political practice. It is certainly not embedded in political culture. Empowering individual MPs and the parliament as an institution is externally driven and consequently artificial. Appropriation is largely limited to those MPs who are boosted by foreign partners. Parliament is awarded operating funds from the national budget but while money for parliamentary investigations is theoretically available, accessing it requires approval from the managing board. Parliamentary investigations are thus politically controlled. MPs like judges and civil servants do not have the budgets, staff or operational facilities (such as computers, adequate office equipment and transportation) to do their work. The reinforced presidential majority could erode legislative power even further as most work is done outside of parliament's two chambers.
Formal norms exist in theory but in reality, informal and formal practices are blurred. Social accountability is also weak in DRC because reform of the judicial system has been slow (Vircoulon 2009). Social accountability and justice are directly linked on the DRC political landscape because there is widespread popular belief that those in power are immune to sanctions and control. Diminishing immunity from wrongdoing has been a major governance challenge over the past decade – but to little effect. Freedom of expression is limited (Frère 2011) which is another challenge to instituting mechanisms of accountability. There is also a serious deficit in communication between parliament and the general public (Kabemba 2005). The fact that the official Internet site of the DRC parliament is dead is a telling indicator of this communication problem.
As Congo is a rentier economy, access to its significant natural wealth is the main driver on a political landscape controlled at the summit. President Kabila has in this respect reproduced the Mobutu system of patrimonial governance. DRC has major ongoing security challenges (especially in North Kivu), an economy that is essentially informal and a history of distrust between ordinary citizens and elites. This means that instead of accepting to share power and resources with other governmental institutions and civil society, Kabila is desperately jockeying to preserve his fragile dominance. Executive command over the judiciary and the legislative bodies is a clearly identifiable pattern in the DRC. The executive – comprised primarily of the President, the Ministry of the Interior, the Police Inspector General (PNC), the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) and the General Directorate for Migration (DGM) and the Police Judiciaire – functions according to its own ad hoc rules and priorities. The attributes of sovereignty and executive power seem to overlap in this respect, supporting Englebert's assertion that: ‘Sovereignty is indeed broadly irrelevant to the question of what states can do for you, but critical to what they can do to you’ (Englebert 2009, p. 62).
In 1966, one year after Mobutu seized power in a military coup ‘parliament did continue to meet … but both legally and practically the New Regime had rendered it powerless’ (Young and Turner 1985, p. 55). During the conflict years (1996–1997 and 1998–2002) and the subsequent post-conflict transition, parliament was hobbled by the power-sharing arrangement between former belligerents set up in 2003 (commonly referred to as 1 + 4 – one president and four vice-presidents). The legacy of parliamentary powerlessness persists today.
Parliament was nonetheless able to function and achieve some meaningful results for a brief period under the helm of Vital Kamerhe. This South Kivu politician was president of the national assembly from 29 December 2006 until 25 March 2009. But the erstwhile Kabila ally fell out with the president and was forced to resign, thus ending the short window of effective parliamentary work. Other examples of efforts by Kabila's work at reinforcing the executive to the detriment of parliament was his taking control of parliamentary finances, thus blocking the possibility of funding parliamentary investigations. At the same time, he decided to preside over the council of ministers himself, removing this duty from the prime minister.
Budget allocation is a fundamental attribute of Western-style parliaments. But most of the national economy in DRC is outside of budgetary control. Prime Minister Matata Ponyo presented the 2012 budget to the national assembly on 22 June. It amounts to less than US$8 billion, a very slight increase over last year's budget. Over the past few years, spending for most budget lines is far below allocations. Only the president and prime minister exceed their allocations. As the country emerged from war, the budget increased steadily over the past decade. Nonetheless, it remains insignificant given the country's size, resources and population. Internal revenues (mainly from customs duties and corporate taxation) come to nearly US$5 billion. Contributions from international donors are US$3 billion. For comparison, the annual operating budget of Boston University is US$1.6 billion. Matata defined the need to build an effective state (25% of the budget), the imperative to develop basic infrastructure (18%), the revitalisation of the main production sectors (25%) and strengthening human capital and improving social conditions of the population (30%) as his government's main priorities. Budget allotment and management is a good indicator of a government's performance. Although a half-century of development aid shows that more money does not necessarily mean better results, it will be difficult to accomplish much in DRC with US$8 billion.
The Congolese parliament consists of a senate (with 108 seats) and a national assembly (with 500 seats). Provincial assemblies vote for senate members (but after nearly one year of delay, provincial elections have not taken place so the senate is a remnant of the previous legislature). Members of the national assembly were elected by open-list proportional representation in multi-member constituencies to serve a five-year term. In this context of a remnant senate and disputes over election results, parliament has not been productive. When it opened after summer recess in September (in a hotel because work in the Palais du Peuple was incomplete!) the main point on the agenda was Rwanda's support of the M23 rebellion in North Kivu and discussions about the budget. But work on the budget is being implemented by International Monetary Fund experts, which is a strong testimony to Congo's limited sovereignty.
The permanent commissions of the national assembly and senate deal with (i) legal, administrative and political problems, (ii) foreign relations, (iii) economic and financial questions, (iv) defence and security, (v) woman, family and children – and support of democratic institutions, (vi) social and cultural questions, and (vii) reconstruction and development. In addition to the work of these permanent commissions, parliamentary work is also theoretically carried out in other commission and sub-commissions.
Although generally circumvented or undermined, the relations between the government and parliament are clearly defined in the Constitution, mainly in Chapter 2, Articles 100–148. While parliament is supposed to be the main actor in drafting laws, this responsibility has been largely taken over by the government via technocratic experts in the relevant ministries – more often than not with external advisory support.
Foreign relations
Uncertain relations with important bilateral partners such as Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom after the elections chaos dominated Congo's foreign affairs agenda in the early months of 2012. The Carter Center and the European Union monitoring team said the elections were seriously flawed and lacked credibility. The Catholic Church network had 30,000 election observers whose assessment corroborated massive fraud, irregularities and intimidation. The only head of state to accept Kabila's invitation to his swearing in ceremony was Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe. Europe and America boycotted the event. Indeed, Kabila was temporarily out of grace. When asked what Kabila expected from Belgium, a high-ranking Belgian diplomat responded honestly and concisely: recognition!
Congo's Western partners were hypocritical and inconsistent during this period. While they vigorously pontificated about the importance of elections as part of the democratic state-building process and the need to respect the will of the people, they had absolutely no desire to see Tshisekedi president. This hypocrisy is reminiscent of Western demonisation of Congo's first democratically elected leader, Patrice Lumumba in 1960 (Dunn 2003, pp. 91–97). The veteran opposition leader is perceived as being stubborn and unpredictable. This explains why Western diplomats and business people preferred to have Mr Kabila masquerading in the emperor's costume. Despite problems with him, he does represent some continuity and predictability. Discourse shifted from ‘We do not really know who won the elections’ to ‘As we don't know, let's just assume Kabila won and continue business as usual’.
Congolese diaspora groups, particularly in Brussels, London and Paris, organised major demonstrations, sit-ins, lobbying actions and rallies. Their two-fold objective was to draw attention to the electoral masquerade orchestrated by Kinshasa and urge Western governments to put pressure on Kabila. While they were successful on the first count, they were naïve and disappointed on the second. Europe and the United States have very little leverage over Kabila because Congo has the natural resources the world needs. With its vast mineral reserves, including a significant percentage of the world's coltan which is vital for the mobile telephone industry, the earth's second most important tropical forest which could contribute to combating global climate change if managed appropriately and hydro-electric potential that could light up much of Africa, Kabila does not have to kowtow to Western hypocrisy. Furthermore, Western donors are justifiably sensitive to the conundrum of sanctioning dictators if doing so could negatively impact the population.8
Diverging views amongst Western allies also served Kabila's interests. Belgium's older generation ‘friends of Congo’ establishment, for example, wanted Kengo as prime minister. The World Bank, however, felt more comfortable with Matata because of his work at the Finance Ministry and BCECO (the coordination bureau responsible for overseeing World Bank and African Development Bank projects). The engagement of newer partners with ‘no strings attached’ business plans like China, South Africa, Brazil or South Korea further diminishes Western leverage over Kabila and his entourage.
French President François Hollande attended the diplomatically important Sommet de la Francophonie in Kinshasa in October despite calls by Congolese opposition forces for him to either boycott the summit or change its location. Hollande officially declared that the human rights situation in DRC was ‘totally unacceptable’. But this was only of minor embarrassment to Kabila. The fact that the summit was held in Kinshasa and the French president attended was more meaningful than his declaration which was, moreover, dismissed by the Congolese authorities as poor counselling by his advisers.
Kinshasa has poor relations with most of its immediate neighbours. This handicaps Congo's development and jeopardises its security. Kinshasa's requests for the extradition of former Mobutu military troops and officers from Congo-Brazzaville have been unanswered, exacerbating Kabila's security paranoia. There was what appeared to be a coup against him in February 2011, allegedly orchestrated by DR Congo rebels based on the Brazzaville side of the river.9 Disputes over oil revenues and offshore oil exploitation blocks continue to embitter relations between Kinshasa and Luanda. There were also border problems between the south of Congo's Bandundu Province and Lunda Norte in Angola and the massive expulsion of Congolese from Angola in 2009–10 – expulsions accompanied by torture and killing (Misser 2012). But given Angola's military support to Kabila, the two countries have reached a fragile entente cordiale – although Kabila is the vulnerable actor in the relationship. On the eastern front things couldn't be worse. Uganda continues to illegally exploit Congolese natural resources (timber and minerals) and there is militia activity on the Congo–Burundi border zone.10 The South Sudanese military has joined Uganda in slaying elephant in Congo's Garamba National Park, exporting ivory mainly to China.11
Rwandan support of the M23 rebellion was the main foreign affairs challenge of the second semester of 2012. M23 succeeded in capturing Goma, the strategic capital of North Kivu. It received significant attention at the United Nations General Assembly in September when Kabila and Kagame refused to publicly shake hands. M23 is the newest avatar of Rwandan support for Tutsi rebellions in eastern DRC. It is a rebel movement made up mainly of Congolese Tutsis, who formerly comprised the CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du People). The CNDP was set up in eastern Congo to fight Hutu military groups associated with the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and to protect Tutsi minorities. It also sought to control mineral extraction and access to land. The M23 defected from the Congolese army in April this year amid pressure on the government to arrest General Bosco Ntaganda who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. Despite overwhelming evidence of Rwandan support in the form of arms, heavy artillery, military supplies and new recruits, Kigali systematically denies any involvement. Rwanda's position of ‘donor darling’ is weakening as the Western partners that matter – the UK, the US, and the EU – have frozen certain forms of aid disbursements. It is too early to say if this is symbolic or committed policy.
Mistakenly opting for a military solution opposed to a diplomatic one, Kinshasa sent its best troops to Kivu (the 321st and 322nd battalions trained by Belgium and the 41st and 42nd battalions trained by South Africa) in July 2012. The Congo government moved a US-trained battalion from the north of the country to Goma. The battalion was previously used in the hunt for Lord Resistance Army fighters. Very few officers in the Congolese army received military training, however, which explains their poor performance in confrontations with M23 forces. On the frontlines in the fighting between M23 and the Congolese national army, civilians have been murdered, stranded, displaced, robbed and raped, causing a new wave of crisis. Humanitarian non-governmental organisations, notably Human Rights Watch, have documented in detail this new wave of trauma and terror that results from the three interconnected problems of ethnic hatred between Tutsis and Hutus, Rwandan meddling, and a Congo state too weak to assume its security responsibilities. 12 Resolving these problems is beyond the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). But this did not stop students from ransacking MONUSCO property in Kisangani in November. They were angry about MONUSCO's incapacity to take a more active role in thwarting the rebel takeover of Goma.13
Change without improvement
The United Nations' Human Development Index is a useful tool in assessing a country's development context because it prioritises well-being as an alternative to conventional macroeconomic criteria such as income levels and growth indicators. According to its latest report, Congo ranks 187 out of 187 countries surveyed: rock bottom in other words.14 The World Bank's Doing business 2013 report indicates that Congo's score was worse than the year before: 181 out of 185.15 Congo today is one of the worst places in the world to be a woman. Another World Bank report (Herderschee et al. 2012) deplores that ‘[c]ritical institutional reforms are lagging, and elements of political culture and general capacity issues create a downside risk for the economy’ (pp. 21–22). Other barometers tell tragically similar stories. In the diamond-rich city of Mbuyi-Mayi (approximately two million inhabitants) the number of people connected to public water plummeted between 2002 and 2012, going from 18,000 to 3000. Nationwide, less than 9% of people have access to electricity. Despite compelling arguments of legendary Congolese joie de vivre, this is real poverty.
With the formation of a new government, ongoing support by international partners, the government's discourse on la révolution de la modernité and – most importantly – the continued dynamism and resilience of ordinary people, Congo has been on the move in 2012. The narrowing of the gap between very rich and dirt poor visible in other African countries does not seem to be taking place in Congo – aside from sparse evidence in the big cities. There are nonetheless some timid signs of the emergence of a Congolese middle class. The recent increase in the numbers of Congolese men and women with bank accounts is an indicator. First steps to ‘de-dollarise’ the economy have been introduced in an attempt to reclaim the sovereignty of the Congolese currency.16 Diaspora Congolese seem to be seeking opportunities and taking risks for development investment back home. Dikembe Mutombo, a retired Congolese American basketball player set up a charity and built a hospital in one of Kinshasa's poorest neighbourhoods. There is a growing sense of dynamism in some strategic sectors such as forest and environment, agriculture and mining. Thanks to the China Railway Century Group Corporation, the railroad through Angola between Dilolo and Lobito will open soon, facilitating the export of Katanga's mineral production.17 The government could earn credibility and recognition if it succeeds in capitalising on this dynamism instead of being immobilised by political wrangling and security threats from the east.
The need to overcome ambiguity, randomness, powerlessness and uncertainty is the underpinning of the kind of state-building that Congo needs. But leadership has not made enough progress in overcoming these priorities which helps account for the ongoing crisis. Political culture also constitutes a challenge to state-building and improved governance (Trefon 2011). Prime Minister Matata has vigorously pushed for new leadership and capacity-building initiatives.18 While it may be too early to judge because his government is still new, it has not yet demonstrated real efficiency or political clout. For the moment, this wait-and-see situation is best assessed as change without improvement.