Introduction
The world has become interconnected and interdependent, not only in the economic, but also in the social, cultural, political and environmental domains of life. Globalisation has intensified worldwide social relations which link distant localities, so that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens 1990; Veltmeyer 2005). This situation has important consequences for the role of major institutions governing access to resources in rural Africa. This is because apart from economic interconnectedness globalisation also generates global flows of ideas, cultures, and people, which in turn affect traditional socio-cultural, economic, and political patterns on the local stage (Katalin and Un 2009). Such effects are not always positive, as can be seen in the ways in which neoliberal globalisation is eroding the moral foundations of rural societies. The result is unequal access to resources needed for involvement and inclusion in the market relations of production and reproduction. Neoliberal globalisation policies have caused significant institutional changes in rural northern Ghana. These changes, however, are not the only driving force of traditional institutional change; nevertheless, they have served to intensify old tendencies using new mechanisms. By addressing how global changes/trends affect local institutions, which are directly relied on by rural people, the paper adds a refreshing insight to understanding the relationship between globalisation and rural livelihoods.
Changes in traditional institutions are the result of a complicated nexus between government and global policies, population growth, urbanisation, and environmental degradation. Constant contact between proximate cultures, which have coexisted for centuries, is equally important in shaping traditional institutions. However, the paper seeks to show how neoliberal globalisation shapes the processes of local traditional institutional change and the mechanisms that impel different paths for accessing resources. It argues that the changing institutional structure at the local level privileges a minority of power holders and their ‘subject-clients’ to the disadvantage of the majority who lose out in the struggle for resources and social justice.
Ghana adopted a neoliberal paradigm of development in 1983 and effectively opened its borders to the rest of the world without any of the restrictions that pertained earlier. Two important policy reforms include the democratic decentralisation and land tenure reform changes under legal pluralism. Also, the state's role has been rolled back and private sector export-led growth is encouraged, and this has had implications for the adaptive and coping strategies of various institutions and individuals. There is increasing poverty among some socio-economic groups and geographical areas, and decreasing standards of living due to poor access to basic facilities (Konadu-Agyemang 2000; Obeng-Odoom 2012; Rimmer 1992; Rothchild 1991; Songsore 1992). The agricultural policies adopted under the structural adjustment programme in Ghana have not addressed the long-term difficulties that farmers face. Instead, these policies have exacerbated the complex and contradictory relations between the state, capital and farmers regarding access to agricultural resources (Puplampu 1999). In the urban sphere, the informal economy has grown substantially but without the corresponding necessary welfare enhancement for the majority of its participants, especially private sector and small-scale self-employed workers (Otiso and Owusu 2008; Owusu, Agyei-Mensah, and Lund 2008; UN-HABITAT 2009). The role of the state was diminished as state enterprises were privatised, the size of the public sector reduced, economies deregulated, and international trade encouraged, with more imports and exports along the comparative advantage thinking (Anyinam 1994; Boachie-Danquah 1992; Easterly 2005; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). The emergence of land markets and private property led to drastic changes in both governance and institutions at national and local levels. Continuous primitive accumulation, an inherent feature of the capitalist mode of accumulation, is one of the mechanisms and power relations that liberal democracy masks in Ghana (Ayelazuno 2011). The privatisation and liberalisation of economies removes the stumbling blocks to global capital and exposes rural communities to both market forces and individualistic norms (Amanor 2010).
The abuse of power by chiefs and other power brokers in Ghana, especially with regard to land sales, arbitration, participation and the consequent marginalisation of the poor is well documented (Abdulai 2002; Berry 2000; Owusu 1970; Ubink and Quan 2008; Yaro 2010). The checks and balances on chiefly authority are being eroded in northern Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey 2001). In the rest of Ghana, some have decried changes in the control of land and labour relations within the community under neoliberal policy, which are viewed as increasingly commoditised and unequal (Amanor 2001; Antwi and Adams 2003; Berry 2009). These changes have led to the monetisation of the institution of chieftaincy and other positions of power in local governance (Alhassan 2006, 2009; Lentz 2006, 2010).
Neoliberal globalisation, through its market-oriented approach, intensifies past processes of resource capture and dispossession, leading to wider inequalities. I acknowledge that economic development is by its nature ‘destructive’ to certain traditional forms of institutions. These can have both beneficial and detrimental consequences. Changes are bound to occur, and not just due to the adoption of neoliberal policies, as the circumstances of poverty, deprivation, and livelihood diversification detailed by Hart (1973) show. However, the nature of the changes will differ in terms of the mechanisms associated with the paradigm of growth, and will have varying consequences for different social relations and social differentiation.
The adaptations and the reinterpretation of ‘tradition’ in these spaces lead to changing sources of economic and political power. The critical questions are then: what kind of local institutional changes are caused by neoliberal globalisation, and how are these defining a new landscape of access to resources? How have neoliberal globalisation and neoliberal policies exacerbated processes of social exclusion/inclusion, and who benefits or loses from the processes of change? This paper seeks to provide some answers to these questions using the case of northern Ghana, an area in which little has been written about the local political economy and processes of dispossession among the diverse actors. By classifying the study sites in terms of degree of integration with the global economy, the paper provides a comparative understanding of the implications of neoliberal globalisation on governance, land tenure, gender equity and social justice. Although the paper does not discuss state and civil society institutions and organisations at the local level, it recognises their importance as they interact with traditional institutions by acting as the axis along which neoliberal globalisation influences traditional institutions.
In the following sections the paper presents the literature on the processes and mechanisms generated by neoliberalism and how these influence societal changes. The third section describes the research communities and research methods. The fourth section presents the results by major themes. The fifth section discusses the findings and the conclusions.
Neoliberal globalisation: reincarnated primitive accumulation and changing traditional governance
The structural adjustment policies (SAPs) backed by the IMF and the World Bank mark the introduction of neoliberal globalisation into the African continent (Parfitt and Wysocki 2012). Neoliberalism is the belief in the efficacy of market mechanisms for the allocation of resources and the reward of factors of production, where markets can be made competitive by deregulation. It argues that competitive markets, based on private ownership, produce the most efficient economies and the highest levels of welfare (Bowles 2005; Harmes 2012).
Neoliberal globalisation processes have brought about profound changes in societies with contradictory consequences, as some sections of the population accumulate wealth while others suffer marginalisation and exclusion (Amin 1997; Giddens 1990; Harvey 1998). The World Systems Theory by Wallerstein provides a broader understanding of the core–periphery relations in the process of capitalism's expansion within the entire capitalist world-system. It assesses the historical and transformative processes, as well as the reproductive process, as the results of actions taken by hegemonic state and powerful corporations in overcoming structural contradictions (Wallerstein 1974, 1995, 2000). Neoliberal globalisation is merely an extension, in a deeper fashion, of the capitalist forces and liberal ideologies embedded in the process of internationalisation.
The interactions between global and local forces result in substantial (positive and negative) impacts on rural people in developing countries (Round and Whalley 2002; UNDP 1999; World Bank 2000). Pro-globalist arguments that efficiency gains have resulted in increasing growth and poverty reduction often neglect the social and economic contradictions inherent in the process of capital accumulation. The neoliberals argue that the new reforms will create greater incentives for rural farmers, which will fuel an increase in agricultural output due to the use of modern methods (Watkins 1995; World Bank 1981). Anti-globalists, on their part, provide important insights into the changing inequalities and contradictions (Bello 2002; Braun 1997; Chossudovsky 1998; Polanyi 2001) but tend to overlook the considerable success gained in turning around countries that were heading towards an economic abyss, and the consequent quantitative reduction in poverty worldwide. The question is not about the merits of neoliberal globalisation, but rather about the neglected aspects of this process that create contradictions in the bid to achieve development for all through an inclusive participatory process.
The process of social exclusion is fast-tracked under the influence of neoliberal globalisation, as both traditional and modern institutions adapt to the new challenges of the market logic. The processes of dispossession that pertained in the past are reincarnated in peculiar ways in a neoliberal world. This is done through the intertwining of political and economic power as dictated by the invisible hand of the market (Bush 2009; Bush, Bujra and Littlejohn 2011). Under the influence of neoliberal globalisation, African traditional governance systems are changing rapidly. The colonial regimes that at first tried to dismantle these institutions later relied on them to deliver their policies and ultimately created chieftaincies and the hierarchies of traditional governance (Busia 1951; Mamdani 1976). These traditional authorities were made largely accountable to the colonial office rather than to the people, a situation which effectively diluted the traditional system of checks and balances (Kennedy 1988; Platteau 2009). Thus, critical reviewers have described the posture of traditional rulers within the colonial governance system as ‘decentralised despotism’ (Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004; Young 2000).
Traditional institutions are not immutable but continually change, making them compatible with modern trends and institutions (Wunsch 1979). It is argued that under favourable historical and structural circumstances, traditional institutions can actively serve the cause of ‘development’ (Whitaker 1970). In such circumstances, tradition and modernity may evolve and adapt in response to mutual needs (Silver 1981). Some scholars have argued that these institutions and their guardians/leaders are power-hungry patriarchs and authoritarians attempting to both reinvent their political, social and economic power and reassert their control over local level resources at the expense of the larger community (LiPuma and Koelble 2009; Mamdani 1996). The process of neoliberal globalisation has been accompanied by major changes in the role and responsibilities of a wide range of institutions such as families, communities, civil society institutions, business corporations, states and supranational organisations (Ghai 1997). These changing roles pertain to the redistribution of power and the rights of people, the essential ingredients for access to resources. The processes lead to the emergence of winners and losers (O'Brien and Leichenko 2003) and the entrenchment of patron–client relations that are inimical to the socio-economic progress of the losers.
The study sites
The research was undertaken in six communities in northern Ghana representing different levels of integration into global production circuits and degrees of ‘foreign’ influences. From each region two communities were selected according to micro agro-ecological conditions, commercial crop production, modern institutions, population density, commoditisation of land tenure, accessibility and level of economic activity. Savelugu and Yapei were selected in the Northern Region; Loho and Danko in the Upper West Region; and Tenzug and Kajelo in the Upper East Region. The choice of sites reflects the effect of roadside location on the influence of globalisation via accessibility, by determining the degree of incorporation into the global circuits of trade, knowledge, and culture. Also, the selection took into consideration the importance of the presence of state institutions which act as gateways to globalising influences. About 80% of the population depends on rain-fed agriculture (Yiridoe et al. 2006). Below are the profiles of the communities.
Savelugu is located in the Savelugu–Nanton district of the Northern Region and has a moderate population density. It is found on the main trunk road between Tamale and Bolgatanga. Savelugu is mainly dominated by the Dagomba ethnic group who are predominantly Muslim, with the minority being traditionalist and Christian. The dominant occupation is farming. The main crops grown by men include maize, millet, yam, groundnuts and cassava. Women engage in large-scale shea butter processing. There is increasing youth unemployment and migration of girls and boys to the major cities in the south to work as head potters (known as kayaye) and scrap metal collectors respectively.
Yapei is a river port town in the Central Gonja District with a low population density. The indigenes are predominantly Muslim, with a minority Christian immigrant population and a few traditional religious believers/practitioners. The White Volta is a major natural resource for the community. The main livelihood activities include farming and fishing for the men, and farming, fish smoking and trading for the women. The main farm produce comprises maize, groundnuts, beans and millet. Social infrastructure in the town includes schools (ranging from primary to junior high), a clinic, a market, a community centre and a major trunk road.
Kajelo is located in the Kassena–Nankani West District of the Upper East Region and has a high population density. The people belong to the Kassena tribe and are mainly Christians and African traditionalists. Kajelo has a day nursery, a primary school and a junior high school. The Tono irrigation dam is not far from the community so, not surprisingly, some members rent land from the project. The water table in Kajelo is high and thus enables irrigated vegetable cultivation, an important component of livelihoods in a land hungry community with a short rainy season.
Tengzug is in the Talensi–Nabdam District of the Upper East Region, a town with a high population density. Tengzug is located on rocky hills. The people are mainly traditional African religious worshippers and indeed, the village plays host to a revered deity used by people all over the country. Tenzug has a tourist office run by US volunteers. Tourism attractions include the Whistling Rock, the Tengzug shrine (Tongnaab) and the historical caves. The main crops include millet, sorghum and groundnuts. Migration of the youth to the south, especially during the dry season, is an annual survival strategy.
Danko is located in the Wa municipality in the Upper West Region and has a moderate population density. The people belong to the Wala ethnic group and are mainly Muslim. The main crops cultivated include yams, beans, sorghum, maize and cassava on a semi-subsistence basis, and groundnuts and cotton as the main cash crops. Women engage in shea butter extraction and dawadawa production. There is growing scarcity of land and land fragmentation due to rapid peri-urbanisation from Wa. The University for Development Studies is located partly on Danko lands, and its establishment has propelled private demand for land.
Loho is located in the Nadowli District and has a high population density. Loho is a Dagaaba village located about 5 km from Wa. The inhabitants practise mainly Christianity and African traditional religion. Food crops cultivated are yams, beans, sorghum, maize and cassava, mainly on a semi-subsistence basis, with groundnut as the main cash crop. Women rely heavily on shea butter extraction, dawadawa production, and ‘pito’ brewing as their main economic activities. Out-migration to surrounding villages and to the south of Ghana is high (Figure 1).
Research methods
The paper uses qualitative data gathered from individual in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, under the broader umbrella of the participatory research approach. Participatory approaches enable a much deeper understanding of the social dynamics, as well as perceptions of the structure of power, of rights, of cultural change and behaviours. A systematic approach was employed in all the communities. Five individual interviews were conducted in each community composed of two women, two men, and the assemblyman. A total of 30 individual interviews were conducted with respondents, almost half of whom were below the age of 30, and half of whom considered themselves very poor. Selection of interviewees was carried out with the assistance of some community members after the focus group discussions. The themes for the interviews revolved around livelihoods, family situations, geographical conditions, land tenure, local governance, gender issues, access to resources and perceptions of changes in society and their consequences.
Three focus group discussions were held in each community. The first group discussion in a village was by a mixed group of 10 people in Kajelo, Loho and Danko where the chiefs/elders kept to the numbers given them. In Savelugu, Yapei and Tenzug, the numbers surged to 20 people as enthusiastic community members joined in. These community discussions had three important elders or sub-chiefs of the village in attendance. The groups delineated the socio-economic changes in their communities showing both past and present trends, the structure of power and various responsibilities, the emerging problems with new trends, some explanations and solutions. The powerful local elite had a larger say in these meetings.
The other two focus group discussions were by male and female groups representing more marginalised groups. The groups consisted of three elderly and four middle-aged women or men. In the interaction with the women the main interest was to elicit views on the gender dimension of power, rights and access to resources. They discussed socio-economic processes taking place and how these affected their livelihoods and assessed changes in norms and practices that affected access to resources for their livelihoods. The elderly representatives were in their fifties and sixties and they understood the political structure and resource access rules. However, the younger persons represented change and agency. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded.
Changing traditional governance systems
Traditional governance before neoliberalism
In the Northern Region, local traditional institutions included the hierarchical chieftaincy system with a subset of sub-chiefs, earth priests and family heads. African ‘traditions’ of reverence, respect, reciprocity, and fairness guided these institutions. All of these values were strictly adhered to due to the belief in deities and in the power of the earth god. The earth priest of Savelugu claimed that ‘no power holder in the past would contravene any of the principles of ensuring a happy society because the land deity would strike the person dead.’ An elder in Yapei described the system of installing new chiefs in the past as very smooth following nominations by the earth god through soothsayers. He said that ‘we always had a few candidates from a specific clan, so the soothsayer had a job of selecting one who would obey the gods and serve the people by ensuring peace so that people could go about their normal lives.’ In both communities the number of sub-chief positions was fixed, probably due to low populations. Kingmakers assessed the background of possible candidates based on their interactions with them. Hence, a track record of good social relations, economic ability and knowledge of tradition were central to being elected, as lists for/from the soothsayer were narrowed down (kingmaker in Yapei). Family heads were important in that they managed what an elder in Savelugu called the kagsogu, which is the family land over which chiefs had no control. Also, the buglilana (earth priests) were important because they sacrificed to the gods and influenced village decisions by prescribing what the gods wanted and disliked. Several sacred groves with thick vegetation formations were to be found in every community. The hierarchical chieftaincy system had a specific pattern of promotion even though a few were subject to intense lobbying. Hence, rivalry was limited to those open positions for which only a specific number of chiefs could contest (general group discussions).
In the Upper East Region, the local governance system was highly decentralised, with clan heads as the elders. In Tenzug, the chief said there had always been three earth priests who ruled the community based on the dictates of the deity in the village. None of the three was considered the leader. Earth priests (tendamba or tigatiina) have been the most important because they control the economic and spiritual asset of land. Family heads acquired land by making sacrifices to the earth priest, who relinquishes the economic aspect to the family but maintains the spiritual aspects. The elderly in both group discussions affirmed that due to the respect and fear for the deities, which were also linked to the thunder deity, no power holder wavered in carrying out their responsibilities, and if they did, it led to illness, death and family misfortunes. Seniority was the main yardstick for ascension to positions of power, even though a soothsayer still had to confirm the obvious candidate (chief of Tenzug). The title of chief was normally conferred on one of the elders of the village merely to satisfy the colonial authorities who needed a contact person in the village. An elder in Kajelo said this position did not change the traditional role assigned to that person's original position.
The governance system in the Upper West Region was also decentralised, with clan heads and earth priest having the disaggregated mantle of power. In many instances earth priests also doubled as clan heads by virtue of seniority and relationship to the deity (son of earth priest in Loho). However, the compound family head had the most power, as he was not directly accountable to the elders except where his rule incurred the dissatisfaction of his family members, who would report such matters to the clan elders and the earth priests. Access to resources and justice was therefore the preserve of the family head, upon whose shoulders lay the burden of procuring more landed resources from the earth priests. Chiefs occupied symbolic positions given to clan heads (confirmed by the elderly in both communities). The gods/deities regulated traditional governance systems and life in general, hence each family possessed gods belonging to the ancestry and/or ‘bought’ from other sources (elder in Loho).
Changing ‘traditions’
Traditional governance
In the Northern Region, Yapei and Savelugu have divisional chiefs controlling several villages under their jurisdiction. They have sub-chiefs who rule over different sections of the community. Appointment to the different levels is by contest where reverence for higher-level members is important. An elder in Savelugu stated that ‘these days if you don't have money and livestock to pay your way through, it is difficult to become a sub-chief or chief.’ These days, as one youth lamented, ‘it is very important and beneficial to be a sub-chief because the candidates for positions of village chief bring lots of gifts to the sub-chiefs for their support.’ An elder told me that this is not a new practice but rather tradition, the difference being that people are richer or willing to pay cash in addition. Also, he explained that currently there are many more interested candidates and therefore the contest is keener. In Yapei the situation was no different, as contestation for positions involved increasingly modern influences where relatives lobbied with gifts including fertilisers, livestock, attendance at social functions of kingmakers and support for their policies (group discussion). In both Savelugu and Yapei the number of sub-chiefs has increased over the last two decades. The elders explained that the population has increased and new sectors such as youth chief, religious chief and development chief have been added to the original sectors of war, vegetation, land, deity and clan. Also, the role of family heads is changing rapidly as they lose power to their members who now make many of their own life decisions – a departure from the fixed pattern of the past when they contributed labour to family production and benefited from a range of assistance (mixed focus groups). Due to the influence of religion, the role and position of the earth priest has been relegated to the background while those of imams or Muslim clerics have risen. The position of imam was considered on a par with the linguist and war chief. Soothsayers are no longer the main means of selection and confirmation of chiefs, but rather intense lobbying and contest.
In the Upper East Region, there is an increasing interest in the position of chief, mainly because the state's interaction with the chieftaincy institution grants privileges and new powers that enable chiefs to access appropriate resources. In Tenzug, one of the four caretakers of the shrine has been transformed into the chief and wields powers beyond his original mandate. Each family is controlled by its head, whose accountability to the chief is much more limited. In Kajelo the chief is the political figurehead, but the tigatuu 1 is the spiritual landowner, followed by the clan heads, the compound house heads and then the nuclear family. Due to the considerable powers still maintained by the tigatiina and family heads who ‘own’ their farmlands, the role of chiefs is more limited than what pertains in the Northern Region.
In the Upper West Region the chiefs in Loho and Danko are heads of their clans selected to represent the village. They coordinate all other clan heads who now constitute a kind of cabinet. The structure in Danko is however different from that in Loho due to the influence of Islamic norms which confer considerable powers on the chief, the imam and the council of elders. The chief in Danko was able, with the connivance of some of his elders, to sell off lands belonging to clans, contrary to traditional governance rules which ascribe such powers to the tendana (traditional spiritual landowner). The chiefs are challenging the tendana for ownership rights over land. Resistance to this move, especially by the youth, has reversed this pattern and now some families have taken control of their lands (men's group discussion in Danko).
Struggles between chiefs and tendana/tigatiina for control over land are commonplace in the Upper Regions. Informants narrated bitter struggles between the chief of Pungu Bavugunia (a neighbouring community to Kajelo) and his tigatiina over rights to sell land. This situation has been observed also by Lund (2006) in the case of Bolgatanga.
In all regions significant changes are occurring that have resulted from the enabling policies and consequences of neoliberal globalisation. The changes are remarkable in the Northern Region, where centralisation of power by chiefs has altered the governance structure and processes. Religion and family land ownership systems mediate the nature of changes in the two Upper Regions where a further decentralisation of traditional governance has occurred, with stiff resistance to efforts to legitimise the chief as a manager of resources. Neoliberal influences result from the economic changes, cultural influences, decentralisation processes and the land tenure administration reform. Economic changes induced a shift from semi-subsistence agriculture reliant on state support to commercial production under individualistic social systems. The hardships of the economic reform and the exposure of consumers to foreign products and cultures through the mass media have increased materialistic tendencies. The granting of permission to chiefs to transact in land as enabled by the 1986 land title law, which fed well into a huge urban demand for residential land, has been taken advantage of by power holders to commoditise land.
The decentralisation process has ascribed an important role to chiefs and community leaders, thereby enhancing their powers over their citizens. Chiefs are now accountable to the state rather than to the citizens, a situation where the apparatus of the state can be used against community members. Increasingly, the position of the chief has become very important because ‘being a chief means acting as a gateway to the state and the outside world which brings in dividends’ (assemblyman of Kajelo). Some divisional chiefs are paid allowances, while the state has provided cars and tractors for these leaders as a way of soliciting their assistance in governing the country and winning elections.
Land commoditisation and dispossession
The commodification of land in the peri-urban areas of Savelugu, Yapei and Danko has led to the interpretation of allodial title as ownership title to enable the chiefs and sub-chiefs demarcate and sell off the lands of families to willing buyers. The chiefs effectively used the provisions of the nation's constitution that divested land back to skins (chiefs sit on skins as symbol of power in northern Ghana) and the traditional idea that the chief ‘owns’ the people and the land (mentioned in group interviews in Savelugu and Yapei). Chiefs' appropriation of prime land is thus legitimised and ordinary people are denied the vital income needed as start up capital in a commercialised global environment.
In Savelugu in the Northern Region, chief and elders sell/have sold subjects' farmlands after holding consultations with family representatives and the youth, basically to tell them of the need to sell off land on which ‘visitors’ wanted to construct houses and other commercial infrastructure. No family can object to the decision when their farmlands are affected, so instead they try to negotiate for a number of plots for themselves based on their numbers (men and women's focus group, Savelugu). In Yapei, at a meeting to discuss the granting of fishing rights, dissenting voices that spoke against granting such rights to migrants were silenced by the chief and those who stood to gain from the rents. Elders and the youth representative of fishermen were told that the river was available to them and that the chief and sub-chiefs had decided to rent out the ponds. A fisherman at the meeting said ‘The chief said our presence in the meeting was basically to carry the information to our colleagues that fishing in the village ponds was henceforth prohibited.’
In the Upper West Region, the case of Danko illustrates how the initial sale of land by the chief and clan heads led to the disaggregation of larger compounds into smaller families (reflecting the nuclear family system) in order to lay claim to family lands (men's group discussion). The chief and elders appropriated land for sale but faced tough opposition as villagers started interpreting tradition along clan ownership lines, which recognise the powers of tendamba, compound and nuclear house heads rather than those of elders and chiefs (male focus group). This allowed some family heads to keep their farms or sell them, with smaller percentages of the proceedings going to the elders and the chief (Interview with assembly man). The people effectively challenged the legitimacy of chiefly actions. In Loho, which was gearing up for land sales, it was not clear what would happen. But various individuals asserted that their family heads would transact their family lands while the tendana and the chief would deal with common property lands.
In the Upper East, the case of rural Kajelo and Tenzug show that land resources have been maintained as individual properties of the families once the required sacrifice is made by the tendana. This state of affairs is attributable to the decentralised governance system in these communities, as well as the family system of land ownership, the long distances from major roads, and their poor integration into global circuits. Land scarcity makes it impossible to acquire more land by the traditional means of sacrifices to the earth shrine through the tendana. The tendamba families now own the common property lands and would only allocate land to their extended families (this was echoed in all individual interviews). The youth complained of not being able to access land in this new system where every plot is claimed on an individual basis. This system leads to land fragmentation with continuous cultivation regimes.
Participation and communitarianism
Participation through representation by elders was expected to ensure that the views and interests of all households were taken into consideration in the decision-making process. Consensus building is an important traditional governance tool. Generally, women are not part of the governance system except for informal advice and representations made through women's associations.
In the Northern Region, where sub-chiefs speak on behalf of all people, it is obvious that such chiefs defend the interests of their social class rather than those of the members of their clans or families. Depending on the issue at stake, some ranks in the hierarchy are not invited to meetings (men's group discussion in Savelugu and Yapei). The youth groups in Yapei and Savelugu pointed out that this system represents a club of old fashioned ‘commercialised traditionalists’ making decisions for a generation of young educated people. The Loho assemblyman attempted to justify this situation by arguing that: ‘not all people are kingmakers, so some people should have a larger say than others.’ The magazia (women's leader: normally rich traders) in the Northern Region plays a role by negotiating with the elders on women's issues (women's focus groups in both sites). The interest of the elderly is of prime importance in consensus building. Relationships between the various hierarchies and the nuclear household could be described as those between superiors and their subordinates, particularly since the young who constitute most of the nuclear family do not have much of a voice. As a result the youth in non-royal families use the traditional system and respect it when they need it, but resort to modern institutions such as police and the courts to contest traditional norms that negatively affect them (elderly man: general focus group in Savelugu). This points to a growing dissatisfaction with these systems and also to the growing influence of the modern state on distant rural places.
The clan based representation of the two Upper Regions results in smaller deliberations within clans, with the exception of larger community discussions which mostly involve different actors, depending on the issue at stake (general group discussions in all four sites). The commercialised economic landscape makes it difficult for the higher hierarchies of power to provide the needs of the lower ones as tradition obliges them to. The joint ownership of family resources of the past is altered and each nuclear family now owns its farmland and economic trees (reported in all discussions). The family pool system of food, labour and expenditure is now disaggregated, a situation which also reflects the declining power of elders over nuclear family units.
The ‘communitarian’ attribute of local traditional social and economic life is eroding fast under the influence of neoliberal forces. These are emerging cracks in the ‘collective’ philosophy of traditional systems, as nuclear families develop individualistic tendencies in response to difficult economic situations and perceived opportunities. A breakaway family head in Savelugu lamented his actions but defended them on the grounds that his brothers were lazy and depended on his efforts. The perception of being used by non-performing lazy family members was echoed in the focus groups in Yapei, Danko and Savelugu. The rising individualistic tendencies in their communities were attributed to the ability of individuals to survive economically in the new monetised and altered social system.
People are now becoming independent, thereby making fewer claims on traditional sources. An elderly participant in Savelugu asserted that:
The youth now refuse household jobs and prefer market jobs to earn a living. The market has made the youth self-sufficient economically, enabling them to earn income, and the elders who are family heads are no longer respected.
Social justice and gender dynamics
The traditional governance system should play the role of arbitration and ensuring peace and good neighbourliness in their communities (elderly woman in Kajelo). Respondents in all the villages repeated the adage that ‘who you are’ and ‘whom you know’ counts in how your case will be heard and dealt with by the chiefs and elders.
The rich may bribe their way out or use their power to intimidate chiefs into supporting them (assemblymen in Yapei and Savelugu). It could even be the case that most of the chiefs are sponsored by the rich and educated elite to ascend to their current positions, as the chieftaincy title itself is now highly commercialised and goes to the highest bidder among the ‘royals’ (assemblymen in Danko and Savelugu). The wulana (linguist) of Savelugu explained that people accuse them wrongly because such people do not understand tradition, which prescribes that chiefs and elders are supposed to ensure peace. As a result, not all cases against the rich and the powerful result in sanctions. Using this excuse, the powerful in society will escape justice by rendering unqualified apologies without due compensation. The passage below captures one such ambiguous reinterpretation of traditional rule:
Though both the poor and the rich have access to the system of arbitration, sometimes the poor might not receive justice because when the rich are wrong, the elders will only ask for forgiveness from the poor thereby allowing the rich to get away. Some rich people can connive with the elders to interpret the rules or logic in their favour especially in new cases that have no traditional blueprint to follow. (Assemblyman of Danko)
An old man in Danko recounted a more just society when he was in his twenties but asserted that ‘these days everything has changed and so has the judgement of elders. In most instances the rich get away with their misbehaviour due to discrimination.’
Spatially, the pattern of discrimination is highest in the Northern Region where modernisation defined by urbanisation, infrastructure, and commercialisation is highest, while Tenzug in the Upper East has the lowest (based on responses from all 30 individual interviews). Commercialisation is high in Yapei as evidenced by the selling of rights to fishing ponds to Tongu fishermen rather than to indigenes; the growing business of fish trading/mongering around the toll bridge on the White/Black Volta; and the rise of land values due to the establishment of a petroleum depot/booster station, the TAYSEC Construction Company and other non-governmental organisation infrastructure. In the case of Savelugu, urbanisation, education, strong state institutions, commodification of land, and other modern infrastructure that enable connectivity with the rest of Ghana explain the level of commercialisation and monetisation of social and economic life.
In contrast, Tenzug, which is characterised by traditional religiosity, a low level of commercial activity, ecotourism and a leadership committed to tradition, has a more equitable society. Loho and Kajelo rank closer to Tenzug, while Danko is closest to Yapei along a continuum of more traditional to more modernised.
Discrimination by gender is most noticeable and acknowledged in all discussions. In the Northern Region women are not allowed to inherit land, and can only cultivate family land or borrow from outside the family. Women can only take part in sharing assets other than land, such as personal belongings. This situation pertains especially among Muslims. Women can also be co-owners of houses rather than full owners; they now own houses because they are allowed to buy land as long as they can afford it, although males would normally do the land purchase transactions on their behalf. An elder in Savelugu explained that all of this is ‘because they have the financial ability which is the major determinant in today's Ghana’. Women can own property, but not by inheritance from family pools. A woman interviewee in Savelugu explained that though traditional rules do not specifically grant them these rights, a few women have benefited from the property of their late husbands and their children, depending on how humane the elders in charge were. Land was accessible to women in all regions, even though they had only usufructuary rights. In reality, women find it more difficult to expand cropland than men, and women depend on men for access (reported in all female focus groups). Globalisation can be credited for the current access of women to property via their financial ability, enabled by commercialisation and also through national laws that reflect the gender neutrality of international guidelines.
Discrimination and favouritism have worsened in these neoliberal times, and this is due to the utilitarian perceptions of actors. Interviewees stressed the importance of ‘knowing’ the chief and landowners in accessing resources. ‘Knowing’ here refers not to mere acquaintance, but to systematic relations of reverence, reciprocity, respect and loyalty. Interviewees reiterated the saying ‘poor man no get friend’, which means that the poor are excluded from social networks of assistance because no one expects anything from them. To be part of a network of assistance requires some utility value, as in neoliberal thinking. Both traditional leaders and their subjects have become rational economic agents whose actions are guided by the logic of making some gains – rents and profits. Eggen's (2011) studies in Malawi show similar practices of discrimination by chiefs against the poor and opponents, and favoritism for relatives and friends.
Discussion and conclusions
The current era of neoliberal globalisation has brought tremendous changes in traditional governance structures, proving the assertion that African traditions evolve flexibly in tandem with changing conditions (Platteau 2009; Silver 1981; Wunsch 1979). The differences in level of changes and influences in the different communities indicate a convincing relationship between capitalism's penetration and socio-cultural changes. Communities which lie along the major trunk road and which are also district capitals exhibited higher globalised values and economic structures. More remote locations tended to have lesser influence on political structure, but nevertheless the social relations between the different levels are changing to suit individualist profit-oriented aspirations.
The policies of the state regarding privatisation and individualisation of land ownership through land title registration, divestiture of land to skins and family heads, and mechanisms to protect private property, led to the emergence of land markets, especially in peri-urban areas where demand for housing land blossomed. The magnitude of abuse of power in appropriating resources in a typical primitive accumulation fashion is higher in more globalised Savelugu and Yapei than Tenzug and Loho. The austerity measures of structural adjustment and the new opportunities for cash income transformed social relations according to the market logic. Participation is a necessary precondition for benefiting from market relations. However, the evolved traditional governance systems have poor levels of participation in decision-making and social justice, which are important for access to economic resources and for the building of capability. Globalisation redefines local institutions of access to resources and realigns cultures in tandem with global production and consumption (Quaye et al. 2010).
Unlike under democratic systems, the local patriarchal hierarchical systems do not allow participation of the kind that produces inclusiveness. Local patriarchal institutions are highly compatible with neoliberal globalisation's accumulative strategies, as the power wielders transform into economic agents who transform local institutional rules and norms for an effective penetration of capitalism and for the consequent erosion of more ‘communal’ and ‘egalitarian’ traditional values. This process runs contrary to the positive adaptability found by Wunsch (1979). The traditional notion of participation is a representative articulation rather than a direct confrontation as pertains to the modern Western concept. The problem with representation lies in the practice whereby men purport to represent the views of women, while the elderly represent the youth. Contemporary traditional governance systems often show a facade of inclusiveness and representativeness, when in reality they are based on patronage. The incentives generated by globalised market systems allow chiefs and clan elders to impose their wishes and interests on their members and to deny the latter a voice in development debates similar to findings by Ntsebeza (2005). These findings are in consonance with Spear's (2003) conclusion that tradition is a complex discourse in which people continually reinterpret the lessons of the past in the context of the present. Principles of the past are reinterpreted to meet the needs of the present. But the needs of the present reflect the interests of the louder voice, in this case, the top hierarchy, using a flawed model of deliberative democracy as indicated by LiPuma and Koelble (2009) in the case of South Africa.
The modern state, acting as the instrument for facilitating neoliberal globalisation, does not provide the alternative checks and balances on tendencies that discriminate and sever people's access to resources. The state's incapacity to check and transform traditional governance and institutions in line with modern principles of accountability, participation and transparency is recognised in other studies (Berry 2009; LiPuma and Koelble 2009; Ubink and Quan 2008). State institutions and laws constitute important axis for the penetration of neoliberal capitalist norms.
The respondents in this study, like those in the study by Awanyo (2001), acknowledged the production incentives of neoliberal paradigms, yet many farmers are unable to increase production. The competition for land, capital, technology and labour made positions of power and wealth important in surviving the capitalist storm. As explained by Amanor (2010), commercialisation produces new alliances based on financial gain. In Yapei, the assemblyman claimed that most of the few rich farmers were sub-chiefs who had benefited from state programmes of subsidised mechanisation and improved seeds, which he claimed, were to be made accessible to the poor. However, these ‘innovator–farmers’ failed to diffuse the technologies and instead enriched themselves. Similarly, villagers in Danko co-opted into cotton production explained how the wealthier farmers gained while the poor lost out because of constraints to labour. Monetisation of social relations had led to the decline in labour parties. The poor therefore became labourers rather than participating in the lucrative cotton farming. Social networks are no longer determined by obligations to kin or reciprocity, but rather by new vertical alliances, often in commodity production and exchange systems, that create losers and winners.
Traditional local structures worked hand in hand with state policy in producing the landscape of losers and winners. The winners are the few privileged capital accumulators in the local circuits with links to national circuits of accumulation. Berry (1993) confirms these conclusions by stating that farmers’ access to the means of production is shaped by the mobilisation and exercise of power and the terms in which rights and obligations are defined. The processes of dispossession under neoliberal globalisation are characterised by primitive accumulation, where force is used to enforce adapted rules and norms that enable resource grabbing by those in positions of power. The second source of dispossession emanates from the more silent but effective squeezing out of the poor peasantry by market forces through rising cost of production and inaccessibility to productive inputs and markets.
This paper has shown the concrete manifestation of the erosion of traditional norms and values by state enabled neoliberal globalisation processes, and the magnification of social inequalities inherent in traditional patron–client relations. The paper has demonstrated how processes of accumulation and dispossession at macro levels are replicated at the local level among those often described as the ‘homogenous poor’. Neoliberal globalisation, through invisible market forces and state policies aimed at removing stumbling blocks to the operation of global capital, has transformed traditional governance systems and values in varying degrees with common outcomes. The findings do not suggest that traditional systems should be immutable, but simply point to the contradictions of neoliberal globalisation as it neglects mechanisms for including the lower classes in society in the process of accumulation. The findings have implications for the processes of decentralisation, which often assume a coherent community structure with shared interest. Policy makers need to rethink how local communities are engaged in the development process in order to prevent the hijacking of the process by those capable of reinterpreting tradition.