Introduction
Northern Somalia, with Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the northeast, is generally considered to be more stable and peaceful than southern Somalia. This situation is currently changing, at least in some parts of the region. These changes are in various ways related to the ongoing political and conflict dynamics in southern Somalia. The violence in southern Somalia reached a new level after militant Islamists took control of Mogadishu in 2006 and threatened the externally backed but internally weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Ethiopia intervened militarily to back up the paralysed TFG. In early 2007 an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created to secure strategic positions in Mogadishu for the TFG. The Islamists of Al Shabaab rose to power in their struggle against what many Somalis perceived as external occupation forces, and between 2009 and 2010 controlled much of southern Somalia (Menkhaus 2007; Marchal 2009). Al Shabaab also managed to establish some bases in the north, as outlined in this article. Given the presence of relatively strong regional governments there, the militant Islamists could only operate clandestinely. Al Shabaab took advantage of some existing conflicts, particularly in Puntland. The conflict to which Al Shabaab most obviously became a party escalated around Galgala, a small town in the Golis Mountains, which is inhabited by members of the Warsangeli clan. It is located in the contested borderlands between Somaliland and Puntland, which is one factor complicating the conflict and its possible settlement. Initially, the conflict was over resources. It pitted local Warsangeli clan militias against troops of the previous president of Puntland, Maxamuud Muuse Xirsi aka Cadde Muuse.1 Later, with the resource conflict still pending, local actors forged ties to Al Shabaab and the Warsangeli militia in the mountains increasingly turned into an Islamist militia, including members of various Somali clans, with the aim of overthrowing the ‘apostate’ government of Puntland. In February 2012, Al Shabaab officially took control of the movement. Currently, the remote but strategically important Galgala area is serving as a refuge for Al Shabaab fighters fleeing the south, where they came under pressure from a counter-offensive of the TFG and its allies, including AMISOM, and Ethiopian and Kenyan troops. This offensive started in early 2011 and has succeeded in pushing Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and the surrounding area. The militant Islamists also experienced losses in other parts of the south in the first half of 2012. But as of early 2014, Al Shabaab is still a force to be reckoned with. It underwent internal restructuring in 2013 and continues to operate as a terrorist movement. This means that the outpost in the north may also remain active as a place from which a ‘second front’ could be opened in the future or at least where fighters and arms could be smuggled through.
The background section of the article is based on long-term literature and field research on political dynamics in northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) since 2002. Recent primary data on the conflict dynamics in the Galgala area were collected in September 2011 and June 2012. Additionally, UN reports and Somali websites were scrutinised.
Background to the Warsangeli territory
Somaliland in northwestern Somalia unilaterally seceded from collapsing Somalia in 1991. Hargeysa became the capital and seat of the government. The central regions of the country are inhabited by Isaaq, who are the majority and to some extent dominate Somaliland politics. The west is inhabited by members of the Dir clan family. In the east, members of the Darood clan family (particularly Warsangeli and Dhulbahante) reside. Somaliland has developed over the past two decades as a de facto state, exhibiting all the key features of statehood but lacking international recognition. Puntland in the northeast was founded in August 1998 as a regional state, administered by members of the Darood/Harti clan collective. This clan collective comprises Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and a few other clans. Power was divided proportionally to estimated clan size. Majeerteen took the presidency, Dhulbahante the vice-presidency and Warsangeli the speaker of the parliament. Garowe became the capital and seat of the government. This means that the loyalties of Warsangeli (and Dhulbahante) are split between Somaliland, where they belong according to the ‘territorial logic’ of the government in Hargeysa, and Puntland, where they belong according to the ‘genealogical logic’ of the government in Garowe. Puntland does not claim independence, as does Somaliland, but works for the establishment of a united but federal Somalia (Hoehne 2009a).
The town of Galgala and the surrounding Golis Mountains are located in the contested borderlands between Somaliland and Puntland. Most of the area of concern in this study is located in Puntland. It is part of the (western) Bari region, near Bosaso, the port of Puntland. However, since most Warsangeli clan members reside in the regions of Sanaag and Badhan, this means that the majority of the clan is located in eastern Somaliland. It is this location of Galgala on the contested border and the dual membership of Warsangeli in both administrations in northern Somalia that complicate the conflicts in the area (see Figure 1).
The Warsangeli territory is geographically remote. It lacks infrastructure and is thus difficult to access. In particular, the Golis Mountains are very rough terrain without proper roads. Politically, Warsangeli were quite far away from the centres of power in colonial and postcolonial times. This marginality with regard to inner-Somali affairs contrasted with extensive external links to the Arab Peninsula and beyond. The members of the Warsangeli clan who inhabit parts of the northern Somali coast were already fishermen and seafarers in pre-colonial times. One can argue that Warsangeli became accustomed to minding their own business and that this self-reliance and distance from the political hotspots inland have served the clan well over the past few centuries. This may have changed, however, with the conflict in the Golis Mountains (particularly related to the places Majayahan and Galgala), as outlined below.
Throughout the 1990s, power in the Sanaag region lay in the hands of local strongmen belonging to the various local clans. At the highest level, the Warsangeli were under the authority of their clan leader, the old Suldaan Cabdisalaan. After his death in 1996, his son Siciid was installed. Siciid became involved in a power struggle with his uncle Ismaciil. This power struggle ended when Ismaciil died in 2004. Politically, Warsangeli are typical borderlanders with split loyalties. While most of them support Somali unity (represented by Puntland), they also come to arrangements with Somaliland for the sake of peace in their region and economic benefits. From around 2000 onward, members of the Warsangeli elite took positions in the administrations of both Somaliland and Puntland, but it is questionable how much legitimacy those elites had in the eyes of the local constituencies they were supposed to represent. Eastern Sanaag, which was recently named Badhan region by the government in Hargeysa, and its people remained at the margins of Somaliland and Puntland. The local economy there was based on diverse activities: animal husbandry, some farming (where possible, e.g. around Galgala, where dates grow) and fishing. Additionally, trade to and from the port of Bosaso was an important source of income.2 Finally the Warsangeli diaspora and some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), particularly Horn Relief (now Adeso), have supported moderate development in the Warsangeli territories since the 1990s. Neither Somaliland nor Puntland invested any substantial amount of money in the area (interview with Maxamed, Boroma, March 2011; Ali 2010).3 Okumu (2012), looking at inter-state conflicts in East Africa, recently argued that location in the contested borderlands and political and economic marginalisation, combined with deposits of valuable mineral resources, make an area vulnerable to conflict escalation. This captures three of the most important factors driving conflict in the Golis Mountains; the fourth is, of course, the intensification of Islamist insurgency and counter-terrorism across southern Somalia and Puntland.
First conflict: fighting over resources (2006)
Suldaan Muuse, who was the commander of the Somaliland armed forces in the Sanaag region and simultaneously (since 2005) a high-ranking ‘traditional’ leader of the Dubays sub-clan of the Warsangeli (hereafter Warsangeli/Dubays), summarised the beginnings of the fighting that erupted in early 2006 as follows:
The fighting started first in a place known as Majayahan, which is near Galgala. In the conflict the Warsangeli sub-clan called Dubays whose members resided in the area fought the administration of Puntland under President Cadde Muuse. The reason for the fighting was that Cadde Muuse wanted to exploit the minerals that can be found in that [Majayahan] area. But the local people refused. They had not been consulted before. The president did not succeed in exploiting the resources for which he had contracted [a company called] Range Resources. (Interview with Suldaan Muuse, Ceerigaabo, 10 September 2011)
This quote accurately captures the central issues at stake – resource exploitation and lack of consultation with local people. All Warsangeli with whom I spoke supported this perspective and felt quite strongly about ‘their’ land and ‘their’ resources.
To fully understand the escalation in the conflict and the relationship between the first and the second war in the Golis Mountains, it is necessary to investigate briefly the ‘pre-history’ of the fighting. Cabduraxmaan Faroole had been minister of finances in Puntland from 2003 to 2004, under President Cabdullahi Yuusuf. He was in contact with Terry Donnelly, an Australian national who was the chairman of the NGO Kids in Need that was working in the region. Through Terry Donnelly, contact with Australian companies was established, first with Consort Private Ltd and then with Range Resources (interview with Siciid, Hargeysa, 15 September 2011). Both companies were focused on oil and mineral exploitation. Cabdullahi Yuusuf was elected president of the TFG in 2004, and had to vacate his seat in Puntland. Cabduraxmaan Faroole competed for the presidency of Puntland during the elections in January 2005 but lost to Cadde Muuse. He then left for Australia, where he obtained a BA in political sciences. In the first half of 2005, Cadde Muuse, the new president of Puntland, ‘harvested’ what Cabduraxmaan Faroole had ‘sown’. He struck a deal with Consort Private Ltd, which was later taken over by Range Resources. However, the TFG under Cabdullahi Yuusuf (2004–2008) rejected the deal. It claimed that only the TFG, as the internationally recognised Somali government, was in a position to enter into contracts with foreign companies over resource exploitation in Somalia (including Puntland). In November 2005, this conflict was resolved (SomaliTalk 2006; Anderson and Browne 2011, 378–379). The administration of Puntland and the TFG had agreed on sharing some of the money generated by the agreement with Range Resources. Allegedly, some US$2 million was paid in advance by the Australian company, plus further monthly payments (group interview with Cabdullahi, Siciid and Xasan, Ceerigaabo, 9 September 2011; interview with Maxamuud, Hargeysa, 15 September 2011). It was furthermore agreed that once resources (oil or minerals) were exploited, Puntland and the TFG would get their share.
Several Warsangeli elders met with President Cadde Muuse in Bosaso at the end of 2005 to discuss the plan to exploit resources in their clan territory in the Golis Mountains. Since colonial times it had been known that some valuable minerals (particularly coltan, a black metallic ore known industrially as tantalite) and metals (such as tin) could be found in the area, and in the 1970s, the Somali government had given mining concessions to a Bulgarian company that had started to mine in Majayahan (interview with Siciid, Hargeysa, 15 September 2011). With Asian economies developing at a rapid pace, demand for these kinds of materials continues to rise.
The elders stressed that the Warsangeli as a clan had to be involved when it came to resource exploitation in their clan territory. President Cadde Muuse said that the money he had received from Range Resources was already divided up and nothing would be given to the Warsangeli. The Warsangeli elders and the president parted acrimoniously (interview with Cabdullahi, Siciid and Xasan, Ceerigaabo, 9 September 2011; interview with Maxamuud, Hargeysa, 15 September 2011). Cadde Muuse decided to implement the agreement with Range Resources using force, if necessary. This choice was probably influenced by the fact that the president belonged to the Ciismaan Maxamuud sub-clan of the Majeerteen clan. First, this group is the ‘royal line’ of Majeerteen. The highest ranking clan leader with the title of boqor comes from that sub-clan; Ciismaan Maxamuud are ‘accustomed to rule’. Second, the members of this sub-clan have a sizeable presence in Bosaso and the surroundings. President Cadde Muuse probably felt that he was in a stronger position, given the close proximity of the Golis Mountains including Majayahan and Galgala to Bosaso (approximately 60 km), and the presumption of substantial backing from his own sub-clan.4
A team of specialists started the first explorative phase in March 2006. It included international and local specialists (including one geologist from the Warsangeli and one from the Dhulbahante clan) and was guarded by the Puntland armed forces. The team and the guards went by car from Bosaso along the coast to the west and then into the mountains. After two days of exploration in the Majayahan area, fighting broke out at the end of March 2006. Local Warsangeli militiamen fired shots and mortars at the Range Resources team and its guards. At this stage, nobody was killed, but when the team and its guards returned to the exploration site the next morning, the Warsangeli militia had mined the access road and one troop carrier drove over a mine and exploded, killing eight soldiers (interview with Siciid, Hargeysa, 15 December 2010). Afterwards, the fighting intensified. Cadde Muuse sent more personnel, made up of soldiers (members of Ciidanka Daraawiishta 5), armed policemen, members of the Puntland Intelligence Service (PIS)6 and Ciidanka Madaxtooyada (‘the Presidential Guard’). The latter was dominated by Cadde Muuse's sub-clan Ciismaan Maxamuud. Around 500 to 600 men were fighting on the side of Puntland. The Warsangeli/Dubays troops consisted of only 80 to 100 men. They had a strategic advantage because they could use key positions in the mountains above Majayahan to shoot and shell the troops below them. They could also hide in the territory with which they were most familiar. In addition, the Warsangeli/Dubays troops received support from other Warsangeli sub-clans (in eastern Sanaag or the Badhan region), as well as from those in the diaspora (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011). The diaspora support comprised moral and financial support. Some $US20,000 was collected to buy food for the troops (interview with Xasan, Hargeysa, 16 September 2010). The fighting was coordinated by Warsangeli military officers from various sub-clans. A vital point to note here is that the conflict over Majayahan concerned virtually all Warsangeli in the region and in the diaspora (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011).
There was also some support from the government of Somaliland, or at least individual officials in the Somaliland administration and military. Suldaan Muuse, who was a traditional leader of Warsangeli/Dubays and simultaneously the commander of the Somaliland army in the Sanaag region, stressed that he personally used his power and resources to support the Warsangeli troops in Majayahan. He added that the then president of Somaliland, Daahir Rayale Kaahin, also knew about his involvement. The government of Somaliland gave logistical support to the Warsangeli (interview with Suldaan Muuse, Ceerigaabo, 10 September 2011). It has to be noted that the information I collected on this point is ambiguous. My sources generally emphasised the important role of Suldaan Muuse in supporting the fighters in Majayahan. Some, however, denied official or direct involvement of Hargeysa in the fighting (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011).
During the first war in the Golis Mountains, Cadde Muuse could not rely fully on his own troops and his officers. A number of high-ranking military and police officers in Puntland perceived Cadde Muuse's approach to exploiting resources in Majayahan as a mistake; some even resigned (interview with Siciid, Hargeysa, 15 October 2010). This is illustrated by the case of Caydiid, who had been a popular police commander in Bosaso in the mid-2000s. Caydiid was by descent Warsangeli/Dubays. His mother was from Majeerteen/Ciismaan Maxamuud. President Cadde Muuse ordered Caydiid to lead the troops in the Majayahan area. Caydiid preferred negotiations with the local elders over military action. He resigned from his post and eventually left Bosaso for a small town called Dahar, his home town in eastern Sanaag/Badhan region. On the way, he passed through the Golis Mountains, where he was welcomed warmly by the locals. He was respected as somebody who had prevented a split among his people (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011).
The fighting between Warsangeli militias and some Puntland troops continued, with interruptions, for several weeks. A number of Warsangeli men were captured and imprisoned in Bosaso. They were treated as prisoners of war and were not abused, as one of the former prisoners told me (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011; interview with Cabdi and Cali, Ceerigaabo, 11 September 2011). Several people were killed, and many injured. Almost all of the dead were Puntland soldiers; the dead soldiers belonged to various clans, including Majeerteen, Dhulbahante and some Warsangeli. On the side of the Warsangeli militias, only one person was killed (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011; interview with Cabdi and Cali, Ceerigaabo, 11 September 2011). The troops of Cadde Muuse eventually retreated. Range Resources, the Australian company, left the area and suspended its efforts in the Golis Mountains. However, it remained in a contract with Puntland over oil resources in other parts of Puntland. This included oil reserves in the Nugaal Valley in the Sool region, which is contested between Somaliland and Puntland (Anderson and Browne 2011, 379).
After his defeat in the mountains, Cadde Muuse retaliated indirectly against the Warsangeli/Dubays. He armed the Majeerteen/Cabdiraxiin group residing with Dubays in a place called Laag, along the tarmac road about 30 kilometres south of Bosaso. The place marks the entrance into the Golis Mountains to the west. The Cabdiraxiin fighters used their arms to expel the Warsangeli/Dubays from Laag. The expelled Dubays took refuge in the Golis Mountains, and this added to the negative feelings of Warsangeli about the government in Garowe. At the same time, the PIS started to arrest members of the Dubays sub-clan in Bosaso. The government in Garowe also sent spies to the Galgala area. The spies were Warsangeli/Dubays, which further strained the relations between the Warsangeli in the mountains and the government of Puntland, causing many Warsangeli to lose any remaining trust in Puntland (interview with Cabdi and Cali, Ceerigaabo, 11 September 2011). Later, Cadde Muuse sought to negotiate with important representatives of the Warsangeli clan. Most of the Warsangeli, however, refused to engage with the president, who in their view had committed a very serious mistake when choosing violence in order to gain access to ‘their’ land and resources (interview with Maxamuud, Hargeysa, 15 September 2011). The Warsangeli as a relatively small group felt threatened by the Majeerteen, a relatively large group with great influence in Somali politics as a whole, who had repeatedly attempted over the previous century to gain land at the expense of the Warsangeli.
Second conflict: a new militant Islamist agenda
Cadde Muuse's term ended in early January 2009. No peace with the Warsangeli had been reached. In January 2009, Cabduraxmaan Faroole was elected as the new president of Puntland. Cabduraxmaan Faroole belonged to the Ciise Maxamuud sub-clan dominating in the Garowe area. Cabdisamid Cali Shire, a military colonel of Dhulbahante/Maxamuud Garaad/Nuur Axmed descent, from the small town of Taleex in the Sool region became vice-president. As a result of these new appointments, the Warsangeli lost power. Their candidate for the presidency had been Cabdullahi Axmed Jaamac Ilkajir, but he was defeated. The Warsangeli also lost the position of the speaker of the parliament, which they had held since Puntland was established in 1998. Finally, Ilkajir became minister of the interior. Cabduraxmaan Faroole was, like his predecessor, interested in attracting foreign investment to Puntland and supporting the exploration and extraction of natural resources. He renewed contacts with Range Resources.
In the meantime, not only had the leadership of Puntland changed, but new political dynamics had also unfolded in the Golis Mountains between mid 2006 and early 2009 that had a decisive impact on the further developments of the conflict. A man called Sheekh (Sheikh) Maxamed Siciid Attam from the Warsangeli/Dubays sub-clan had gained influence and power in the Galgala area and added a religious dimension to the conflict. He advocated an Islamic government based on the shari'a and argued that the current government of Puntland was an apostate government led by men who cooperated with the enemies of Islam (particularly the governments in Washington and Addis Ababa). During an interview with the Mogadishu-based Radio Simba, Sheekh Maxamed Siciid Attam said: ‘Dagaalka waan wadaynaa inta aan ka gaarayno ujeedadeenna oo ah in diinta Islaamka lagu xukumo dhammaan deegaannada Puntland’ (The aim of the war we wage, as far as I am concerned, is that the Islamic religion will be the basis of rule all over Puntland). In this interview Sheekh Attam, as he became known, also accused the Ethiopians of fighting together with the Puntland army against his forces.7 Simultaneously, Sheekh Attam mentioned the resource conflict and presented himself as a local from Galgala who just wanted to defend his and his relatives’ land. When asked by a BBC Somali Service journalist to explain who was fighting in the Golis Mountains, Sheekh Attam replied: ‘Waa dadki meesha degenaye, beerahoodi la guubayo. Waa dadka degaanka ah’ (It is the people who live there [in Galgala] whose farms have been burnt. It is the locals).8 In this way, Sheekh Attam created a strategic ‘double face’ that helped him and his group to attract support from (militant) Islamists who wished to see political change in Puntland and from the Warsangeli as a clan whose members were concerned with defending what they saw as their land and their resources. By early 2009, Sheekh Attam had developed into a serious political leader whose potential to threaten the political order in Puntland increasingly caught the attention of the government in Garowe, but also that of international observers. The UN Monitoring Group concerned with the arms flow into Somalia first mentioned Sheekh Attam in its report published in December 2008. This was quite a rapid career progression, given that before 2006 he had local religious but few political or military credentials. See Figure 2 for a profile of Sheekh Attam.
A profile of Sheekh Maxamed Siciid Attam (drawn by the author from McGregor 2010 and from some interviews cited in this article).
President Cabduraxmaan Faroole reached out to the Warsangeli in the Galgala area in late 2009/early 2010. He called a large number of Warsangeli elders to a meeting in Garowe and proposed that Sheekh Attam either join the Puntland administration, or accept money and stay quiet, or accept money and leave the country (interview with Cabdullahi, Siciid and Xasan, Ceerigaabo, 9 September 2011). The president also sent a minister from the Dubays sub-clan to lead the negotiations. These endeavours did not work out, however, for reasons that are not fully clear. Some argue that another Warsangeli emissary was sent by the government of Somaliland with money in order to prevent an agreement between the people of Galgala and Garowe (interview with Siciid, Hargeysa, 15 December 2010). This seems, however, rather improbable. The government in Hargeysa would certainly not have liked to be associated with an Islamist terror suspect, particularly not at a time when much of its external funding was directly related to counter-terrorism. Others stress that in the middle of the negotiations, President Faroole went abroad. When he returned, he had changed his mind (interview with Cabdullahi, Siciid and Xasan, Ceerigaabo, 9 September 2011). This means that some ‘foreign power’ might have urged Faroole to take a harder stand against his local terrorists, which is not improbable. A recent UN Monitoring Group report had it differently: ‘According to a source close to the negotiations, the Al-Shabaab leadership in Mogadishu sent emissaries to pressure Atom [sic] to break off the talks’ (UN Monitoring Group 2011, 19). There may also be some truth to that. But one has to carefully differentiate Puntland's counter-terrorism discourse from the facts. In any case, many different groups had an interest in the Galgala affair, and the main reason why negotiations in late 2009 and early 2010 failed was certainly the lack of unity among the actors on each side. Neither the Galgala militias and their associates nor the government of Puntland and its allies managed to take a firm position and stick to it. Subsequently, the pressure on those suspected to be part of Attam's militia increased. In Bosaso, a number of Warsangeli/Dubays men were arrested in 2010. This was just the continuation of a development that had begun in 2007, with bomb attacks and assassinations in the city triggering harsh crackdowns on Warsangeli by the PIS (and sharp responses in return against the PIS) (UN Monitoring Group 2008, 12).
The UN Monitoring Group report (2010, 45) mentioned that Sheekh Attam was still essentially a Warsangeli warlord, but noted that he
has strengthened ties with Al-Shabaab during the course of 2009. A significant number of non-Warsengeli militia[men] are reported to have recently joined his group. His training camp at Galgala remained active in 2009, and the Monitoring Group has received reports about two related training centres in the Bari region. Numerous sources indicate that there are several non-Somali instructors at the Galgala camp, and according to eyewitness reports delegations from southern Al-Shabaab groups have been regular visitors.
The report also stressed that Sheekh Attam ‘appears to be preparing to confront both the Puntland and the Somaliland authorities more directly’ (UN Monitoring Group 2010, 45).
This prediction was correct regarding Puntland, because Sheekh Attam's forces attacked the Puntland security forces in western Bari region on 26 July 2010. The attack happened in the area of Laag. Most Warsangeli respondents argued that the Puntland troops had established a post in the area of Laag to stop any trade and transport between the port of Bosaso and Galgala. The aim of the Puntland troops in setting up the post had been to form a blockade to prevent the delivery of food and other goods into the mountains. This led to food shortages in the Galgala area (interview with Cabdi and Cali, Ceerigaabo, 11 September 2011). The first attack of Sheekh Attam's forces in July 2010 targeted this post in Laag. Heavy fighting also erupted in a place called Sugure, a strategic point close to the mountains (c.4 km from the tarmac road). In response, Puntland's army attacked militia bases in the Golis Mountains. This time, the whole army of Puntland was involved. The commanders and politicians in charge of the operation on the side of Puntland were Vice-President Cabdisamid Cali Shire (Dhulbahante), Siciid Dheere (Majeerteen/Ciisa Maxamuud), who was commander of Ciidanka Daraawiishta, and Cabdullahi Axmed Jaamac Ilkajir (Warsangeli), the minister of the interior. All of them had begun their military careers under the former Somali president Maxamed Siyad Barre (1969–1991). Besides, the regular army, Ciidanka Macadinta (literally ‘the Minerals Army’), was involved on the government side. This force had been specially trained by Saracen, a South African-based private security company that officially worked in Puntland to train the anti-piracy forces. The Puntland troops captured most insurgent bases in the mountains including Galgala in August 2010. After Sheekh Attam's militias had lost their bases they hid their heavy weapons, retreated to inaccessible places in the mountains and resorted to classical guerrilla tactics. They attacked the army in hit-and-run operations in the following months (McGregor 2010, 12–13).
In the fighting between mid 2010 and early 2011, more than a hundred people were killed and hundreds of families were displaced. Most of the dead were among the Attam militia. The refugees, who were all Warsangeli/Dubays, fled to places such as Badhan, Dahar and Ceerigaabo in the regions of Sanaag and Badhan; some also fled to Bosaso (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011; interview with Cabdi and Cali, Ceerigaabo, 11 September 2011). There were rumours that Sheekh Attam had been injured in November 2010. One report even stated that he was brought to the town of Badhan for treatment (Somalilandpress 2010). This is, however, most improbable. Badhan had been under the control of Puntland for several years. There was a local military post there, and it would have been easy to arrest Sheekh Attam while he was being treated in Badhan.
In August 2010, Casha Axmed Cabdalla, a very outspoken female Warsangeli MP in the TFG in Mogadishu, accused the Puntland administration of committing atrocities in the Golis Mountains. In November that year, the Puntland police chief, who was Dhulbahante by clan, resigned from his post in protest over the heavy-handed campaign of the Puntland forces in the Galgala area. Some local elders who had attempted to mediate between the two sides accused the Puntland government of overreacting against the militias of Sheekh Attam (McGregor 2010, 13–14; Somalilandpress 2010). During the capture of Galgala, the farm of Sheekh Attam and his family, including the old date trees, was burned and his home was deliberately destroyed (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011). Some other farms and trees were accidentally damaged in the fighting.
Afterwards, most Puntland troops were ordered to retreat. Only a force of some Dubays soldiers (within Ciidanka Daraawiishta) stayed, together with some PIS troops to guard Galgala. The rest of the army in the area kept control of Sugure and Laag, some 25 kilometres east, at the bottom of the mountains. In late 2010 or early 2011 Sheekh Attam went to southern Somalia. He reportedly stayed in Mogadishu and Kismayo (UN Monitoring Group Report 2011, 21). In his absence, two other men took command. One was called Yasin Kilwe; he was Warsangeli/Dubays. The other was Cali Gacamey; he was Darood/Harti/Tinle. Yasin Kilwe had been arrested and jailed in Somaliland in 2003 for the theft of a car belonging to an international organisation. He was released under President Daahir Rayaale Kaahin in 2009 and then went straight to the south, to join Al Shabaab. Cali Gacamey had spent some time in Malaysia (interview with Caydiid, Ceerigaabo, 12 September 2011; Somalia Report 2012b). Somalia Report mentioned that Cali Gacamey was once a madrasa teacher in Bosaso and had been sentenced in 2009 (in absentia) for being linked to Al Shabaab (Somalia Report 2012c).
It is unclear when exactly Sheekh Attam returned to the Golis Mountains, but it must have happened in the first half of 2011. In June 2011, Sheekh Attam's troops attacked the Puntland forces stationed in Galgala. With most Puntland forces removed to the tarmac road, the attackers outnumbered those remaining in Galgala and killed many. The militant Islamists took control of the place again (interview with Cabdi and Cali, Ceerigaabo, 11 September 2011).
Security in Bosaso continued to be a problem in 2011 and up until the end of 2012. Numerous killings took place in the city. Particularly influential members of Warsangeli/Dubays and Puntland officials were assassinated. The government in Garowe accused Sheekh Attam of being behind these actions. In turn, Sheekh Attam accused the PIS of being involved in the killings of Warsangeli/Dubays elites in Bosaso.9 One source mentioned that some of the elders killed were very close relatives of Sheekh Attam (interview with Cabdi and Cali, Ceerigaabo, 11 September 2011). It is noteworthy that Sheekh Attam comes from an important family within Warsangeli/Dubays. His primary lineage is called Reer Gurxaan. This is also the group to which a famous caaqil (traditional leader) of those Dubays residing in the mountains belongs. Once the caaqil had become aware of the militant Islamist tendencies within Sheekh Attam's movement, he opposed them. He went to Bosaso and cooperated with the Puntland government. Since then the caaqil has been attacked many times and several of his sons have been killed (interview with Faduumo Jibril, Nairobi, 27 June 2012).
This affair illustrates the complexity of the issue. In accordance with Somali traditions and ‘clan logic’, a Warsangeli leader such as Sheekh Attam, who carefully tried to gain support both from his clan and from the Islamists, would not attack his own close relatives. He would rather try to win them over or isolate (and exile) them. This would support Sheekh Attam's claim that the targeted killings of Warsangeli in Bosaso were organised by others, e.g. the PIS, in order to create disunity among the Warsangeli/Dubays and cast a shadow on Sheekh Attam. On the other hand, it is clear that Islamic extremists in Somalia do not honour Somali traditions and officially despise clanism. Therefore, it is also possible that the assassinations of those Warsangeli elites cooperating with the Puntland government were orchestrated by these Islamists close to Al Shabaab who were once allies of Sheekh Attam, but who in 2011 and 2012 tried to take over the movement (Mahad 2012). There were rumours about an increasing Al Shabaab presence in the Golis Mountains and in Bosaso back in 2010. While equating the Galgala militias with Al Shabaab back then certainly was ‘propaganda’ by the leadership of Puntland to attract external support (Mahad 2012), there were credible reports about an influx of Al Shabaab early on (interview with Faduumo Jibril, Nairobi, 27 June 2012). However, until recently, the number of Al Shabaab fighters in the mountains was certainly small.
New negotiations between emissaries of Sheekh Attam and the Puntland government started in a place called Af-Urur in the west of the Bari region, on 21 July 2011. The delegations of both sides discussed a solution to the conflict. On the side of Puntland, Siciid Dheere, the commander of Ciidanka Daraawiishta, was involved, among other officers and MPs. The meeting took three days. The most important results were: 1) Nine prisoners of war taken by the Puntland forces should be released. 2) The road from Bosaso to Galgala should be opened. 3) The Puntland troops should leave the mountains and retreat to their former positions. 4) The administration in Garowe should compensate for the damage done to the properties of people residing in the Galgala area. 5) Range Resources and other companies should not be allowed to come to the mountains to pursue the exploitation of resources. 6) A follow-up meeting of the concerned groups should take place to discuss future developments in the area. 7) No further fighting should take place. 8) The government of Puntland should issue an amnesty for Sheekh Attam and his militia. 9) All fighters not belonging to Warsangeli/Dubays (meaning: all militant Islamists from other Somali clans plus probably ‘foreign fighters’) should leave the area (Muuse 2011). Just before the negotiations, a hardline faction within Sheekh Attam's militia declared that it would not accept any negotiations and would continue fighting (Somalia Report 2011).
After the negotiations, the nine Warsangeli prisoners of war were released, but the implementation of the other points was still pending when new fighting between Sheekh Attam's militia and Puntland forces erupted in Bosaso on 7 September 2011 (Terrorism Monitor 2011). This marked the failure of the previous negotiations and the beginning of a new phase of violence. Subsequently, and until the end of 2012, a series of attacks on Puntland positions and clashes between Puntland forces and militias from the mountains occurred. The attacks and fighting were concentrated mainly in the area between Bosaso and Laag (Somalia Report 2012c; UN Monitoring Group Report 2012, 172–173).
Changes of power in the Galgala area: Al Shabaab takes over
The intensification of fighting since Fall 2011 came along with a seeming change of power within the leadership of the Galgala militias. Initially, as mentioned above, Yasin Kilwe and Cali Gacamey replaced Sheekh Attam while he was on a mission in southern Somalia in late 2010 and early 2011. In the second half of 2011, it was unclear who really was in charge of the militias in the Golis Mountains. There had been rumours among locals in the Sanaag region that Al Shabaab fighters from the south were increasingly joining the militias and that those local Warsangeli/Dubays who were against Al Shabaab and its interpretation of Islam had to flee their homes in the mountains. Many fled to Dahar in the Badhan region. In early 2012, the shift from a predominantly Warsangeli to a predominantly Al Shabaab militia became obvious ‘with the announcement in February 2012 that the “Mujahidiin of the Golis Mountains”, formerly headed by Mohamed Sa'iid “Atom” [sic], had formally joined Al-Shabaab’ (UN Monitoring Group 2012, 15). Simultaneously, Yasin Kilwe, who reportedly is a close associate of Axmed Cabdi Godane, the leader of Al Shabaab, ‘officially declared himself “Amir” of the “Mujaahidiin of the Golis Mountains”’ (UN Monitoring Group 2012, 15–16). Cali Gacamey became his deputy. Sheekh Attam seemed to have resisted this change of power. On 19 February 2012, he denied that the militias in the Golis Mountains were aligned with Al Shabaab. On 25 February Yasin Kilwe confirmed the alignment (Somalia Report 2012c). In the following months, the exact whereabouts of Sheekh Attam were unknown to most internal and external observers (interview with Faduumo Jibril, Nairobi, 27 June 2012). According to the UN Monitoring Group, he was ‘allegedly considering leaving the movement’ (UN Monitoring Group 2012, 171). In early 2013, it had been suggested by one source that Sheekh Attam and his close family had gone into hiding in southern Somalia, because they had been too exposed in the Galgala area (interview with Sikiriye, Burco, 27 February 2013).
Recent reports maintained that new groups of Al Shabaab fighters from the south were arriving in the Golis Mountains (Somalia Report 2012a, 2012c). This was related to the crackdown on Al Shabaab in the south. Between early 2011 and early 2013, Al Shabaab came under intense attacks by AMISOM, the Somali National Army, and Ethiopian and Kenyan troops. The movement was pushed out of Mogadishu between August 2011 and early 2012. It also had to stomach military defeats in many parts of southern Somalia (particularly in the regions of Hiiraan, Bay, Gedo, and Middle and Lower Juba). In late 2012, Al Shabaab lost control over the port of Kismayo, which had been its most important position after Mogadishu. Throughout 2013 it retained a military presence in the hinterland of southern and central Somalia and remained capable of operating clandestinely in and around Mogadishu, conducting assassinations and bomb attacks. But its capacity to engage in open battles and control and administer large territories had dramatically diminished. Another recent development was that destitute local youth from Warsangeli but also other northern Somali clans joined the militant Islamists in the mountains (Somalia Report 2012c). An experienced local development worker stressed the lack of jobs and infrastructure as one of the reasons why the extremists around Galgala enjoy local support. She suggested that the international anti-piracy naval operations off the northern Somali coast contributed to the destitute situation on land. ‘The navy ships patrol in front of the Warsangeli coast. They shoot at the boats of the fishermen’ (interview with Faduumo Jibril, Nairobi, 27 June 2012). This undermines a major source of income for local people.
The intensification of conflict dynamics in the Golis Mountains and to the east, between Bosaso and Laag, has an increasingly negative impact on life and business in Bosaso. Assassinations happen frequently in the city; most locals can only speculate who is behind them. The security forces either do not have the situation under control or are complicit in the violence. This leads to a decrease in economic activities of ordinary people. Some professionals and students have left the city to pursue their careers in safety elsewhere (Mahad 2012).
Whenever Sheekh Attam was interviewed about his relation to Al Shabaab, his position was ambiguous: He kept on saying that he was a ‘local person defending local interests’. Simultaneously, he had good contact with Al Shabaab, which since 2008 has been the dominant military force in southern and central Somalia. Sheekh Attam seemed to have had closer relations with the militant Islamists in the south since mid 2006. However, it remained unclear for long how close his personal and his militia's ties to Al Shabaab really were. In 2011, the UN Monitoring Group report stressed that ‘Atom's [sic] militia is now considered … to have essentially merged with Al-Shabaab’ (UN Monitoring Group 2011, 23). This statement is unduly simplifying a more complex reality. A more balanced analysis shows that the militia of Sheekh Attam was essentially split. In 2010 and 2011, it most probably consisted of a relatively small hardline faction that included dedicated jihadists from various Somali clans and possible a very small number of non-Somalis. But it also still included local Warsangeli/Dubays fighters who were determined to defend their territory. The latter still had a reason to be worried about Puntland politics since the administration in Garowe under President Cabduraxmaan Faroole continued the endeavours to exploit the natural resources in the Golis Mountains in cooperation with Range Resources. This ‘heritage’ from the first conflict (2006) lent legitimacy to continued Warsangeli resistance. The resistance, however, became weak since many Warsangeli did not agree to Sheekh Attam's ‘religious programme’ and to the increasing involvement of extremists from outside the area. This disagreement within the Warsangeli/Dubays (and the Warsangeli more generally) led to the defeat of Sheekh Attam's militia in the second half of 2010 and to the capture of Galgala by Puntland forces. The jihadist fighters from other clans had nothing to defend in the mountains. Their aim was to undermine security in Puntland, and the conflict in the Golis Mountains just provided an entry-point.
Things changed in the first half of 2012. Sheekh Attam lost his grip on power over the militias in the mountains. Due to the pressure on Al Shabaab in the south, more fighters from there sought refuge in the north. The Galgala area became a place for regrouping. It is strategically important for various reasons. It offers the chance to continue to Yemen, or to stay in Somalia and continue the destabilisation of the regional or even national ‘apostate’ regimes in Garowe and Mogadishu. Also the closeness to resource-rich areas including Bosaso (where oil is being extracted) makes the Golis Mountains an important post for Al Shabaab. Finally, natural ports at the bottom of the mountains, such as Ceelayo, offer the possibility for smuggling e.g. arms. The decline of Sheekh Attam's power and the rise of Yasin Kilwe certainly signify tensions between ‘Somali Salafi Islamists and the hard core Salafi-jihadists’ of Al Shabaab (UN Monitoring Group 2012, 171). It also shows that the Warsangeli stake in the affair has diminished, although it would be mistaken to assume that the Warsangeli have been completely overpowered by external Al Shabaab fighters in the mountains. Without some local support, non-Warsangeli jihadists could hardly stay in the area. It is unclear what the fate of Sheekh Attam might be. If he contemplated leaving the militias in the mountains, as a recent UN Monitoring Group report (2012, 171) suggested, he would certainly try to evaluate the risks of being captured by the PIS and/or by US commandos or by Al Shabaab assassins as a traitor. Therefore, Sheekh Attam may well be compelled to arrange with Yasin Kilwe and the Al Shabaab faction and continue fighting (and eventually dying or fleeing) with them.
Conclusion
This article has shown that one has to differentiate at least two conflicts in the Golis Mountains. The first one erupted in early 2006 between Warsangeli clan militias and parts of the Puntland forces under President Cadde Muuse. It concerned the control of natural resources in a place called Majayahan. The second conflict began openly in July 2010. However, the build-up to this confrontation had started earlier. This second conflict was more complicated. It still involved a Warsangeli clan element and was partly justified by Warsangeli mobilising to defend their territory. But it also involved militant Islamists who were fighting against the ‘apostate’ regime in Garowe, which was cooperating with Ethiopia and the USA. The second conflict played out in the area between Galgala, Bosaso and Laag. While it had arisen locally, it clearly was also part of conflict dynamics far beyond the Golis Mountains. It involved aspects of the ‘global war on terrorism’, although until the end of 2013 the USA had not (yet) decided whether to conduct drone strikes or undertake other direct military campaigns against the Islamists in the mountains.
Still, the persistent usage of counter-terrorism policies and practices, including harsh measures by the US-trained PIS against civilians in and around Bosaso, contributed to the feeling of those opposed to Garowe being under siege. Like in other situations, counter-terrorism measures worsened the situation and contributed to the intensification of terrorism (Hoehne 2009b). In this context, Sheekh Attam, who seemingly wanted to be both a clan leader and an Islamist reformer, became ‘hostage’ to a group of extremists in his own militia whom he initially invited as useful allies but who later took over command from him.
It is important to note that throughout the escalation of conflict since 2006, traditional authorities such as elders, but also high-ranking leaders such as Suldaan Siciid of the Warsangeli clan, did not manage to calm the situation and end the violence. The reasons may be that in the first conflict, virtually all Warsangeli were on one side against President Cadde Muuse. Negotiations would have needed some impartial parties, which were not at hand (and also would perhaps not have been acceptable to the president). During the second round of conflict, negotiations did not succeed despite attempts to resolve it. Axmed Adaami, the minister of defence of Somaliland, who was Warsangeli/Ugayslabe, mentioned that a number of local elders watched the rise to power of Sheekh Attam in the Golis Mountains with concern. However, they could not stop him because
Dubays fear Majeerteen. The conflict over land goes back to pre-colonial times. The Warsangeli were good fighters and knew the value of their land. Later the Majeerteen became powerful. They now have their own government and say that ‘as Harti, we all own the land and its resources together.’ However, the Warsangeli think that the Majeerteen just want to grab their land and their resources. This is why they accepted Sheekh Attam as defender of their interests. Moreover, Galgala is a remote place and people there lack education and foresight. Finally, Attam made himself really relevant to the local people and that is why they accepted him. (Interview with Axmed Adaami, Hargeysa, 15 September 2011)
Any sustainable solution to the conflict must take into account the legitimate claims of the Warsangeli about the protection of their land and their resources. The anti-terrorism discourse prevalent in Puntland is likely to inhibit the understanding of the issues at stake. Faduumo Jibril, who founded the NGO Horn Relief (now Adeso), argued:
Al Shabaab is in the Golis Mountains. But, one needs to understand: people there stand with their backs against the wall. They are not all Al Shabaab, but have to fight against Puntland intrusions and US-counter-insurgency. … The USA and others should have a more constructive approach. They need to offer people alternatives; only fighting and killing will lead to more violence. Warsangeli are becoming the casualties in between the Islamists and the Puntland and anti-terror forces. (Interview with Faduumo Jibril, Nairobi, 27 June 2012)
There have been local initiatives to provide alternatives to destitute young people to prevent them from joining armed groups including pirates or extremists. Among these was the opening of a university in Badhan, the Warsangeli ‘capital’. This university, called Maakhir State University, was set up by the community concerned, together with the Warsangeli diaspora. It has been operational since late 2011 and offers courses such as information technology and business administration. Investing in higher education (and other civic infrastructure) together with long-term economic development of the region is certainly a way to decrease the vulnerability of marginalised communities to recruitment by militant groups.
(ayn); ‘x’ denotes 
(ha).