Introduction
In January 2005, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended Sudan's longest running insurgency. By providing a legal framework for the secession of South Sudan, its implementation paved the way for the partition of the country. The completion of the CPA led to South Sudan's independence in July 2011 and annulled Sudan's legal authority over its southern territory. However, the process also brought about widely expressed concerns about the viability of South Sudan as an independent state.
South Sudan was born in the greater Horn of Africa depicted by some as a ‘bad neighborhood’ (Weiner 1996, 26) renowned for its notorious inter-state relations. A number of South Sudan's neighbours have the capacity to undermine its strength and territorial integrity. However, the new state is also troubled by the legacy of internal divisions within its leading cadres related to the intractable and highly complex civil war and the spoils of subsequent self-government. Since 2005, the southern Sudanese ruling elite, made up almost exclusively of military men backed by their private armed constituencies, has engaged in the painful attempt of state- and nation-building centred on the main rebel movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).
However, in mid December 2013 South Sudan experienced an outbreak and escalation of armed violence which has produced a severe humanitarian crisis. While it has again raised questions about the viability of the South Sudanese state, the crisis has also resulted in a shake-up of the diplomatic landscape by changing and consolidating strategic relationships between South Sudan and its closest neighbours. This briefing argues that the newly reconfigured inter-state relations are a sign of South Sudan's continued dependence on outside actors, and shows how external alliances and invasive military involvement continue to contribute to the internal political and economic reality which allows the highly contested leadership to remain in power.
Domestic dynamics in the current political crisis
In order to understand the current military escalation in South Sudan, it is necessary to be aware of the legacy of the complex and intractable civil war in the region. Although in principle the war was fought between various – mainly southern Sudanese – rebel formations and successive Sudanese governments, in practice it was a violent struggle predominantly between southerners forming militias and armed opposition groups confronting each other. The latest protracted insurgency in the region (1983–2005), led by the SPLM/A, was a bitter battle from the outset, and splits and offshoots from the movement along with the existence of other armed groups added to its complexity.
Initially, the SPLM/A sought to establish itself as the main rebel organisation in the region by engaging in eliminating rival groups. Founded in 1983, its leadership has consisted principally of the Dinka, a politically influential majority ethnic grouping against which various leaders of other groups have harboured political grievances for a long time. In spite of these challenges, however, by the late 1980s the SPLM/A had become the uncontested flagship of the rebellion, and its leadership had developed an intense system of recruitment and indoctrination (Nyaba 2000) in order to reach beyond ethnic divisions and maintain the supremacy of the rebel organisation over rivals.
Yet, the initial bloodshed left a legacy of bitterness among some prominent southerners, including some Nuer leaders from the second largest ethnic grouping in South Sudan. A number of southern politicians, civil servants and local communities resisted the SPLM/A. Some organised protective militias and other armed groups, such as the Equatoria Defence Force and the Nuer White Army, which Khartoum often supported as an integral part of its counterinsurgency operations.
In 1991 the Ethiopian Mengistu regime's downfall caused further strain to the SPLM/A as it lost its main source of external support. The same year the SPLM/A suffered a defection orchestrated by Riek Machar (a Nuer) and Lam Akol (a Shilluk). The Sudanese government supported the new SPLM/A-Nasir faction, while its splintering in 1994–95, involving disagreements regarding Khartoum's support, contributed to the further complexity of the war. Thereafter Machar continued to command his faction of the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army against the main SPLM/A, but when momentum for peace increased in 2001 he reconciled with the SPLM/A supreme leader John Garang and consequently rejoined the main SPLM/A.
However, Garang died in a helicopter accident in 2005. Salva Kiir, one of his closest and most loyal commanders, who had already formed part of the 1960s Anyanya insurgency, was chosen to replace him. As a result, Kiir (a Dinka) inherited the SPLM/A chairmanship and the presidency of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), which had been formed as part of the CPA implementation (2005–11). In the process, Riek Machar became the GoSS vice-president.
Both Kiir and Machar are potent leaders. On the one hand, Kiir has often been commended for his military achievements, his ability to forgive anti-SPLM/A rebel leaders and his fight against corruption within the SPLM/A leadership. On the other hand, Machar is known for his abilities as a statesman, his diplomatic skills and capacity to work over the ethnic sub-divides among the Nuer in spite of his otherwise controversial reputation for having fought bitterly against the SPLM/A in the 1990s.
The rivalry between these two culminated after the independence of South Sudan. With his eye on becoming president in the election scheduled for 2015, Machar rallied for support among the highest SPLM/A leadership and officially through its Political Bureau and National Leadership Council (NLC) in the course of 2012–13. However, Kiir, for his part, has been poised to retain the presidency for another term (Sudan Tribune 2014a). Consequently, after evidence about Machar's plans emerged in March 2013, Kiir first restricted the vice-president's powers and went on to sack Machar in July (BBC 2013a). In the process, in May 2013, he also dissolved the Political Bureau, the NLC and the SPLM national and states' secretariats. As a result, Machar expressed to the international press his intention to contest the SPLM party chairmanship in the 2014 SPLM national convention because obtaining the position would convert him into the party's official candidate for the 2015 presidential election (BBC 2013b). Given the SPLM/A's control of South Sudan's political system and the security apparatus, becoming the official SPLM candidate also largely secures the presidency.
What exactly occurred on 15 December 2013 remains somewhat obscure. What is known is that the escalation of violence began from a fight between soldiers in the Presidential Guard when its Nuer elements were subjected to disarmament. In retrospect, Kiir has also been accused of executing a plan to neutralise opposing SPLM politicians who had boycotted the proceedings of the NLC following his speech in which he rejected calls for SPLM reform that would have weakened his personal position (Sudan Tribune 2014b). Kiir blamed his adversaries for planning a coup, which was used to justify detention of 13 senior officials,1 including those who had accused him of ‘dictatorial tendencies’ in an earlier joint address (Sudan Tribune 2013). However, Machar and two others2 escaped arrest and organised armed groups, militias and SPLA defectors into more coherent military opposition facing Kiir's government.
The coup allegations may have been fabricated. In a later statement, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, claimed that the US administration had found no evidence of a planned coup (Sudan Tribune 2014c). Moreover, Machar's spokesperson echoed these claims and stated that instead of a coup the officials had planned a political rally to denounce ‘shortcomings in the [SPLM] party leadership’ (Sudan Tribune 2014d). In any event, after the outbreak of violence, reports and eye-witness accounts emerged of Kiir's personal Dinka militia and state security forces committing ethnically targeted killings against Nuer civilians in Juba, which turned the violence into ethnic confrontation that the opposition forces answered in kind in other towns (Sudan Tribune 2014d; Human Rights Watch 2014; Sudan Tribune 2014e). The current evidence suggests that the coup allegations were used to justify the targeting of Machar's constituency.
The armed violence has since escalated into full-scale military operations. The fighting has taken place mainly in the troubled eastern South Sudan, where a number of local groups have long challenged SPLM/A's authority and legitimacy. Many of the reported battles have occurred near stronghold areas of Machar's commanders in the vicinity of some of South Sudan's major towns, particularly Bentiu (Unity State), Bor (Jonglei State) and Malakal (Upper Nile State). Although some of the towns have exchanged hands several times during the conflict, the military confrontations have not reached the state's capital, Juba, from where many development organisations and consulates have been evacuated since the outbreak of violence.
The ensuing conflict has caused a severe humanitarian crisis. Although the number of total casualties is unknown, International Crisis Group estimated on 7 January that the fighting had resulted in nearly 10,000 deaths (New York Times 2014). Later, in February, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported over 700,000 internally displaced and over 150,000 South Sudanese refugees in the neighbouring countries (UN OCHA 2014). Although the United Nations Mission to South Sudan, preceded by the United Nations Mission to Sudan (2005–11), has a deployment strength of more than 10,000 and a mandate to protect civilians, it has faced a number of challenges and has a poor track record in doing so.
External involvement
In spite of Juba's violent excesses in the current conflict, Western powers and international organisations have generally sided with Kiir as the head of the internationally recognised government of South Sudan. Similarly, the Western media has preferred to portray Machar's opposition as a rebellion rather than armed opposition with legitimate concerns, which is contrary, for example, to the image transmitted of the armed opposition in Sudan. The support for Kiir is due in part to South Sudan's somewhat positive image in the West (as opposed to that of Sudan), but perhaps even more to the costly ongoing international peacebuilding intervention that the Western powers desperately hope will succeed.
However, the conflict has had wide regional implications involving South Sudan's relations with some of its neighbours. A number of neighbouring states have found opportunities and encountered obligations in the current situation in the region's newcomer state, but, unlike in the past, some neighbours have lent support to its internationally recognised leadership.
First, Uganda has been responsible for possibly the most blatant involvement in the crisis. Siding with the Kiir government, Uganda's support has to be understood in the context of a long personal relationship between President Yoweri Museveni and the former supreme SPLM/A leader Garang. From the mid 1990s onwards, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) has intervened in southern Sudan with the pretext of pursuing the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has sought to overthrow the Ugandan government and continues to use the Democratic Republic of Congo–South Sudan–Central African Republic–Uganda borderlands as its sanctuary. Since Garang's death in 2005 Museveni has maintained close ties with the long-time SPLM/A leader Salva Kiir and sees Uganda as the main guarantor of South Sudan's integrity primarily against Sudan, which has a history of supporting the LRA. In contrast, Museveni's view of Riek Machar is more negative, in spite of the latter's role in mediating between Uganda and LRA in 2006–08. The Ugandan leadership continues to see Machar as an SPLM/A defector, a view that the recent events have strengthened.
At the onset of the crisis in mid December, Uganda almost immediately unleashed the UPDF, which was already operating in the South Sudanese territory. It joined the SPLA loyal to Kiir in the latter's military operations against troops under the general command of Machar. This swift deployment was critical in saving Juba from initially falling to Machar's forces, and Ugandan units and the air force subsequently continued attacking along with the SPLA. For instance, the UPDF played a major role not only in protecting the capital but also in recapturing the town of Bor, as Museveni claimed that Uganda was attempting ‘to save the neighboring country from collapse’ (Sudan Tribune 2014f). Initially, Museveni and his government spokesmen further maintained that the UPDF was deployed at Kiir's personal request to protect the South Sudanese state, to guard Juba airport and to prevent a looming genocide in South Sudan, as well as to protect the many Ugandans present and to undo threats to national and regional security (IRIN 2014; Parliament of the Republic of Uganda 2014; Sudan Tribune 2014g). Museveni had acted unilaterally in consultation with Kiir, and Uganda later concluded a status of forces agreement with Juba (SoFA 2014). Museveni also gained the Ugandan parliament's approval for the military involvement in a later vote (IRIN 2014). Although Ugandan authorities initially insisted that Uganda assumed the cost of its military deployment in South Sudan, it later surfaced that Kiir's government had paid for it (Sudan Tribune 2014h). This suggests that external military support is so vital for the survival of Kiir's government that it has been willing to spend significant public funds on it.
Uganda, however, is interested in ensuring stability and the political status quo in South Sudan. This is principally because Museveni continues to base his close relations with South Sudan largely on the supreme SPLM/A leadership. In addition, the demand for imported food and goods in South Sudan has been lucrative for Ugandan businesses and has led to significant economic cooperation. Moreover, the crisis in South Sudan has provided a pretext for Museveni to vent pressure from military idleness at home by deploying the UPDF, also occupied in the Democratic Republic of Congo and international missions elsewhere, and prevent it from potentially becoming domestically destabilising. Although Museveni has faced international criticism and fears of Ugandan involvement leading to a possible regional escalation, Kiir's invitation and the close relationship between Juba and Kampala have sanctioned the operations. Yet, Uganda has repeatedly expressed its willingness to withdraw the UPDF from South Sudan if an effective military force planned by the sub-regional organisation, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), replaces it.
Second, unlike what some Sudan analysts have argued, Khartoum appears to have played a somewhat positive role in the early stages of the current crisis. Although the Sudanese government continues to have incentives in undermining South Sudan particularly because of boundary disputes and rebellion in the common border areas, the strategic relationship in the current situation between Sudan and South Sudan has changed to an extent. Faced with economic problems in financing its starving state, Khartoum has increasingly a common interest with Juba in maximising oil exportation. Thus, safeguarding oil originating in South Sudan and piped through Sudan for export plays an important role in Khartoum's financial strategy. Although the South Sudanese government is the prime beneficiary of its oil proceeds, any disruptions to petroleum exports undermine Sudan's budget, which is in part composed of transit fees from South Sudanese oil. Decreases in oil exports, which the conflict already caused in January, have the potential of pushing Sudan's economy in a downward spiral. Consequently, unlike in the past, in the initial stages of the current crisis Sudan has backed Juba diplomatically, offered mediation assistance and help to protect South Sudanese oil installations, and aided South Sudanese refugees in its territory. However, it has also condemned Ugandan involvement as hindering any peace process.
Third, Ethiopia and the IGAD have played active roles in attempts to find a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Ethiopia's role as a mediator between the Sudans has become increasingly emphasised after it assumed the leading position in trying to settle the number of pending post-secession issues between the two states. Addis Ababa is concerned about possible contagion and regionalisation of the conflict in its western territory in Gambella, an area largely inhabited by the Nuer that has a long history of cross-border arms trading and housing of South Sudanese rebels. The Ethiopian government has repeatedly mentioned that the military presence of Uganda (an IGAD and African Union member state) hinders attempts to find a lasting solution to the crisis.
Fourth, Kenya has involved itself in the crisis moderately in support of Kiir's leadership. When Juba released seven of the remaining 11 political detainees on bail on 29 January, Kenya received them.3 Kenya has also expressed concerns about Uganda's military involvement in South Sudan while dispatching Lazarus Sumbeiywo, the renowned IGAD mediator who brokered the 2005 CPA, to take part in the IGAD mediating team to find a negotiated settlement to the crisis. However, Kenya conceded to the demands of Machar's armed opposition to allow the seven released politicians opposing Kiir to travel to Addis Ababa and participate in the peace negotiations. This was contrary to Juba's wishes as it initially rejected their involvement largely because of the fear that a more comprehensive process beyond the two-party talks would threaten Kiir's position and power as the head of the SPLM/A and government. Certainly, peace negotiations including a broad spectrum of disgruntled representatives of South Sudanese would expose Juba's lack of broad societal support.
Finally, although the parties reached a ceasefire agreement on 23 January (CoHA 2014), the conflict has continued unabated and each side has repeatedly accused the other of ceasefire violations. In January–February, Machar's spokesmen repeatedly denounced the SPLA and the UPDF attacks on opposition positions, and alleged that these were joined by the SPLM/A-linked Sudan Revolutionary Front4 forces from Sudan, while continuing defections from the SPLA strengthened the opposition's position particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile (Sudan Tribune 2014i).
Meanwhile, in mid February the IGAD-mediated peace talks in Addis Ababa5 reached a deadlock. This was due mainly to Juba's intransigence regarding release of the four remaining political detainees, its refusal to end UPDF support and Kiir's unwillingness to step down to make way for an interim government, but also to the opposition's refusal to give way on some of its demands and Machar's ambition to lead any new government in spite of the controversy surrounding him. Kiir's government has also charged Machar and two other armed opposition leaders with treason (Sudan Tribune 2014j), which counts as an additional factor complicating any possible future settlement.
Avoiding collapse
Although the South Sudanese state is dwindling, it is unlikely to collapse. However, given the strength of the armed opposition, a comprehensive military solution – even with Ugandan support – remains highly unlikely. Kiir's government remains weak and dependent on the UPDF, which is exemplified by its repeated statements that Ugandan forces would only withdraw when stability and peace prevailed. Juba has also launched an intensive military mass-recruitment campaign to prepare for the eventual exit of the UPDF. The hanging on to the external military support to obtain an upper hand in the conflict indicates Juba's continuing bet on coercive strength, and its belief that any serious weakening of the forces associated with Machar also weakens the opposition's challenge to Kiir's position.
In addition, Ugandan support provides Kiir leverage to defy demands for an inclusive peace process and political reforms that might result in him losing power. It not only supports Kiir's current position but may result in the strengthening of the role of the presidency from its already strong position in the South Sudanese political system. This may help in pushing South Sudan further towards authoritarian political order, as any additional concentration of political power in the already powerful presidency would increasingly resemble Ugandan political reality in terms of extremely extensive presidential powers over a highly exclusive de facto one-party political system. Such a development, in turn, would further aggravate the political grievances behind the current escalation in South Sudan and continue to diminish the already meagre state legitimacy, which would inevitably result in the state becoming increasingly unviable in the long term.
Some voices have called for South Sudan to be subjected to external rule until it learns to manage its own affairs in a viable manner. However, this is unlikely because it would require a much more extensive and costly long-term peacebuilding intervention than the current, already immensely expensive, endeavour. In addition, it would require external actors to learn from their past mistakes in promoting highly exclusive piecemeal peace processes in Sudan. Moreover, any such intervention should prioritise the gradual long-term process of nationbuilding needed to overcome the drastic identity divisions and to significantly improve state legitimacy. It is likely that external actors would be unwilling to embark on such a long-term mission that would be difficult to justify due to its cost and because it would constitute a severe violation of South Sudan's status as a sovereign state.
Instead, international and regional actors should press for an inclusive negotiation process in which large-scale political reforms should be agreed. All major civil society stakeholders in South Sudan should have their say, and political and economic power should be significantly reconfigured. The objective should be to halt the tendency towards increasing authoritarianism and encourage a vibrant multi-party democratic order. Here, the effective separation of leading politicians from the armed forces, security organs and militias, as well as other private coercive formations, is essential. Equally important is the establishment of a functioning system of public financing in support of peaceful political formations other than the SPLM, as well as more transparent management of public funding, effective redistribution and wider economic opportunities. In such a situation, ideally the use of the state's security organs would be gradually subjected to more collective decision-making, while members of more than one political party would have the possibility to produce an economic platform enabling effective participation in decision-making and wield a certain amount of political power.
However, such cross-cutting reforms remain highly unlikely. Yet, without seizing the opportunity for an inclusive peace process and considerably redistributing de facto political and economic power, peacebuilding to construct a legitimate and viable democratic state in South Sudan remains a fantasy. Nevertheless, unless significant reconfiguration of political and economic power is effected there remains little hope that South Sudan will turn its back on political repression and violence in the near future.