‘We changed the government; we changed the union’1
Labour scholars seem to agree that the South African movement faced a crisis, while Zambian unions were in terminal decline (Buhlungu and Tshoaedi 2013; Larmer 2005, 2007; Lee 2014; Mulenga 2008; Mulenga contribution in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2011; Rakner 2000; Satgar and Southall 2015; Simutanyi 1996). In both mining nations, trade unions had fought to introduce democracy and reduce racial discrimination, but lost political direction and influence in macroeconomic policy since the mid 1990s. South African labour leaders surrendered their militant resistance to the alliance with the ruling party. The National Union of Mineworkers was furthermore co-opted by mining corporations, which paid top union officials’ salaries. Meanwhile, Zambian labour had agreed to wage freezes and austerity measures in the name of debt relief and economic restructuring. Unions fell victim to the deregulation and liberalisation of trade, labour and markets.
In both countries, union solidarity was undermined by disagreement and fragmentation, shrinking and heterogeneous membership, organisational weakness, shifting ideologies, lack of training and education, bribery, and mismanagement of funds (Beresford 2012; Botiveau 2015; Buhlungu 2002; Buhlungu 2013; Buhlungu and Tshoaedi 2013; contributions by Koyi, Mulenga, Simutanyi, and Sumaili in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2011; Larmer 2007; Mulenga 2008). Decision-making was centralised at the national bureaucracy; representatives seemed preoccupied with their career. The relationship between officials and the rank and file was marked by distrust, antagonism and actual or threats of violence during strikes.
Conflicts erupted at the Marikana massacre in 2012, where workers had elected their own strike committee, while the union president asked the Police Minister to discipline strikers with paramilitary units. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) lost all credibility in the eyes of the workers, and the rival Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) became popular as a strike-leading union (Alexander et al. 2013; Chinguno 2015; Sinwell and Mbatha 2016).
Zambia’s mining union experienced the same contestation and insurgency. The dominant Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) ‘had collapsed, institutionally and ideologically’ (Fraser 2010, 18), while two breakaway unions emerged in 2003 and 2010. There is no empirical research on the formation of the newest splinter union, the United Mineworkers Union of Zambia (UMUZ), nor on the competition and internal dynamics between the three mining unions. The general assumption takes fragmented labour as a weakness, especially since new unions tend to struggle with a lack of resources, instability, and poor organisation (contribution by Mulenga in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2011). Yet the South African scenario suggests potential for a return to militancy, democratisation, and shop-floor mobilisation (Sinwell and Mbatha 2016).
On top of the change in union leadership, mining towns organised political opposition and voted the Patriotic Front into office in September 2011. Mineworkers celebrated the opposition victory with great enthusiasm. In its ten-year-long campaign, the Patriotic Front had placed issues of labour, mining, and the living conditions of the urban poor at the centre of political debate (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010; Larmer and Fraser 2007; Lungu 2009). Presidential candidate Michael Sata had condemned ‘slave wages’ and ‘Chinese colonialism’, but quickly turned to appease Chinese investors once he took office, as Ching Kwan Lee (2014) indicated.
The opposition victory and the rise of two rival unions gave hope for a revival, but their effect on the strength of the mining unions has not been researched. To follow up these recent developments in the mining unions from the early 2000s to 2016, this article discusses how the multi-union environment and the change of government affected their bargaining power. As I will show, the Zambian labour movement indeed experienced a revival in 2011, but it lasted for only one bargaining period. My argument is based on a qualitative case study of the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ, formed in 1949), the National Union of Miners and Allied Workers (NUMAW, formed in 2003), and the United Mineworkers Union of Zambia (UMUZ, formed in 2010). Between 2011 and 2014, I conducted 55 narrative interviews and focus group discussions with mineworkers, union leaders, district politicians, and government officials in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt. The workers, branch, and shop-floor representatives were employed at the Swiss-owned Mopani Copper Mines, the Chinese state-owned companies CCS and 15MCC, the Canadian Kansanshi mine, the parastatal Ndola Lime company, and the British-owned Kagem emerald mine.
My analysis reveals that the opposition victory in 2011 turned the industrial relations upside down in a way the country had never experienced before. Due to the militant, leftist election campaign, workers thought themselves assured of government support and went on strike in 23 mining companies. Branch officials from all three unions got involved in mobilising their members – together. The new Labour and Mines Ministries backed the demands for higher wages and pleaded for a reinstatement of dismissed strikers. Yet, the exceptional moment of labour militancy ended soon, as the Patriotic Front made a U-turn, decided to form a ‘responsible’ government and commit their ministries to ‘prevent future industrial unrest’. The Labour Minister advised the MUZ president to accept the companies’ offers. The unions bowed and fell back into assuming a disciplining role, persuading miners to accept meagre wage raises in the following years.
Even though the new ruling party came to power with a leftist, resource nationalist agenda, it suppressed organised labour nearly as much as the previous regimes. First of all, I argue that the new government lacked the capacity to enforce stricter regulations in the mining industry; but, furthermore, the party got caught up in a struggle for its own political survival. Labour leaders were expected to serve as loyal government supporters and maintain stability in the urban and industrial areas. Their publicly expressed criticism was perceived as a potential threat. The hegemony of corporate power seemed to persist, above the change of labour and political leadership. The Patriotic Front government tried four times to collect higher taxes from the mining companies, but backtracked when investors threatened to leave the country, close the mines, halt expansion projects, or take legal action. On the same lines, all three unions surrendered to the dominant narrative, according to which strikes and higher salaries destabilised the economy and ruined the chances of employment and investment in the long run.
The two splinter unions may have been a grassroots revolt against the national MUZ bureaucracy, but were not more militant. The newest UMUZ was easily co-opted; it took an interest-free loan from the government and from Mopani Copper Mines, one of Zambia’s largest private employers. The multi-union environment further benefited officials who were voted out of office, but continued their career in another union. In the Zambian case, pluralism neither deepened democratic leadership, nor did it strengthen the unions’ bargaining power. In fact, after the initial success of 17.4% wage increase at an inflation of 7.3% in 2012, miners’ real wages declined from 2013 to 2017.
Background of Zambian mining unions
Zambia had one of Africa’s strongest labour movements until the structural adjustment measures crushed it in the 1990s. The mining union was formed in 1949, under the colonial company-state. It was militant and successful until 1962, when Kenneth Kaunda’s party commanded workers to give up their strike activities in the name of national development. The union chairman John Chisata was deeply angered: ‘I reminded Kaunda he has no business in interfering in an industrial dispute.’2 Miners had high hopes of independence, and the first years of the young nation were the most strike-ridden, with 165 strikes between 1964 and 1970 (ILO n.d.). The authoritarian government put immense effort into taming the ‘Trouble Belt’ (Bates 1971; Gupta 1974). Kaunda tried three times to incorporate the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) into the ruling party, but labour leaders ‘totally and vehemently rejected the proposal’ (cited in Rakner 1992, 109). Trade unions eventually organised an underground movement for the return to democracy, and mass protest pushed Kaunda to announce elections. In 1991, Zambians elected the 17-year-long ZCTU chairman Frederick Chiluba to the presidency.
While President Chiluba came from the labour movement, he took the market road to neoliberalism. His ruling party, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), started out very popular and enforced harsh policies without any significant resistance (Larmer 2005, 30; Rakner 2000, 11). In fact, the first years of the MMD turned out to be the calmest in Zambia’s mining history, with only nine strikes between 1991 and 1996 (ILO n.d.). Mineworkers had been ‘the dynamite that brought down the old order’, but ‘were the first to be sacrificed by the new order’, as Michael Burawoy found (2014, 975). The government sold the copper mines to multinational investors, and the MUZ lost half of its members, from 56,482 in 1992 to 24,753 in 2002 (Muchimba 2010, 23, 26).
The fate of mineworkers was subject to political (de-)regulation and major economic fluctuations. The mines had generated huge profits between 1949 and 1969, but the falling copper price between 1972 and 2002 brought production down from 824,658 tonnes (t) in 1969 to a historic low of 241,200t in 2000 (US Geological Survey 1970, 2000).
Just when the union was at its weakest and the state had withdrawn from the market, the copper price shot up to unprecedented heights. Since 2004, the industry has experienced a revival as new mines have developed and old ones have expanded. They extract mostly copper and cobalt, but also gold, iron, manganese, nickel, silver, coal, tourmaline and emeralds – with investors from South Africa, Canada, UK, Australia, Switzerland, China, India, Brazil, Kazakhstan and Singapore. Transnational corporations seemed to shift huge profits out of the country, but workers found themselves in precarious employment, with casual and contract positions. Miners lost their welfare benefits, and municipal services deteriorated (Fraser and Lungu 2007; Lungu 2008; Mususa 2012).
Rising political opposition in mining towns, 2000–2011
Mining towns responded to the invasion by transnational corporations with a turn from the ruling MMD party to the Patriotic Front opposition. In 1996, the Copperbelt had voted for the Movement for Multi-party Democracy with 81.94% of votes cast, but, in 2001, the MMD only drew 38.01% of votes; in 2011 26.22%; and in 2015 just 0.91%. In 2001, residents searched for alternatives and gave 61% of their votes to 10 different opposition parties. It eventually became the Patriotic Front that won the hearts and minds in the urban and industrial centres. This success can be illustrated with the case of the Wusakile mine township in Kitwe, which increased its support for the Patriotic Front from 17.47% in 2001 to 73.17% in 2006, and up to 83.09% in 2015 (ECZ 2015). These developments are set out in Table 1.
| Year | Political and economic events | Election results in Kitwe, Wusakile mine townshipa | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1991 (MMD) | |||
| 1996 | |||
| 2001 | |||
| 2006 | |||
| 2008 | |||
| 2011 (PF) | |||
| 2015 | |||
| 2016 |
Note:
aVotes shown in percentages (%); upward ↑ and downward ↓ trend as compared to previous elections; political parties: UNIP (United National Independence Party), MMD (Movement for Multi-party Democracy), PF (Patriotic Front), UPND (United Party for National Development), ZDC (Zambia Democratic Congress), and HP (Heritage Party); results from the Electoral Commission of Zambia, accessed January 11, 2016. https://www.elections.org.zm/past_election_results.php.
Mineworkers and union officials condemned the MMD government for its implicit alliance with foreign investors: state leaders seemed to tolerate and authorise low wages and bad working conditions because they were blinded by gifts, bribes and donations. The state failed to redistribute mineral benefits to mine communities; it lacked the capacity to monitor and enforce regulations on labour, health, safety and environment. Miners considered their industrial production, work discipline, and tax payment as part of a reciprocal commitment: they fulfilled their duty, but the government neglected its responsibilities of care and concern. As a NUMAW branch secretary commented, ‘You work hard; the government gets a lot, you remain with nothing’ (Interview 2, January 4, 2012). The MUZ president criticised the imposition of wage ceilings:
For a long time, miners were subjected to oppression under the MMD government. They were never given a free bargaining atmosphere because the government always protected the corporations. The corporations were advised many times by the government not to go beyond a certain threshold. (Streetnewsservice, November 7, 2011)
The veteran politician Michael Sata had formed the Patriotic Front in 2000 and conducted a pro-poor, working-class, resource nationalist campaign (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010; Larmer and Fraser 2007; Lungu 2009). The Patriotic Front took up miners’ concerns and promised to raise salaries, increase the minimum wage, improve working conditions and safety standards, reduce wage taxes, revise the labour laws, end outsourcing and casual labour, create jobs, replace foreigners with Zambians and respect the independence of trade unions. The party declared war on foreign investors, especially ‘Chinese colonialism’, and demanded that Zambians received a greater share of the country’s mineral wealth. When Konkola miners went on strike in 2005, Sata boasted of having ‘incited’ the illegal strike. He told a Post reporter that he was ready to get arrested for the workers’ cause, and promised to bring back the ‘militancy’ from the colonial past (The Post, July 22, 2005).
With its populist campaign rhetoric, the Patriotic Front represented miners’ imagination of an ideal government. In 2010/11, the MUZ and NUMAW leadership openly called for political change (The Post, May 3, 2010 and July 8, 2011). A number of union branch and shop-floor leaders mobilised support as party members or local Patriotic Front branch representatives. A few ran for ward posts, while (ex-) MUZ leader Mbulu ran for a parliamentary seat. One MUZ chairman at 15MCC, a Chinese contracting company in Chambishi, explained:
We were using the company buses from the plant to the komboni [compound], you know, shouting PF [Patriotic Front] slogans, singing, dancing in the vehicles of the company […] with my strong voice to say, ‘Gentlemen, you have the right, this is your time, and what we are longing is to change!’ (Interview 4, November 21, 2011)
Strike wave with government backing and union mobilising, 2011
The opposition victory turned Zambia’s industrial order upside down. The annual collective bargaining started just one week after Michael Sata’s inauguration. Miners were confident that the new government would back their demands and protect them from being discharged for strike activity. They expected wage raises about 20, 40, or 50%, while the two previous years had brought an average of 11–12% at an inflation rate of 7.4% (Interview 8, November 7, 2011). Workers started the first strike at the Chinese state-owned NFCA, Sino Metals and Chambishi Copper Smelter. The strikers got support from former MUZ president Mbulu who, in his new position as Labour Deputy Minister, directed the management to increase the salaries to the same level as Konkola mine, which represented a rise of 2 million Zambian kwacha (k2 million; US$380) (Simuusa 2011). Yet the Chinese awarded only US$38, and workers went back on strike. NFCA dismissed about 2000 employees, but reinstated them after a meeting with the new Mines Minister Wylbur Simuusa. The Mines and Labour Ministries also directed Grinaker and Luanshya to reinstate fired workers. The political support encouraged workers to protest in more than 20 other mining companies. As the MUZ organising secretary and Patriotic Front city councillor for Chambishi explained, ‘Now strikes are allowed’ (Interview 9, November 17, 2011).
Even the mining unions felt secure enough to let their members protest. The new MUZ president made an unusually militant announcement: ‘We have already started negotiating with the mines, and if they do not take heed then there is ground for a legal strike’ (Streetnewsservice, November 7, 2011). Zambia had never had a legal strike, but branch officials were occasionally involved in organising their members. Such a strike with unofficial union mobilising took place in Kitwe in January 2012.
Zambia’s largest private employer, Mopani Copper Mines, ended the negotiations with 12% and threatened to fire the entire workforce should the unions refuse (Interview 10, May 12, 2013). Branch officials informed their shop stewards, and they got angry. A branch chairman suggested going into the plant and letting members decide for themselves – he knew very well that members had been infuriated by the four previous agreements. As soon as workers heard the 12% news, they started marching to the central shaft, chanted protest slogans, and demanded to meet the CEO. Meanwhile, the branch chairperson communicated with MUZ head office, and a few national leaders expressed support – ‘Let’s go on strike!’ As Labour Minister Chishimba Kambwili was on the Copperbelt, the branch chairman decided to call him. Kambwili was willing to meet the miners, so branch and shop-floor leaders from all four unions mobilised their members to march to the company headquarters, including the union for nurses in mine hospitals. The Minister addressed the strikers, ‘I can agree with you that the 12% salary rise is too low. I have given management at MCM up to Wednesday next week to come up with a better pay rise’ (Zambia Daily Mail, January 29, 2012). After that ministerial visit, the management raised the offer to 17%.
Political U-turn: from inciting strike action to disciplining workers, 2012–2017
President Sata was far from pleased with his minister’s confrontational way of dealing with investors. Labour Minister Kambwili had instructed other companies to convert short-term contracts into pensionable employment; threatened to close the Chinese 15MCC if conditions of services did not improve; and ordered the cancellation of the work permit of the chief medical officer at the Chinese mine hospital (Interview 4, January 24, 2012). After these incidents, President Sata imposed more diplomatic and moderate conduct on his staff:
As a government, we have to be level-headed and not be seen to be inciting the public. I expect ministers to discourage strikes and lockouts. Strikes or industrial unrests have a very negative effect on a fragile economy like ours. (The Post, February 5, 2012)
The U-turn took place under pressure from Cabinet members and mining companies. The Zambia Federation of Employers had complained that ministers dictated wage increases and acted as labour inspectors (Masupha 2011). The three-week strike in the Chinese NFCA mine had already sparked a debate in Parliament – it was the longest strike of the past 20 years (or more). Some MPs worried about the loss in revenue, and both the mines and labour ministers had to justify their involvement. Mines Minister Simuusa clarified: they had neither pressurised companies to pay salaries above k3000 (US$570), nor encouraged workers to protest. He emphasised:
There are no PF cadres who are instigating workers to agitate for salary increments […] In fact, I can confirm that it is the Opposition, Hon. Members, who are trying to make the PF government look irresponsible by inciting workers. (Simuusa 2011)
The government decision to prevent strikes was enforced in the following months. Vice President Guy Scott reminded strikers at Kansanshi mine that ‘the strike was illegal and that the government would not defend those who would be disciplined’ (Zambia Weekly, January 13, 2012). Mopani and Kansanshi dismissed 23 striking workers; Africa’s biggest copper producer even sued the local Patriotic Front chairman and district secretary of the ZCTU for having induced a second strike (Zambia Weekly, March 30, 2012).
The public sector experienced the same disciplining. The Ministry of Health induced the dismissal of 594 nurses who went on unauthorised strike in December 2013. When the ZCTU announced mass demonstrations over the fired nurses and the public sector wage freeze for 2014 and 2015, Labour Minister Shamenda warned the ZCTU general secretary Roy Mwaba: ‘What he is saying is basically a threat to an elected government. Mwaba should not incite the public to turn against this government’ (Zambia Weekly, March 30, 2012).
The apparatus of authority was even further enforced with the coming of yet another economic crisis. The opposition victory had coincided with an all-time high copper price, which had jumped from US$1847/t in 2000 to US$8871/t in 2011, only to decline to 4916 in 2016 (US Geological Survey 2016). Mineral production was affected by electricity deficits and falling demands from China and the Eurozone debt crisis. In 2015, about 5000 miners were retrenched at Mopani, Konkola, Chibuluma, and Chambishi Metals, as MUZ research assistant director Yewa Kumwenda explained to me on January 18, 2016. The new Zambian president Edgar Lungu5 and Mines Minister Christopher Yaluma justified the redundancies: they were ‘the only way’ to save the mining industry; it would be ‘irresponsible’ to ‘dictate’ that the mines keep their workforce (The Post, October 31 and November 17, 2015). During the mass retrenchment, President Lungu called upon workers to be ‘patient’, ‘remain calm’, and accept ‘sacrifices’ (The Post, October 31, 2015; Daily Nation, October 31, 2015; ZNBC, November 4, 2015) – an appeal miners knew too well from the previous MMD government, which had authorised the wage freeze and retrenchment of 9516 workers in 2009 (Muchimba 2010, 16). The government’s lack of action was criticised by the MUZ president and new ZCTU chairman Nkole Chishimba, but President Lungu only suspected a conspiracy to remove him from office (The Post, September 15 and November 2 and 3, 2015).
The economic crisis also brought efforts to collect higher taxes from the corporations to a standstill: the government had increased the mineral royalty rates in 2015 and confiscated the value added tax on copper exports in 2013/14, but backpedalled in the face of investors’ threats to leave the country, close the mines, withdraw corporate social responsibility programmes, halt expansion projects, and take the Zambia Revenue Authority to court.6
The Patriotic Front party had taken office with a leftist, resource nationalist agenda, but stumbled at the state’s limited actual ability to regulate the activities of transnational corporations. On top of that, the ruling party got caught up in a struggle for its own political survival. Despite the setbacks, the government kept a few promises: it exempted low wageworkers from paying personal income tax (on monthly incomes of less than k3000 in 2013) and, by the end of 2015, issued a statutory instrument to discourage casual employment. We are yet to see the effect.
Performance of the mining unions, 2000–2016
The mining boom after 2000 brought an increase in production, investment, and employment, but union membership has not kept pace. Copper output rose from the historic low of 241,200t in 2000 to 763,805t in 2013 and about 755,000t in 2016 (Lusaka Times, April 26, 2017). The industry recruited more workers than ever – nearly 74,000 in 2013, compared to 35,042 in 2000 (Muchimba 2010, 21). The MUZ had 24,735 members in 2000, but, 13 years later, three mining unions shared 39,000 members and, in 2016, only 30,000. MUZ membership varied between 18,300 in 2010, 23,000 in 2013, and below 17,000 in 2016. The MUZ lost many workers to the breakaway NUMAW and UMUZ unions, which emerged as a result of grassroots revolts in 2003 and 2010. NUMAW gained 12–13,000 members in its 10 years, while UMUZ had around 3,000 members in 2014.
The unionisation rate diminished drastically due to the outsourcing and casualisation of labour. This can be demonstrated in the case of Mopani Copper Mines, Zambia’s largest private employer (see Table 2). Since the Swiss-based Glencore bought the mines in 2000, it doubled employment from 10,655 to 20,718 in 2014.7 Yet 91% of the new staff were hired on a contract basis. In 2001, MUZ members represented 87% of the direct employees and 69% of the total workforce. In 2014, however, 77.5% of the direct employees belonged to four different unions, while only 35% of the total workforce was unionised.
| Employees at Mopani Copper Mines (in Kitwe and Mufulira) | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2001 | 2014 | |
| Full employment | 10,655 | 20,718 |
| Direct employees | 8,472 | 9,343 |
| Contract workers | 2,183 | 11,375 |
| Unionised membersa | 7,365 | 7,245 |
| MUZ | 7,365 | 4,668 |
| NUMAW (formed 2003) | 1,518 | |
| UMUZ (formed 2010; had 1150 in April 2013) | 852 | |
| ZUNO (formed 2007 for nurses in mine hospitals) | 207 | |
| Unionisation rate among direct employees | 86.9% | 77.5% |
| Unionisation rate among all workers | 69.1% | 35% |
Zambia’s 12 biggest mines had 67,720 employees in 2014, but a majority of 35,423 were on contract (Sikamo 2014a). As Lee (2014) observed correctly, Chinese state-owned mines offered lower wages, but more employment security; while multinational commodity traders, potentially offering higher salaries and better conditions of services, employed more casual and contract workers, and repeatedly dismissed large numbers of employees. The Chinese investors had started with no domestic experience of autonomous unions or collective bargaining, but improved labour relations gradually (see also Hairong and Sautman 2013).
The gross salaries varied considerably and ranged from k1449 to 15,147 monthly in 2016 (US$275–2878). Table 3 summarises the recent pay rises in the 13 biggest mines, but it should be remembered that these cover only direct employees. The average gross salary for an underground miner was k4659 per month (US$885).8
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average salary increment (%)a | 17.4 | 10.8 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 3 |
| Inflation (CPI) (%) | 7.3 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 21.1 | 7.5 |
| Copper price (US$/t) | 8,015 | 7,322 | 6,862 | 5,494 | 4,916 |
| Copper production (mt) | 697,910 | 763,805 | 712,320 | 711,515 | 750,000 |
Note:
a Average annual pay rises of 13 biggest mining companies (Yewa Kumwenda, MUZ research assistant director, February 2, 2017).
The opposition victory brought the biggest achievement between 2007 and 2016: workers struck an average wage increase of 17.4% at an inflation rate of 7.3%. Yet 2013 and 2014 brought the same meagre results as 2010 and 2011, 11–12% rises at 7.4% inflation. The following crisis led to wage freezes for 2016, as did the global crunch in 2009. A collection of bargaining agreements with Mopani Copper Mines reveals only minimal achievement: from 2000 to 2016, the average annual salary increment of 14.1% only balanced the inflation rate of 13.3%.
The change from MMD to Patriotic Front government brought no higher bargaining results. The unions were very disappointed at the loss of political support. A NUMAW shop steward explained, ‘There is no one who can talk for us now’ (Interview 12, April 17, 2013). The MUZ general treasurer agreed: ‘The government doesn't help us […] You need to push on your own’ (Interview 13, April 23, 2013).
Two major goals of the unions were to raise all salaries above k3000 (US$570) and convert contract jobs to permanent and pensionable ones. The unions achieved further improvements in housing allowances, medical assistance and education assistance, as well as funeral grants for employees and registered dependants.
Union officials acknowledged their weak performance. They attributed this to external economic and political factors in combination with internal organisational shortcomings. The primary rational explanation was companies’ financial and operational difficulties; they were de facto not able to meet miners’ demands. Second, investors and the government were more powerful and not willing to grant higher wages. And third, the unions lacked financial resources as well as access to company-specific operating and financial data.
Negotiations take place in a battlefield of knowledge: while international aid agencies accuse companies of accumulating exorbitant profits, companies portray themselves as barely surviving. The burden of proof lies with the unions. Yet, their access to company data is restricted and they face better-qualified degree holders at the bargaining table. The unions lack accurate information to challenge management statistics on profit, production, export, investment, liabilities and operating costs.
Since independence, the mining unions have never announced and authorised a strike. The formal procedures for a legal strike are complicated and take long: the unions needed to declare a dispute, engage a conciliator, conduct a strike ballot, and give the Labour Minister 10 days to settle the dispute (Industrial and Labour Relations Act, Cap 269). It so happened that the last strike ballots date back to colonial times, in 1952 and 1954 (Bates 1971 , 55, 108; Larmer 2007, 33). In 2012, the unions refused to accept a bargaining offer from Kansanshi and First Quantum and took the dispute to the Industrial Relations Court. Yet MUZ and NUMAW ended up owing almost k900,000 to the lawyer (US$171,000), which forced MUZ to sell some of its property.
With no right to strike, no money to sue companies, and no evidence to support higher wage claims, the unions are left to prevent their members from striking illegally. In my case study, branch and shop-floor representatives of all three unions (MUZ, NUMAW and UMUZ) saw their responsibility as ‘educating’ members to work hard and make ‘reasonable’ pay claims. They warned workers that a protest would be at their own risk and the union could not defend them. They developed tactics to ‘calm down’ workers should they get ‘angry’ and were about to ‘overreact’.
Between 2005 and 2016, the mining industry experienced four or five wildcat strikes every single year – except for the bargaining season after the opposition victory, with 23 strikes. Work stoppages occurred more frequently in Chinese mines and at contracting companies. Most strikes brought additional wage increases, but also a few dismissals.
The breakaway of NUMAW (2003) and UMUZ (2010)
The unions were harshly criticised by their members, who expected pay rises of about 20 or 30%. They took increments below 15% as an indication of corruption and unfair distribution of profit: union, company, and government officials seemed to get rich at the expense of poor miners who worked hard, risked their lives, ruined their health, and had paid taxes and union subscriptions. From the perspective of many workers, the unions were ‘useless’, did ‘nothing’ but ‘exploit’ them and ‘steal’ their money. They characterised national officials and branch chairpersons as driving fancy cars, building big houses, buying farms, and earning four times as much as their members. Unions ‘imposed’ and ‘dictated’ meagre bargaining results and ‘lied’ about the companies’ financial position.
Members expressed their criticism through insults, elections, wildcat strikes, and the formation of splinter unions. At the recent branch elections in Kitwe and Mufulira in 2012 and 2014, miners elected 47 new officials and re-elected only 19 executives for a second term. An underground miner explained the vote for new MUZ branch leaders: ‘We wanted to change the union. People wanted to remove that old union and put the new one […] There were too much, in short, too much criminals in that old union’ (Interview 1, 11 April 2013).
Members’ long-term frustration led to NUMAW’s breakaway in 2003 and UMUZ’s in 2010. NUMAW was initiated by MUZ members at Konkola and Mopani Copper Mines who criticised the union for having accepted poor retirement packages, being ‘compromised’, and ‘failing to represent them adequately’. NUMAW met a lot of resistance from the government and had to enforce its registration by the court. The MMD government had treated the union as ‘enemy’, as National Secretary Goodwell Kaluba explained (Interview 14, November 23, 2011).
All unions participate in the annual negotiations, which are decentralised and company based. Workers saw little improvement with the coming of NUMAW and their anger increased with the wage freeze and mass retrenchment in 2009. During the negotiations for 2010, some miners in Mufulira petitioned against the unions and demanded to be represented by an independent body, such as professional lawyers. Yet Mopani dismissed them over causing industrial unrest (Interview 7, April 1, 2013). A few months later, workers elected new branch officials for MUZ, and three of the election winners decided to break away from the establishment.
In this way, the new UMUZ was formed by three MUZ branch officials in Mufulira in 2010 who had scored a massive win at the MUZ elections and decided to realise their vision of revival with a new union (Interviews 15, 16, 17, December 20, 2011 and January 19, 2012). Their main concern was business ventures: since 1998, MUZ has taken up some of the welfare services previously provided by the parastatal company. It engaged business partners that provided loans and sold food and other basic commodities on credit. Workers condemned these business ventures as ‘exploitation’ because the union’s mealie-meal was more expensive than that in the supermarket, and loan interest rates higher than at commercial banks. The UMUZ founders saw their main mandate in reducing these food prices and interest rates. The second reason for the split-off was the allegation that MUZ barred branch leaders who were ‘vocal’, ‘tough’, and ‘strong’ by reporting them to the management and seeing to it that that those people were fired. The UMUZ founder, Steve Mulenga, believed that he had fallen victim to such dirty tricks in the past: Mulenga had been a shop steward for MUZ in 1991/92, when he started a pressure group and was suspended from work for five months. Mulenga thought that it was MUZ and the Intelligence Service that had initiated his suspension. Nineteen years later, when Mulenga won the branch elections, he felt that MUZ was planning to cause his dismissal once again because he was a ‘trouble man’. In addition to these two main concerns, the UMUZ founders denounced MUZ and NUMAW as ‘corrupt’ and ‘anti-democratic’: it was alleged that they took bribes from management and business partners, appropriated union funds, violated the union constitution, and many interviewees voiced the allegation that the MUZ president only managed to win office because he had bought the votes (Interview 15, December 20, 2011).
The three UMUZ founders designed a constitution and standing orders in secrecy until they received the certificate of registration from the Labour Commissioner. In 2011, they signed the first recognition agreements with Mopani and Konkola and recruited 2100 members. They opened business ventures, rented an office in Mufulira town centre, purchased desks, computers, mobile phones, three vehicles, and held their first national elections.
Mineworkers had mixed feelings about the formation of yet another union. A technician explained his change from MUZ to UMUZ:
The initial union that was there wasn’t in favour of the people, and too much bribery. So we wanted that union to be gotten rid of so that this very new union that has come in can take over. (Interview 18, December 21, 2011)
These unions are there to pocket, enrich themselves only. They are not looking at the plight of the essential worker or the taxpayer, they don’t look at it. That’s why you’ve seen more and more unions being formed here in Zambia every day because of the same; because they have seen, this is the only way you can make quick money. (Interview 19, January 7, 2012).
The UMUZ formation was driven primarily by frustration with the dominant unions and a genuine concern for living conditions in mine communities. At the same time, however, the UMUZ founders sought to build political careers and dreamt of becoming a Member of Parliament one day. They considered leadership as a calling from God, and they were born with that gift. The UMUZ founder Steve Mulenga was pastor at a Pentecostal church. The general secretary (and succeeding union president), Wisdom Ngwira, had formed a branch of the opposition party Patriotic Front in Chingola in 2000, together with Chishimba Kambwili. UMUZ leaders were strong opposition supporters at the time of union registration under the MMD government. When the Patriotic Front took office in 2011, the UMUZ chairman held occasional phone calls with President Sata (Interview 15, December 20, 2011). The union’s first general treasurer, Pride Lombe, stood for mayor of Mufulira as Rainbow Party candidate in 2016.
Effects of the multi-union environment
The multi-union environment opened career opportunities for representatives who had already served two terms or were voted out of office. One prominent case was a MUZ branch chairman who was not re-elected and was then offered a position with UMUZ. He became UMUZ branch official, trustee, national treasurer and, in the local government elections in 2016, ward councillor with the ruling Patriotic Front party. The chairman’s behaviour was condemned by MUZ head officials as ‘self-centred’: he seemed to be one of these ‘few individuals’ who were just looking to ‘enrich themselves’ and ‘benefit’ from the organisation. NUMAW experienced a shock when its founding president Mundia Sikufele had completed his two terms and took up employment as MUZ’s director for organising. NUMAW leaders considered his defection a betrayal, commenting:
He is not principled. He’s jealous and just looking for something to put food on his wives’ tables […] These guys have a self-gain motive in their joining a union. Sadly, where two or more elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. (Interview 20, March 17, 2014)
The breakaway unions were not more militant. In contrast to the South African AMCU, which became popular as a strike-leading union (Sinwell and Mbatha 2016), the UMUZ founders emphasised that they did not mean to ‘cause industrial unrest’ or ‘destabilise the mines’. One UMUZ shop steward even supported his disapproval of strikes with reference to the Bible: ‘In God’s organisation, God doesn’t need protest […] Philippians 2:14 says, “Do not complain or dispute or argue; work first, accept what is being offered.”’ (Interview 21, March 22, 2013).
Since the unions failed to satisfy their members with wage settlements, some branches launched new initiatives to demonstrate material benefits. They offered funeral assistance and honoured retirees with a bicycle. Some distributed free mealie-meal to the plant so that workers could cook their own lunch. UMUZ announced that it would construct employee housing – so far only a wishful dream given the union’s indebtedness. In 2016, MUZ took a loan from the Development Bank of Zambia and constructed a milling plant in order to produce and sell maize meal at a low price.
Recent branch elections involved heavy campaigns, with candidates trying to win members over with money, food and drinks. Given the precarious employment context, a few individual members built informal, clientelist relationships with branch chairpersons by asking for money for food, transport or school fees for their children. Most chairpersons felt obliged to assist with small amounts, such as 10, 20, 50, or even 100 kwacha (US$2–20).
Contested leadership: of hostages and a vote of no confidence
The presence of multiple unions did not strengthen their bargaining power (see Table 4). Since Mopani and Konkola miners have been represented by three or four unions, they received salary increments of 8.6% (MCM) and 6% (KCM), while the average annual inflation rate was 10.2% between 2012 and 2016. It must be noted, however, that this decline in real wages took place in times of falling copper prices, from US$8.8/t in 2011 to US$4.9/t in 2016 (Nickel 2016).
| 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Konkola Copper Mines (Vedanta, Britain-India) | 17 | 7.5 | 0 | k500 (5–6%) | 0 |
| Mopani Copper Mines (Glencore, Switzerland) | 17 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 0 |
| Inflation (CPI) | 7.3 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 21.1 | 7.5 |
Note: the table shows bargaining results between Zambia’s two largest private employers and three/four unions (MUZ, NUMAW, UMUZ, and ZUNO – the union for nurses at Mopani hospitals).
As the expectations of the new UMUZ and the newly elected MUZ and NUMAW branches did not materialise, conflicts erupted between the shop-floor and the bargaining team. When branch chairpersons at Mopani came back with 8% for 2014, shop stewards held them hostage for hours. They demanded the resignation of the branch chairpersons of all four unions (MUZ, NUMAW, UMUZ and the Zambia Union of Nurses Organisation) and the national MUZ president who chaired the negotiations. A MUZ shop steward reported, ‘We became furious; so we wanted to beat the president and these Executive because we suspected them that maybe they were given something by Mopani management’ (Interview 22, December 5, 2013). Another UMUZ branch official emphasised:
All we want is for these guys to resign their positions. They have failed us and they don’t represent us well. Negotiations are not proceeding normally, so we would like, if anything, ourselves, we are prepared to meet the CEO, Danny Callow, he will listen to us and give us what we want, not these branch officials. (The Post, November 29, 2013)
Conclusion: mining and contentious politics
In this article, I discussed how the formation of splinter unions and the change from MMD to Patriotic Front government affected the bargaining power of organised labour. Unfortunately, the opposition victory and the presence of multiple unions brought miners only one successful bargaining period. Since then, from 2013 to 2017, their real wages declined in line with the falling copper price.
It was the third time that Zambian mineworkers had helped a political party to power, but the alliance turned out to be another bad marriage. Workers had joined Zambia’s United National Independence Party (1964), MMD (1991) and Patriotic Front (2011) because they expected support in their fight for higher wages and improved living conditions. Yet, despite militant election campaigns, the state cut off their strike powers and left them at the mercy of large corporations. The initial popularity of the new Patriotic Front government in combination with an economic crisis secured union compliance and docility: the mining unions accepted the same oppressive behaviour from the Patriotic Front which they had harshly condemned as ‘misbehaviour’ by the previous MMD. The official narrative that national development depended on industrial peace, and the moral condemnation of strikes as being criminal, uncivilised and economically damaging served to strengthen corporate power and disempower workers.
Mining towns felt ‘terribly betrayed’ by the party they brought to power in 2011, but still mobilised support for the Patriotic Front at the 2015 and 2016 elections, only to prevent the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) from seizing power. The founder of the UPND, Anderson Mazoka, had been managing director for Anglo American Corporation, one of the world’s largest mining companies, and his successor, Hakainde Hichilema, had served as a business consultant and group leader in the privatisation. Mineworkers look forward to changing the government again, but do not want to entrust their fate to a capitalist leadership.
As mineworkers kept changing their labour and political leaders, the hegemony of corporate power seemed to persist. Regulating the activities of transnational corporations was a huge challenge. The Zambian state took many steps forward and many steps backwards. We need more empirical research on these struggles between state agencies and foreign corporations, such as Dan Haglund (2010) started; research carried out in labour ministries, in mine ministries, safety departments, the workers’ compensation fund, environmental agencies and revenue authorities.
The multi-union environment had ambivalent consequences. Distrust made the unions more vulnerable to manipulation and intimidation by both politicians and corporations. At times rival unions spent more energy denouncing each other than offering resistance to the management. The competition for members brought the unions to take over welfare functions, but recent investment projects may as well indicate a shift to business unionism. In this regard, Zambian unions display similar tendencies to those in the South African labour movement: in both countries, we can observe leaders’ career ambitions, antagonism between leaders and the rank and file, followed by worker opposition and grassroots militancy (Beresford 2012; Botiveau 2015; Buhlungu 2013; Sinwell and Mbatha 2016). In the Zambian case, pluralism increased the pressure for financial accountability, but did not deepen democratic leadership: actual democracy would require the unions to conduct strike ballots.
One might discuss practical recommendations to strengthen workers’ power. More pressure is needed on the companies to provide the unions with financial statistics ahead of the collective bargaining. Furthermore, the secrecy around the negotiations makes workers wonder whether it is management, government, or union representatives who deny them proper salaries. To build trust, the unions could distribute financial reports to ordinary members and inform them during the proceedings, even though this is prohibited by the management. The unions’ weakest point is their commitment to ‘industrial harmony’. I believe the unions should render support to striking workers: they could mount public pressures on the companies and the government to avoid or rescind dismissals of strikers; and strikers should return to work only if the management assures that all striking workers will remain employed. To build a united front against company threats, workers may launch a public campaign, engage a petition website, and align themselves with non-governmental organisations, church leaders, the media, business leaders, local politicians and international activists.
While this article documented the unions’ weak bargaining power, it acknowledges that the contestation over mining rose tremendously on the national level. Since 2007, corporations have been facing increased pressure from churches, environmental organisations, opposition politicians, media representatives and researchers. Villagers and activists took companies to court,9 while the government increased the mining corporations' annual contribution to total tax revenue from less than 1% in the period 2000 to 2008, to between 12 and 20% in 2010–14.10 The unions are a major, driving force in the broader development of contentious politics (Uzar 2017).