Introduction
Political theorists writing on democracy often emphasise the crucial importance of a peaceful transfer of power through ‘fair elections’ at ‘regular intervals’ and ‘without excluding any social group’ (Lipset 1995, iv). However, in Somaliland, although elections have been generally considered as legitimate, a pattern of rescheduling them has consolidated. At times political opposition and civil society organisations in Somaliland, as well as the international community (European Union 2017; U.S. Mission to Somalia 2017), have protested against such delays, considering them to constitute a serious setback for democratisation because they breach the term limits stipulated in the constitution. The decisions resulting in the rescheduling of the elections also reflect some of the difficulties faced by the political actors when seeking to reconcile the distribution and separation of powers between political institutions and the state leadership. Perhaps most eloquently, the repeated delays demonstrate the extensive political influence of Somaliland legislature’s upper house, the House of Elders (Golaha Guurtida, or the Guurti), and its close relationship with the republic’s executive, the president’s office. However, at the same time, the absence of any severe political crisis in spite of the decisions that prolong parliamentary and presidential terms has shown the robustness of Somaliland’s political system and its ability to maintain stability. This is remarkable considering the local circumstances and the inhospitable surrounding political environment in which the state in Somaliland emerged more than two decades ago.
Democratic transition and political institutions
In the early 1990s, the Somali National Movement (SNM) rebel movement and the elders in charge of clan organisations came together to establish political institutions for Somaliland, whose territories by then were mostly under control of the SNM security forces. Somaliland’s political institutions are an intriguing mix of modern state structures and local forms of administration. Essentially, they are a result of an agreement between the leadership of the local SNM leadership exercising coercive power, and civil society leaders considered as legitimate in their representation of the general population. The democratic transition began in the early 2000s when a concerted attempt to convert the state-run, clan-based, power-sharing system into a democratic government was initiated. A national referendum on the constitution, which was conducted ‘openly, fairly, honestly, and largely in accordance with internationally recognised election procedure’ (Initiative & Referendum Institute 2001, 55) on 31 May 2001, jump-started the transition. Indicative of this process, a presidential election took place in April 2003 (Bradbury 2003) and was again held in June 2010 according to the six-year presidential term limit stipulated in the constitution. The 2017 presidential election was initially to take place in March but the House of Elders decided to postpone it for six months owing to difficult drought conditions (“Somaliland’s House of Elders” 2017).
However, the repeated rescheduling of parliamentary elections has become a bigger concern among observers (U.S. Mission to Somaliland 2017). The first election of the House of Representatives was scheduled to take place in May 2002. Yet, the House of Elders postponed it first for one year, then in March 2003 for two years and finally in May 2005 until September of that year when the election eventually took place. The next parliamentary election scheduled for September 2010 was again postponed first to June 2015 and then controversially until 28 April 2019, along with the municipal election (“Somaliland’s House of Elders” 2017), emphasising security concerns and the unpreparedness of the National Election Commission (NEC), although, at the same time, the NEC was successfully able to administer the presidential vote in November 2017. A longstanding pattern in which the House of Elders recurrently postpones elections, particularly in the case of the House of Representatives, has consolidated. On each occasion of rescheduling, it has cited Article 42(3) of the Somaliland constitution.1 According to Barnes and Elder (2015), the real issues behind the latest decision, however, appear to be the ruling Kulmiye’s (Peace, Unity, and Development Party) succession for presidency, which affects Guurti’s close relationship with the president’s office, conflicts between the executive and the House of Representatives, and divisions between the two opposition parties UCID (Justice and Welfare Party) and Waddani.
Meanwhile, the 82-member House of Elders represents Somaliland’s much-celebrated ‘hybrid’ type of political system. An upper house of the Somaliland parliament initially formed by clan elders in the 1993 Borama Conference, it functions as a traditional forum for negotiation that arbitrates and seeks consensus to overcome divisions among the political elite. The Guurti has been a key institution in mitigating inter-clan and sub-sectional conflicts of interest in a peaceful manner in spite of contradictions in the democratic process.
Given its track record, it has become clear that the House of Elders has become the political institution that has proved most resistant to democratisation. Although Article 58(2) of Somaliland’s constitution stipulates the term limit for its representatives to be six years,2 in March 2003 the president’s office advanced two bills allowing an extension of Guurti’s mandate. These were subsequently voted on and passed by the House of Representatives. Since then, Guurti’s mandate ‘must always expire one year after that of the House of the Representatives and that of the President’.3 This, however, means that, by a collective decision to postpone elections and prolong the mandate of the lower house and/or the incumbent president, the members of the House of Elders can extend their own term in office. The Guurti has done just that by extending its own mandate (from 2003 to 2006, then to 2009, 2011, 2013, 2017, and most recently to 2020) through repeated rescheduling of the parliamentary election. As a result, many members of the House of Elders have been in office since 1993, while others have inherited seats from deceased representatives of their respective clan families. The Guurti, therefore, remains as Somaliland’s main non-elected political institution with extensive powers and influence.
In spite of challenges and recurrent delays in the democratic process, Somaliland’s political institutions have been remarkably successful in maintaining stability. This is largely due to their legitimacy, which is a product of the mixed bottom-up and top-down process of state-building in which authoritative representatives of society have been crucially present. Following a successful constitutional referendum in May 2001, the political leadership embraced a multi-party democratic system in which three official political parties are allowed. A high level of popular political engagement and admission of a relatively elevated degree of plurality have maintained a stronger sense of ownership of political institutions than in some of the more authoritarian neighbouring countries. This has allowed the institutions to consolidate to the extent that even the Guurti’s recurrent rescheduling of elections has not significantly undermined their overall authority and legitimacy in spite of occasional protests.
The 2017 presidential election
By and large, Somaliland’s elections have been described as free and fair, although a number of them have not reached the level of fully complying with international standards. The political scene has been dominated by the majority Isaaq clan and its sub-sections, while sub-clans of Dir (e.g. Gadabursi and Issa mainly in western areas) and Darod (e.g. Harti and namely its Dhulbahante sub-section mainly in eastern territories) inhabiting peripheral areas and constituting minorities in Somaliland have gained less representation in national political institutions. Some voices among eastern groups, partly driven by the sentiment of marginalisation and lack of representation, have gone as far as to call for the region’s independence from Somaliland or integration with Puntland.
The 2017 presidential election took place on 13 November, and was conducted in a situation of high stakes. While Somaliland’s political leadership is facing increasing pressure to resolve the burning issue of the state’s lack of international recognition, it also needs to operate in a regional environment in which the war in Yemen has drawn the Gulf States to invest and build alliances in the Red Sea coastal countries in the Horn. While Somaliland’s strategically important Berbera port, which also serves landlocked Ethiopia, is upgraded by a United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based company DP World, Somaliland has also agreed on the UAE building a military base and operating Berbera airport. The leasing of the Berbera airport alone, for 25 years, brings Somaliland USD 1 billion in economic and social development projects.4 This development, largely a product of the Yemen conflict and Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s attempt to isolate Qatar, has boosted Hargeisa’s economic power and furthered polarisation between it and Mogadishu, which maintains warm relations with Qatar and Turkey. Consequently, the political dynamics of the Gulf rift allow the strengthening of Hargeisa’s call for independence and international recognition. They are also likely to offer lucrative economic opportunities for Somaliland’s new executive and the political and economic elite aligned with it.
In the election itself, a total number of 704,089 registered voters were eligible to participate (Hassan 2017) in more than 1600 polling stations. As has been the case in previous elections, the diaspora was again actively involved in financing candidates and seeking appointments and positions. The voting was generally peaceful in all Somaliland’s six regions in spite of some minor incidents that were not expected to affect the overall result. Indeed, an international observer mission described the election initially as ‘well-organised’, ‘peaceful’ and as ‘another progressive step’ (Electoral Observation Mission 2017) in the consolidation of democracy in Somaliland. According to the mission, there were no observed irregularities of the scale that would compromise the integrity of the election. Based on this assessment, some might conclude that the election stood in stark contrast with recent elections in Somaliland’s neighbourhood, namely Ethiopia in May 2015, Djibouti in April 2016, Somalia in October/November 2016 and February 2017, and Kenya in August 2017.
However, although voting itself went without major incidents, Waddani senior officials suspected the election officials of foul play and accused the ruling Kulmiye of fraud. The accusations centred on ballot stuffing and colluding with the company from the UAE in charge of printing election materials (“Opposition Claims Fraud” 2017). Following Waddani announcing the suspension of cooperation with the NEC until its grievances were addressed, riots by Waddani supporters broke out in which at least seven people died, many were injured and property belonging to Kulmiye notables was destroyed. While the army and police chief vowed to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of election violence, the NEC announced it would seek criminal charges against the Waddani officials who claimed false ballots had been used in the election (“Somaliland’s Army” 2017). According to the Waddani leader and presidential candidate, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Irro’, ‘The election was not free and fair … because members of our party representatives and supporters were arrested’ when ‘we found out that the election was massively corrupted and rigged’ (Olad 2017). Meanwhile, NEC Chairman Abdikadir Iman also held a press conference in which he denounced the claims of electoral fraud, dismissed the rumours regarding forged ballot papers and called on ‘all political parties to have confidence in the election and to continue their cooperation’ with the NEC (“National Electoral Commission” 2017). In response, Abdirahman ‘Irro’ and his party’s senior officials held a press conference in which they reversed Waddani’s position towards the NEC and stated the party’s willingness to resume negotiations to resolve the situation following the 16 November riots. In the course of 17 and 18 November, Waddani officials negotiated with the NEC and attempted to have the body to look into its claims of election irregularities and to recount votes in Somaliland’s all six electoral districts with special attention to Gabiley and Hargeisa where they especially claimed wrongdoing. However, the NEC eventually only agreed to recount the votes in Hargeisa, which the Waddani leadership reportedly accepted (“Somaliland Presidential Election Update” 2017).
Somaliland’s Presidential and Local Councils Elections Law gives the Chairman of the NEC the ultimate authority to announce provisional election results and resolution of vote disputes.5 However, on 23 April 2017, prior to the presidential election, the three parties and the NEC had signed a specific code of conduct which states that each party needs to agree on the results before the NEC declares the winner (“Political Parties” 2017). This strengthened Waddani’s ability to dispute the initially announced election result and resulted in the partial recount. Although the opposition’s protests and election-related violence in Hargeisa and Burao raised concerns of a possible political crisis, the negotiated solution and the following announcement of Waddani’s acceptance of the results after the partial recount on 21 November demonstrate the robustness of Somaliland’s democratic process.
Candidates and representation
Chairmen of the three official parties, Kulmiye, Waddani and UCID, contested the presidency. Eventually, the previous President of the Republic, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud ‘Silanyo’ (Kulmiye), hailing from Habar Jeclo sub-clan of the Isaaq, made way to his fellow co-founder of Kulmiye, Musa Bihi Abdi, after approximately seven years in office. Musa Bihi, the Chairman of Kulmiye since 2010 and a former air force officer and SNM member, won the election with 55.1% of the overall vote ahead of opposition candidates Abdirahman ‘Irro’ of Waddani (40.7%) and Faisal Ali Warabe from UCID (4.7%). The turnout was quoted as 80% (Shaban 2017).
Musa Bihi’s ascent to power had been expected. In November 2015, the leading Kulmiye had selected him as its presidential candidate. While hailing from the populous and economically powerful Sa’ad Muse section of Habr Awal6 sub-clan of the Isaaq, his deputy, Abdirahman Abdullahi Ismail ‘Saylici’, who won the second term in office, is a Gadabursi of Dir clan from Zeila in the Awdal region of western Somaliland. Musa Bihi’s expected victory provides continuity to the presidency and its close relationship with the Guurti. Although this relationship strengthens both institutions, it has the potential to provoke grievances among those in civil society and the opposition seeking further democratisation and may therefore undermine the state’s legitimacy in the long term. It may also fuel accusations of Kulmiye’s rent-seeking, corruption and nepotism (Lacobini de Fazio 2017).
The two candidates of opposition parties who contested state leadership were long-time opposition politicians Abdirahman ‘Irro’ (Waddani) and Faisal Ali Warabe (UCID). A Hargeisa-born politician from Habar Yoonis section of Garxajis sub-clan of the Isaaq, Abdirahman ‘Irro’ is the main founder and Chairman of Waddani and was officially nominated as the party’s presidential candidate in March 2017. Waddani contested the presidential election for the first time and this resulted in its being the main competitor against the dominant Kulmiye largely because of Abdirahman ‘Irro’’s large and powerful clan constituency. While drawing on the vote of those frustrated by the government, the Waddani vote was to an extent affected by the allegations of external influence based on its ties with Mogadishu and Abdirahman ‘Irro’’s insinuations that, if elected, he would cancel the strategic agreements with the UAE. The Speaker of the Somaliland Parliament until he stepped down in August owing to his presidential campaign, Abdirahman ‘Irro’ spent time in diaspora in Finland and later served as a deputy in UCID before falling out with its main founder, Faisal Ali Warabe. Abdirahman ‘Irro’’s vice-presidential running mate Mohamed Haji Ali Abdi hails from Gibril Yoonis section of Gadabursi sub-clan belonging to Dir. A recently returned exile politician, he is an academic and former ambassador to Belgium and the Netherlands (“Diplomat Vying for Wadani Party” 2015), and continues to be one of the leading politicians in Waddani.
Faisal Ali Warabe, an experienced veteran politician, contested the presidency for the third time. The main founder and Chairman of Somaliland’s oldest and only ideologically oriented party, the socialist UCID, he is a diaspora returnee from Finland who hails from Ciidagale section of Garxajis sub-clan of the Isaaq. Although Ali Warabe has been influential in Somaliland politics since 2001, he has a smaller clan constituency than his two rivals, which largely explains his third place and the minority share of the total vote. Ali Warabe was considered the best-performing candidate in the pre-election debate and adopted a less conventional, and seemingly more progressive and inclusive approach than his rivals. By maintaining UCID’s agenda to fight inequality and marginalisation, he sought to look beyond clan interests when seeking to gain support among the youth and chose Mohamed Musa Abyan as his running mate. Musa Abyan hails from the Jama Siyad section of Dhulbahante (belonging to Harti sub-clan of Darod) in the eastern Sool region, an area that Somaliland has long disputed with Puntland. Parts of the region have been less integrated into the state and there are voices critical of the Somaliland leadership. While appearing to seek further inclusiveness of the eastern territories in Somaliland politics, Warabe has also proposed the possibility of establishing a co-federation between Hargeisa and Mogadishu as a ‘two-states-two-capitals’ solution to overcoming Somaliland’s persistent lack of international recognition and Somalia’s perpetual crisis of statehood.
The swift resolution of election-related uncertainty enabled the new president Musa Bihi to assume office in a due manner. Although he co-founded Kulmiye and enjoys wide support within it, Musa Bihi has remained in the shadow of the more popular president ‘Silanyo’. Moreover, as the election result and the overall political climate indicate, his challengers, particularly Abdirahman ‘Irro’, were considered to have sufficient support to effectively contest the presidency. Although both candidates commanded significant support, Musa Bihi prevailed in part owing to Kulmiye’s ability to use its role as the governing party to capture the majority vote, which necessarily required a successful engagement with clan-based constituencies, Somaliland’s large youth population and among influential sections of the diaspora. Yet, by appointing few cabinet ministers from the diaspora, Bihi has sought to limit direct diaspora influence on the government (“Somaliland President” 2017). This has generated dissatisfaction among some diaspora elements.
The election result, and particularly Ali Warabe’s poorer than expected performance, therefore reaffirms the persisting importance of relative size and power of clans in Somaliland politics. Advocating for a social welfare state and denouncing clan-based politics did not work for UCID’s campaign as the party scored its worst election performance to date. Meanwhile, Kulmiye’s success in outdoing Waddani in spite of widespread discontent with its governance performance is largely due to the loyalty of its clan constituency as well as its ability to harbour sufficient support among the key voting sectors of the population.
Concluding remarks
The success of holding the presidential election in a reasonably democratic manner, and without major incidents causing significant political instability, has again demonstrated Somaliland’s relative political maturity in the highly volatile sub-region in which a number of its neighbouring states have few democratic credentials. The election result serves to consolidate Somaliland’s alliance with the UAE and the Saudi-led coalition waging war in Yemen, and solidify its statehood and claim for international recognition through these new partnerships.
With respect to domestic politics, the presidential election and the relatively peaceful transfer of power point to the commitment of maintaining strong state leadership through the relatively consolidated democratic process. It also offers an opportunity for the continued intimate relationship between the presidency and the Guurti in spite of concerns that this may encourage undemocratic conduct among Somaliland’s main political institutions. While such fears may be founded, they are often based on the understanding of democratic conduct according to Western ideals. According to such normative criteria on democratisation and the democratic process, the political culture and practices in Somaliland’s political system may not appear exemplary. Yet, the political institutions, especially the Guurti, have proved to be resilient and continue to enjoy widespread legitimacy, which mirrors the strong clan-based voting pattern in the 2017 presidential election.
At the same time, however, the election presented an opportunity to reach beyond clan affiliations in order to further strengthen national unity. In the presidential election, this opportunity was handed to the candidates who could demonstrate their commitment to an increased incorporation of representatives of marginalised minority groups at the highest echelons of Somaliland’s political system. Indeed, reflecting the approach of the candidates, and particularly that of Ali Warabe, the interests of minority clans in the margins of Somaliland need to be increasingly, visibly and legitimately represented in the political institutions in order to enhance the sense of ownership and democratic rule. This sense of ownership, in turn, promotes the sentiment of belonging and national unity, also facilitating the consolidation of Somaliland’s territorial claims in its eastern margins. Although the deputy president hails from western Somaliland, and Kulmiye received a significant number of votes in the country’s eastern parts, determining to what extent the incorporation of marginal regions and their populations was achieved in the election will require time.