Introduction
This article argues for government-led farmer commercialisation within a framework of intensive structural agrarian transformation (Moyo and Chambati 2013; Moyo and Yeros 2004). Although commercialisation is strongly associated with capitalist development, we argue that integration and participation of smallholder farmers in markets seem to be unavoidable. The nature of rural–urban international market relationships already places some farmers along the commercialisation trajectory. However, integration must be slow, controlled and regulated by the government to minimise exploitation (Amin 2012). This article uses data from two national household surveys to assess the degree to which commercialisation has been developing across both crops and regions since the Fast Track Land Reform programme (FTLRP).
This section provides a background to the impact of the FTLRP on the agrarian structure. The section that follows then discusses approaches to commercialisation for small farmers. Later, the article then examines the process of commercialisation and the approaches to the commercialisation of small farmers including an explanation of the Crop Commercialisation Index. Following that, the article presents Commercialisation Index values across farming types and ecological zones. We also measured the degree of commercialisation of the Input Commercial Index. Finally, we draw conclusions from our findings and discuss their policy implications.
The rights to control and exploit resources are at the centre of most political economy debates. Zimbabwean political economy has had its roots in the land since pre-independence, although additional issues arose especially after the 2000 FTLRP. National and international opinion has been polarised by the 38-year regime of ZANU–PF, mostly labelled as a huge failure that brought the once ‘bread basket of Africa’ to the ground. It is widely argued that the FTLRP violated white settlers’ property rights and eventually reduced agricultural investments. Thus, the regime has been harshly demonised and described as a top-down system riddled with corruption and controlling the socio-economic sector. However, this viewpoint ignores the deeper power relationships that prevailed from the pre-independence era to the 1980s and during the FTLRP. Specifically, it fails to consider the racial imbalance in land access and the control that radicalised peasants leading to the FTLRP (Sadomba 2011). Moreover, it fails to acknowledge the role of war veterans and peasantry in this fight for land, often called the ‘third chimurenga’ (Moyo 2012, 11), as well as that played by the World Bank/International Monetary Fund in destroying African economies through their 1990s Economic Structural Adjustment programmes (Shivji 2009, 1). Furthermore, the effects of the attempts by white landholders to delay the reforms by refusing to make available part of their land for redistribution are heavily underplayed.
In 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a bi-modal agrarian structure, consisting of white settler Large-Scale Commercial Farmers (LSCFs) on vast portions of productive land, and subsistence farming by black farmers of unproductive communally held land. These communal areas were created by the colonial government (Native Reserves Act-1898; Land Apportionment Act-1930) to make sure that each household could produce just enough for reproduction, thus blocking commercialisation. Borrowing the expression from Marx, the hidden reason was to ensure a healthy ‘reserve army of labour’ that LSCFs could exploit. Indeed, these areas were located around LSCFs and mockingly named ‘African Reserves’. Furthermore, the hut-tax system was introduced, requiring every household to pay taxes to the colonial government, forcing people to supply labour to the white settlers. Black farmers held 0.3–1.5 hectares on average and had no support compared with LSCFs. This fed directly into the rhetoric that small-scale farmers were unproductive and inefficient; and more land was appropriated and made into larger farms (Land Husbandry Act-1957; Tribal Trust Lands Act-1965). These restrictions on land access were implemented to block small farmers’ commercialisation.
Any attempt to commercialise farmers, i.e. to move them from subsistence to market-oriented-production, had to start with giving them land. We argue that government efforts in this direction took the form of market-based reforms in the 1980s, albeit with little success. Power relations within government institutions and their international commitments, chiefly the Lancaster House Agreement, delayed land redistribution and thus can be viewed as impediments to commercialisation. The comprehensive reform, when it eventually came, took the shape of a radical mass appropriation of land led by war veterans, backed by peasants and supported by the government (Moyo and Yeros 2004, 191; Muchetu 2018, 72–78). Although some Western scholars have described this as state-led top-down reform, the truth obtaining on the ground was that it was the peasants who developed political connections, and the government that hijacked the movement that was already in full swing.
The FTLRP had by 2014 resettled approximately 180,000 small families into A1 (small-scale farms, 6 hectares on average) and A2 (medium to large scale, 10–300 hectares) farms, making accessible agricultural land that was previously held by 4500–6000 commercial white farmers (Moyo 2011, 941; Moyo et al. 2014). This finally provided the fundamental base for commercialisation. The increase in the farmers’ base put more pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) to provide agricultural capital goods, in the light of the underperforming economy and the inputs market system (Mujeyi 2010, 6–10). Access to land represented a necessary but not sufficient condition for commercialisation, as other issues had to be considered. The GoZ attempted various solutions for family farmers’ inclusion, with a contract farming system (only for cash crops) being the main example (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012). Such policy interventions were necessitated by the failure of private financial institutions to provide credit to farmers. The few who could access it were subjected to usury (Moyo and Nyoni 2013). Therefore, the most difficult hurdle was financing. Before November 2017, tenure documents could not be used as collateral; banks demanded land audits, valuations, compensation and the reinstatement of private property rights on land as a prerequisite. Although the current tenure documents have not changed, they can now be used as surety against bank loans, highlighting a politically motivated paradigm shift by private banking institutions.
The FTLRP not only changed the agrarian structure, but it also reconfigured institutions, alliances and relationships within and across borders. The international community, led by the USA and UK, supported restrictions to agricultural investment flows based on citing violations of human and property rights. An incapacitated state had to govern markets from 2000 until 2009, through state controls and pricing policies. Agricultural markets were liberalised in 2009. Although a new government is now in charge, the land reform has been deemed irreversible by both the ruling party and the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (Cliffe, et al. 2011, 918; Johnson, et al. 2012, 3).
Approaches to agricultural markets development
The literature on the negative consequences of integrating small-scale farmers into global markets is extensive (see Amin 2012; Moyo and Yeros 2004). The debates from the radical literature highlighted the detriments of liberalising agricultural markets, and the topic has remained pertinent and illuminated agrarian debates ever since. Scholars such as Bernstein (1979, 424–430) argued that gross agricultural profits for small family farms are significantly reduced if small-scale farmers are exposed to unfettered markets. As gross agricultural profit shrinks, indebtedness, poverty and assets mortgaging eventually drive small family farmers out of farming and turn them into labour providers, a phenomenon also referred to as proletarianisation (and which he termed ‘the simple reduction squeeze’). The role of the state thus becomes critical in protecting small-scale farmers from the vagaries of the market. Both USA and EU governments protect farmers through subsidies and by using extra-economic coercion to secure international markets for their produce (Patnaik and Moyo 2011, 48, 64, 77). The state could intervene in several ways to develop agricultural markets, and over time these strategies have fallen into two basic and polarised categories. In addition to differences in the macro-economic environment, the two approaches differ in the power relations and relative roles of government and the private sector.
The first approach promotes active participation of peasants through inclusive development. Amin (2012, 15) envisages a framework that maintains peasant agriculture while initiating a slow process of technological and social revolution towards market-oriented production for peasants. The stimulus must come from the state itself through national, global and international policies that protect food production systems from unequal surplus transfer (De Janvry 1981, 52–54). This perspective, to some extent, acknowledges the pervasiveness of peasant agriculture in global value chains (and/or vice versa). Farmers depend on inputs markets controlled by monopoly capital, which siphon surplus labour from farmers, keeping them constantly pauperised. However, if a slow integration of agro-ecological and input-mediated policies is implemented, then national food security can be achieved. For example, structural transformative policies can lead to inclusive development in the countryside (Amin 2012).
The second approach focuses on larger farms and excludes ‘inefficient producers’. Neo-classical economists advocate a large scale-oriented agricultural production model. It cites the inefficiency of the small family farms. In this view, small-scale farms should be aggregated to pave way for large-scale agricultural production. This reasoning led the World Bank and other multilateral agencies to induce African states to embrace large-scale investments during the 1980s and early 1990s (Patnaik and Moyo 2011; Amin 2012). The global food crisis between 2007 and 2009 resulted in agglomeration of more small-scale farms into large-scale enterprises. This process was based on the argument that modern agriculture is intensive in terms of technology, finance and logistics, and thus small farms with access to none of these are not in the position to produce substantial marketable surpluses (Collier and Dercon 2009). Thus, these scholars suggest that only those initially favoured by adequate means of production such as land, labour and capital (i.e. large-scale commercial farms) can fruitfully exploit global markets.
The study on agricultural cooperatives for small farmers by Chayanov (1925) in Thorner (1965) offers a third-way type of solution to the peasant question. Specifically, the study recognised the pervasiveness and enduring nature of the capitalist national mode of production in most countries. The author advanced the idea of a productive small family farmer operating in such a framework. Thus, in times of economic stress, typical of most agrarian economies in Africa, farm household labour could make do with low-/zero-wage labour, which cannot be applied to commercial enterprises. Given this, Chayanov supported the full market participation of peasants (as cooperatives), postulating that it would uplift the community directly or otherwise (Chayanov 1991; Lenin 1923).
Jayne et al. (2011, 1–2) posit that growth in the agriculture sector can occur without incorporating small family farms, as it is primarily driven by large-scale commercial farms. Using the example of the Latin American Latifundio estates, which expanded aggregate economic production, although millions of family farmers remained in poverty, the authors conclude that, to address chronic poverty and inequality, it is critical to engage in inclusive policies bringing family farms to the fore. In this respect, commercialisation has the potential to include all the above-discussed approaches, with peasants actively participating in markets, together with private companies on a level playing field provided and regulated by the state (Patnaik and Moyo 2011).
The overall objective of this article is to examine the degree of market participation of family farms after the implementation of the FTLRP. The level of participation achieved thus far helps understand the effect of the FTLRP on commercialisation which is affected by transaction costs, input and producer prices, distance to the market, as well as access to information and credit. It also gives an indication of the level of government intervention through rural area policies. Consequently, increases in commercialisation indicate improvements in the above-mentioned areas. Therefore, this study aims to understand the extent of commercialisation almost two decades after the reform. Specifically, the paper seeks to:
examine the level of participation and the commercialisation rates achieved by farmers after the FTLRP;
examine the challenges to smallholder commercialisation in Zimbabwe after the FTLRP; and
discuss the potential for commercialisation to foster development after the land reform.
The study employs the Sam Moyo African Institute for Agrarian Studies (SMAIAS) household survey data collected from six districts across five agro-ecological zones in Zimbabwe over the period December 2013 to November 2014. Comparisons with the 2006–07 Baseline Survey are also made throughout the paper. The data was collected using a comprehensive questionnaire that captured land use, markets, productivity, food security and social aspects of farming. Commercialisation indices were calculated which helped to position the differentiated peasantry in the emerging agrarian structure along their respective commercialisation levels. The study also examined the commercialisation levels for the communal area (CA) farmers to highlight the effect of access to land, since the A1 model is sometimes viewed as an extension of the CA.
The process of commercialisation
The levels of inputs utilisation, market access (inputs and outputs) and sources of household income determine the level of agricultural commercialisation. The definition of commercialisation helps us understand subsistence (through the Crop Commercialisation Index method) and participation levels achieved in the market, from which implications for farmers can be derived. Commercialisation also strengthens rural–urban linkages. The initial stimulus has a multiplier effect throughout the entire economy as it leads to the accumulation of purchasing power by family farmers. Small-scale farmers are ideal to start a cycle of local spending as compared to urbanites who often spend their monies on the international markets. Indeed, local spending enables the circulation of more money through the economy, significantly boosting local demand for goods, and leading to a virtuous cycle in which rural and urban labour forces provide a market for each other (Mellor [1976] in Jayne et al. 2011, 1; Patnaik and Moyo 2011). This implies increased disposable income and productive asset investment capacity in rural areas.
Therefore, the necessary and urgently needed change in the way both the private and public sectors carry out their businesses can only be realised through an organisational and operational transformation. To develop the agricultural sector as part of a process of the structural transformation of the economy will require an enabling policy and regulatory environment with improved market linkages, sector coordination, affordable inputs and credit facilities as well as improved production and marketing infrastructure. For Zimbabwe, such a development path has been compelled by the recent FTRLP, which was in itself structurally transformative (Mazwi, Muchetu, and Chibwana 2017; Moyo and Yeros 2004).
The Agricultural Marketing Authority Act (Chapter 18:24), the Statutory Instrument (SI) 142 of 2009 and the SI 147 of 2012 are examples of GoZ pro-commercialisation policies enabling farmers to participate in cotton production (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012). This has made possible cotton markets (inputs and outputs) to remain relatively stable, showing the possibility of structural changes that provide a ‘win–win’ situation for both private and public sectors.
Smallholder commercialisation
The concept of smallholder commercialisation is marred by misunderstandings regarding its true definition and implications, especially for policymakers in government structures. Commercialisation has been often associated exclusively with cash crops, mechanisation and modernisation, eventual land appropriation and displacing of smallholder farmers. In contrast with the widespread narrow definition of the term in the literature, Zhou, Minde, and Mtigwe (2013, 2601) define commercialisation as a process of agricultural transformation in which farmers shift from consumption-oriented/subsistence production towards a market-oriented one. This market orientation is dissimilar to profit-oriented production, as peasants exploit their own labour and are not motivated by making profit. In other words, they utilise their labour until the marginal utility of output is equal to the marginal disutility of work (Chayanov 1991). Zhou, Minde, and Mtigwe (2013, 2603) go further, highlighting the various approaches that can be used to carry out commercialisation: state-led/socialist (tried by most African countries after attaining independence); private-led (tried during the structural adjustment era); and donor-led. The best approach is to have all stakeholders working together, like in the small-ruminants collaborative commercialisation efforts in South Africa and Namibia (Zhou, Minde, and Mtigwe 2013).
The emerging agrarian structure is characterised by a significant expansion of family farms that focus on food self-sufficiency, utilise own-generated inputs (retained seed and manure) and primarily rely on on-farm income sources (Moyo 2016). Subsistence producers represent the target of the commercialisation efforts. At the middle stage, production is market oriented, and farmers aim for surplus production from a mixture of traded and non-traded inputs (Table 1). At the extreme end there are commercial producers whose primary focus is to maximise profits through the utilisation of the most advanced technologies relating to seed, machinery and financing systems. Compared to the global North, commercial producers tend to be proportionally fewer in the agrarian structures of the global South due to a blocked agrarian transformation (Amin 2012). The biggest challenge to modernising the agrarian structure has been to find a path with the least possible marginalisation and pauperisation of the peasantry ( Ibid. ). As households move from lower stages upwards, their production mix shifts from a wide range of crops to moderately specialised ones, with the income sources diversifying to other non-agricultural sectors (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; SMAIAS 2015). Drawing on lessons from the Asian green revolution, once farmers start to access non-farm sectors, because of pull (not push) factors, poverty and famine can be drastically reduced (Wiggins 2012).
| Level of market orientation | Farmer’s objective | Sources of inputs | Product mix | Household income sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subsistence systems | Food self-sufficiency | Household generated (non-traded) | Wide range | Predominantly agricultural |
| Semi-commercial systems | Surplus generation | Mix of traded and non-traded inputs | Moderately specialised | Agricultural and non-agricultural |
| Commercial systems | Profit maximisation | Predominantly traded inputs | Highly specialised | Predominantly non-agricultural |
To define which category of Table 1 each Zimbabwean farmer belongs to, two indices were used. Specifically, commercialisation measures should reflect both the inputs and outputs markets (Zhou, Minde, and Mtigwe 2013). Some researchers measure commercialisation through crop sales, implying that these measure how much commercialisation is taking place. Some studies go further and specify that farmers selling a minimum amount of a certain produce can be considered as engaged in market-oriented production; e.g. in the Integrated Rural Development Program studies in the Northern Province of Zambia, commercialised farmers were defined as those selling more than 30 bags of maize per annum (Leavy and Poulton 2007).
1. The Crop Commercialisation Index (CCI) (Strasberg et al. 1999 in Leavy and Poulton 2007, 7) considers the ratio of marketed crops to aggregate crop production to give a measure of the level of commercialisation attained by a household.
CCI values range from zero, signifying strict subsistence or no commercialisation, to 100, indicating that all crops are marketed. The simplicity of this index calls for criticism for not considering size of output. Thus, the produce marketed by a farmer whose output is two bags and who sells both will have a higher CCI value than that farmer who sells 8 out of 10 bags. Therefore, the CCI value largely reflects farmers’ participation in the output market with respect to what they have produced on-farm. Moreover, this index does not consider farmers engaged in non-crop agricultural activities such as livestock rearing and fisheries.
2. On the other hand, as highlighted by Von Braun and Kennedy (1994), there are indices that also try to categorise smallholders with respect to their activities in the input markets. One of these is the Input Commercialisation Index (ICI) (Leavy and Poulton 2007), measuring the value of inputs bought in the market relative to the value of agricultural production.
Higher ICI values signify that there is substantial use of green revolution-type inputs such as improved seed, inorganic fertiliser, crop protection chemicals and mechanised equipment. This definition ignores farmers who are growing crops for household use, use market-traded inputs and at the same time take part in off-farm income activities.
Depending on the type of data utilised, there are other indices that can be used to measure commercialisation in the sector. As observed by Leavy and Poulton ( Ibid. ), the CCI brings subsistence farming to the fore of discussions. Its decrease suggests that households dedicate more of their resources to own food consumption, thus moving away from market-oriented production. Market integration in the input markets will most easily be motivated by a change in the alternative options available to households from other non-farm sectors affecting the ICI.
Levels of commercialisation among Zimbabwe’s small family farms after the FTLRP
As discussed above, it is important to understand the level of commercialisation already attained. Who has commercialised? What is the rate of commercialisation between households? What are the constraints for each specific household type?
The main food crops grown by producers in the 2012–13 season were maize (grown by 90% of the respondents), groundnuts (35%), roundnuts (21%), sorghum (18%), cowpeas (13%) and sugar beans (11%), while tobacco, cotton and sugarcane were each grown by less than 10% of respondents. However, the most marketed food crops (besides cash crops) were sugar beans (69.2%), maize (42.4%) and dry-beans (14.5%) (Table 2). These figures indicate low output/market participation in the bulk of crops grown by smallholder farmers. For example, groundnut was the second-most-grown crop, but only 9.5% of its producers managed to offload the crop onto the market. Comparing this data with the 2006–07 Baseline Survey, we observe a shift in farmers’ participation in the outputs markets from food crops to cash crops. The marketing of maize, beans, groundnuts and sunflower declined significantly (28.9%, 74%, 66.5% and 69%, respectively), while that of cash crops like sugarcane, tobacco and soybean increased (12.2%, 24.5% and 4.2%, respectively). This shift is more pronounced in the A1 sector than in the A2 (see Table 2). In 2013 alone, Zimbabwe imported 305,000 tonnes of maize worth US$109 million and 3800 tonnes of groundnuts worth US$3.1 million (FAOstat 2016). Structural transformation seeks to prioritise agricultural production to allocate, for example, the US$112.1 million towards the commercialisation of family farms to produce enough food and reduce the need to import annually.
| A1 | A2 | Total | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006–07 | 2012–13 | % change | 2006–07 | 2012–13 | % change | 2006–07 | 2012–13 | % change | |
| Food crops | |||||||||
| Maize | 59 | 33 | −44.1 | 62.7 | 59.2 | −5.6 | 59.6 | 42.4 | −28.9 |
| Small grains | 0 | 6.8 | - | 0 | 20 | - | 0 | 7.2 | - |
| Edible dry-beans | 56.7 | 7.5 | −83.4 | 54.1 | 34.1 | −37 | 55.8 | 14.5 | −74 |
| Oilseeds | |||||||||
| G/nuts | 29 | 7.3 | −36.8 | 20 | 16.9 | 15.5 | 28.4 | 9.5 | −66.5 |
| Soybean | 60.4 | 51.5 | −15.1 | 78.3 | 82.5 | 5.4 | 66.4 | 69.2 | 4.2 |
| S/flower | 92.1 | 31.6 | −102.5 | 75 | 0 | −100 | 89.1 | 27.3 | −69.4 |
| Key exports | |||||||||
| Tobacco | 67.1 | 92.7 | 43.4 | 77.8 | 79.7 | 2.4 | 69.1 | 86 | 24.5 |
| Cotton | 90.2 | 68.1 | −37.5 | 60 | 0 | −100 | 88.5 | 68.1 | −23.1 |
| Estate crops | |||||||||
| Sugar | 88.2 | 50 | −64.7 | 76.5 | 94.7 | 23.8 | 80.4 | 90.2 | 12.2 |
Notes: A1 = New small farmers. A2 = Medium- to large-scale farmers.
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14 and Baseline Survey 2006–07, Household Questionnaire.
Market participation varied by district (or by natural region) (SMAIAS 2015). Therefore, to improve commercialisation rates, it is necessary to focus on district-specific crops and to tailor policies that promote the production and sale of that particular crop.
The Crop Commercialisation Index values
In recent studies, the bulk of the application of this index has been related to aggregate crop production. However, using detailed household data from the SMAIAS household survey, we can deepen the analysis and calculate CCI values for individual crops.
Agro-ecological zones are characterised by different rainfall and temperature conditions, which affects land productivity. Within each zone, rainfall patterns vary each year in terms of total amount and rain ‘spread’ in one season. A downward trend in rainfall was observed over the period 1970–94; however, there has been a slight increase from 1995 to 2015 (Figure 1). Although an increase in the aggregate rainfall was recorded, significant shifts in rain spread have been noticed through increased mid-season dry spells, which have affected the agricultural production.
First, we highlight the presence of a positive relationship between CCI values and precipitations, with high rainfall seasons associated with higher CCI values. Considering that from 2000 to 2015 rainfall precipitation averaged around 690 millimetres, and that the 2012–13 agricultural season recorded 668 millimetres of rainfall, we held rainfall at constant for this particular season (MSD 2015). However, differences in the precipitation levels within one year were used to explain the variations in CCI values across the different agro-ecological zones.
Farmers’ participation in the food crop market was found to be low. Roundnuts and rapoko are grown by a significant number of farmers, yet no one markets these crops even though roundnuts are a vital portion of the food consumed by the Zimbabwean population. Maize marketing was highest for A2 farmers, who on average sold 35% of their maize output, while CCI values for A1 and CA farmers were lower (16% and 8.4% respectively). As highlighted earlier, Zimbabwe imports a significant amount of maize driving the Zambian and South African maize production system.
Among the food crops, the highest CCI value was recorded for the potato crop as farmers growing it (3.7% of all farmers) offloaded around 60% of their produce onto the market. However, potato is highly perishable (storage costs are high) and was only grown by approximately 4% of the farmers, hence this does not signify efficiency in its marketing. Despite the fact that demand for sweet potatoes and groundnuts is high especially in urban areas, it had low CCI values of 0.1 and 0.84 respectively of the crops sold on the outputs markets. On the other hand, key exports and estate crops had the highest CCI values (averaging over 85 across all farming models) since these are cash crops (see Table 3). These crops provide policy makers with a starting point in their quest for structural transformation.
| A1 | A2 | CA | Total | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCI | N | CCI | N | CCI | N | CCI | N | |
| Food crops | ||||||||
| Maize | 16.1 | 451 | 35.2 | 228 | 4.8 | 301 | 17.1 | 980 |
| Millets | 0 | 24 | - | . | 0 | 48 | 0 | 72 |
| Sorghum | 5.7 | 97 | 24.2 | 4 | 2.2 | 93 | 4.4 | 194 |
| Sugar bean | 19.3 | 51 | 37.2 | 59 | 17.2 | 10 | 27.9 | 120 |
| Potatoes | 61.1 | 12 | 62.2 | 26 | 0 | 2 | 58.8 | 40 |
| Rapoko | 0 | 97 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 93 | 0 | 194 |
| Roundnuts | 0 | 126 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 84 | 0 | 228 |
| S/potatoes | 0.1 | 53 | 0.1 | 19 | 0.1 | 26 | 0.1 | 98 |
| Cowpeas | 0 | 51 | 0 | 59 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 120 |
| Oilseeds | ||||||||
| G/nuts | 0.55 | 55 | 1.13 | 59 | 0 | 1 | 0.84 | 115 |
| Soybean | 41.54 | 33 | 60.25 | 45 | 0 | 1 | 51.67 | 79 |
| S/flower | 25.08 | 19 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 17.65 | 27 |
| Key exports | ||||||||
| Tobacco | 83.33 | 47 | 100 | 2 | 86.64 | 9 | 84.42 | 58 |
| Cotton | 97.87 | 55 | 88.52 | 59 | 0 | 0 | 92.22 | 115 |
| Estate crops | ||||||||
| Sugar | 50 | 2 | 89.46 | 39 | 0 | 1 | 85.45 | 42 |
Note: Crop Commercialisation Index (CCI) values for non-food crops were not at 100% because some of the farmers experienced serious post-harvest losses which affected their overall CCI values.
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
Horticultural crop production and marketing CCI values were generally higher than for field crops especially for tomatoes (33.7), cabbage (30.9) and butternut (22.5). However, leafy vegetables such as rape and covo were mainly grown for household consumption as their average was 3.5 and 13.3 respectively across all settlement types (see Figure 2).
CCI values for major landholder horticultural crops by settlement type (2012–13 season). Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
Despite almost all Zimbabwean households having some space to grow these leafy vegetables, demand is still high for them as they are consumed daily in the country in almost all meals and have been the major driver of such trading places such as Mbare and Machipisa musika (markets). High transaction costs (transportation, storage, taxes etc.) for marketing these crops coupled with their high perishability have discouraged farmers from actively commercialising them. Therefore, the government could try to make the horticultural sector viable by encouraging commercialisation, since these crops are easy to grow and can represent a reliable source of cash. Infrastructural development of roads, market decentralisation and refrigeration infrastructures could spur the sector’s transformation.
The CCI level for field crops was just above 50 for A2 farmers, while that for A1 was 27.8, with the lowest value (4.6) in the communal area (Figure 3). Small family farms were engaged more in the horticultural marketing system than in the field crops market (e.g. 30.8 for A1 and 19.2 for CA), however fewer A2 (40.7) farmers produced and marketed horticultural crops as compared with field crops. The CA farmers (10.9) were the least active in the sale of agricultural products, followed by A1 (29.2) and A2 (53.9) farmers. Table 4 presents the index values across districts and agro-ecological zones. Different types of crops were characterised by different CCI values. As noted above, rainfall and land quality differ across districts, thus affecting production decisions. Field-crop productivity declined as we moved from districts in natural region 1 towards 5. A limited number of field-crop farming contracts (which guaranteed markets for farmers) was found in the drier regions of Chiredzi (Natural Region 5, poor rainfall and land quality) for sugarcane production. Specifically, the CCI values in these areas were lower than in wetter regions. Farmers in drier areas participated in horticultural markets more than they did in field crops markets (Table 4).
Overall CCI values for major landholder crops by settlement type. Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
| Agro-ecological zone | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 2 & 3 | 3 & 4 | 4 | 5 | |||||||||
| Crop type | Chipinge | Goromonzi | Zvimba | Kwekwe | Chiredzi | Mangwe | Total | |||||||
| CCI | N | CCI | N | CCI | N | CCI | N | CCI | N | CCI | N | CCI | N | |
| Field | 29.26 | 158 | 41.52 | 170 | 46.41 | 167 | 11.98 | 183 | 36.18 | 145 | 0.43 | 140 | 27.97 | 963 |
| Hort. | 21.58 | 71 | 27.09 | 109 | 29.63 | 101 | 31.04 | 82 | 32.07 | 63 | 27.76 | 53 | 28.21 | 479 |
| Overall | 28.73 | 145 | 42.97 | 162 | 47.06 | 161 | 16.81 | 187 | 43.49 | 128 | 6.24 | 132 | 30.86 | 915 |
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
Goromonzi, Zvimba, Chipinge and Chiredzi exhibited considerably higher CCI values for field crops while Mangwe had the lowest value (0.43). Horticultural crops generally showed higher CCI values with a smaller deviation around the mean (µ = 38.2). The drier region of Chiredzi recorded higher CCI values. Even though this is backed by out-grower financing that Mazwi and Muchetu (2015, 41–42) described as exploitative, this shows that commercialisation can be achieved in any natural region. The sugarcane farmers in Chiredzi are provided inputs and they are guaranteed a market for their produce at the end of the season. Huge investments have also been made in infrastructures for the irrigation and transportation system from farms to milling plants ( Ibid. ). This type of ‘commercialisation’ falls under the private-led approach and often implies farmers losing out to private capital if the government and other stakeholders are not involved in the process. The findings by Mazwi and Muchetu ( Ibid. ) seem to confirm the argument by Zhou, Minde, and Mtigwe (2013) advocating private–public and donor partnerships in commercialisation.
The different levels of CCI values between CA, A1 and A2 confirmed the argument by Moyo (2011) of the emergence of a tri-modal agrarian structure from the land reform policy that intended to create an agrarian capitalist middle class. Subsistence producers were mostly in the CA class (68%), and while fewer than half were in the A1 class (40.7%), they exhibited CCI values ranging from 0 to 5. Over 83.2% of the communal farmers were offloading less than 25% of their output onto the markets, representing more than two-thirds (together with some A1 farmers) of the farming population. Overall, farmers selling less than 5% of their produce accounted for 44% of the respondents (Figure 4). Furthermore, intra-modal variations in CCI and ICI existed as well, which could be attributable to different levels of access to information, skills and education, as well as proximity to the markets. For instance, A1 farmers in Goromonzi (a peri-urban district) exhibited higher values.
Overall range of CCI values for smallholder crops (2012–13 season). Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
Poor rainfall districts such as Mangwe and Kwekwe showed the greatest number of subsistence farmers (84.1% and 55.6% respectively). These areas exhibited higher CCI values for the horticultural production and thus efforts could initially focus on these crops grown under irrigation (mostly market gardening). Improvements in these areas will contribute to the fight against underdevelopment and poverty. Similar studies have reported average national CCI values of 28 for grain marketing in 1996 across grain-producing African states. For example, Gebreselassie and Sharp (2008, 65–68) found values as high as 33 for the Ethiopian case, while some studies for cash or high-value crops in Ethiopia’s weredas areas that grow Tef showed CCI values of 49.
The type of marketing channel used has implications on current and potential commercialisation, as well as structural transformation programmes (Table 5). A1 landholders’ data reveal that most farmers accessed the nearest market, which comprised selling their produce to local/village markets, on-farm to intermediary traders, on-farm to consumers or to the nearest town (29 km away from their homestead on average). Cotton was sometimes sold on-farm to contractors for the farmer to reduce the transportation costs. However, tobacco farmers sold their produce at auction floors, as this is how the tobacco markets are structured.
| Type of crop | Marketing channel used (No, with % of market participants in parentheses) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| pp | Local/village market | On farm to intermediary traders | Nearest town | On farm to consumers | Roadside | State marketing | On farm to contractors | Auction floor | Total | |
| Maize | 453 | 15 (8.9) | 53 (31.5) | 26 (15.5) | 45 (26.8) | 1 (0.6) | 27 (16.1) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 168 (100) |
| Sorghum | 90 (0) | 1 (7.1) | 3 (21.4) | 1 (7.1) | 5 (35.7) | 0 (0) | 3 (21.4) | 1 (7.1) | 0 (0) | 14 (100) |
| Roundnuts | 170 (0) | 4 (23.5) | 4 (23.5) | 2 (11.8) | 6 (35.3) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 17 (100) |
| Sweet potatoes | 52 (0) | 2 (10) | 11 (55) | 2 (10) | 5 (25) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 20 (100) |
| Sugar bean | 55 (0) | 1 (3.8) | 10 (38.4) | 10 (38.4) | 5 (19.2) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 26 (100) |
| Soybean | 27 (0) | 1 (4.1) | 1 (4.1) | 16 (66.7) | 1 (4.1) | 3 (12.5) | 1 (4.1) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 24 (100) |
| Tobacco | 58 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (3.1) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 5 (7.7) | 58 (89.2) | 65 (100) |
| Cotton | 42 (0) | 0 (0) | 4 (12.1) | 0 (0) | 1 (3) | 0 (0) | 1 (3) | 27 (81.8) | 0 (0) | 33 (100) |
Note: pp = number of producers.
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
Comparing 2012–13 data with the Baseline Survey in 2006–07, there has been a significant decrease in the number of farmers sending their produce to the state marketing board. For example, maize producers who used to send to the Grain Marketing Board decreased from 52.5% of the respondents to 16.1%, while soybean producers dropped from 35.5% to 4.1%. Furthermore, the 2012–13 data suggests a huge penetration into the rural agricultural markets of intermediary traders, who now command a significant share of trading in both cash and food crops (Table 6). Thus, commercialisation efforts need to curb the proliferation of the intermediaries and shorten the marketing channel distance between farmers and consumers.
| Type of crop | pp | Marketing channel | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Local village market | State marketing | Private agribusiness | Other | Total | ||
| Maize | 1480 | 85 (5.7) | 777 (52.5) | 0 (0) | 11 (0.7) | 873 |
| Roundnuts | 67 | 16 (23.9) | 17 (25.4) | 0 (0) | 5 (7.5) | 38 |
| Groundnuts | 403 | 84 (20.8) | 22 (5.5) | 0 (0) | 11 (2.7) | 117 |
| Soybean | 91 | 15 (16.5) | 32 (35.2) | 3 (3.3) | 5 (5.6) | 55 |
| Sunflower | 38 | 4 (10.5) | 19 (35.2) | 9 (23.7) | 3 (7.9) | 35 |
| Cotton | 82 | 3 (3.6) | 0 (0) | 70 (85.4) | 1 (1.2) | 74 |
| Tobacco | 79 | 4 (5.1) | 0 (0) | 40 (50.6) | 9 (11.4) | 53 |
| Sugar | 17 | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 13 (76.5) | 2 (11.8) | 15 |
Note: pp = number of producers.
Source: SMAIAS Baseline Survey 2006–07, Household Questionnaire.
Farmers across the six different farming districts and settlements were more focused on subsistence production, with the surplus food produce only offloaded to other local farmers, and cash crops sold in urban areas (see Table 7). The same situation was also obtained for the marketing of livestock, with farmers avoiding meeting transaction costs by selling their produce in local markets (Table 7). Thus, we argue that improving marketing channels will reduce transaction costs for farmers and enable them to access more profitable markets and consequently increase their household incomes.
| Channel used | 2012 | 2013 | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RA | CA | Total | RA | CA | Total | |||||||
| No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | |
| CSC | 22 | 4.6 | 12 | 10.6 | 34 | 5.7 | 6 | 1.2 | 2 | 1.7 | 8 | 1.3 |
| Intermediary traders | 59 | 12.2 | 9 | 8 | 68 | 11.4 | 81 | 16.2 | 6 | 5.2 | 87 | 14.1 |
| Local butchery | 99 | 20.5 | 18 | 15.9 | 117 | 19.7 | 83 | 16.6 | 18 | 15.7 | 101 | 16.4 |
| Neighbouring farmers | 211 | 43.8 | 68 | 60.2 | 279 | 46.9 | 238 | 47.5 | 86 | 74.8 | 324 | 52.6 |
| Export | 1 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.9 | 2 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.2 |
| Nearest town | 81 | 16.8 | 3 | 2.7 | 84 | 14.1 | 83 | 16.6 | 0 | 0 | 83 | 13.5 |
| Auction | 9 | 1.9 | 2 | 1.8 | 11 | 1.8 | 9 | 1.8 | 3 | 2.6 | 12 | 1.9 |
| Total | 482 | 100 | 113 | 100 | 595 | 100 | 501 | 100 | 115 | 100 | 616 | 100 |
Notes: RA = resettled areas (A1 + A2). CA = communal area.
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
The Input Commercialisation Index
Being an indication of the ratio of inputs to total production, the ICI seeks to measure households’ participation in the inputs market. This study calculated the total cost of all the inputs employed including hired labour and land tillage for each household to obtain a value for the inputs acquired from the market. Table 8 shows that larger land-sized A2 farmers exhibited relatively higher ICI values for maize (0.43) and soybean (0.2), while these were lower for A1 and CA farmers, suggesting that they were not actively participating in the inputs markets, that is, they were not able to access inputs for agricultural production (Table 8).
| A1 | A2 | CA | Total | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ICI | N | ICI | N | ICI | N | ICI | N | |
| Maize | 0.33 | 445 | 0.43 | 221 | 0.40 | 268 | 0.37 | 934 |
| Cotton | 0.3 | 41 | 0.19 | 2 | 0.21 | 8 | 0.28 | 51 |
| Tobacco | 0.21 | 60 | 0.14 | 60 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.18 | 120 |
| Soybean | 0.11 | 38 | 0.2 | 47 | 0.56 | 1 | 0.16 | 86 |
| Sugar bean | 0.29 | 29 | 0.24 | 31 | 0.01 | 4 | 0.25 | 64 |
| Overall ICI | 0.3 | 446 | 0.41 | 280 | 0.23 | 287 | 0.31 | 1013 |
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
Overall, A2 farmers were able to spend more on inputs followed (0.41), by A1 farmers (0.30) and CA farmers (0.23). However, further investigation highlighted a slightly different result from that found in the CCI range analysis. A significant number of farmers (24.1%) purchased less than 5% of their inputs on the market. The use of own-generated inputs (retained seed and manure), draft power ownership, labour use patterns and type of crop (determining type of inputs required and their potential source) significantly affected market participation. For CA and A1 farmers, the use of family labour, own-generated inputs and fewer fertilisers resulted in a lower ICI value while the use of hired draft power increased the index value. As for A2 farmers on the other hand, the use of minimum family labour and own-generated inputs increased the ICI values while ownership of draft power lowered them. Farmers’ participation in the inputs markets was found across all ICI clusters (Table 9). Similarly to the CCI, the proportion of households utilising own-generated inputs was highest for CA farmers (38.3%) and lowest for A2 farmers (7.5%).
| ICI | A1 | A2 | CA | Total | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No | % | No | % | No | % | No | % | |
| <0.05 | 113 | 25.3 | 21 | 7.5 | 110 | 38.3 | 244 | 24.1 |
| 0.06–0.25 | 127 | 28.5 | 80 | 28.6 | 72 | 25.1 | 279 | 27.5 |
| 0.26–0.5 | 94 | 21.1 | 66 | 23.6 | 48 | 16.7 | 208 | 20.5 |
| 0.51–0.75 | 92 | 20.6 | 91 | 32.5 | 41 | 14.3 | 224 | 22.1 |
| >0.75 | 20 | 4.5 | 22 | 7.9 | 16 | 5.6 | 58 | 5.7 |
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey 2013–14, Household Questionnaire.
To evaluate the existing constraints, respondents were asked to rank the top three challenges they were facing in production. Figure 5 presents the number of times a challenge was listed among the top three. Access to inputs was listed more times than other challenges. Access to credit, lack of working capital and access to output markets were listed as second, third and fifth respectively. Periodic droughts in different years as well as mid-season dry spells were also mentioned as main challenges affecting production. In this respect, investments in irrigation infrastructures become key. Interesting to this discussion was also the poor state of the road networks connecting farmers and input/output markets. These results suggest that these challenges have not been addressed by government policies ever since the implementation of the FTLRP. Limited access to inputs and credit, high input prices and limited availability of draft power were the greatest challenges recorded in the 2006–07 survey as well (Figure 5).
These challenges represent the core areas that the government should focus on to guarantee access to inputs and outputs markets and move towards commercialisation of the smallholder farmers. Such issues as corruption, nepotism and even tribalism are some of the factors reported to affect distribution of resources necessary for development. For example, there are media reports that former president Mugabe’s rural area received more development resources while areas such as in Matabeleland and Manicaland remained isolated and underdeveloped because of tribalism. While such claims are hard to substantiate or dismiss, bad policies, inadequate resources and implementation skills on the part of the government seem more plausible an explanation. For example, farmers always try to produce maize across the country even though maize cannot be efficiently produced throughout the country.
Conclusions
Delays in land redistribution slowed the commercialisation of family farms. Efforts from below (peasants) supported by the state to acquire land eventually opened spaces for an accelerated commercialisation. The FTLRP, by making land available, facilitated this process, however land access is a necessary but not sufficient condition for rural development. Infrastructural development, inputs and outputs markets’ strengthening and the provision of social services as well as of adequate and timely extension services remain underdone.
This study has highlighted generally low but differentiated levels of market participation across the three FTLRP agrarian models (CA, A1 and A2), as well as across the five agro-ecological zones. Given the differences in land quality and rainfall patterns, participation rates were mainly affected by limited access to financing, inputs and high transaction costs. The share of the national budget allocated to the agricultural sector has averaged around 4.5% over the past eight years, while inputs/subsidies always arrived late to their ‘intended’ beneficiaries, thus undermining productivity. Although macroeconomic conditions have been unfavourable, commercialisation through structural transformation has the potential to solve these problems. More and more resources need to be allocated towards agriculture, and this message must be hand-delivered to the government with a delivery note for them to sign.
Issues related to agricultural funding have centred more on the politics to push for reinstatement of private property tenure on land rather than on the productive capacity of family farms. Nonetheless, other avenues can be pursued to finance the agrarian structure, including inter alia inputs subsidies, government credit, contract-based inputs, credit provision, output insurance programmes, investments into irrigation and cooperative group-lending models. Cooperatives are ideal for making farmers undertake commercialisation into the global markets. Yet many governments across Africa seem not to consider them. If the capitalist control of financial markets is reconfigured into cooperative ‘capitalism’ controlled by peasants, then small producers could engage collectively as associations of numerous individual farmers instead of surrendering their produce (control) to the markets. Cooperativism can/should initially be supported by the state through laws and credit to enable them to resource themselves and regain control over the rural economy.
Contract farming arrangements (for cash cotton, sugar and tobacco cash crops) exemplify the increase in private–public sector linkages. Recent programmes such as command agriculture, a private–public initiative that targets large-scale farmers with irrigation facilities who can put at least 200 hectares under maize, are appealing because they have a strong presence of the state with the aim of preventing farmers’ exploitation. Maize productivity rates of 6 tonnes per hectare are more lucrative than average tobacco output per hectare, since maize entails significantly lower labour costs (farmers produce tobacco only because credit is provided for its production instead of maize). The state should very carefully expand these arrangements to food crop production to enhance development and productivity, as well as eradicate poverty in rural areas. Chibuku® (Delta Beverages) breweries sometimes contract farmers to grow maize, barley and sorghum while seed oil companies have attempted to implement the same model with sunflower and soybean. These value chains need to be maintained through mutually beneficial agreements, legislation and regulation as they may represent the only way for farmers to obtain the necessary inputs.