When Boris Johnson and his Conservative Party won a landslide victory in the general election of 12 December 2019, with his campaign promise to ‘Get Brexit done', the immediate reaction of the business world, in the UK as well as in the European Union (EU), was one of relief. After all, the vote suggested planning security for investments. Nevertheless, most commentators were sceptical regarding Johnson's loud-mouthed promises of a rosy economic future, and the the risk of a ‘hard Brexit’, i.e. an economically risky crashing out of the EU in December 2020, still persisted.
Whereas the impact of Brexit on anglophone Africa was a major issue in the controversial UK discussions on its pros and cons, possible repercussions on French-speaking Africa have been rarely mentioned up to now (Douet 2019; Togo First 2019). Yet the range of possible effects includes, in first place, direct economic consequences, like the impact on farm-gate cocoa prices in the CFA currency regions and subsequent repercussions on the state budget of these countries. Second, there are the political effects, especially concerning regional integration: e.g. the cooperation between the Central African Economic and Monetary Committee (CEMAC) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), but also concerning the EU and its European Development Fund (EDF) programmes, to which the UK has been a major contributor so far, and the enforced renegotiation of controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Third, Brexit could have an impact on the revival of progressive social networks in francophone Africa. Fourth, the murky network of Françafrique – the critical term coined by Verschave (1999) – could be revitalised and consolidated, given no more UK countervailing power within the EU. Last, Brexit could also have a negative effect on acquired human rights, both in Europe and in Africa. In fact, Brexit constitutes a retrograde step by promoting a political and socio-cultural climate which could become similar to that of apartheid South Africa. Possible repercussions include the pursuit of ultranationalist goals and compromising on established human rights, for example concerning growing inequality and the crusade against ‘infidels’ and ‘the other’. More generally, Brexit could also impact negatively on acquired ethics concerning popular anticipation, both in Europe and in Africa.
However, all of this did not distract Brexiters from yearning for the re-establishment of the glory times of the British Empire. Their vision was conceivably based on a euphoric and overambitious multi-expert report of the Africa All-Party Parliamentary Group, financed by the Royal African Society, on post-Brexit Africa–UK trade and development cooperation relations (APPG 2017; Kohnert 2018). This was the more so because the UK was already successfully poaching in foreign preserves in the 2000s. It has important economic relations with francophone and lusophone Africa, including the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Angola. Other members of the French pré carré (private preserve, or sphere of influence) in Africa,1 like Togo, want to enter the Commonwealth of Nations too. This Brexit vision concerning Africa is thus an extension of Britain’s post-colonial policy since the 1960s.
To understand fully the integral impact of the Brexit on Africa it is imperative to know the history of Britain and France’s rivalry for supremacy, both in Africa as well as in the early days of the EU. Therefore, the economics of the admission of the UK into the EU and the political repercussions of Brexit for France and francophone Africa are first considered, before then introducing an analysis of key indicators of the economic impact of Brexit. Finally, the impact of Brexit on the ‘second liberation’ of francophone Africa is outlined.
The history of Britain’s and France’s rivalry for supremacy in Africa
For an evaluation of the impact of Brexit on francophone Africa, it is pertinent to know about the long and conflictual history of Britain’s and France’s rivalry for supremacy in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), notably in West Africa (Wesseling 2004). Although until now the chasse gardée (private hunting ground) of the so-called Françafrique (Verschave 1999, 2005; Boisbouvier 2010) has been outmatched by British dominance in Africa, it is still very much alive (AFP 2017; Haski 2013). The term Françafrique, originally coined by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, first president of Ivory Coast in 1960, was used to describe the post-colonial relationship between France and its former colonies. France wanted to continue by all means, legal or not, to control them. This clandestine system of self-interested parallel French foreign policy, founded in the late 1950s, was led by men in the shadows under the watchful eye of Jacques Foccart, the ‘Mr Africa’ of the Elysée until his death in 1997. It was an integrated political, military, economic and financial system of venality in SSA by which French and African political and business elites scratched each other’s backs at the expense of their fellow citizens. Its walling-off by a special currency, the CFA franc, assured restricted competition and extraordinary gains for all parties involved on the back of the poor in Africa and France (Kohnert 2005). The major losers in the WAEMU were Niger, Togo and Burkina Faso, and Cameroon in CEMAC. Empirical evidence showed that in total there were more losers than winners in the CFA franc monetary cooperation system (Allechi and Niamkey 1994).
Thus, post-colonial dependence continued in other forms, including the looting of raw materials, with the complicity of corrupt African heads of state – sometimes maintained at great expense economically, socially and politically. African autocrats were well aware that dependency was no one-way road and that they wielded considerable power over the former metropolis as well (Airault and Bat 2016). Examples are the escapades of infamous ‘Emperor’ Bokassa of the Central African Republic, or the pillage of the resources of their countries over decades by the late Omar Bongo (Gabon, succeeded after his death in 2009 by his son Ali Bongo) and General Eyadéma Gnassingbé of Togo, continued to date by the heir to his throne, Faure Gnassingbé (Kohnert 2019).
All this continued, despite repeated unfulfilled promises of French presidents, from Nicolas Sarkozy, through François Hollande to Emmanuel Macron, concerning the departure from the established policy of Françafrique since Sarkozy’s controversial Dakar Declaration of 2007. Some experts even noted a degeneration of Françafrique to a mafia-like network of high-ranking French and African politicians and businessmen (Verschave 2005; Mbembe 2010; Cailletet and Milot 2010; Thorel 2013).
In view of the absence of the countervailing power of the UK within the EU in the case of Brexit (see below), it is quite possible that the murky network of Françafrique or alternative shady trans-boundary networks of corruption, trafficking and money-laundering in francophone Africa could even be revitalised, consolidated and extended, notably in the resource-rich countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. The current Bolloré affair, probed by the French judiciary in connection with the notorious tycoon Vincent Bolloré and his network of corruption in collusion with African autocrats in French West Africa, could be a sign of things to come (Pilling 2018).
British–African relations, on the contrary, are said to have been less ideologically charged than those of France, with the possible exception of those with its former settler colony Zimbabwe (Haefliger 2019). In this respect, a look into the history of EU–African relations is revealing. For example, the creation, as a privileged partner of the EU, of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), i.e. former British and French colonies, was a direct result of Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. A British application for EEC membership had been vetoed in 1963 and November 1967 by France, which wanted among other things to preserve its chasse gardée of Françafrique. However, the post-colonial networks were not limited to the rivalry between Britain and France. Italy also tried to outmanoeuvre France’s post-colonial ambitions, for example in Libya, Chad, Kenya and the West African Sahel zone (Bagnoli 2019).
Moreover, contemporary French post-colonialism was to be felt in the cultural realm too, including in France itself. When the French scholarly journal Afrique Contemporaine, co-financed by the French Agency for Development (AFD), tried in 2018 to publish a critical evaluation of the failed French military intervention in Mali and related security problems, AFD censored the publication. This created an outcry in the academic world far beyond France, and unearthed the truth about French knowledge production on Africa, subsidised by public resources (Ibid.).
Arguably, the past French veto against the admission of the UK into the then EEC has direct links to the Brexit vote of 2016 (Goldsmith and Farrell 2017). Charles de Gaulle, then French president, had favoured an EEC dominated by France and steered by a Franco-German alliance (Ramiro Troitiño, Kerikmäe, and Chochia 2018, 89; Connolly 2017; Goldsmith and Farrell 2017). Moreover, he suspected that the UK would effectively act as America’s agent inside the EEC. He was afraid that the UK would promote a free-trade agreement with the USA and Canada inside the Community; this unacceptable to him, because it would allegedly lead to economic domination of the EEC by the USA (Ramiro Troitiño, Kerikmäe, and Chochia 2018, 89–90). London, on the other hand, wanted to preserve the UK’s privileged economic and monetary relations with the Commonwealth countries, including the imperial preference system (Deschamps 2017). France’s interest in EEC relations with Africa was based on the need to finance the external influence of the French power elite in Africa via the Community, something it could not afford on its own in the context of Cold War politics (Chochia et al. 2018, 69). Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that France did not want a competitor in its post-colonial dealings with Africa at a time when francophone Africa was one of the few remaining bargaining chips in its struggle for imperial might, after having lost its colonies in Indochina.
Antecedents: economies of the admission of the UK into the EEC
The formation of the ACP resulted in the Lomé Convention, signed in 1975 between the EEC and 46 ACP countries. Joining the EEC offered the UK the chance both to collectivise its obligations to some of these ACP states at the expense of the other EEC member states, while at the same time opening new prospects in francophone Africa, which had previously been beyond its reach (Price 2018). The UK government itself stated in 2013 that through the collectivisation of aid provision in the EU, the ‘reach and magnitude of EU financial instruments’, which includes the EDF, ‘outweighs those the UK could bring to bear bilaterally’. This allowed the UK to maximise the use of its resources, allowing it in times of austerity to focus ‘scarce national resources on priorities elsewhere’ (Olivié and Pérez 2018; UK Government 2013; Price 2018).
Their untenable ‘Africa vision’ was an attempt by conservative British politicians to maintain global influence (Kohnert 2018). However, Britain’s competitiveness has decreased substantially within the past decades. Its share of SSA’s imports decreased from 14% to 3% between 1990 and 2017 (UNCTAD 2019). British trade with Africa is dominated by fuel, precious stones and fresh fruit that, last but not least, suffered as a consequence of falling commodity prices. By comparison, trade with the EU is dominated by machinery and vehicles, either as finished goods or as parts and components (Romei and Cocco 2018). France, Germany and Italy export more than double the value of goods to Africa in comparison with the UK. Even Spain, which has an economy half the size of the UK’s, exports more than Britain (Ibid.).
Political repercussions of Brexit for France and francophone Africa
On the other hand, in the case of Brexit, French self-centred dominance of EU–Africa policies could reign unrestricted by British countervailing powers. Despite the UK rarely being a constructive player in the European integration process, it has played an important role in counter-balancing the power of Germany and France, for example by resisting undue protection of the EU agricultural market. The ability of small EU member states to have a say in the decision-making of the Franco-German axis will depend on the strength of EU institutions in continuing to balance the interests of all members, and the collaborative working of small states to influence EU decision-making (Bishop and Clegg 2018).
But African countries – especially the majority of countries in francophone Africa that would suspect being let down by the UK in favour of Commonwealth Africa, given Britain’s priorities and limited resources – could also look for other partners if their ties with the UK and the remaining EU-27 get complicated because of Brexit. China has already outmanoeuvred the EU, as it became SSA’s biggest export partner by 2013, accounting for 27% of the region’s exports, compared with only 23% to the EU, and 21% to the USA (Tan 2018). Moreover, China’s goods exports to Africa are eight times those of the UK, and even more than those of the top three exporters (Germany, France and the US) after China combined (Romei and Cocco 2018).
The impact of Brexit on the ‘second liberation’ of francophone Africa
According to a significant number of ‘influencers’ of French-speaking social networks, like the Franco-Cameroonian woman cartoonist Annick Kamgang (2016), Brexit could also inspire Africa in relaunching a debate on its sovereignty, including judicial and monetary. Brexit could thus be used as a cause for a ‘second liberation of Africa’ from colonial domination. One prominent case in the realm of justice is the controversy in African media about supposedly biased rulings on African leaders by the International Criminal Court. The trial of the former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré (1982–1990) was a case in point. Yet, his conviction by the Extraordinary African Chambers, and sentence to life imprisonment in 2015, showed that Africans themselves were able to judge their former leaders. The same holds for Rwanda’s judiciary who accused France of complicity in the 1994 genocide. Paris and Kigali are still trying to reach a settlement.
Another, even more, important issue in the realm of the economics of francophone Africa is the long-standing controversy on the ill-adapted and increasingly anachronistic CFA franc (Kohnert 2005). Kamgang and others ask, when will there be a genuine African debate and a referendum on these issues similar to the Brexit vote? In fact, the debate has already begun. In October 2016, a group of African and European economists published a book entitled Liberate Africa from monetary slavery: who profits from the CFA franc? (Nubukpo et al. 2016). In the wake of the public debate sparked by this and similar publications (Pigeaud and Sylla 2018), people began to speak out more openly (Sylla 2018). They were assisted by internationally renowned (former) African officials and critics of the CFA franc, including Togo’s Kako Nubukpo (ex-Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest [BCEAO] and former Togolese minister), Senegal’s Sanou Mbaye (ex-African Development Bank), and Guinea-Bissau’s Carlos Lopez (ex-UN Economic Commission for Africa), as well as African bankers like Henri-Claude Oyima (President-Director General of BGFI Bank).
Moreover, for some years now, a social movement has grown, demanding the withdrawal of African states from the CFA franc. On 7 January 2017, for example, an non-governmental organisation set up and run by the activist Kemi Séba, backed by ‘SOS Pan-Africa’, organised anti-CFA demonstrations in several African and European cities (Sylla 2018). In Senegal, the France Dégage group has been campaigning for the ‘monetary sovereignty’ of the CFA countries (Lottersberger 2018). However, the Senegalese economist Ndongo Samba Sylla has deplored the debate over the CFA franc for too often being restricted to the general pros and cons as, in reality, the CFA franc benefits mainly a small political and economic elite, both in France and francophone Africa, as well as the managers of central banks and French companies (Sylla 2018). Increasing support for the withdrawal from the CFA franc was revealed recently by a survey conducted by Afrobarometer, published on 7 February 2019, taking the example of Togo. The survey disclosed that two-thirds of the Togolese population are in favour of leaving the CFA franc because ‘the currency benefits France more than Togo and should be replaced’ (Akinocho 2019). In the meantime, a task force for exit by 2020 has been established, even though a majority of heads of state of WAEMU continue to give their support to the CFA franc (Ibid.). Yet, former Togolese minister Nubukpo was deposed from his position as Director of the Francophonie in 2017 because of his opposition to the CFA franc, an indicator of the continuing influence of Françafrique.
The economic impact of Brexit
Economic forecasts suggest that Brexit would not result in a loss for all parties involved. According to one study, the effects will be far from uniform (UNCTAD 2019). The most developed African countries with a diversified industry, such as South Africa, should be better off (with a forecast increase of 39% in their exports to the UK, worth over US$3 billion). On the other hand, Ghana (with a forecast lost of 39% in exports, or US$91 m) and Cameroon (–28% in exports, or US$17 m) would be the biggest losers (Douet 2019). Mostly indirect general effects were forecast, both in relation to the former British empire in Africa and more so for the former French colonies, as asserted by the World Bank chief economist for West Africa (Zeufack 2016).
Zeufack argued that the indirect effects of Brexit may seem especially noticeable at the level of international financing, with international liquidity becoming more expensive and less available. This could affect, for instance, those African countries that would like to raise funds on international markets. Moreover, the indirect effects could include lessons for regional integration that African states could draw from Brexit. This was confirmed implicitly during the African Union (AU) summit in Kigali in March 2018. The African Continental Free-Trade Area (CFTA), which was finally approved by 54 African governments and entered into force on 30 May 2019, envisages using its negotiating advantage as a desirable trading partner to press for greater protection of its member states' domestic markets and infant industries (Westcott 2018). Again, this is of special concern for francophone Africa because the CFTA could offer solutions concerning long-standing problems of economic integration, like the anachronistic multitude of eight currencies, including the anachronistic CFA franc, competing in West Africa, which is a real handicap for the economic performance of the region.
Closely related to the question of independent monetary policy is the question of the impact of Brexit on African stock markets. Whereas some experts consider Brexit as a stimulus to African growth, including the liberating effect on stock markets (Busch 2018), they are part and parcel of the CFA zone. Apart from 29 stock exchanges in Africa, representing 38 nations’ capital markets, there are two regional exchanges: the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM), in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières d’Afrique Centrale (BVMAC), in Libreville, Gabon. These exchanges are still relatively small, with a limited number of companies listed. However, according to Bush, they would benefit dramatically if the shares are listed in a common currency which will allow cross-border capitalisations of African companies and projects. The BCEAO itself sounds less optimistic. In its monthly economic report for the WAEMU countries for November 2018, it cautioned about continued slowdown of economic activity in 2019 as a aresult of Brexit (BCEAO 2019).
Besides, there could be also more direct economic effects of Brexit. For example, the Ivorian prime minister, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, cautioned about possible unintended consequences of Brexit on West African cocoa farmers (Wheatley 2017). Thus, any fall in the value of sterling against the euro, once Britain leaves the EU, would have damaging consequences for Ivorian public finances because cocoa is priced in sterling and the CFA franc in West Africa is linked to the euro. The cocoa price has already fallen sharply in recent years since the Brexit referendum, so the value of Ivorian cocoa sales has dropped. This has provided a small foretaste of what else could be in the pipeline. Therefore, the former Ivorian minister of commerce Jean-Louis Billon maintained that it would become necessary to make the Ivorian currency independent and convertible to guarantee the country’s stability in trade.
On the other hand, Brexit could offer new opportunities in the long run by allowing the Ivory Coast to restructure and improve its trade agreements. The UK is the fourth-largest consumer of chocolate worldwide. Up to now, it has imported most of its cocoa products from the EU-27. If after Brexit the UK imposes duties on EU imports, it could mean that the price of chocolate will increase. Therefore, the Ivory Coast is likely to focus on establishing better relations with the UK (Intellivoire 2016); even more so, because the EU’s controversial EPAs oblige West Africa to open about 80% of its market to imports from the EU, in exchange for duty-free access to the European market for African products, which constitutes a one-sided advantage for the EU and could undermine local industrialisation efforts (Ibid.; Kohnert 2015).
In general, the biggest impact post-Brexit in Africa would probably be in the area of investment. UK investment in Africa has steadily increased, doubling between 2005 and 2014, and currently stands at approximately £43 billion (Gaynor 2018). In 2018, the UK government promised a further increase of £8 billion, including partnership programmes between African companies and the City of London for mentoring and technical assistance. However, whether all francophone countries in Africa would benefit from these investments is open to question. Cameroon and other French-speaking countries such as Chad and Ivory Coast, where the UK holds important investments, also have to worry in the event of Brexit (Anadolu Agency 2016), because UK investments in these countries could fall, be interrupted or to a lesser extent renegotiated, as they were concluded under the French influence of the EU. This would apply for example to Chad, where the UK is the third-largest investor (after China and France) in the infrastructure and exploration of oil sites, and to Niger and its uranium. Cameroon, with its oil sites, including many that are exploited by the UK, will probably have to pay a heavy toll too, in the assessment of the Chadian economist Abdel Mamout (Ibid.).
As for the CEMAC, including Cameroon, early lessons can already be drawn from a future Brexit according to CEMAC Commission Vice-President Rosario Mbasogo Kung Nguidang (Andzongo 2016). Cooperation between CEMAC and the EU could be affected for example at the level of National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) of the EDF to which the UK is a major contributor. In addition, the EPA would have to be renegotiated between the EU and Central Africa. The NIPs and RIPs are within the EDF compass, the main instrument of EU aid, while the exports of the CEMAC countries to Britain in 2015, represented €355,098 m, and imports €594,625 m (Ibid.).
As for the impact of Brexit on Senegal, 7.9% of imports and 5.5% of total EU-28 exports to Senegal were made by the UK (Berthelot 2016). Yet, Senegal should not suffer large losses in customs duties in the event of Brexit, because it is likely that the UK will maintain the EU’s ‘Everything but arms’ status for all Least Developed Countries (whereby imports to the EU are duty-free and quota-free, with the exception of arms), including the AU, although it will tend to privilege commercial relations and external assistance with English-speaking countries. Moreover, Brexit could impact on African security matters, notably in French-speaking Sahelian countries. Noting on her visit to the continent in August 2018 that ‘African and UK security are inextricably linked’ (Edwards 2018), former UK prime minister Theresa May promised a rising post-Brexit UK presence in Chad, Niger and Mali in relation to security matters. Consequently, the francophone Sahel could become increasingly important between the UK and the EU for military cooperation as well (Gaynor 2018). In general, Brexit will offer francophone Africa the chance of renewed negotiations both between the UK and Africa, and also between Africa and the remaining EU-27. In short, there will be change, but it will be a medium- to long-term affair; negotiations will span many years to come.
Last, but not least, Brexit will impact on migrants from French-speaking African countries living in the UK, including the tricky question of remittances. Remittances have been the largest source of international financial flows to Africa since 2010, accounting on average for about a third of total external financial inflows, and three times as much as development aid, according to the World Bank. They represent the most stable source of flows (AEO 2018). The UK, with its large migrant population, is the 10th-largest source of remittances worldwide. The fall in the value of the pound will have an adverse effect on these remittances (Gaynor 2018). Moreover, UK post-Brexit migration policy will not be as liberal as before. May repeatedly committed herself to tackling illegal migration, going as far as to propose an end to free movement ‘once and for all’, allowing only ‘highly skilled’ migrants into the UK. Many countries who are heavily reliant on remittances – from which Senegal, for example, derives 14% of its GDP – are likely to suffer (Ibid.).
Conclusion
Contrary to widespread opinion, available evidence suggests that Brexit will impact considerably not only on the English-speaking African Commonwealth countries but on francophone Africa too. The possible effects range from effects on farm-gate cocoa prices in the CFA currency regions, with subsequent repercussions on state budgets, through to more indirect effects on regional integration, going as far as the revival of progressive social networks in francophone Africa. The latter are already demanding more political and economic sovereignty. All in all, the power elite of francophone Africa, both in France and in its former African colonies, have profited enormously over decades from France’s special relations with its African backyard, at the expense of the poor in Africa and Europe.
More generally, Brexit and its spread effects could also impact negatively on acquired human rights in relation to popular participation, both in Europe and in Africa. This is because the elite-driven process of European integration has been enhanced and developed over decades by granting a greater political role to ordinary citizens, by reaching mutually acceptable agreements that balance their various communitarian commitments in ways that reflect a cosmopolitan regard for fairness (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998, 447–448; Brown 1994; Nunes 2011). This right of participation goes far beyond the politics and economics of Brexit. It includes also the ethics of participation which are in the long run even more important for the cohesion of the EU than political and economic motives. Thus, the withdrawal of the UK will have implications, widely disregarded to date, for shared ethics (Frost 2019). In fact, Brexit constitutes a retrograde step in promoting a political and socio-cultural climate which could – in the worst case – become similar to that of apartheid South Africa, for example in policing borders and forming a reserve-pool of migrant labourers which can be admitted or not, depending on the ‘national interest’. Thus, this globalised lumpenproletariat would be deprived of basic individual civilian rights, declassifying it in terms of race, religion and gender, and denying the basic rules of the global free market of goods to human beings (Frost 2019, 192–196). The outcome of all this might very well include severe conflicts, both within the state and between states, when radical right-wing nationalists begin to use violent means to defend their perceived legitimate interests, including neo-fascist militias similar to those in Europe in the 1920s. The backlash will not be a long time in coming. Activists among the segregated ‘foreigners’ and ‘infidels’ will turn to asymmetrical warfare, labelled as ‘terrorism’ by the populist majority (Frost 2019, 197). This includes the pursuit of ultranationalist goals and compromising on established human rights in relation, for example, to growing inequality and the crusade against ‘infidels’ and ‘the other’(Frost 2019).
Yet, the changes caused by Brexit could offer new opportunities, both for those francophone African governments that flirt with the idea of joining the African Commonwealth and those that remain in francophone Africa. They could be inclined to fall back on the old-established see-saw policy of Cold-War times. This would allow for renewed negotiations between African governments on the one side and the UK, EU and other global players in the race for African resources and markets, like China, India, Brazil and Turkey, on the other, to open up new doors for increasing economic and political power.
The revival of already written-off murky socio-political networks like that of Françafrique or alternative new networks of trans-boundary corruption, trafficking and money-laundering, to the detriment of the ordinary taxpayer, cannot be ruled out either, given no British counter-balance within the EU. On the other hand, hopes ran high for increased grass-roots political democratisation in the wake of the ‘second wind of liberation’ that was stimulated by the sovereign national conferences held in francophone Africa in the early 1990s (Robinson 1994), but were ultimately frustrated. This should serve as a warning to those looking forward to enhanced political participation in francophone Africa and elsewhere.