Anti-fraud measures in Eastern Africa

SUMMARY

This briefing explores anti-fraud measures (AFMs) in Eastern Africa (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Madagascar). The second of a three-part briefing series, it complements previous accounts of AFMs in southern Africa and confirms key AFM features that the authors previously identified concerning typical actors and their alliances, major sectors, fraud types and measures against fraud. The evidence suggests an expansion of anti-fraud agencies and initiatives, collecting and sharing more data within and across borders; of official governance of financial and product flows; and of efforts by AFM actors to enable the detection of genuine products, with related controversies among actors with divergent views and interests.

Main article text

Introduction

In this briefing, we set out to identify the characteristics of anti-fraud measures (AFMs) in East Africa. We will show that the key AFM actors are governments and, increasingly, international and local corporates, and only rarely civil society organisations; that the key sectors that AFMs target are consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, finance, banking and mobile phones; that the key targets are substandard and counterfeit goods, tax evasion, money laundering and terrorism financing; and that the major AFM tools are information technology (IT), hotlines, intelligence sharing, raids, confiscations, training, incentives, awareness building campaigns and the use of particular discourses.¹ More specifically, we will show that private commercial AFM actors, alone or with state actors, work to promote an image of brands emphasising product reliability, financial security and customer care. Moreover, AFMs regularly equip customers with IT that can be used to verify the genuineness of goods or educate them on the dangers of counterfeits. Customers are often rewarded with such incentives as gifts or free product warranties. However, the AFMs’ characteristics and effectiveness remain under-researched to date.

We now explore AFMs in more detail in each of the four countries studied.

Kenya

The main sectors where AFMs feature include pharmaceuticals, insurance, banking and finance, textiles and garments, other consumer goods, logistics and taxation. In the pharmaceutical industry, Kenya’s Pharmacy and Poisons Board (PPB) introduced the Pharmacovigilance Electronic Reporting System – reportedly the first of its kind in the world and used to collect and process information on drugs, and detect fraudulent products (Xinhua 2013). In another initiative, the PPB ran a series of raids in which it confiscated substandard drugs worth millions of shillings (Muchangi 2014). Chinese stores selling iron sheets were also raided, resulting in confiscation (Daily Nation 2015). The Kenyan Bureau of Standards (KEBS) cited the lack of standardisation labels, the failure to translate the description of products into English or Swahili, and quality concerns as reasons for the raids. Other measures included the commitment to target large manufacturers and introduce stronger profiling of clearing agents and shipping lines to prevent the import of fake drugs (Mwaura 2015). Another initiative that deals with strengthening of control of counterfeit trade was the establishment in 2015 of the Border Control and Coordination Committee, made up of 11 bodies, including the Kenyan Revenue Authority (KRA), KEBS, the National Police Service, the Emigration Department and others (KTN 2015a).

In the insurance industry, the Kenya Police Anti-Fraud Insurance unit was established in 2011 and includes a partnership between the Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) and the police. This is the fourth unit of its kind, the others being anti-fraud units attached to the KRA, the Central Bank of Kenya and the Capital Markets Authority, indicating a high interest in governing financial flows (Mulunda 2011). AFMs in the banking and financial services sectors were extensive. Similar to initiatives in southern African countries, IT was used as a tool. For example, CompuLynx (an information and communications technology [ICT] firm) in 2015 unveiled anti-fraud software for financial institutions intended to help detect suspicious transactions at an early stage (The Star 2015). Another AFM – the ‘Be alert’ ATM safety campaign – was started in 2012 by the Kenya Bankers Association in collaboration with Kenyan banks, Visa Inc., communications company Safaricom, the Retail Trade Association of Kenya and Pesalink (Mbogo 2018). It aimed to reduce ‘skimming’, by providing PIN protection techniques. Another initiative was rolling out Europay, Mastercard and Visa (EMV) standard payment cards with an embedded microprocessor chip, claimed to provide extra security during transactions (Irungu 2013; Situma 2013). As in other similar initiatives in this sector, commercial actors are extensively involved. For example, Fraud-Vigilance, a local fraud solution company, has launched a fraud management engine called Glinde 2.0, and an online database that contains real-time fraud alerts and warns costumers about potential fraud threats. It is already in use by multinational companies, banks, Safaricom dealers and others (Kuria 2015). The system also has a toll-free line, which allows customers, suppliers and employees to report cases of fraud (Okulo 2015).

The expressed commitment to adhere to international standards was also evident in the financial sector. For example, from 2015 the Kenyan banks were claimed to be compliant with the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an intergovernmental organisation that works on addressing such crimes as money laundering and terrorism finance (Mbogo 2015). In 2019, the country’s members of parliament (MPs) were proposing amendments to the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2016), as this law was allegedly harming businesses (Wangui 2019). However, the governor of the Central Bank is reported to have pushed back against changes, as this might ‘frustrate the war on corruption and cut off Kenya’s banking sector from the global financial system’ (Ngugi 2019). In another legislative move, the National Treasury has put forward a draft Unclaimed Financial Assets (UFA) policy, aimed at creating more stringent audit procedures and addressing the issue of abandoned assets (Alushula 2019).

There have also been substantial initiatives in the technology sector. For example, in 2012, the Communications Commission of Kenya, now the Communications Authority of Kenya, ran a campaign aimed at curbing the illegal trade of mobile phones. Together with the Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Agency, it initiated the switching off of all unlicensed handsets (Mulunda 2012). The targets were handsets without an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number. This was a response to the widespread use of counterfeit mobiles, said to impact negatively on tax revenues and those companies producing genuine ones. Over the years, thousands of fake handsets have been switched off (Chebusiri 2012). It was reported that the campaign had a negative impact on both consumers and traders: substandard mobiles were highly favoured by consumers due to affordability, and traders of cheap phones faced significant cuts to their revenues, loss of stock, and increased debt. Traders expressed their discontent with having to bear the decreases in revenues, while arguing that the KEBS ‘have the single responsibility to ensure that all goods entering the country are of high quality’ (Ibid.). Some traders also claimed that although some mobile phones do not have IMEI numbers this ‘does not mean they are counterfeit’ (Mulunda 2012). Traders stated that genuine phones manufactured by small companies were also switched off; in these cases the manufacturers had not applied for the IMEI registration, since omitting this step makes the phone cheaper and, furthermore, it is not compulsory (Ibid.). Local traders were among the major critics of various AFMs, across the countries studied.

Ostensibly to address money laundering, counterfeiting and embezzlement of funds, Kenya has begun a demonetisation initiative, initially replacing old banknotes (BBC 2019; Gaitho 2019; Okoth 2019). It was reasoned that this move will make it harder to hide and move cash in the ‘hidden economy’. The move was traced to President Uhuru Kenyatta’s pledge, after being elected in 2013, to address corruption and the illicit flow of funds (BBC 2019; Gaitho 2019). Reports also questioned the president’s decision to release some imported goods that were previously seized, citing the potential connection of the owners of those goods to the president’s own political circle (Gaitho 2019). In another example, the government was deemed to offer a ‘comprehensive strategy’ to address contraband and illegal smuggling, especially that linked to the financing of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab (Makong 2020). The strategy included strengthened border controls, improved information sharing, calls for chiefs to report anyone involved, and educational activities starting from primary school.

Like the other countries in this study, Kenya demonstrated activity aimed at tax avoidance and evasion. For example, in 2015 the KRA put in place a new tax dispute resolution system, which was aimed at bringing clarity and transparency (KTN 2015b). Some of the main components of the system include: the specification of the reasons why a certain company has been selected for an audit; the automation of case registration; a clear framework for conducting searches and retaining documents; and, more generally, clearer governance procedures (Ibid.). Moreover, to address tax evasion and avoidance among the small and medium enterprises, KRA announced that it was starting a compliance initiative ‘not to punish but to encourage’ (KTN 2015c). The initiative entails the lobbying of county governments to give it access to the accompanied registries and so to promote a ‘compliance oriented’ regulatory strategy (Tombs and Whyte 2019).

AFMs concerning tax evasions regularly featured in media headlines largely because they targeted some well-known and powerful business ‘tycoons’ at regional and national levels and stirred up related politics (Kiplagat 2019; Oketch 2019). KEBS has been at the centre of media scrutiny since its former chief executive was charged with misconduct and tax evasion, namely allowing uncertified imports to enter the country at a reduced custom value (Malalo 2018; Munguti 2019). Another report questioned KEBS’s effectiveness in meeting its commitment to address counterfeit cosmetics potentially containing health-threatening chemicals, trade in which fraud was thought to be rife (Njerun 2020). Moreover, controversies arose when appointing the new managing director (MD), where allegedly the office was given to someone who did not achieve the top score while in the running for the post (Owino 2020). In an interview, the new MD pledged to be objective in his work and implement cultural change at the organisation (Business Daily 2020). Finally, companies and banks were also implicated (and punished with fines) in public procurement scandals (Wasuna 2018).

Rwanda

In Rwanda, AFMs were evident in the banking sector, in tax revenue collection and in relation to consumer goods. In 2013 the central bank introduced a new system to process cheque payments aimed at addressing cheque fraud (Babijja 2013). There was also the introduction of a new core banking system, named ‘T24’, which is aimed at addressing bank fraud (Tumwebaze 2014b). T24, in combination with another system, Oracle e-Business Suite Enterprise Resource Planning, sought to strengthen the banking system and help to withstand fraudulent attacks (Ibid.). Both systems are being implemented by Temenos, an international market software provider whose headquarters are in Geneva, which provides banking software used by over 90 banks across Africa: the reach and influence of this international company across the banking sector in Africa can thus be clearly seen.

Efforts to address tax evasion and avoidance are prominent too. For example, Rwandan civil society activists and organisations joined other African countries in a campaign run by the Tax Justice Network-Africa in 2015 to ‘stop Africa from bleeding’ (Agutamba 2015a) – one of very few initiatives with a civil society organisation as an initiating actor. The Rwandan International Trade Union Confederation took the issue further and petitioned President Kagame in an open letter to address the issue of illicit financial flows in the country (Ibid.), calling for policies that would minimise the tax loopholes exploited by global corporations. There were campaigns to register taxpayers at the district level, to draw attention to the importance of a healthy tax system, to address tax evasion and to ensure that this does not affect the ‘implementation of development projects’, thus making Rwanda more ‘self-reliant’ (Nkurunziza 2015). The introduction of electronic billing machines (EBMs) and a mobile telephone facility that allows traders to declare their taxes is another governmental initiative for improving the system that was introduced in 2013 (Kwibuka 2014). The EBMs reportedly helped to increase tax collection by 5% in 2015 (Mugisha 2015), although research in 2017 suggests that effects have been disappointing due to issues with compliance (Steenbergen 2017).

The above developments are notable in the light of the recently introduced investment code which states that the country ‘reduced its corporate income taxes from 30% to 15%, for priority sectors, including energy, financial services, transport, affordable housing and logistics’ (News of Rwanda 2015). Moreover, ‘the country is giving up to seven years of tax holidays to projects investing $50 million in energy, manufacturing, health and ICT, key sectors in [the] country’s economy’ (Ibid.). Although this code is aimed at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), its impact on earlier and ongoing efforts to reduce tax evasion is as yet unknown. The government has attempted to revisit tax laws, putting a 10% tax on items that were previously exempt (Agutamba 2015b). The case of the new code suggests that there are conflicts between the objectives of opening up the country for FDI, giving tax incentives and curbing illicit financial flows.

Representatives of various authorities have suggested that addressing counterfeiting, bank fraud and tax evasion could help wean the country off foreign aid (Kwibuka 2014), which would contribute to the successful implementation of development projects (The New Times 2015a). This echoes the government’s investment and development policies. Moreover, the above statement touches upon issues of sovereignty. Reduced dependency on multilateral and bilateral aid is assumed to give more autonomy to the country, thus reducing exposure to policy conditionality and interference in domestic policymaking. Such discourses mirror those identified by us in southern African countries.

The confiscation and destruction of counterfeit product is a method used extensively in AFMs. For example, in 2014, counterfeit goods worth Rwf14.5 million were seized as a result of ‘Fagia’, an Interpol-backed regional operation (Nkurunziza 2014). This operation was part of a wider action by the East African Police Chiefs’ Corporation Organisation (EAPCCO), where similar operations were organised in member countries. In Rwanda, it was run in collaboration with several agencies and ministries. Furthermore, in 2014 and 2015, police operations (Usalama 1 and 2) – run in collaboration with Eastern and Southern Africa police chiefs’ organisations – targeted cross-border counterfeit flows (The New Times 2014a, 2015b).

In the same year, ‘Operation Whip Out’, a collaboration among the officials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM), the Rwanda Bureau of Standards, Interpol, the Rwanda Development Board, and the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority, took place (Tumwebaze 2014a), responding to the East African and Southern African Police Chiefs’ recommendations on the action needed to address the inflow of illegal products. Other authorities, such as the Rwanda Association of Manufacturers, the Private Sector Federation (PSF) and MINICOM, are working together to add to the efforts of addressing counterfeit products. This partnership was believed to ‘support local producers and ensure consumer confidence’ (Tumwebaze 2015). According to a PSF representative, the government encourages such cooperation and thus creates an ‘enabling business environment for the private sector, especially to support industrial growth’ (Ibid.). As in other African countries, the policies of creating an ‘enabling’ business environment and protecting consumers, thus reducing damage to state legitimacy from the prevalence of counterfeits, and discourses around local business, growth, national development, and reduced dependency are among the push factors for AFMs. Moreover, the above-mentioned operations reveal the prevalence of inter-agency cooperation, nationally and regionally.

Madagascar

AFMs emerge in a variety of sectors, including consumer goods, banking, finance, taxation, and high-value products such as vanilla, rosewood, minerals, medicine and wildlife. In the late 2000s, Madagascar underwent years of political and economic instability and a political transition; this unstable situation reportedly fostered fraudulent activity in some sectors (Ford 2013).

Regarding consumer goods, in 2014, the Ministry of Commerce began a series of unannounced checks to clamp down on fake products (Navalona 2014c). As part of the initiative, consumers were encouraged to report out of date or mislabelled products (Navalona 2014b) – although some imported products are labelled in foreign languages. To reinforce these efforts, changes to the legislation were introduced (Antsa 2015a; Navalona 2015). There was a strong emphasis on stakeholder communication and cooperation between the relevant government ministries (Navalona 2014b, 2014c, 2015).

Commercial actors were active in protecting their brands from substandard and counterfeit products. For example, Feline, a local perfume manufacturer, worked on educating its customers regarding how to identify genuine products, introducing unique holograms and stickers to authenticate them (Navalona 2014a). Additionally, both state and non-state actors have launched campaigns designed to raise awareness of counterfeit products, learning to identify and report them (Antsa 2015a; Hanita 2014; Navalona 2014a).

In medicine, the multinational pharmaceutical company Merck has financially supported the Malagasy authorities in creating two laboratories to detect fake medicines (Navalona 2014c). As in other sectors, legislative changes were introduced to reinforce AFMs in the pharmaceutical sector. The 2013 Customs Code allowed authorities to destroy and seize goods without compensation and to impose heavy fines (Institute of Research Against Counterfeit Medicines – IRACM n.d.). Cases of international cooperation, public–private cooperation, and the use of new technological innovations also featured in this sector (Bradley 2009; IRACM n.d.; Navalona 2014c; Schiller 2013).

In the area of tax revenue collection, the Finance Law of 2011 was a prominent legislative initiative. It requires companies to provide evidence of compliance and strengthens sanctions if companies do not adhere to the legislation (Edmond 2011). Notably, under the new law, the government was able to request details on all Malagasy nationals from credit and financial institutions (Rafidiarisoa 2016). While this is officially underpinned by a discourse of increasing commitment to transparency and law enforcement, questions were raised regarding the implications for data privacy and surveillance (Rafidiarisoa 2016). Further, international cooperation in efforts to address tax avoidance and evasion was also prevalent. For example, in 2015 government representatives took part in an inter-regional South and Central-African seminar organised by the International Monetary Fund’s Africa Regional Technical Assistance Centers and the Africa Training Institute, which focused on value added tax (VAT) fraud, and where the importance of cooperation and intelligence sharing across borders was stressed (Charalambous 2015). In another initiative in 2014, there was an unannounced campaign launched by the General Tax Directorate that involved spot checks on importers, wholesalers and manufacturers for tax compliance. Following the campaign, officials vowed to keep making unannounced spot checks and also set up a hotline so consumers can report instances of unfair practice (Antsa 2014). Madagascar also came up in the Panama Papers, where the seafood company Unima Group has allegedly set up shell companies in the country to avoid taxation (Carver and Fitzgibbon 2018), and in the Swiss Leaks, where the equivalent of 1.38% of the country’s gross domestic product in 2013 is thought to be kept in HSBC’s Swiss banks (Fernholz 2015). Neighbouring Mauritius has also featured in similar news (Fitzgibbon 2019). It is worth highlighting that in 2020, the World Bank, together with the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, conducted a ‘technical assistance mission’ (OECD 2019). This entailed confirmation of commitment by high-level officials, including the Minister of Economy and Finance, the governor of the Central Bank and several World Bank representatives, to implement international tax transparency standards.

The last decade has also seen the government taking steps to tackle money laundering. In 2016, a special court for economic crimes was created with the jurisdiction over money laundering activities (Randrianja and Voahangy 2016). Additionally, cooperative action features strongly in numerous initiatives: membership in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has assisted member states in building the analytical capacity of their Financial Intelligence Units, with Madagascar reportedly being the greatest beneficiary (Tralac 2016). COMESA held a ‘sensitisation workshop’ on money laundering and terrorist financing in Madagascar (Tralac 2016) and, aided by the EU-funded Regional Maritime Security Programme, has supplied Malagasy authorities with over US$100,000 worth of IT equipment (Samifin 2016; Tralac 2016). COMESA has emerged as a strong initiator of investigations, particularly into cartel activity, and other leads on other AFMs across the East African region (Anyanzwa 2019; Bowmans 2019).

Initiatives also aim at stricter border and customs control. In 2015, a new centre was opened at the Office of Customs in Toamasina so that ‘at risk’ goods can be checked in less time (Antsa 2015b). Moreover, top governmental officials have backed initiatives of this nature; in 2016 the president declared that the government will take action against trafficking. He questioned why smuggled items are not detected by customs officials, police and surveillance cameras (Bill 2016). Moreover, to mark International Customs Day 2016, which had the theme of ‘Digital customs’, the president called for the implementation of digital tools and systems within customs, which should both improve efficiency and reduce crime (Dominique 2016). International agencies were also involved: for example, a World Bank economist delivered a presentation to customs officials on ‘mirror statistics’ – a method used in identification and targeting of products and services with greatest risk of being exposed to fraud. The World Bank supports Madagascar in the use of mirror statistics to improve performance across the economy (Edmond 2016).

AFMs to protect the vanilla sector, the country’s key export, were also significant. The National Vanilla Platform, a government and industry body established in 2016, aims to compile an inventory of growers, collectors and exporters to ensure quality (Richardson and Razafimahatratra 2016). The rise in fraudulent activity in the sector was reportedly linked to the ban on illegal logging of rosewood in 2010, another of Madagascar’s highly sought-after products. Allegedly, the proceeds from logging were invested in immature vanilla then to be resold at a higher price (Richardson and Razafimahatratra 2016). Clearly, AFMs in one sector can cause an increase in criminal activity in another. In the rosewood sector, efforts to stop illegal logging ranged from government-led initiatives (Caramel 2015; Chatham House 2015) to cross-country cooperation (WWF 2015) and assistance from international organisations such as Interpol (CITES 2014).

Tanzania

AFMs in Tanzania included those aimed at tackling counterfeit products in electronic and banking sectors, as well as tax evasion. In 2012, the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) in collaboration with Bureau Veritas launched a mandatory Pre-shipment Verification of Conformity to Standards (PVoC) programme in order to address the inflow of counterfeit products. The aim of the programme was to ensure that imports comply with relevant standards before shipment (TBS 2012). Those imports that do not have a Certificate of Conformity are subjected to a penalty charge and could face re-exportation or destruction. Protection of the rights of consumers, of the local market, of local industry players and of sovereignty, and also border security concerns, ‘to move the economy to the next level’, as the Bureau Veritas vice-president put it (Aman and Mtweve 2013), are cited as some of the drivers behind these measures. Moreover, what characterises this initiative is the key role of international inspecting firms (headquartered in the global North), including the UK-based Intertek International Ltd, the Bureau Veritas from France and the Société Générale de Surveillance SA from Switzerland.

Other commercial actors were prevalent in other AFMs: Samsung Electronics Tanzania launched an e-warranty platform, which would allow their customers to register their phones and as a result enjoy a 24-month warranty and other services (Tambwe 2014). This platform also allows customers to check the authenticity of their phone, helping to stamp out counterfeit mobile devices. In another initiative, Hewlett-Packard began a campaign to curb counterfeiting of their brand (Lazaro 2013). The company continually seizes fake products, such as 3500 fake print cartridges between January and May 2013, and has developed authentication technology. Total Energy Solutions (Totensol) – an oil, gas and minerals service company – hosted a workshop in fraud prevention and investigations for banking and financial institutions (Mchekadona 2014).

The joint interest of state and capital in AFMs is demonstrated by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Human Development Innovation Fund (HDIF), itself founded by DFID with management consultants Palladium International and KPMG International, supporting the American company Sproxil – ‘a global leader in mobile-based brand protection and consumer engagement technology’ – to set up an office in the country (Sproxil 2017). ‘Mobile Product Authentication’ – Sproxil’s anti-counterfeiting service – is said to allow consumers to differentiate between fake and genuine products through the use of a mobile phone.

In an effort to curb counterfeit mobile phones, the Fair Competition Commission (FCC) ran an operation confiscating fake handsets (Kajoki 2014). Small-scale traders voiced their discontent with the commission’s actions, arguing that for a real change to happen, the commission should look at large companies (Ibid.). According to the traders, mobiles they sell are often bought from agents of large companies, and the traders lack the skills that would allow them to identify whether a product is fraudulent (Ibid.). In a region-wide initiative, the African Police Cooperation Organisation (Afripol) was formed, to offer a consolidated approach to fighting crime on the continent, including transnational crime, cyber-crime, counterfeit medicine and others (Gashumba 2014). According to the news piece, alliances between criminal organisations have strengthened, requiring a more collective, harmonised response.

In a state-based initiative, the National Payment System Bill was introduced by the government aimed at improving the security of electronic payments and mitigating fraud (Andrew 2015; The Paypers 2015). This legislation was meant to regulate and protect electronic payment systems. It stipulated that all firms that wish to provide electronic money payments must do so with the permission of the Bank of Tanzania. Failure do so would incur a penalty of 500 million shillings, or five years’ imprisonment (Andrew 2015). In an effort to improve tax legislation, the government further passed the Tax Administration Bill (2014) (Mbashiru 2015). The new bill introduces a currency point system in tax administration. This was meant to ‘harmonize’ and ‘streamline’ penalties for the tax laws administered by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA). The bill gives the TRA more power allowing the search of premises and assets, and also allows public denunciation of tax offenders in order to discourage tax evasion.

In a further legislative move, the government initiated three bills tagged ‘Certificates of Urgency’, related to the extractive industry – The Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act 2015, The Oil and Gas Revenue Management Act 2015 and The Petroleum Act 2015 (Policy Forum 2015a) – although these were criticised for the ‘rushed’ way they were introduced. In another initiative, the government introduced the Cyber-Crime Bill, which was meant to address a number of issues ranging from child pornography and cyberbullying, to online financial fraud (Baerendtsen 2015). This bill was criticised on the grounds of limiting freedom of expression, creating obstacles for whistleblowing and giving considerably more power to enforcement agencies (Baerendtsen 2015; Eyakuze and Taylor 2015; Mwangonde 2015; Songa 2015).

At a Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia in July 2015, the Tanzania Tax Justice Coalition issued an open letter to the Minister of Finance calling for a strengthening of the awareness of international taxation issues (Policy Forum 2015b). The Tanzanian Minister of Finance called for ‘strong collective actions by both countries of origin and reception to curtail, reverse and facilitate asset recovery and repatriation of funds to countries of origin’ (UN 2015, 5). Even though establishing an intergovernmental tax body was at the centre of the conference’s agenda, wealthy nations, led by the US, the UK and Japan, reportedly blocked the proposed avenue for negotiations on this matter (Ladu 2015).

Finally, a nationwide initiative to improve VAT revenue collection was introduced by the government in 2010. The initiative stemmed from the VAT (Electronic Fiscal Device) Regulation and included the use of electronic fiscal devices (EFDs) to enable the automatic transmission of data on transactions, such as receipts and invoices, to the tax authorities (URT 2012). The introduction of EFDs was being associated with increased rates of revenue collection and was highly celebrated in numerous articles (Malanga 2019; The Citizen 2020). Revenue collection by the Tanzania Revenue Authority reportedly rose by 67% in the period between 2014 and 2019 (Malanga 2019).

Conclusion

This briefing has explored AFMs in the East African region. The findings reveal similar trends to those discussed in an earlier briefing, namely (i) the increased involvement of state and private actors in pushing for AFMs; (ii) the major role of outreach, engagement and ‘empowerment’ of consumers, primarily through awareness raising and education; and (iii) the proliferation of IT as a tool for uncovering counterfeit/substandard products and finance/bank fraud, thereby increasing revenue collection. The need to ‘authenticate’ products and customers underpins many initiatives of this kind. Moreover, the ‘educational’ character of many initiatives is in line with what Tombs and Whyte (2019) call a ‘compliance-oriented’ regulatory approach. This approach typifies a long-standing regulatory strategy, expanded under neoliberalism, which uses education, encouragement and persuasion rather than formal enforcement techniques (Ibid.). This is further revealed by the incentives and rewards that individuals are promised in return for their involvement in such AFMs. The role of the state in cracking down on fraudulent activity emerges strongly. For example, news pieces are particularly descriptive in revealing the quantities of goods confiscated and destroyed and how much individuals were fined. Importantly, this briefing continues to illustrate the structures of power and interests, and the conflicts, that shape AFMs – for instance, the struggle between being seen as ‘open and investor-friendly’ to foreign capital versus protecting national brands and tax bases. Finally, we note that AFMs are supportive of and complementary to agendas relating to the digital economy, data collection, surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019) and ‘secure capitalism’ that bring together a range of actors in illustrious coalitions of joint interests.

Note

1

See Mykhalchenko and Wiegratz (2019) for study background and methods, and findings for countries in southern Africa.

Acknowledgements

We thank Peter Lawrence and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the text. We are also grateful for funds provided by Review of African Political Economy and the University of Leeds (ESSL Summer Research Internships Scheme and Q-Steps Fund) that enabled the research. We thank Harvey Dodds for his research on the Madagascar case, and also thank Clare Smedley and the ROAPE Editorial Working Group for their work and support in editing this briefing.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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