Introduction
Artisanal fishing has remained the major source of employment and means of livelihood among littoral communities, particularly those living in the coastal South South region, Nigeria (Olaoye and Ojebiyi 2018). Over 75% of the population living on the coast depends on the fishing economy for their existence and survival (Okafor-Yarwood 2017). Available statistics also show that 69% of fish consumed daily in Nigeria is caught by artisanal fishers (both men and women) who live in riverine areas (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] 2017). According to the same NBS report, artisanal fish production stood at 3,506,865 metric tons (mt), which was higher than the production from both industrial fishery (204,403 mt) and aquaculture (1,383,690 mt). Hence, marine artisanal fishing contributes more to the country’s fish supply than do the mechanised fish production outlets. However, the increasing piracy against artisanal fishery has continued to threaten not only the food security of the coastal population but also its contribution to the national fish supply. Artisanal fishery is a traditional small-scale fishing system that utilises a relatively low level of technology such as traditional fishing gear (spears or hand reels), small boats or canoes with no or very simple low-power engines, as against larger and more powerful vessels (Caceres 2017; FAO 2017).
Piracy attacks have been a major security concern in the Nigerian maritime domain in the last two decades. In fact, the 2013 judgements of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) identified Nigeria’s maritime domain as the most dangerously piracy-prone marine space in the Gulf of Guinea since 2011. Existing scholarship has identified various issues that threaten artisanal fishery in Nigeria, including climate change (Mustapha 2013), weak policy environment (Agbeja 2010; de Montclos 2012), inadequate application of modern technology (Egesi 2016) and overfishing (Chilaka, Nwabeze, and Odili 2014; Ukpong and Ukoima 2017). However, empirical analysis of how piracy in the Gulf of Guinea impacts on food security among artisanal fishers remains rare, and this briefing fills that gap.
This study adopts a mixed-method qualitative approach in data collection and analysis. Added to information generated from documentary reports, focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with some fishers and other stakeholders living in the three Nigerian Gulf of Guinea coastal states of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa and Rivers, in March 2018, July 2019 and September 2019.1 These research sites were chosen because they represent the epicentre of piracy attacks against artisanal fishery, as well as the highest contributing states in the South South region to the national fish supply (Olaoye and Ojebiyi 2018). The FGDs were separately arranged with some key stakeholders in the fishing sector. These stakeholders are fishers, fish merchants and fishing settlement groups.2 All the stakeholders have been, or are still, active in the fishing business. Two FGDs each were conducted in the three coastal states (these states being purposively selected on the basis of a common history of engagement with the maritime threats). There were six participants in each of the FGDs, who were randomly selected to eliminate bias and give every stakeholder an equal opportunity of being involved in the study. All of the information generated was audio recorded, transcribed and discussed.
The remainder of the article is divided into five sections. The next section lays out the study environment. This is followed by a section that highlights the theoretical underpinnings of piracy attacks against fishing vessels. The next section presents evidence of piracy at the sea and its food security implications among artisanal fishers in the South South region. The legal framework that explains the persistence of the attacks against artisanal fishers is presented in fourth section, and the final section contains the conclusion.
The South South region as the study environment
The South South region or geopolitical zone of Nigeria represents about 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass, with an area of about 84,587 km2 (Anaro 2012). It comprises six states – Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers – and is strategically located at the point where the Y tail of the River Niger joins the Atlantic Ocean through the Gulf of Guinea (Asenguah 2017). The South South region constitutes the heart of the Niger Delta that is significantly known as home to energy and marine resources and is the country’s economic lifeline (Akpabio and Akpan 2010). The region is endowed with the most sought-after fish in the country; indeed, over 60% of all Nigeria's fish species are found here (Okafor-Yarwood 2017). The region is also one of the most productive ecosystems on the planet and harbours an array of mineral, forest and water resources of immense economic potential (Inyang 2009). The mangrove of the region offers a conducive environment for the growth of fish species such as bonga, tilapia, croakers, catfish, crayfish, shrimps and finfish, among other marine animals. Over two million people in the region are estimated to derive their livelihood from artisanal fishing (Okafor-Yarwood 2020). It is therefore the major source of employment for both the youths and the aged. As in other coastal regions, the fishing business in South South is exploited in both commercial and subsistence quantities by large- and small-scale artisanal fishing vessels (Branch et al. 2002), and an estimated 41–75% of animal protein consumed in the region is obtained from fish alone (Okafor-Yarwood 2017).
State fragility: towards a theoretical explanation of piracy against artisanal fishery
De Montclos (2012) raised three pertinent questions confronting piracy studies generally in Nigeria: (1) How can we measure the escalation or decrease of criminal violence at sea? (2) What is the relationship between piracy and the (permanent) crisis of the state in Africa? (3) What is the relationship between violence at sea and conflicts onshore? While these questions continue to occupy scholars, other studies demonstrate that because the maritime domain presents enormous opportunities for quick wealth, the sector will continue to be attractive to both state and non-state actors, including criminals (Cheng 2019; FAO n.d.; OECD 2016). Questions remain: Why is the Nigerian state challenged in providing security to poor artisanal fishers within the littoral communities of its Gulf of Guinea region? How has the weakness in security provision impacted the food crisis among littoral communities in South South, whose major means of livelihood are dependent on small-scale fishing?
To answer these questions, this study was anchored on fragile state theory. Fragile states have come into the spotlight particularly since they were identified as potential havens for criminals (Barakat and Larson 2014). State fragility is a concept mainly employed by development agencies to explain the character of a state where the government cannot or will not deliver its core functions to the majority of the people (DFID 2005). This study, however, relies more on a nuanced analysis of state fragility from the perspectives of scholars such as Zoellick (2008), Cammack et al. (2006), Barakat and Larson (2014), Gruffydd Jones (2013) and Saeed (2020). These scholars account for state fragility in a way that is different from that of donor agencies. For example, they argue that donors’ interventions also contribute to political instability (Barakat and Larson 2014; Cammack et al. 2006). At the heart of the discourse is the link between fragility and violence (Saeed 2020). The state fragility narrative rests on the fact that states have responsibilities, the non-fulfilment of which implies that they have become fragile and could lead to complete failure (Saeed 2020). State fragility, therefore, is a categorisation that goes against the normalcy of state–citizen and state–state relationships (Brooks 2005 cited in Saeed 2020).
Three main characteristics stand out in scholarship in determining a fragile state: poverty, ineffective government and conflict (Zoellick 2008). Thus, state fragility is often characterised by growing violence and insecurity, a legacy of conflict, weak governance, poverty and the inability to deliver the efficient and equitable distribution of public goods (Zoellick 2008). Using these indices, Nigeria is a fragile state, having become the third most terrorised country in the world (GTI 2020), with over 46% of its population living in extreme poverty (Kharas, Hamel, and Hofer 2018), and with the rate of unemployment and underemployment rising from 24.1% in the first quarter of 2015 to 55.7% in the second quarter of 2020 (NBS 2020).
The implication is that Nigeria encourages the emergence of individuals or groups motivated to commit crimes because of the extreme poverty, ineffective security apparatus with weak enforcement capacity, and high rate of unemployment and/or underemployment. As such, the maritime domain is preyed on by criminals and ethnic-themed champions (including unemployed youths, ex-militants, and ex-cadets from the maritime academy without job opportunities) who exploit the security gap to unleash mayhem on the poor artisanal fishers while bringing to the environment more poverty, insecurity and loss of jobs.
Piracy, artisanal fishery and food security in the South South region
Attractive soft targets are abundant in Nigeria’s coastal waterways because of weak security infrastructure (Ships and Ports 2014), and pirates exploit this lacuna to prey on the marine (blue) economy. The methods used by security operatives to track criminals also appear hamstrung against sea pirates, who are often armed with heavy automatic weapons (Mair 2011). Evidence obtained from FGDs also lends credence to the fact that successive governments have paid attention mainly to oil production and protection while the artisanal fishery sector was neglected. Sometimes, in an attempt to secure the maritime domain (especially the oil pipelines) against attacks from criminals whose activities overwhelm the security agents, the government awards security contracts to ex-militants (Adibe, Nwagwu, and Albert 2018). The implication is that Nigeria technically relinquishes its monopoly use of force to individuals whose activities once impacted adversely on state security. While this initiative results in greater attention to petro-dollar businesses, it undermines the security of other, informal economies, including artisanal fishing. To continue in their own business, the fish merchants in some cases resort to seeking security from the militants. Many fish merchants who participated in the FGDs admitted that sometimes, to survive in the fishing business, they engage the services of the militants, who provide them with security cover, but not after parting with some shares of their fish proceeds. This creates a volatile environment that threatens sustainable business while incentivising crime.
In the South South coastal zone, artisanal fisheries are characterised by simple cluster fishing vessels and trawlers navigating the marine area of 46,000 km within the creeks with an estimated 3–5 nautical mile (NM) radius from the shoreline (Olaoye and Ojebiyi 2018). Although most coastal dwellers depend on artisanal fishers for their fish supplies, armed robbery at the sea that targets artisanal fishing boats has increased fish supply scarcity (FGD 1 2018a). This supply crisis results in reduced catch reaching the shoreline and lost revenue for artisanal fishers, thereby increasing the risk premium on food security in the coastal communities who depend on fishery proceeds for their survival (FGD 2 2018b). This could explain the rising amount of fish importation into Nigeria. It was estimated that Nigeria spends over N1.0 billion (about US$2.2 million) importing about 2.2 million mt of fish annually (Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea 2016).
Meanwhile, the criminal acts against artisanal fishery have contributed significantly to the changing pattern of unemployment and poverty that pervades the South South region today (FGD 5 2019a). Fish merchants admitted during the FGDs that it was difficult to quantify the adverse impact of piracy on artisanal fishery due to the lack of relevant empirical data. This confirms an existing finding, which showed that there are not enough data to monitor the real trend of maritime piracy, and that the available data ignore ‘small’ trawlers and fishermen who are ‘the first victims of pirates’ (de Montclos 2012, 531). Nevertheless, FGDs and KIIs with relevant stakeholders show that hijacking of artisanal fishing boats occurs frequently and poses a huge threat to the survival of the people of the coastal region. Estimates obtained from participants in the FGDs indicated that over 178 hijackings of fishing boats were recorded between 2015 and 2018. The outboard engines of these boats were often stolen for re-sale3 and this limits the growth of artisanal fishery. According to Amire Akinbola, the president of the Nigerian Trawlers Owners Association (NITOA), the number of artisanal fishing vessels operated by NITOA dropped from 250 to less than 130 due to frequent armed sea robbery attacks (Olawoyin 2018). The result has been a gradual reduction in the volume of fish that arrive at fishing markets within this region. As a participant in the FGD in Bayelsa noted, ‘only an estimated 30–40% of fish caught currently gets to the buyers and secondary sellers due to continuous seizure of artisanal fishing vessels by criminals’ (FGD 6 2019b). Another participant, in Akwa Ibom, corroborated this:
hijacking of fishing vessels has led to the scarcity of fish in the fishing markets, which has, in turn, threatened the consumption volumes of fishes by the locals as well as for commercial purposes. Local fishes are very costly because of scarcity, our people prefer them because local fishes are fresh and nutritious. This act has annihilated our only source of livelihood, by adversely affecting education, health, general well-being and food security across the coastal region. (FGD 7 2019c)
My people are dying daily from sea pirates[’] attacks and hunger. We do not have land to grow crops, everywhere is water, no forest for logging, we depend only on the high sea for food, but sadly, sea robbers have taken over the sea, leaving my people without the hope of survival. (Ships and Ports 2017)
government does not pay sufficient attention to this sub-sector [referring to artisanal fishery] as it is done in the oil sector. This is because the navigational routes of fishing trawlers and vessels are without security coverage. Sea robbers sometimes disguise as naval personnel to perpetrate the act. Despite various security calls, the waterways remain without security coverage. The government seems to be ignoring our security problems but we are paying levies. (FGD 3 2018c)
Apart from losses in monetary terms, hijacking of artisanal fishing vessels has left many fish merchants out of business, and most such cases are usually not reported. This could add to why the sector attracts little government attention. Narrating the experiences of fishers in South South, Samuel Ayadi, Chairman of the Nigerian Artisan Fishermen Association (NAFA), revealed that 18 fishing vessels of fishers were once accosted at the Ibeno coastline (in Akwa Ibom state) by sea robbers, who removed the outboard engines and took all the fish caught that day – which were worth millions of naira (Ayadi 2018). Actions such as this could leave fishers trapped, as finding replacement engines to drive their vessels could constitute a traumatic as well as costly experience. Also, on the coastline of Mbo in Akwa Ibom state, sea pirates seized five fishing vessels loaded with crayfish and other seafood worth millions of naira, and forcefully collected a large sum of money from the fishermen; yet there was no confrontation due to the absence of marine police (Okwong 2016).
These actions constitute huge threat to sustainable artisanal fishery. One of the major consequences, as painted by an FGD participant in Mbo, Akwa Ibom State, is that some energetic youths were left unemployed (FGD 4 2018d). According to him, ‘some of the displaced victims of armed robbery at the sea may have become armed robbers themselves as alternative source of livelihood. Some of them may have become smugglers, using their wooden boats to ferry contrabands from neighboring countries … ’ (FGD 4 2018d). In light of the above, the artisanal fishery crisis and its attendant threat to food security in the South South region could largely be attributed to the ineffective security management and weakness of relevant regulations in Nigeria. The next section presents fishery legislation vis-à-vis its inherent weaknesses.
Nigeria’s fishery legislation and weaknesses
The federal government of Nigeria has evolved various regulatory mechanisms for managing its fishery industry (see Table 1). While the security of marine resources is exclusively shouldered by the federal (central) government, it shares the duty of managing inland fisheries with the states (federating units). Meanwhile, the bulk of attacks against artisanal fishers take place in the maritime space. This space is exclusively manned by the Nigerian Navy. The navy is saddled with the responsibility of securing the waterways, especially in terms of piracy against oil vessels and related threats. However, inadequate security to businesses run by less privileged Nigerians within the ocean belt has increased piracy attacks against artisanal fishers, with attendant job losses.
Relevant fishery legislation.
| Relevant legislation | Major focus | Weakness |
|---|---|---|
| Sea Fisheries Decree No. 30 of 1971 | Restriction of fishing in the territorial waters without licence from the federal government | Restricts littoral communities’ free access to ocean resources, including artisanal fishery. |
| Sea Fisheries Decree of 1972 | Restriction of fishing trawlers from operating within first two nautical miles of the continental shelf | Monopoly control of fishing and fishing proceeds on the continental shelf, with low incentive for investment and limited security for artisanal fishers. |
| Sea Fisheries Act No. 71 of 1992 | Provides conditions for granting a fishing licence for shrimping and fishing | Harsh on renewal of licensing but silent on fishers’ welfare, including security. |
| Inland Fisheries Act No. 108 of 1992 | Provides for state control of only inland fishery | No powers accorded to the federating units to monitor and secure artisanal fishery on the continental shelf. |
Source: Authors’ compilation.
The implication of the federal government’s regulatory frameworks is that artisanal fishing within the Gulf of Guinea is exposed to piracy attacks. Although there is an obvious broadening of the ocean belt with little or no legislative backing, artisanal fishers are trapped between risking their means of livelihood and seeking alternative security from Niger Delta militants who are known to shift allegiance between actors, moving from fishers to pirates and from pirates to security officials (Adibe, Nwagwu, and Albert 2018), all aimed at legitimising piracy within the region. In this regard, the states that would have complemented the federal government in regulating the sector were restricted to regulating inland waters such as lakes, rivers and reservoirs. The result is that armed robbers prey on artisanal fishing boats almost unhindered.
Conclusion
This briefing concludes that the survival of the coastline population, whose major means of livelihood depends on small-scale fishing, is at a crossroads. This is because of state fragility in Nigeria, which helps to legitimate piracy against artisanal fishers in the country’s Gulf of Guinea region. There is, therefore, an urgent need to expand surveillance of the waterways by involving the federating units, to revise the obsolete regulatory mechanisms, and to improve law enforcement to enhance investment in the artisanal fishing economy.