Introduction
In the last decade of the twentieth century, the quest and agitation for democracy could no longer be surmounted by the ruling autocratic regimes in some African countries. The end of apartheid in 1994 and the return of Nigeria to democracy in 1999 after 16 years of military rule increased the clamour for democracy throughout the continent. With two of the largest economies in Africa democratising within five years, coupled with sustained agitation for change in North African countries, it is imperative to explore the key agents of democratic change in Africa. While factors such as institutionalisation of political parties (Lynch and Crawford 2011), free and independent media (Abdulai and Crawford 2010), international actors’ and donors’ insistence on structural adjustment and good governance (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) have been credited with the emergence of democracy in Africa, social movements have been important in preventing several countries from crumbling into absolutism (Kpundeh 1992).
Social movements involve a distinct social process consisting of mechanisms through which actors are engaged in collective actions meant to oppose or promote a social change. Members are linked by dense informal networks and share a distinct collective identity (Diani and Bison 2004; Della Porta and Diani 2006). The social movement explored in this article is a form of self-determination movement which was established to oppose dictatorship and promote the attainment of democracy. Within this movement are recognised social movement organisations such as the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) in Nigeria. Although there is ample research on the rise of social movements and their importance to the emergence of democracy in Africa, a thorough empirical analysis of what happens to these types of movements after they have achieved (or come close to achieving) their aims remain lacking. This article fills this gap in the literature in order to explain the sustainability of movements, especially those whose focus is self-determination.
In advanced democracies, social movements have mastered the act of specialisation and are able to focus on the emerging needs (or specific issues) of the populace after attaining their initial goals (Taylor 1997; Buechler 2000). For instance, social movements that fought against broad issues of race and gender inequalities in the twentieth century have metamorphosed to focus on specific issues in the twenty-first century, such as trans rights. This article argues that social movements in developing democracies often ‘become lost in transition’ and are unable to transform or specialise, sometimes undoing what they have previously achieved. After achieving their main goals, social movements in developed democracies could disintegrate, specialise or continue to influence issues ‘from outside’. This is not the case in developing democracies, as the complexities of the operating environment coupled with political patronage and the need for resources often expose these social movements to political corruption, which sometimes results in implosion or capitulation.
This article does not see social movements in Africa as sui generis, since this makes comparison with social movements outside of Africa difficult. Rather, it focuses on an empirical analysis of the transformation of social movements based on the unique characteristics of African politics, steeped in historical issues such as colonialism and the Cold War, while political patronage remains a prevailing issue. This article uses Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and counter-hegemony as well as neopatrimonialism to explain the challenges to the sustainability of social movements in the democratisation process. While Tilly and Wood (2013) argue that democratisation promotes the formation of social movements, this study shows that democratisation can also weaken or lead to the demise of social movements in a neopatrimonial setting by weakening the counter-hegemonic element of social movements and through ‘negative funding’. This article posits that neopatrimonialism has been transferred into the democracies of previously authoritarian regimes. This form of politics is often ethnocentric in nature, provides funding for social movements in a negative way and weakens the evolution of social movements. In explaining the rise and evolution of social movements in Africa, this article explores one of the largest social movement organisations in Africa – the OPC in Nigeria.
The aim of the OPC was to agitate for the emancipation of the Yoruba (one of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria) through democracy (OPC 2019; interview excerpts).1 The members of the group were linked by dense informal networks and are mostly of the Yoruba ethnic group. It is important to state that the OPC is one of several self-determination movements formed by the Yoruba in the 1990s and early 2000s, among them groups such as Afenifere, the Oodua Republic Front (ORF), Oodua Youth Movement (OYM) and the Federation for Yoruba Culture and Consciousness (FYCC). Drawing on 40 interviews with OPC members, politicians, police officers and the general public carried out in 2017 and 2018, as well as newspaper articles, journals and other relevant materials, this article explores the formation, rise and eventual implosion of the OPC and its transition from a social movement into a partisan political organisation (contrary to its constitution). Interviews for the article were carried out in South-Western Nigeria, which forms the core base of the OPC.
The first section of the paper explores the evolution of social movements in Africa. Using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and counter-hegemony and the theory of neopatrimonialism, the second section of the paper analyses the weakening of counter-hegemony vis-à-vis the impact of ‘negative funding’. The third section explores the link between social movement and democracy in Nigeria. The paper then explores how the inability of social movements to transform and specialise coupled with the availability of negative funds could result in partisanship, implosion and possible collapse of the movement. The article concludes that while social movements are important in the democratisation of African countries, their inability to transform or specialise and focus on specific issues could pose a danger to emerging democracies through partisan political activities.
Evolution of social movements in Africa
There are several studies exploring the origins of social movements in Africa (Touraine 1985; Tar 1999 and several others). Eder (1993) describes social movements as a genuine modern phenomenon that has played a constitutive role in social development. Buechler argues that the need for state building coupled with the rise of capitalism gave rise to social movements ‘as a distinctively modern form of collective action’ (Buechler 2000, 5). According to Flacks (1997), when normal politics fail, social movements emerge. Flacks argues that the emergence of social movements in the twentieth century was because of perceived inequalities in the polity. The need to guarantee workers’ rights, equality in political participation and dividends of democracy, among other issues, led to the growth of social movements. In addition, Zinn (1997) argues that tyranny or forms of dictatorship also encourage the masses to support or participate in social movements. In the case of Nigeria, the long military dictatorship with its accompanying brutality, inequality and poverty resulted in massive collective dissatisfaction, a condition necessary for mass mobilisation through which social movements thrive (Zimmermann 2015).
Three main contemporary elements explain the evolution of social movements. First is the availability of a political structure that defines the opportunities available and the constraints faced by social movements. The second element is the financial and human resources that allow a movement to mobilise and operate, and the third element is the identities that provide the platform for actors’ involvement and legitimacy (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Touraine 1981; Tarrow 1994). While scholars like Habib and Opoku-Mensah (2009) argue that the third factor has been particularly influential in explaining the rise of social movements in Africa, this article will argue that the sources of finance and the type of financial or human resources they are exposed to determine their stability and sustainability. This is particularly relevant to social movements in Africa, which often have limited access to funding.
The role played by social movements in entrenching democracy in Africa cannot be overemphasised. Despite the immense volume of research on the topic, most studies have been geographically restricted to southern Africa (Eckert 2017), partly because the region has been able to develop structures that could accommodate such organisations ahead of other regions in Africa, leaving a gap in the research on the other regions. Molutsi agrees, stating that there were over 1500 such organisations in Botswana in the 1990s and that many of them were significant in entrenching democracy in the country (Molutsi's 1995 paper, cited in Somolekae 1998). The statistics are similar in several other countries in the region, such as South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (Ntseane and Youngman 2002). Despite the regional lopsidedness, Habib and Opoku-Mensah (2009) argue that social movements in Africa are vital in entrenching democracy by providing the certainty necessary to create accountability among political elites, thereby enhancing sustainable development.
This study chooses a different geographical area and charts a different line of research by exploring the decline of social movements in emerging democracies. It has been over 20 years since Taylor (1997) argued that research on social movements focuses too often on the periods of mass mobilisation and rise of social movements and not on their decline. While it is logical that a reversal in the fortunes of the key issues underpinning successful mobilisation of social movements (relative deprivation, resource mobilisation, framing and political opportunism) would automatically lead to its decline or demise, it is imperative to analyse other issues. There are diverse arguments about what happens to social movements once they attain their core objectives. Exploring abeyance processes in social movements using examples of women’s movements in the post-suffrage decades and feminist activities in the twentieth century, Taylor suggests that movements do not die; rather, they ‘contract and hibernate, sustaining the totally dedicated and devising strategies appropriate to the external environment’ (Taylor 1997, 437). Other scholars proffer five main issues that could lead to a social movement’s decline: (1) success – achieving their overarching goals; (2) failure – an inability to achieve their stated goals in the face of dwindling resources; (3) repression – when the state or its agents use measures to control or destroy the movement; (4) co-option – when movement leaders are enticed to work with the state they were protesting against; and (5) adoption – when the movement’s goals or ideologies are adopted by the state, making the movement irrelevant (Boren 2001; Macionis 2001).
There is a need to clarify the difference between the demise of social movements in advanced capitalist democracy and in emerging democracies; and it is important to establish the impact of common issues in emerging democracies, such as neopatrimonialism and patronage, on social movements. An analysis of the evolution and regression of OPC offers an insight into the key challenges faced by social movements in emerging democracies after achieving their core objectives. Although the OPC has yet to achieve its key aim, which is the emancipation of the Yoruba from political inequality,2 the attainment of democracy weakened the counter-hegemonic element of the movement and resulted in the loss of public support due to the inability of the movement to rebrand itself. The opportunity cost for social movements in emerging democracies is such that movements are more likely to shelve their overarching goals and ideologies in return for continuity rather than decline into oblivion. Furthermore, the fluidity of such movements calls into question the exact aspirations of movement leaders.
Neopatrimonialism and social movements
Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the country has oscillated between military and civilian regimes. Military dictatorship in Nigeria established a form of supremacy which Gramsci described as hegemony (Gramsci 1971). Gramsci argued that the supremacy of a class or a social group manifests itself in two ways: domination and hegemony (1971, 57). The former is rule by force and the latter is rule by consent. The military regimes in Nigeria used a combination of force and consent to mould consensus. Force was used through the subordination of the rule of law, crackdown on dissent, arbitrary detention and forced disappearance. Consent was established through bribery and corruption of the middle and working class, divide and rule tactics, ethnic factionalisation and, most importantly, a promise of democratic reforms. Some of the military juntas carried out a form of passive revolution in the face of the incapacity of the ruling class to establish hegemony. For Gramsci, organising consent starts with economic compromise between the dominant class and the subordinate groups (Im Baeg 1991). This was achieved in Nigeria through the distribution of the proceeds of oil exploration to all the states of the federation using a derivative principle (Ako 2011; Ako and Ekhator 2016).
The perceived illegitimacy of military rule in the country, coupled with economic instability, corruption and mismanagement of oil resources during subsequent military eras, resulted in widespread revolt and condemnation of military regimes, which is close to Gramsci’s concept of counter-hegemony (Gramsci 1971). In his prison notebooks, Gramsci described counter-hegemony as ‘a line of collective action’ constructed by a ‘new intellectual and moral order’ seeking to establish a ‘new type of society’ (Gramsci 1971, 194, 398). Counter-hegemony explains the response of movements to counter the hegemonic activities of military regimes through mass mobilisations and civil unrest. Organisations like the OPC fit Gramsci’s description of organised proletarians. One of the main reasons for the formation of the OPC in 1994 was to protest against the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election and to entrench democracy in Nigeria (OPC 2019). The annulment of the election ‘touched the essential’ aspect of the hegemony (established by the military) by breaching the consensus built on the promise of democracy, resulting in counter-hegemony and the subordinate class withdrawing their consent to hegemonic rule (Gramsci 1971, 161). The annulment of the election, which had been won by a Yoruba candidate, gave impetus to the group and served as a mandate to embark on protests and demonstrations (Interview with state executive, Oyo State, December 2017).
Despite the success of social movement organisations such as the OPC in entrenching democracy, politics built on neopatrimonialism inhibits the development of counter-hegemony. Since the discovery of oil in the country, Nigeria has operated a neopatrimonial pattern of politics. Neopatrimonialism can be defined as a type of informal governance (especially of resources) or institutions controlled by the elite that has been regularised, accepted and practised (Guliyev 2011). It involves a patron–client relationship whereby resources trickle down from the patron, who is usually a powerful political office holder, group or party. Braathen et al. define neopatrimonialism as a ‘mixed type of rule combining in various degrees differentiation and lack of separation between public and private spheres’, common in many post-colonial countries in Africa where bureaucratic and patrimonial norms co-exist (Braathen, Bøås, and Saether 2000, 11) and in countries that depend on natural resource exploitation and central government (Ajala 2018). In such scenarios, the extraction and distribution of natural resources are often privatised, and the distribution often follows ethnic or religious lines. The distribution mechanism often forms the basis of the government.
Neopatrimonialism creates ethnic division and has been prevalent during successive military and civilian administrations in Nigeria as it is a common practice for the president to align with his ethnic group during his tenure in return for political support and patronage. This practice creates three main issues: first, his ethnic group supports him regardless of how the country is run; second, corruption allegations by other ethnic groups or sections of the country are labelled a witch-hunt against him; and, third, his ethnic group forms the majority of his cabinet, resulting in a further lopsided distribution of resources and benefit of governance. The president also utilises force to sustain hegemony, which hinders development and national unity. Neopatrimonialism takes a different dimension in civilian regimes. Since one of the tenets of democracy is the rule of law, civilian presidents are not able to openly use force to entrench a patrimonial system. Neopatrimonialism in a democratic regime often takes the form of ‘subtle coercion’, where the president uses his power to facilitate lopsided resource distribution.
Ethnic affiliations represent one of the major modes of neopatrimonialism in Nigeria. This results in a situation whereby some social movements are also formed along ethnic lines, with some formed to protect the interests and identity of their ethnic group against perceived marginalisation. The problem, however, with the alignment of social movements with the political process is that non-partisanship faces the risk of being traded for patronage in a neopatrimonial society. This could happen for three main reasons: first, a patrimonial leader would employ every ethnic platform available to retain political positions, including the use of ethnic social movements; second, the not-for-profit nature of social movements coupled with the need for resources makes them vulnerable to patronage; and, third, when a social movement achieves or partly achieves its aim, it could become partisan. All of these weaken counter-hegemony and faith in social movements. While neopatrimonialism is not unique to Nigeria (and other developing countries) but also prevalent in developed countries – under names such as pork barrel politics and crony capitalism (Lancaster 1986; Holcombe 2013) – the main difference is the ethnic dimension in developing countries such as Nigeria.3
Social movements and democracy in Nigeria
During the periods of military rule, some social movement organisations emerged with the aim of putting pressure on the military to cede power by advocating for democracy. The long military rule, coupled with distrust of the military’s intent to transition to democracy, increased the agitation for self-determination that led to the formation of pro-democracy movements and Yoruba self-determination groups. These groups included the OYM (which predated OPC), ORF, FYCC and several others which were united in their quest for democracy and self-determination. In 2002, an umbrella organisation called Coalition of O’dua Self Determination Groups (COSEG) was formed to unite all these groups, which had previously operated in silos (HRW 2003).
The theory of collective action as a component of counter-hegemony explains the formation and operations of the organisation. Collective action theory hinges on the inability of the populace to access political power and on their reaction to the status quo. Oberschall (2007) identified two levels of explanation for the theory: macro and micro. Collective actions such as marches, demonstrations, protests, strikes and boycotts represent micro-level resistance. Although most of the activities of these groups are non-violent, every form of unrest is deemed illegal by authoritarian regimes and met with stiff resistance. The macro-level societal conditions identified by Oberschall are dissatisfaction, ideology, capacity to mobilise and opportunity. Both the macro and micro levels explain the formation of OPC.
OPC members are made up predominantly of economically excluded youths, as defined by Walker and Pettigrew (1984). These youths link their economic condition to military dictatorship and the ill treatment of Nigerians, especially the Yoruba, by successive military regimes in the country. Most of the military heads of state were from Northern Nigeria and the Yoruba felt disenfranchised by the military regimes. The initial strategy of the OPC was anchored on the determination of the ‘Yoruba people to extricate themselves from the malaise of marginalization and under-development’ (OPC 2019). The emancipation was meant to be achieved through democratisation. This counter-hegemonic strategy was highly effective in the initial mobilisation and attracted the participation or support of many Yoruba (Im Baeg 1991).
The main objectives of OPC fall under two categories: first, to unite all Yoruba under one umbrella and, second, to form a solid base for the emancipation of the ethnic group. These objectives fit directly into the organisation’s strategy and were designed to be achieved through an overall framework of democratisation and decentralisation (OPC 2019). The organisation’s constitution was designed to attain its objectives through non-partisanship.
The OPC also had the capacity to mobilise as one of the largest social movement organisations in Nigeria. According to Human Rights Watch, as of 2003 OPC claimed to have over five million members, mostly based in the South-Western region of Nigeria (HRW 2003) but with membership spanning Europe, North America and the Caribbean (OPC 2019). Although the membership of the organisation is difficult to ascertain, empirical studies and interviews revealed that the group has hundreds of thousands of active members across Nigeria. The structure of the group provides a clue regarding the number of active members involved in the organisation. The organisation has a hierarchy that includes national, state, local government and zonal executives, with members directly affiliated at the zonal levels. The international members are directly under the national executives. Each state has a coordinator (who presides over the state executives and directs the affairs of the local governments) and zonal branches reporting directly to the national executives. In an interview, the local government coordinator for Ibadan North West local government area in 2018 described the membership. He explained that there are 1256 registered members in the local government covering 10 zones. He stated further that there are on average 1000 registered members in each local government, indicating there are about 33,000 active members in Oyo State, which has 33 local governments and around 150,000–200,000 active members in the South West region of Nigeria (Interview with OPC local government coordinator, December 2017). The large numbers of registered members make it easy for the group to mobilise. In terms of resources, the organisation initially funded itself through contributions from members as well as donations from Yoruba indigenes both in Nigeria and in the diaspora (Interview with OPC member, December 2017).
Transformation of social movements in emerging democracies
Although social movements in most cases fight for a good cause and often remain relevant for a long period of time (especially in advanced capitalist democracies), it is important to explore the impact of neopatrimonialism on the inability of some social movements (especially self-determination social movements) to transform, and to maintain relevance in emerging democracies after achieving or almost achieving their aims. This is increasingly important not just for the basis of drawing a comparison between social movements but also in understanding the challenges faced by social movements in developing countries.
To understand the relationship between political parties and social movements in Nigeria, it is important to briefly highlight the electoral system practised in the country. Nigeria operates a majoritarian first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, which is a candidate-centred voting system. The winning candidate is the person who garners the most votes, and the system is often described as ‘winner takes all’. One of the main disadvantages of this system is that it encourages the formation of political parties based on clan and ethnicity (Ace Project 2005). Since voters often choose well-known candidates, there is a tendency to choose candidates from their own ethnic groups, especially in emerging democracies like Nigeria. This results in a situation whereby contestants strive to enhance their popularity at the expense of their political party, sometimes creating tensions between the party and its candidates.
The tension between aspiring candidates and political parties can be analysed using the personal vote model of Carey and Shugart (1995). According to this model, ‘if a politician’s electoral prospects improve as a result of being personally well known and liked by voters, then personal reputation matters’ (Carey and Shugart 1995, 419). Although this model was used to explore intraparty competitions, it is also applicable to interparty competitions as seen in Nigeria. This explains why political aspirants in Nigeria put a lot of emphasis on personal recognition, as this is the best way to increase their electoral prospects. This model rests on the assumption that politicians are solely motivated by the desire to seek election or re-election (Rae 1967). The desire by politicians to win elections at all costs sometimes makes them take selfish actions that might not benefit the party in the long run (Carey and Shugart 1995). One such position is ‘contracting’4 undiscerning social movements to boost their popularity. Desperate politicians seeking personal reputation in an FPTP system see ethnic-affiliated social movements as the right vehicle to drive their course. While such movements were formed along ethnic lines to enhance mobilisation (Oberschall 2007), their ability to mobilise predisposes them to political manipulation.
Politicians in developing countries commonly use the resources meant for development for personal purposes. Since 1999, members of the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives have been allocated funds for constituency projects annually meant to bring about even development and encourage participation in politics (Udefuna, Jumare, and Adebayo 2013); however, there have been several allegations that the fund is often used for patronage (Laleye 2017). The need for constituency projects sometimes arises to compensate for bad governance, and funds are often used to enhance patronage and partisan political loyalty, as seen in the case of post-war Italian democracy (1948–1994), where widespread bureaucratic corruption was enhanced through extensive constituency services designed by politicians to retain public positions (Golden 2003). This has been observed in Nigeria too as constituency projects often fuel patronage, which sometimes corrupts social movement organisations. Since constituency allocations are channelled directly to the ethnic group of individual politicians, social movement organisations – which are usually formed along ethnic lines – often become stakeholders in the allocation of constituency projects. A typical example is the pipeline protection contracts that were given to ethnic militias and social movement organisations (including the OPC) prior to the 2015 elections, on the condition of supporting the ruling party candidates (Guardian 2015).
The link between neopatrimonialism and social movements is the funding obtained by social movement organisations from politicians, which I refer to as negative funding. I define negative funding as a perverse form of funding provided by politicians to social movements in a neopatrimonial manner in return for partisan support from the movement. Social movements in developing countries are unable to establish adequate sources of funding and often rely on donations from members and support from the public. When such movements attain their objective (or key aspects of it), financial support from the public wanes, and because the movements may be unable or unwilling to transform, they seek alternative sources of funding – including those offered by politicians, which often compel the movements to use their platform to support the political aspirations of those politicians.
In terms of evolution and transformation, social movements in advanced capitalist societies differ from those in emerging democracies because the former can adapt to new situations, transform or become more specialised to focus on emerging needs (Kitschelt 1993). For instance, environmental movements can start an advocacy with a broad environmental campaign but eventually focus on discrete environmental issues such as nuclear installations, toxic waste disposal or industrial pollution (Kitschelt 1993), allowing them to sustain their funding channels. Social movements in emerging democracies, on the other hand, are often rigid, lacking specialisation or clarity of purpose (Satell 2015), exploited by political systems (Larmer 2010) and then ‘lost in transition’ after achieving their goals. In addition, when democracy is a key aim, democratisation weakens the counter-hegemonic element of movements as military supremacy and the use of force give way to representation and the rule of law, which decreases the need for collective action, a vital mobilisation component of social movements. The OPC, for instance, became less relevant after 1999, when Nigeria returned to democracy, as many indigenes no longer saw the need for the organisation.5
The inability of social movements to transform and remain relevant is one of the key issues facing social movements in emerging democracies. Kitschelt argues that social movements thrive when they can make intermittent and discrete decisions on problems facing the populace. This ability to identify clearly defined and visible issues affecting the people makes it easy for movements to mobilise support and resources to address a collective ill (Hardin 1982). Mass mobilisations for protests can only be achieved when a social movement has clearly defined issues it intends to address; and the moment that the populace cannot identify with the goals of a social movement, its support is withdrawn. The resulting lack of support could result in three main issues: first, the financial support could be withdrawn, making it difficult for the movement to function as an organisation; second, the social movement could lose its relevance and abandon its other aims and objectives; and, third, factionalisation could arise within the movement, especially if some members feel the movement is losing focus.
Relevance and loss of focus: from social movement to social predator
The return of Nigeria to democracy in 1999 changed the dynamics of the OPC as the counter-hegemonic structure which sustained mass mobilisation weakened. The articulation of a ‘national popular collective interest’ which Laclau and Mouffe (1985) describe as counter-hegemony waned, leaving a gap in the movement. One key issue that explains the need for the OPC to change strategy was the repression of the group by security forces. The government of President Olusegun Obasanjo proscribed OPC, as the organisation was classified as an ethnic militia. In order to forcefully implement the ban, the government, in 1999, ordered the immediate arrest of all the members and issued a ‘shoot on sight’ order regarding those resisting arrest. This led to the deaths of several OPC members, with the OYM alleging that over 272 members of the group were killed by the police (HRW 2003; Ikelegbe 2005). This action, coupled with the perceived lack of condemnation by members of the public, resulted in the group rethinking its post-democratic relevance.6 This also formed part of the reasons for the establishment of COSEG to transform and unite loosely affiliated Yoruba self-determination groups.
In addition, after the attainment of democracy, resources from the public began to dwindle due to the organisation’s inability to continue to prove its relevance. The organisation started seeking alternative sources of funding. While some members of the group loyal to its late national coordinator (Dr Frederick Fasehun) were favourably disposed towards active participation in the political process, other members of the group loyal to one of its key leaders (Gani Adams) objected (HRW 2003). The disagreement over political participation led to accusations by Adams’ supporters that Fasehun was benefiting financially from politicians, and this led to the impeachment of Fasehun as national coordinator. Subsequently, Adams was appointed as the new national coordinator, leading to the sundering of the organisation into two factions headed by the respective leaders (Abdulazeez 2013). In terms of support from the populace, OPC lost its popularity as a result of fraternisation with politicians and continuous infighting. According to Tarrow, ‘since the power in movement depends on the mobilisation of external opportunities, when opportunities expand from initial challengers to others – some of whom are elites and authorities – movements lose their primary source of power’ (1994, 266–267).
The factionalisation of the OPC crumbled its activities as a social movement and ushered in a new realm of politicisation contrary to its constitution. Although Fasehun initially denied working for any political party, he ‘assisted’ one of the main political parties, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), to win several gubernatorial and local government elections in the South West region of Nigeria in the 1999 elections (Maier 2000). The success of the AD in the 1999 elections was significant for the OPC and further veered the group from its stated aim, because all six core South-Western states where they had a large followership were won by the AD, with Fasehun playing a significant role in the mobilisation of his factional members. This strengthened the Fasehun-led faction as negative funding from the governors in these states gave them the upper hand ahead of the 2003 elections. It also increased the politicisation of the OPC, as the Adams-led faction became desperate for political patronage due to a lack of resources. As political partisanship increased, public support for the organisation waned further.
The 2003 election in Nigeria was one of the most controversial in the country, as this was the first civilian-to-civilian democratic transition since 1963. With most of the incumbent political office holders re-contesting, the elections were marred by violence, weak electoral institutions (especially the Independent Electoral Commission) and corruption (Omotola 2010). The advent of democracy in 1999 had produced a new wave of social movements and political groups in the country (Ojakorotu 2006; Ajala 2016). The freedom of expression and association that forms part of the democratic package also paved the way for the formation of several ethnically aligned social movement organisations. Many of the ‘newly empowered’ organisations participated in the 2003 elections, as many returning and new politicians used several ingenious means to attain or retain political positions. Some sought the ‘assistance’ of militias (Ajala 2018, 2020) while others engaged the help of social movements (Okafor 2011). In the South-West region of Nigeria, several politicians again sought the help of the OPC but in a different dimension. While most incumbent politicians patronised the Fasehun-led faction of the OPC, opposing politicians employed the services of the Adams faction of the OPC, which was seen as a more ‘militant and effective’ partner based on their antecedent behaviour (Interview with OPC leader, Lagos State, December 2017). Since the OPC factions worked for opposing politicians in the 2003 elections, through thuggery and vigilantism, several clashes occurred between these factions, with some of the clashes resulting in the loss of lives and property (HRW 2003; Nolte 2007).
According to a former coordinator of OPC in Oyo State,
The Gani Adams faction of the OPC to which I belong felt the involvement of the Fasehun faction in the 1999 elections gave them an upper hand in the struggle for dominance in the organisation. Many factional members built houses or bought cars between 1999 and 2003 with some even marrying more wives – which is seen as a sign of affluence. So, when we were contacted to work for opposing politicians prior to the 2003 elections, many of us jumped at the opportunity as we felt it was also our own time to make some money. Although some of our leaders cautioned us not to go against our constitution – to avoid partisan politics – some others felt the need for us to engage with politicians if we were to remain relevant as a faction, as we desperately needed the resources to remain relevant. … I would say our participation in the electoral process is first for dominance and secondly for the resources associated with it. (Interview with former OPC local government coordinator in Oyo State, January 2018)
Partisanship and factionalisation of the OPC
Subsequent electoral cycles witnessed the desperation of politicians and the springing up of ethnic militias, social movement organisations and advocacy groups around the country. The OPC eventually became a fully fledged political entity, with the two main factions aiming to outdo each other in offering political support to politicians in exchange for money. In 2015, prior to the general elections, Gani Adams was accused of collecting over N10 billion (about US$30 million) from the incumbent president to ‘support’ him at the general elections (Punch 2016). Some leaders of the OPC exposed the plot and called for Adams to be investigated. The Kwara state coordinator accused Adams of collecting huge sums of money from the former president on the pretext that the money would be shared with other members of the group, but Adams kept the money to himself despite all of them working for the PDP during the 2015 general elections (Punch 2016). Although Adams denied collecting money from the former president, he confessed that his faction had supported the PDP in the 2015 elections to pursue the Yoruba agenda. According to Adams,
the position of OPC at the time was based on principle and the conviction that Dr Jonathan was sincere about implementing the report of Confab where the position of the Yoruba people regarding some sensitive national issues was properly marshalled by the delegates. (quoted in Olarinoye 2016)
The open admission by Adams that his faction worked for PDP’s success in the 2015 elections, coupled with several financial allegations, further weakened the organisation – which has been in disarray, with two new factions of the group emerging after the 2015 elections. These new factions are the New Era OPC and OPC Reformed, formed between 2016 and 2017 (Akinsuyi 2017). Members of both groups, in a joint meeting, announced the expulsion of both Adams and Fasehun in July 2017, indicating further cracks in the organisation. The formation of new OPC factions by disgruntled members is directly related to the fallout from the 2015 general elections. This further disintegration occurred for two main reasons: first, the unwillingness of the leaders to share the negative funding obtained from the elections with the foot soldiers; and, second, the feeling that the organisation would further lose relevance because of their involvement in partisan politics. Although Ghaziani and Kretschmer (2019) argue that conflict and infighting are constant features of social life and a potentially productive aspect of mobilisation in movements, this study finds that conflicts arising from negative funding through neopatrimonialism fractured the movement rather than strengthening it. Interviews reveal that this source of funding could lead to the demise of the group. One OPC state officer stated in an interview that:
The OPC is daily disintegrating into pieces and it pains my heart that the organisation we worked so hard for and that has changed the lives of many people positively could soon be a thing of the past. I have heard rumours that our leaders collected money from rival politicians and some of them have even been disgraced openly. Although I also got some money for attending a political rally, I didn’t know we were going there to support the party. What I was told was that we were going there to assist the police in providing security at the venue of the rally. I wouldn’t have attended if I knew we were going to be used for these dirty games. The leaders of the group have sold their conscience, we might as well form OPC political party. (Interview with OPC member, December 2017)
Apart from the involvement of OPC factions in partisan politics, the internal divisions sometimes result in violent confrontations, as more factions now clash with each other, signifying an implosion in the organisation. While previous clashes occurred between the Fasehun- and Adams-led factions (HRW 2003), most of the recent clashes have been between the old factions and the new factions. For instance, on 29 January 2018, there was a violent clash between the New Era faction of the OPC and the faction loyal to Gani Adams (Guardian 2018). Although there are several conflicting reports on the actual causes of the violence, it is seen by some that the New Era OPC faction was trying to use violence to ‘announce themselves’8 in the region prior to the 2019 elections. The January 2018 clash involving the New Era group raised new questions about the future of the organisation. Although Fasehun died in December 2018, his faction remains relevant after electing a new leader.
Conclusion
The case study of OPC offers an insight into the difficulty of sustaining social movements (especially self-determination movements) in young democracies. Electoral participation in developing democracies often evolves along ethnic and religious lines, and many social movements are frequently exposed to the neopatrimonial nature of these states, which threatens the healthy evolution of these movements. This article argues that social movements in emerging democracies often find it difficult to consolidate their positions after achieving part of their aims because of their inability to specialise. Social movements hardly achieve all their aims and objectives at once, hence the need to transform once key milestones are achieved. For instance, if the overarching objective of a social movement is the attainment of democracy, transforming to focus on issues of human rights and enacting the rule of law (thereby strengthening democracy) would be more beneficial for a movement rather than disbanding once democracy is achieved. Drawing from Gramsci’s prison notes, the article argues that hegemony explains the use of a combination of coercion and consent to rule by military regimes while counter-hegemony explains the reaction of social movements to authoritarian regimes through the establishment and sustenance of mass movements to counter dictatorship. Neopatrimonialism, on the other hand, gives an insight into the reasons for the inability of social movements to sustain the struggle, resulting in a subsequent weakening of counter-hegemony.
The article argues that the inability of social movement organisations to specialise or their reluctance to disband after achieving aspects of their aims – in this instance, democracy – often results in the weakening of the counter-hegemony that previously sustained public support, loss of revenue and eventual exposure to political corruption through neopatrimonialism. Dwindling resources as a result of the loss of public support is then exploited by politicians or political parties by providing the resources needed by these organisations in return for partisan support. This type of funding could be described as negative funding, as it changes the focus and objectives of social movements. Politicians, especially in an FPTP system, use the resources at their disposal to entice social movements to use their ability to mobilise the populace and influence voters to their advantage. The paper analyses the formation and transformation of OPC to argue that exposure to partisan politics corrupts social movements, sometimes resulting in a total deviation from their original goals, the implosion of the organisation and an eventual lack of relevance.
The OPC as a self-determination social movement was formed to liberate the Yoruba from the perceived injustice perpetrated against the ethnic group by previous military regimes. This aim was to be achieved through democracy and equal participation in governance. After Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, the OPC lost its focus. The inability of the group to continue its quest for emancipation (after attaining democracy) resulted in a loss of relevance. This, coupled with the loss of public support, resulted in outright political partisanship. Crossley (2002) argues that although social movements might plan to stay outside of the political system, the need for resources often drags them back into it. This is particularly so when the movement fails to evolve or to sustain its relevance.
This article explores three main reasons why the OPC could not sustain its aims and objectives. The first is the inability of the movement to transform and specialise to pursue its aims (of self-determination) after the country attained democracy. The second is a ‘lost in transition' situation whereby the organisation could not decide how to capitalise on its ideological gains, resulting in an exposure to partisan politics that was against the core values of the movement. Third, the political system in Nigeria, centred on neopatrimonialism, offered irresistible resources or negative funding to social movements in return for political patronage and support. The essay concludes that social movements might be counterproductive to democratisation if they fail to transform.