Development of the Blue Economy concept in Eastern Africa: strategic frameworks and a simmering conflict

SUMMARY

Eastern African small island states played a role in advancing the ‘Blue Economy’ concept prior to the Rio+20 summit in 2012, when it emerged on a global stage. As their main concern they cited threats caused by climate change to marine life, on which they are highly dependent. This briefing explores the uneven development of the various national policies geared towards the concept. It notes an emphasis on economic policies neglecting climate change and dispute settlement policies, and identifies a need for the development of an all-encompassing regional approach to maximise Blue Economy benefits in Eastern Africa.

Main article text

Introduction

Following Eddy Akpomera’s article in ROAPE that explored the potential and challenges for the development of the Blue Economy in Africa (Akpomera 2020), and taking into consideration the role that Eastern African island states had in advancing the concept, this briefing critically analyses the political development of the concept in the region through various policies.

Prior to the Rio+20 Summit in June 2012, often thought of as when the Blue Economy concept – sometimes referred to as ‘ocean economy’ – emerged (Smith-Godfrey 2016), the Indian Ocean Commission wrote to the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in preparation for the 2012 summit, advocating for Blue Economy to be made an integral part of future negotiations on sustainable development. The Indian Ocean Commission is the only regional organisation in Africa composed exclusively of small island developing states. The Commission also expressed the need for the Blue Economy to be a main pillar of, and not a subset within, the green economy, in order to ensure that the challenges faced by the Blue Economy due to climate change were firmly addressed. The Commission believed and stated at the time that the existing international framework for the protection of the oceans did not have the required capacity to meet the challenges imposed on marine life (UN 2012a).

Eastern Africa has taken a particular interest in the development cooperation of the Blue Economy, especially in the Indian Ocean, as it offers direct benefits to the region. Of the six island nations in Africa, four are in Eastern Africa; of the eight dependencies and territories in Africa, three are in Eastern Africa; and of the 38 coastal countries, six are in Eastern Africa. Of the five countries in Africa that are poised to benefit most from the Blue Economy, three are in Eastern Africa: Madagascar, Somalia and Kenya, in that order, followed by South Africa and Nigeria (Axworthy 2019).

The region’s increased interest in the Blue Economy is further strengthened by the fact that it opens onto the Indian Ocean, the third largest world ocean, covering about 70.56 million km², which is approximately 20% of the water on the Earth’s surface. It is also the major sea route connecting Africa to the Middle East and East Asia, and eventually connects Europe and the Americas. Additionally, Madagascar, one of the Eastern African countries, has the longest coastline – 4828 km – of all Indian Ocean coastal countries (Attri and Bohler-Muller 2018). As a result, regional states have developed various policies geared towards this concept.

Analytical framework

To show the direct relationship between policy and ocean political economy, we focus on the classical ‘tragedy of the commons’ dilemma whereby some individuals and/or some states’ interests are not aligned with public or general welfare interests on resources regarded as common goods, such as the ocean (Hardin 1968). Through critical analysis of some of the policies of the Eastern African nations, we note their uneven development, but also note their common denominator: their aim to maximise the economic potential of resources within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). This common aim might lead to depletion of these resources, yet oceans are regarded as common goods that comprise areas and resources beyond any state’s sovereignty (Schrijver 2016). The result is that as the Blue Economy grows and states seek new capital opportunities, what was once considered public commons and free for all to use is now being enclosed (Kerr et al. 2018) and owned by states in pursuit of the development and usage of ocean resources.

Treverton, Nemeth and Srinivasan (2012, xiii) suggest that this dilemma can be resolved by management of global commons through four clusters of approaches to policy and solutions: international negotiations, coalitions of the willing, transcommunity networking and anti-fragile approaches (preparing for exposure to adverse events). The first of these is through international negotiations, such as the Paris agreement, which deals with climate change. As we will explore further below, under the Paris agreement developing countries have no international obligation to reduce emissions from the burning of coal, oil or gas, which means in essence that climate change is not their priority, hence the neglect (Richmond 2015).

‘Coalitions of the willing’ is the second of Treverton and his co-authors’ approaches to dealing with global commons but, as we will discuss below, there is no harmonisation of national or regional policies by the Eastern African states, even though they share a common body of water. The continental framework, the African Union (AU), has taken a passive role by only commenting and not offering a solution in the current dispute between Kenya and Somalia (AU 2019), as discussed below. Regional cooperation through a unified regional institution is a viable solution, but Eastern Africa is unique, in that there is no unifying regional organisation to which all 14 countries belong: the Indian Ocean Commission members comprise only the island states; the East African Community does not include Horn of Africa or island states as members; and while Kenya and Somalia are both members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), only 8 out of the 14 Eastern Africa region members are IGAD members. This has led to internal conflict: the last position that IGAD took on the Blue Economy dispute was not accepted by Somalia, who then threated to leave the organisation (Demissie 2021). The last two clusters of policy approaches outlined by Treverton, Nemeth and Srinivasan (2012) are transcommunity networking and anti-fragile approaches; these are yet to be developed in the region.

Climate change takes a back seat to regional economic potential

The national strategic frameworks were established under the guidance of an AU strategy with the aim of establishing coherence between regional economic organisations and individual national strategies (AU 2012). Frameworks for a selection of countries are set out in Table 1.

Table 1.

National strategic frameworks for selected Eastern African countries.

Country	Strategic framework/ national policies	Objectives/achievements
Mauritius	The Ocean Economy: A Roadmap for Mauritius	– Mauritius decided to make the Blue Economy a pillar of its economic development strategy, with the objective of doubling the contribution of the Blue Economy to GDP by 2025 – – Mauritius has strong coastal zone protection legislation that is prevalent in its Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) framework – – Mauritius has been advancing Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) in key maritime sectors such as port infrastructure, shipping, tourism, seafood, fisheries, aquaculture, underwater cultural heritage and marine renewable energy – – to strengthen its economic diversification it has also set up an MSP Coordinating Committee
Seychelles	Seychelles Blue Economy: Strategic Policy Framework and Roadmap Charting the Future (2018–2030) Seychelles Blue Economy Department in 2015	Main strategic frameworks are: – – creating sustainable wealth through economic diversification and value addition – – sharing prosperity – by ensuring food security; improving access to and the quality of education, which will result in skilled employment opportunities for citizens; and lastly by creating a business environment for private-sector engagement – – securing healthy, resilient and productive oceans, since broader implementation of the Blue Economy requires maintaining its resource base – – implementation through strengthening the enabling environment – – the Republic of Seychelles has launched the world’s first sovereign blue bond – a pioneering financial instrument designed to support sustainable marine and fisheries projects
Reunion (a French overseas territory with the same status as the French mainland)	France adopted the National Strategy for the Sea and Coast – Decree 2017-222 of February 23rd, 2017 The Océan Métiss project, established in partnership with the state, the Reunion region, the University of Réunion and the Indian Ocean Commission	– – to define a blue strategy for Reunion in the southwestern basin of the Indian Ocean area The Océan Métiss project main objectives are to: – – implement an innovative methodology for marine spatial planning – – develop the sharing of international expertise on the theme of the Blue Economy – – pool scientific and technical human resources – – develop skills and training in professions related to the sea, and – – ensure the sustainability of structural support for blue growth
Kenya	Presidential taskforce on Blue Economy resulted in the creation of the State Department For Fisheries, Aquaculture and the Blue Economy under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries on 2 May 2016 Blue Economy was incorporated as one of the 8 priority sectors under the economic pillar in the Third Medium Term Plan (MTP III) of Kenya Vision 2030 (2018–2022)	– – Kenya hosted the first-ever global ‘Sustainable Blue Economy’ conference in November 2018, in partnership with Japan and Canada – – Kenya is in the process of developing Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) with World Bank support as an approach/strategy to guide maritime resource use for Blue Economy development – – fisheries, shipping and maritime affairs, port infrastructure, tourism and environment are the core sectors in Blue Economy

Sources: compiled by authors based on National Strategic Frameworks for Mauritius (Cervigni and Scandizzo 2017); Reunion (French Ministry for an Ecological and Solidary Transition 2017; Océan Métiss 2018); Seychelles (Seychelles Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy 2015; Republic of Seychelles 2018; World Bank 2018) and Kenya (Republic of Kenya 2016; Kenya’s Vision 2030 2018; Sustainable Blue Economy Conference 2018; Nairobi Convention 2019).

Eastern African countries have been actively developing Blue Economy policies ever since the emergence of the concept, but we now ask whether their policies have been overtaken by economic rather than climate change concerns. While Small Island Developing States (SIDS) were advancing the Blue Economy concept, one of their main arguments was that the challenges to marine life caused by climate change were not being well addressed, therefore the concept of Blue Economy was to deal directly with challenges from climate change (UN 2012a).

The Blue Economy concept has its origins in climate change initiatives but, as can be seen from the policy frameworks set out in Table 1, climate change seems to have taken a back seat. Some of the policies can be interpreted as meaning that the states view climate change as a hindrance to their benefits from the Blue Economy; however, what they should be doing is developing policies to mitigate climate change challenges, as this was the original premise of their argument for the need for and introduction of the Blue Economy concept. Belize, for example, reiterated to the European Union in 2016 that the Blue Economy is driven by SIDs’ vulnerability to climate change (EU 2016).

A further example can be found if we examine the Seychelles Blue Economy Strategic Framework, where we note that economic policies seem to have overtaken climate change priorities. In all four of their strategic frameworks, only the third strategy – regarding the oceans, Blue Economy, climate resilience and adaptation – deals with climate change adaptation and resilience, and then only partly. The rest of the strategies focus on how to harness marine resources.

Seychelles at least has one strategy on climate change. Kenya, under its Vision 2030 strategy, has adopted Blue Economy under its economic pillar instead of its social pillar, which has a section that deals with environment, water, sanitation and regional development. It is seen as an economic rather than an environmental strategy. Kenya’s core Blue Economy sector includes fisheries, shipping and maritime affairs, port infrastructure, tourism and environment, but has nothing on climate change. The same is noted for Mauritius, where the Blue Economy is embedded in its economic pillar, with the aim that the Blue Economy would double its contribution to the country’s GDP.

Carbon emissions cause major impacts on climate change, so sustainable ocean-based industries are supposed to reduce emissions. Some African states, however, including Eastern African states, have been exempted from global protocols and treaties. For example,

With the exception of Reunion and Mayotte (France), all countries in the [Western Indian Ocean] region are exempt from reducing greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Consequently, there is no international obligation to reduce emissions from the burning of coal, oil or gas. (Richmond 2015, 343)

The follow-up Paris climate agreement of 2015, which replaced the Kyoto protocol, still gives developing countries leeway in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. Under Article 4 (4) only developed countries should work towards absolute emission targets, while developing countries should move towards a reduction over time. Under Article 4 (6), ‘[t]he least developed countries and small island developing States may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emissions development reflecting their special circumstances’ (UNFCCC 2015).

One of the main arguments for giving developing countries more time to reduce their respective emissions is because energy is needed for development, both to reduce poverty and to allow businesses to make profits (Richmond 2015). Most of these countries import oil as their main source of energy, and as they continue to develop, the need for energy for their industries and to cater for their increasing population grows annually. There is an urgent need, therefore, to diversify their sources of energy, not only to address to their increased demand for energy, but also to reduce their dependence on foreign oil and to become self-reliant (ibid.).

Eastern African states also face the challenge of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Illegal fishing can be carried out by vessels from other regions, for example from Asia and Europe, and tackling such practices is rendered more difficult by the lack of advanced fishing technologies (Akpomera 2020).

Commissions have been established to address some of these challenges, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), established in 1993, and the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC), established in 2004. Their mission is to ensure sustainable utilisation of the living marine resources of the region, by dealing with challenges such as illegal fishing (FAO n.d.a, n.d.b). Illegal fishing is not, however, specifically a regional problem. Kenya, for example, is an important transhipment point for shark fins within the Indian Ocean. There is a high demand for Kenyan shark fins, especially from Asia, which causes an increase in illegal overfishing (Oirere 2019).

The existence of the commissions and treaties on IUU fishing do not guarantee international cooperation in tackling the problems because not all Indian Ocean states are members of the IOTC or the SWIOFC: it is only members of these commissions that are obliged to abide by the rules/treaties that have been adopted. We also note that these commissions are not focused on the Blue Economy concept of the sustainable development of ocean resources. First, both commissions were established before the Blue Economy concept even emerged. Sustainable ocean-based industries were therefore not part of the initial frameworks established for these commissions, and are yet to be adopted. Second, as long as not all countries are member states of the commissions, then they will face the challenge of non-member states that are not legally bound to the agreements. For developing countries, it is even more challenging to combat illegal fishing in the same bodies of water by countries that are more technologically advanced, for example, in terms of fishing equipment. Last, and this criticism is mainly directed towards the IOTC, it is too specific, namely in that it singles out tuna, while the Indian Ocean hosts thousands of species of endangered fish.

The most recent UN Sustainable Development summit in 2019 noted that climate change is still one of the main challenges for economic development in developing countries (UN 2019). Member states, therefore, need not only to adopt economic policies but also to adopt climate change policies within Blue Economy development in order to find a middle ground between economic and climate change concerns. If states allow the economy to take precedence, then they may not enjoy the benefits of the Blue Economy for long, as they clamour for ownership and the expansion of EEZs, leading to disputes (e.g. the current Kenya–Somalia maritime dispute). These are discussed further in the following section and, later, in the section ‘Blue Economy and the rise in disputes’.

Build-up to nationalisation and ownership of ocean assets

In essence, ‘[t]he Blue Economy conceptualises oceans as “Development Spaces” where spatial planning integrates conservation, sustainable use, oil and mineral wealth extraction, bioprospecting, sustainable energy production and marine transport’ (UN 2014, 3). It is not surprising that the first definition of the term Blue Economy by the European Commission is ‘[a]ll economic activities that depend on the sea’ (EU 2012). Due to the emphasis on economy, these development spaces are seen as the new economic opportunity areas for states, hence the pressure on states to own, protect and expand these spaces is increasing (Voyer et al. 2018).

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, effective from 16 November 1994, led to the establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 200-nautical-mile zone extending from a coastal state’s baseline. Coastal states have sovereign rights access to living and non-living resources in their EEZs, but anything outside the zones is beyond national jurisdiction and designated as the common heritage of humankind (Childs and Hicks 2019). The ownership and exploitation of ocean assets by states therefore was legalised, and became a trend, before the emergence of the Blue Economy concept. After the emergence of the concept, however, we see a new trend where states are trying to acquire more assets.

For example, apart from the 200 nautical-mile zone, countries own exclusive rights too:

If the country can scientifically prove that its continental shelf extends even further – that it is continuously geologically connected to the mainland – it also has the sole rights to the resources there as well. (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2017, clarifying the UNCLOS 1982 Convention)

Based on this, some countries have successfully extended their EEZs. For example, Australia has secured exclusive exploitation rights to both Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, 1000 kilometres north of eastern Antarctica, after proving that these islands stand on the undersea Kerguelen Plateau (ibid.). Kenya also managed to extend its continental shelf area, noting in 2009 to an UNCLOS commission that ‘the outer limit of the extended continental shelf of Kenya encloses an area of approximately 103,320 km² extending beyond 200 M from the territorial sea baseline of Kenya’ (Republic of Kenya 2009) after successfully proving submerged prolongation of its land territory extending beyond its territorial sea. States’ attempts to extend their zones are not always because they are certain that the resources exist: it is rather the thought of future riches that can push states first to try to acquire as much of the seabed as possible, and then explore later.

Citing their vulnerability and dependence on ocean resources for their development, Seychelles and Mauritius submitted a proposal to the UN for joint management of their EEZs (The Commonwealth 2012). In 2012, they were the world’s first two countries to have a joint management economic zone of 400,000 km², as well as a joint commission to coordinate and manage the exploration, conservation and development of the resources of the seabed area (UN 2012b). In 2018 they began exploration.

We note that no country listed in Table 1 has yet developed a single policy geared towards settling maritime disputes, yet the scramble for ownership and expansion of these zones is already leading to disputes, as discussed below.

Blue Economy and the rise of disputes: the case of the Kenya–Somalia maritime boundary dispute

Conflict is not new in the Eastern African region, with violence in various periods since independence. The shift of focus from climate change to exploitation of water resources may result in new types of conflicts not witnessed in the region before.

We have seen how African neighbouring countries that share any body of water manage to coexist peacefully until the discovery of water resources. For example, Nigeria and Cameroon on the Bakassi Pensinsula coexisted peacefully until the discovery of oil reserves. Likewise, Namibia and South Africa coexisted peacefully until diamond deposits were discovered in Orange River (Kadagi et al. 2020).

Similarly, Kenya and Somalia had no maritime dispute until recently, possibly fuelled by the resurgent emphasis on the Blue Economy. Kenya is insisting on using the same method of demarcating boundaries, along parallels of latitude, as it did with Tanzania. Somalia is opposed to losing a 62,000 square-mile triangle in the Indian Ocean to Kenya, as it is believed to contain sizeable amounts of oil and gas deposits (Hattem 2020) as well as fishing opportunities.

Somalia officially brought the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2014, since when it has been postponed three times. In 2021, however, Somalia refused any further extensions, and the case was set to be heard on 15 March 2021 (Ahmed and Herbling 2021). Kenya refused to attend the hearing, accusing the court of bias. Nevertheless, the hearing took place as planned, with Somalia only presenting its arguments. The court is currently deliberating and will deliver its decision in due course (ICJ 2021).

This dispute, left unchecked, might result in a regional conflict with potential interference from international actors. The UK and Norway have expressed support for Somalia while the US and France have backed Kenya’s claim, as it is believed they also have interest in these resources. Kenya has also been trying to get regional support, including securing the support of the semi-autonomous Somali state Jubaland (Hattem 2020). Jubaland is believed to contain some of the oil and gas deposits within the disputed maritime boundary.

In November 2018, Kenya and France signed regional maritime agreements, allowing for the operationalisation of the Seychelles-based Regional Coordination of Operations Centre and the Madagascar-based Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre. The agreements have Comoros, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles as signatories and are to be implemented by the Indian Ocean Commission, IGAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the East African Community, with funding from the European Union (French Embassy Kenya 2018). France’s support for Kenya is attributed to claims that the French company Total Oil was contracted by Kenya in the disputed maritime zone – a move which Somalia apparently did not contest (Maluki 2019). Kenya and the USA have a long-standing partnership in the fight against terrorism, with the USA having a military base in Kenya in Lamu, near Somali waters.

In 2019, Kenya accused Somalia of auctioning oil and gas blocks in Kenya’s maritime territorial area that borders Somalia. Norway was one of the main bidders, as they tried to reclaim their stake in the region through Somalia. This followed the expulsion of Norwegian oil giant Statoil from Kenya in 2012 for flouting contract terms (Business Daily 2012). The UK as well, hosts for the auction, previously had oil concessions in Somalia from the 1980s until 1991, when Somali plunged into civil war. It is alleged, however, that since 2012, the UK has been again hoping for a stake in Somalia’s maritime resources (Maluki 2019).

Immediately after the alleged auction in 2019, Kenya summoned its ambassador to Somalia back to Nairobi and instructed the Somalian ambassador to Kenya to go back to his country for consultations (Reuters 2019). They resumed diplomatic relations in September that year (Mumbere 2019), but in November 2020, after Somalia accused Kenya of interfering in the electoral process in Jubaland, it expelled Kenya’s ambassador to Somalia and recalled its own from Kenya (Sheikh 2020). An IGAD summit held in December 2020 endorsed a fact-finding mission led by Djibouti to look into Somalia’s allegations. The mission reported that there was not enough evidence to support Somalia’s claims, but Somalia rejected the findings (Demissie 2021).

At present, the subregional (IGAD) and regional (AU) organisations are insufficiently active in the dispute, and further involvement could prevent escalation of the conflict. In any case, if the dispute escalates, then neither of the countries will reap the benefits from the resources, as these will be open for exploration and mining by other actors or put on hold, delaying any benefit. This was the case in Afghanistan: exploration there began in the 1960s, but the conflict in the late 1970s interfered with exploration, mining and the extraction of its resources. It was only in 2012 that a Chinese company finally began extracting oil (Shalizi 2012).

To date, there is no public global domain on maritime boundaries that conclusively represents the EEZs of countries. Nevertheless, most of the Eastern African states have peacefully drawn up their maritime boundaries. The Kenya and Tanzania maritime boundary was drawn primarily along parallels of latitude. France has also concluded Reunion’s maritime borders with Mauritius and Madagascar, as has Mayotte with the Seychelles (Kaye 2010).

Conclusion

The Blue Economy concept is still in its initial stages, so there are inadequate data to conclusively provide evidence of achievements other than policy frameworks. In addition, most of the Eastern African member states have limited data on the extent of the resources in their respective EEZs, which impedes exploration. As states deepen their level of cooperation, achievements will start to be realised. States should not forget, however, that it is climate change that was at the heart of and intrinsic to the Blue Economy concept. They should not focus entirely on economic benefits and neglect climate change. As states continue to pursue ownership and expansion of their economic zones, the result may be a rise in the number of maritime disputes in areas thought to have exploitable resources. There is a need therefore to develop an all-encompassing regional approach in Eastern Africa that will handle both climate change challenges and regional maritime disputes without involving external actors who focus on personal interests above regional interest.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Jörg Wiegratz and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the text.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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