This Briefing explores anti-fraud measures (AFMs) in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. It is the third and last in a series, following our examination of AFMs first in Southern Africa and then in Eastern Africa (Mykhalchenko and Wiegratz 2019; 2021a). The rationale, background and methodology underlying the research are set out in these earlier Briefings. This Briefing concludes with a reflection on the data presented across the series.
Ghana
AFMs in Ghana, as in other countries in the study, are found in sectors such as consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, technology, banking, finance and tax revenue collection. Aimed at promoting national manufacturers of goods and countering the inflow of substandard and counterfeit produce and the related harms, John Mahama, the country’s president from 2012 to 2017, released a list of items ‘made in Ghana’ that he has in his home; set up the ‘Made in Ghana’ inventory page, where people could find out and post how many ‘Made-in-Ghana’ products they use in their own homes (Osam 2014); and was very vocal in support of locally made goods (Ansah 2015). He stated that ‘[g]overnment will remove the dumping of cheaper products from other countries into our markets … and the only way is to empower you to produce to your maximum for our markets’ (GhanaWeb 2015). A ‘Made in Ghana’ logo was launched in 2015 and is still being used today to denote goods which have been certified as meeting national and international quality standards (GSA 2021).
Ghana’s clampdown on counterfeited produce ranges from targeting illicit alcohol (GhanaWeb 2012), fuel (Modern Ghana 2012) and textiles (The Finder 2014). The Food and Drugs Board (FDB) has vowed to ‘do everything to protect and ensure the safety of consumers’ (GhanaWeb 2012).
The Ghana Employers’ Association (GEA), together with the Business Sector Advocacy Challenge (BUSAC) Fund, began implementing an action plan to fight counterfeits, piracy and the infringement of intellectual property rights, which are deemed ‘threats to businesses operating in the country’, causing many industries to collapse (The Finder 2014). The GEA called for a stronger legal framework and ‘an effective punishment to serve as a real deterrent’ (ibid.). The association, funded by BUSAC, held a workshop, conducted research on the prevalence of illegal trade and called upon the media to help to communicate the issue to the public.
A report in 2014 noted a senior official’s allegation that ‘foreigners were still running retail businesses in the country in violation of the law’, and noted that illegal foreign businesses were now being targeted (Laary 2014). Here, a legislative approach was taken through an introduction of special courts and training for prosecutors. In another move aimed at foreign traders and investors, a 12-member national task force was initiated by the Ghana Union of Traders’ Association, which included representatives from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service, the Ghana Immigration Service, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust, the Internal Revenue Service, the VAT Service and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Nonor 2009; Modern Ghana 2012). However, the initiative was criticised on the grounds of its ‘selective’ mandate to target largely foreign businesses (Modern Ghana 2012).
In the textiles sector, GTP, West Africa’s leading African wax print and textiles manufacturer, launched the GTP ‘Oga’ (Original Genuine, Authentic) mark, where a consumer can check the genuineness of a product by texting a 12-digit unique code via mobile phone. It was implemented through the mPedigree platform and is being promoted by national celebrities and social media (GTP Fashion 2021).
mPedigree is a Ghanaian company which has become a ‘global leader in the use of web and mobile technology to protect brand-authenticity on manufactured goods’ (Acquah 2015). Well known for its work in pharmaceuticals, it also works with cosmetics, and medical and electronic devices. It is involved in AFMs in five other African countries, as well as in South Asia and the Middle East. It worked in partnership with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Union in seed verification in 19 African countries. It has been estimated that the mPedigree platform will reach 250 million people by the early 2020s (Skoll 2019).
To promote the initiative, 6000 customers received smart phones, ‘airtime’ (phone recharge) vouchers and fabrics (Acquah 2015). Here we see an example of where a private business uses incentivisation to encourage consumers to take part in the AFMs, attract consumers to this brand, and boost the image of the brand as being reliable and one that cares for its customers. A similar tool for minimising market penetration by substandard and counterfeited produce was developed by Hewlett-Packard (HP) (Vibe Ghana 2014a). Their HP Global Product Authentication Service allows customers to use their smartphone to scan a product’s QR code or send the code via a text message to authenticate medications, cosmetics, toys, electronic components and tickets to entertainment events.
To educate and increase awareness, HP organised a two-day summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in April 2014. It was attended among others by government officials, law enforcers and representatives of ministries responsible for anti-counterfeiting who ‘discussed consumer protection and raised awareness against illegitimate goods’ (Vibe Ghana 2014a). Shure, an American audio products corporation, in collaboration with the company’s distributor in Ghana, ‘is waging war against counterfeit through the collaboration of security agencies and would do everything to maintain its brand and products worldwide’ (Vibe Ghana 2012).
In 2014, the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana launched an initiative aimed at curbing imports of fake medicine into the country (Tarlue 2014). The initiative, named ‘PREVENT’ (Patients’ Research, Empowerment, Vigilance and Education Through New Technologies), was launched in collaboration with the mPedigree network and PopOut, a communications agency in Accra. It utilised social media to raise awareness, improve vigilance, empower patients and educate the wider public on counterfeit medicine. However, two years after the initiative, there was no longer any activity on social media channels, or in the news.
In the finance sector, microfinance institutions were targeted by the Bank of Ghana when it threatened to close any that did not hold a licence from the bank (GNA 2014). The bank was working with other agencies to investigate companies suspected of defrauding customers. In another initiative, the Bank of Ghana worked with telecom companies to put in place safer practices associated with the growth of mobile money operations (Larbi 2015).
Similarly to the other countries in the study, Ghana is taking part in initiatives geared towards addressing tax evasion and avoidance. A special operations unit in the President’s Office, together with the Ghana Revenue Authority’s Customs Division, targeted ports via several operations aimed at strengthening border control (Vibe Ghana 2014b). In another example, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between Ghana and the Netherlands to foster cooperation between the two countries through the automatic exchange of tax information (GNA 2015).
Other activities include high-profile public statements, such as that made in 2013 by President Mahama at the G8 meeting in the UK, when he vowed to clamp down on tax evasion and avoidance in the energy sector (TodaysGhana 2013). The president also highlighted an accountability measure which requires the Ministry of Finance to report annually on the sector. Notably, a number of African leaders were invited by UK Prime Minister David Cameron, as part of the summit, to discuss their countries’ progress in good governance and transparency, particularly in the extractive industries.
Finally, there is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) – a global governance standard regarding oil, gas and mineral resources. All the countries included are in the process of implementing this standard, with Nigeria reportedly making ‘meaningful progress’, and Ghana and Sierra Leone making ‘satisfactory progress’. Mining Weekly reports that analysts are hopeful that the standard will bring about the envisaged change in these sectors (De Bruyn 2021); research suggests that EITI impacts positively on reducing corruption (David-Barrett and Okamura 2013); and some countries, such as Ghana, are reportedly already reaping financial benefits (Norvan Reports 2021). Other analysts criticise the initiative’s ‘voluntary’ nature and argue that questions remain over its effectiveness, particularly in relation to its operational and development goals (Lujala, Rustad and Le Billon 2017; Van Alstine 2017).
Nigeria
Similar trends emerge concerning AFM types, sectors, actors, and rhetoric/language in Nigeria. Arrests of individuals committing fraud were widespread, as reported by the Nigeria Police’s Special Fraud Unit (PSFU 2016a; PSFU 2016b), and reporting on AFMs included sectors such as banking (Biometric Technology Today 2016; BizWatch 2016a; Atufe 2016; BizWatch 2016b; BizWatch 2016c; BizWatch 2016d), pharmaceuticals (PharmaSecure 2016; Taylor 2014), tax and insurance (The Guardian 2016 ), oil (Ojo 2016a; Ojo 2016b; MomohJimoh 2016; Uwaleke 2015; NAN 2015; Ojo 2015; AFP 2015), cybercrime (Fox-Brewster 2015), counterfeits (Aluko & Oyebode 2014; Business Day 2014) and intellectual property (Channels Television 2014; NLIP 2014a; NLIP 2014b).
In October 2015, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) fined the South Africa-based mobile telecommunications company MTN an amount variously reported as US$5.2 billion and US$3.9 billion (reduced to US$1.5 billion after negotiations) for failing to disconnect unregistered SIM cards (AFP 2019; Ogunlesi 2015). According to a report by the NCC, a high-profile kidnapping of a former Nigerian finance minister was carried out with the kidnappers using unregistered, untraceable SIM cards, and the record fine was influenced by the kidnap as it had become ‘a matter of national security’ (Ogunlesi 2015; Currie 2015).
Another major trend was in AFMs against cyberfraud. Cyberfraud involves scenarios in which personal financial information is solicited under false pretences. Nigeria over the years has adopted various measures against this type of fraud, including the use of smart technology by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), with support from Microsoft, and has enforced the closure of hundreds of fraudulent websites (CIOL Bureau 2009).
Legislative changes also occurred with the passing of the Cybercrime Act of 2015, which proposed a coordinated and multi-agency approach to cybercrime and increased punishment and fines, including the death penalty for cyber offences that cause the death of individuals (Fox-Brewster 2015; Techcabal 2015). The refreshed 2015 law calls for the death penalty for ‘an offence committed against a system or network that has been designated critical national infrastructure of Nigeria that results in the death of an individual (amongst other punishments for lesser crimes)’ (Techcabal 2015). It was hoped that, after negative global media reporting, the law would help the country’s national reputation, create a safer environment nationally and attract foreign investment (Nigerian Tribune 2016). The law, deemed ‘landmark’ by some, has been criticised by others for infringing press freedom (Adibe, Ike and Udeogu 2017). Military-style language was used to describe the actors involved in AFMs, and those fighting the ‘419’ scams were referred to as the ‘anti-419 squads’ (Quainton 2005).1 The fight against fraud was furthermore a highly political issue, discussed at high levels and used in election campaigns.
There were concerns about the effectiveness of AFMs and the ability of fraudsters to find loopholes in new legislation. For example, it was highlighted how the 2015 Cybercrime Act ‘will also provide excuses for cyber fraudsters and criminals to devise other means of perpetrating these offences’ (Nigerian Tribune 2016). A further issue concerns the possibility that those charged with enforcing such legislation might exploit their authority for personal gain. In this context, the Senate ‘approved a warrant of arrest against the former chairman [of the EFCC]’ after a petitioner alleged that ‘during his stay in office, [Lamorde] diverted over N1tr of looted funds [that were] recovered by the commission from corrupt officials’ (BizWatch 2016b). Lamorde denied the charge (BBC 2015a), but was removed after President Muhammadu Buhari ‘refused Mr Lamorde a second allowable term at the commission’ (Ogala 2015). The petitioner himself was convicted of fraud in 2016 (Akinloye 2016).
A recent AFM initiative in the banking sector featured verification software, chip and pin and other technological solutions (BBC 2015b). Here, bank customers had to register their biometric information with the bank and receive a bank verification number (BVN) to check the account holder’s identity, with the aim of making the service more secure. However, recent new guidelines have been introduced as the system is still prone to fraud, creating an additional opportunity for access to customers’ biometric and financial records. Nevertheless, BVNs have emerged as ‘a core pillar of the Nigeria’s anti-money laundering’ and anti-fraud efforts, ‘driv[ing] the rise of Nigerian fintech; payments, savings and even cryptocurrency startups have relied on it’ (Onukwue 2021).
Technology was also used in other sectors. For example, the American company Sproxil, which provides consumer product verification services, has worked with the Nigerian National Agency for Food and Drug Control (NAFDAC) in the area of pharmaceuticals since 2010, allowing consumers to verify products using a text-based service (Akpotaire 2013; Taylor 2014). Sproxil’s services are also used in Tanzania (see Mykhalchenko and Wiegratz 2021a). It works with brands such as GlaxoSmithKline, and runs projects with USAID in several African countries.
Awareness-raising and education is a key element of many AFMs. For example, an animated video was created by FirstBank to educate consumers on the dangers of online scam messages (FirstBank 2016). Another example includes the work of the Anti-Counterfeiting Collaboration (ACC) – ‘a non-political, non-governmental, non-profit making coalition’ – which, since 2006, has brought together businesses, enforcement agencies and the public in educational events (ACC n.d.). These events have included celebration of World Anti-Counterfeiting Day focusing on counterfeit medicine, widely publicised in the media (ACC 2014a); a roundtable on intellectual property rights sponsored by Microsoft, Unilever, Guinness, Vlisco, Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline (Aluko and Oyebode 2014); and annual roundtables in collaboration with the International Trademark Association on the topic of counterfeiting (ACC 2014b). ACC’s leaders are composed of representatives of global corporate giants including Unilever, GlaxoSmithKline, British American Tobacco, Guinness and Pfizer (Channels Television 2014). Although ACC is non-profit, business interests and brand protection are key themes in the organisation’s activity.
Sierra Leone
AFMs in Sierra Leone include widespread international cooperation, especially in the area of trade and movement of goods across borders. One use of technology was common: the pharmaceutical sector saw high levels of AFM activity, and there were changes in legislation. In an example of international cooperation, the Ministry of Trade, the Sierra Leone Standards Bureau and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) implemented the EU-funded ECOWAS Quality Policy (ECOQUAL) (I. K. Dumbuya 2015). This policy stipulated that imported products and those due for export should be tested against international quality standards. This was seen as important for public health and in order to access international markets.
International cooperation and partnerships with the National Revenue Authority (NRA) and the UK’s Department for International Development included measures aimed at enhancing expertise, building capacity and helping with modernising and digitising tax administration systems (A. M. Dumbuya 2014).
In a move to introduce legislation that would address the issue of imported counterfeit products, the 2011 Customs Act allowed for suspected counterfeit goods to be examined, confiscated or even destroyed (Sierra Leone Gazette 2011). The use of new technology is also an identifiable trend. Examples include investment in the adoption of technology, for example digital systems that would increase revenue collection by the state, as well as its promotion by donor nations (Awoko 2016b; Awoko 2016c).
AFMs featured heavily in the pharmaceuticals sector, with the activity of the Pharmacy Board (the sector’s regulatory body) being particularly prominent. Measures included crackdowns, revoking of licences, and fines (Pharmacy Board of Sierra Leone 2015); destruction of counterfeit medicines in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (Pharmacy Board of Sierra Leone 2014; Kamara 2017); and calls by the top leadership of the board for harsher punishments and public education about the dangers of counterfeit medicines (FDA 2016). Notably, in 2011, a survey indicated that 83% of the population were aware that fake medicine was present in the country (Ogisi 2011), suggesting that the continued use of fake medicine was not due to lack of public awareness about the dangers (see also Klantschnig and Huang 2018).
The Pharmacy Board also attempted to increase stakeholder involvement and cooperation (Saffa 2015). It held consultative meetings, including with the police, the NRA, civil society and the Ministry of Trade in regions with high levels of fake drugs (Lahai 2015). Additionally, the Pharmacy Board held a ‘sensitisation meeting’ in November 2015 with stakeholders ‘to see how best they can work with them as a unit in complementing the effort of government in improving the laws of pharmaceuticals in the country’ (Moriba 2015). Other initiatives included the creation of a nationwide taskforce to tackle fake drugs (Lahai 2015)
Several pieces of legislation, such as the Income Tax Act 2000, the NRA Act 2002, the 2011 Customs Act and the 2015 Finance Act were enacted in an effort to tackle the issue of tax fraud (NRA 2015; A. M. Dumbuya 2015; Sierra Leone Gazette 2011; Kargbo 2015). Additional initiatives resulted in increased specialisation and professionalisation in government departments (NRA n.d.a; A. M. Dumbuya 2014), punitive measures (Johnson 2010), and the utilisation of new technology (Awoko 2016a). The facilitation of business activities, efforts to attract foreign direct investment, and increased efficiency were also common drivers to further AFMs (NRA n.d.b; Awoko 2016a; Kargbo 2015; A. M. Dumbuya 2015).
The government also implemented a number of initiatives to improve border and customs operations in order to prevent economic crime. These have included amendments to legislation, such as to the NRA Act (A. M. Dumbuya 2015) and the 2011 Customs Act (Sierra Leone Gazette 2011, 87–88); changes in practice on the part of government agencies, such as the NRA’s emphasis on post-clearance searches (A. M. Dumbuya 2015); and increased stakeholder involvement and cooperation (A. M. Dumbuya 2015; Kamara 2015). Some changes in legislation have resulted in tangible results, for example, the NRA Act directly led to the establishment of the NRA.
Regarding counterfeit consumer goods, government reforms and initiatives – such as MOUs with international partners and actors within the state, the use of ASYCUDA computerised customs management software, the one-stop border post, and increased capacity – have led to tax revenue increasing: on World Customs Day, an NRA commissioner-general noted in his statement the ‘progression in Customs revenue collection’ from Le283.3 billion in 2011 to Le489.9billion in 2013 (Kamara 2015).
Great emphasis was placed on international cooperation to stop economic fraud, including the establishment of a one-stop border with Guinea, in addition to MOUs on the issue of security and information-sharing signed with Guinea and Liberia (I. K. Dumbuya 2015; Kamara 2015). Other examples of international cooperation present a more explicit involvement of global powers, notably Britain, China and the USA, where aid was utilised to build capacity across different sectors of the economy (A. M. Dumbuya 2015; Koroma 2017).
Conclusion: AFM trends and characteristics across the three regions analysed
This briefing has identified the following trends in AFMs in the West African countries studied: a push for legislative changes to address fraud; widespread use of technology to create new anti-fraud solutions, especially in the area of banking, finance, pharmaceuticals and customer goods; the use of educational campaigns as preventive measures; the encouragement of consumer participation in AFMs; significant cross-agency and cross-sectoral cooperation; and taxation and revenue collection as a major official rationale for the launch and/or intensification of AFMs. At times, tensions and conflicts within agencies were revealed, as various (political, economic and other) interests and agendas interacted with those addressing fraud.
We conclude with some reflections on the data in the three Briefings (see Mykhalchenko and Wiegratz 2019; 2021a; see also Mykhalchenko and Wiegratz 2021b): first, we point to the notable proliferation of units and (local, national, regional and global) alliances to engage in AFMs in various subsectors. We know relatively little about the reality of the inner workings of AFM agencies, old and new – for example, standards agencies – or about regional inter-agency cooperation. What are the respective drivers and patterns of proliferation? How do internal organisational dynamics within (and between) AFM agencies affect AFM dynamics, across sectors, cases and time? We have also noted an increased involvement of non-state actors in advocating for AFMs and the increasing use of IT as a tool to prevent and uncover fraud.
Second, AFMs can produce – directly or indirectly – social harms, for example the uncompensated destruction of a large number of goods that are functioning and of value to users. They can bring about destruction or diminishing of properties and livelihoods of alleged wrongdoers. In our examples, the smallest actors seem to suffer regularly. Further, the AFMs studied were usually regarded by those adversely affected as opaque, harsh, unfair, ineffective or ill-intentioned from the start, serving agendas other than to contain fraud – for example, to raise money for political actors or for the agencies in charge of AFMs; or for their staff and managers to benefit from corruption related to AFMs; or to favour certain economic interests.
Third, with AFMs, matters of quality, standards, procedure, originality and copyright, and the corresponding issues of consumer protection, health and economic development, have become the basis for carrying out expansive and severe top-down state interventions, often against the most income-poor sections of society. This makes AFMs – and their underpinning discourses – particularly potent for certain political or technocratic actors. Who can seriously be or argue against AFMs, against clamping down on (alleged) criminals to save or help citizens and genuine companies?
Fourth, AFMs have a significant class character: in the name of well-being, health, growth or law and order, the mobile phones of millions of people are threatened with disconnection (see, for example, Kasemiire 2020), while profits of ‘genuine brands’ get protected; the livelihood avenues of large groups of low-income earners get blocked, while the avenues of other ‘harm-producers’ remain open. This is not to say that some AFMs are not desirable, are not needed and do not have significant public backing, or are not useful to advance public interests. The analytical and political point here is to highlight their class characteristics and conflicts and their often significant unevenness, patchiness, arbitrariness and injustice (for example, how AFM-related harms and benefits get distributed across classes, or between foreign as opposed to local actors), and foreground the respective dynamics of state interests, power, violence and expansion, and of markets. Regarding the latter, AFMs are creating a particular set of market conditions as well as potential or actual barriers to entry to that market. In other words, AFMs are highly loaded, both politically and economically, especially in a neoliberal context. This makes them ripe for political-economic analysis, particularly with regard to their effectiveness: this is of key analytical and societal interest and is as yet under-researched.
Fifth, our data suggest that AFMs are in many ways political and business operations, and they can be shaped significantly by the commercial interests of the respective inspection firms, politicians (-cum-business persons), experts, state agency staff and technocrats, and firms in the targeted sector. Further, in some cases fraud allegations against high-profile individuals and businesses can be used for the purpose of harming the reputation, livelihood and source of political funding of a political competitor-cum-business person, that is, to punish and deter others from oppositional activity. Another goal can be to harass or deter a business competitor or high-level state/government official. AFMs then can be as much about (purportedly) dubious, controversial, political and ineffective deals; about (alleged) corruption (favourite bidders, signature bonuses, extortion); and about unfairness and heavy-handedness, as much as about the need for a reduction, however temporary, in levels of fraud.
Sixth, AFMs make use of a very neoliberal (-authoritarian) mix of methods, including: (1) awareness, sensitisation and capacity-building campaigns, and, generally, dialogue with acceptable partners and stakeholders; (2) a ‘compliance-oriented’ regulatory approach (Tombs and Whyte 2019) that emphasises engagement and outreach rather than formal enforcement techniques – vis-à-vis business and consumers to curb fraud; and (3) an incentives-and rewards-based approach (for example promises of personal benefits for consumers/whistle-blowers in return for their involvement in AFMs). This incentivisation to induce consumers to participate in the fight to clean up a fraud-ridden economy sits alongside the use of (often well-publicised) state crackdowns, as we highlight below. There is also a notable emphasis on process, procedure and compliance; on improvements, innovation, technology and efficiency gains; on risk, investment and confidence; and on global, all-round, effective solutions – rather than on tackling the larger social conditions underpinning the rise and persistence of fraud.
That said, there is then also a more high-handed, authoritarian practice of clampdowns, confiscation and destruction of goods, and violence. This type of AFM regularly occurs in markets or sectors where the income-poor operate, and – equally crucial – is carried out under far from clear circumstances, in a context of severe power asymmetries. Some negatively affected income-poor people comment that this type of measure is not fair, logical, appropriate or effective and question whether fraud reduction is indeed the actual objective.
Seventh, AFMs regularly take place in a political economy characterised by (perceptions of) long-standing, severe de facto or rumoured corruption of state officials and fraud committed by business persons with state connections (see for example, Maina 2019), and by resulting scepticism and cynicism among sections of people regarding the authorities’ promises to ‘clean up’ the state, the economy or indeed both (Wiegratz 2016). Questions arise such as what constitutes an appropriate, just, fair, measured, effective AFM in the context of, say, neoliberal Uganda. And, relatedly, what is the political economy of AFMs regarding matters of definition and data? Generally, we point to the existence of multiple AFM-related political-economic conflicts, tensions, contradictions and trade-offs.
Eighth, AFMs are plugged into some of the major discourses in neoliberal Africa. The AFM discourse is highly moralised (with shame lists, public denunciation, and slogans such as ‘pay your tax – build your country’). There is a high degree of compatibility of AFMs with agendas of digital economy, data collection, surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019), secure capitalism and ‘build back better’. For all these reasons, we expect that AFMs are here to stay for a long time. They serve various interests (and functions) in neoliberal capitalism, including those of the ruling classes.
Finally, research on the detailed political-economic character of AFMs will need to analyse: (1) the impact of a country’s AFMs on a range of business entities across economic sectors, consumers, professions, the state (including revenue collection), the wider economy, the character of capitalism, and targeted fraud types; (2) patterns of conflict and cooperation between state agencies, state and non-state actors, and non-state actors involved in AFMs; (3) the conditions, forces and agencies that shape the effectiveness of various AFM partnerships or alliances, for example between state and civil society actors (one such collaboration is that in Uganda between the Uganda Consumer Protection Association [UCPA], various regulators and the Bank of Uganda in getting a law enacted to subject all payment settlement systems to one law implemented by the central bank, thus facilitating the central bank and other agencies to coordinate the oversight of transactions in order to curb fraud); (4) the pattern of AFM beneficiaries and losers – that is, the sectoral evenness regarding AFMs, the choice of targets and punishments and its relation to the power of state relative to fractions of capital, and the relative power of those fractions with respect to each other and to labour. We hope to address some of these issues in future research.