Introduction
Analyses of conflict-affected societies have focused on the impact of violence on gender relations, abuse of children, victims and ex-combatants, and on the environment (Albanese 2001; Dudenhoefer 2016; Prieto 2012; Verweijen 2020). Underlying these analyses are issues of power relations in the context of political violence: how violent conflicts affect specific groups differently, how individuals within these groups express their agency in the context of violent conflicts, and why there are specific outcomes in conflict processes. These issues have been the subject of the burgeoning literature on violent conflicts, especially those that seek to explain different variables in the context of civil wars. This article contributes to this literature by emphasising the transformative impact of violent conflicts on socio-political processes in communities affected by armed insurgencies, explaining how this affects the power balance between people associated with militant groups in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region and those not aligned with such groups.1 This process of change is conceptualised as the social transformation of power at the ‘grassroots’.
By focusing on the Niger Delta, this article seeks to re-centre issues of armed violence beyond the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP), a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme designed and implemented by Nigeria’s federal government (Ebiede, Langer and Tosun 2020) that has occupied a central place in the prevailing analyses of the Niger Delta (Aghedo 2013; Ibaba 2011; Obi 2014; Ukiwo and Ebiede 2012). Although these studies are important, the processes and outcomes of violent conflicts in the region have not received adequate attention. Yet understanding these processes and outcomes, especially the impact of violent conflicts on power relations, is essential for inclusive peacebuilding programmes that address the needs of different groups within communities affected by armed conflicts in the Niger Delta.
To explain changes in power relations as a result of armed conflicts, I rely on a constructivist understanding of social transformation in societies that have undergone violent conflicts. In explaining the impact of violent conflicts on societies, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004, 13) note that ‘structures of opportunity and meaning at the level of “grassroots” interactions’ change in communities affected by armed violence. This implies that violence generates new political opportunities, that are competed for by people at the grassroots. As with all forms of competition over power, it is those with more leverage at the time of the competition that are likely to emerge more powerful. In explaining social transformation, Castles (2010, 1576) notes that it is a ‘fundamental shift in the way society is organised that goes beyond the continual process of incremental social change that is always at work’. In times of events such as civil wars, violent conflicts become the catalyst that causes the ‘fundamental’ shift to occur. Using this lens, thinking on political violence recognises the importance of change in societies affected by violent conflicts. This article argues that there has been a constant transformation of power relations among local actors within the Niger Delta communities considered in this article. This is a result of the nature and character of the conflicts in the region and has been consolidated by the PAP, leading to the emergence of new political dynamics in the local communities. These dynamics are evident in the process of reintegrating ex-militants into local communities since the implementation of the PAP. This also results in the empowerment of (ex-)militants in local communities (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004).
This article is divided into six sections. The first outlines the methodology and data used for the study, while the second provides a brief context of conflicts in the Niger Delta. The third section considers how armed militants gained power in Niger Delta communities. The fourth section explains how militants used the powers gained to control community governance structures during their armed insurgency. The fifth section analyses how power relations in communities in the Niger Delta are changing since the implementation of the PAP. The final section concludes, drawing broader lessons and implications of the findings for sustainable peacebuilding in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
Research methodology and data
This article is part of a research project analysing the impact of armed conflicts on communities in the Niger Delta and its implications for the reintegration of ex-militants and sustainable peacebuilding in the region. The project started in December 2013, three years after the implementation of the PAP, and ended in December 2018. Data collection took place between 2013 and 2015, for a period of two to six months each year, with fieldwork conducted in communities across the Niger Delta. The fieldwork focused on collecting qualitative data through key informant interviews in two communities in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State: Peremabiri and Ologbobiri. The selection of these communities was informed by different factors. At a macro level, Bayelsa State is located in the central Niger Delta region, and its indigenous rural communities are mostly from the Ijaw ethnic group, the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta region. Bayelsa State was the site of critical events leading to the armed insurgency against the Nigerian state and international oil companies in the Niger Delta. For example, it was in Kaiama, a town along the River Nun, that youth from the Ijaw ethnic group convened to issue a bill of rights, popularly known as the Kaiama Declaration, that created the ideological foundation for armed militancy in the Niger Delta. Odi, another town in Bayelsa State, was burned down by Nigeria’s armed forces, fuelling anti-state sentiments in the region. At a meso level, although there are eight Local Government Areas in Bayelsa State, all the major militants in Bayelsa State were based in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area. A micro analysis of the study communities also revealed that these communities had experienced intra-communal conflicts before the outbreak of anti-state militancy in the Niger Delta (Ebiede 2017). These conditions informed the selection of the two case study communities. The communities exist within a macro context of conflicts while also experiencing internal contradictions that shape socio-political relations among residents.
In total, 67 respondents were interviewed during the fieldwork. Respondents were drawn from non-militant community members, ex-militants who had been involved in armed militancy in the Niger Delta, government officials in the PAP, local scholars and local staff of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Niger Delta. During this period, I also lived in the two communities, using immersion and observation as a data collection strategy. Interview respondents are quoted anonymously, and code names used for ex-militant leaders who had participated in conflicts in the communities. This ensures the protection of respondents and key characters in the communities, which is important as the respondents still live in the communities, and maintaining anonymity allows the research to collect relevant information without contributing to the narratives of violent conflict that divide communities. For this article, the data were analysed thematically, focusing on relevant issues identified by respondents that determined socio-political relations between ex-militants and other members of their communities.
The context of violent conflicts in the Niger Delta
Historically, the Niger Delta has been marginalised within Nigeria, despite producing the crude oil that is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. Social scientists focusing on the Niger Delta have empirically shown that this marginalisation is an outcome of the skewed nature of the Nigerian political system, that favours ethnic majority groups without regard for ethnic minorities (Naanen 1995; Osaghae 1991). Although these grievances date back to the pre-independence era (Willinks Commission 1957), the most recent process leading to the marginalisation of the Niger Delta people emerged from the evolution of the distribution of oil rents in the immediate aftermath of the Nigerian civil war (Ebienfa and Kumokou 2012; Ibaba 2005; Nwajiaku-Dahou 2009).
The state’s monopoly control of oil rents in Nigeria is achieved through laws that have their origins in the country’s military dictatorships. The people of the Niger Delta were not part of the deliberations of these laws, and so were excluded from participating in creating the legislation that governs the natural resource that is produced in their homeland. Attempts to change these laws since Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999 have so far failed. The exclusion of the Niger Delta people from the governance of their resources led to a sense of alienation (Ibaba 2005) which formed the basis for the mobilisation of ethnic civil society to challenge the state’s continued control of natural resources in the region. The protest movements that emerged from this mobilisation created a contentious relationship between the Nigerian state and communities in the Niger Delta.
Popular mobilisations and protests often manifest as youth protests in the Niger Delta. These youth protests, which first emerged as non-violent movements, metamorphosed into armed militancy against the Nigerian state and international oil companies in the Niger Delta. These agitations, and the armed militancy that followed, were ideologically justified by using the disadvantages suffered by oil-producing communities in the ‘oil complex’ (Ibaba 2005; Obi 2009). Armed groups claiming to represent communities carried out attacks against oil industry infrastructure and kidnapped mainly expatriate personnel of international oil companies. At its height in 2009, armed militancy led to an estimated loss of 800,000 barrels of crude oil per day (Asuni 2009). During this period, people in oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta experienced different forms of state-sanctioned violence, including the destruction of villages, rape of women and corporal punishment.
Despite the claims of armed groups to represent the local people, and the ideological foundations of the insurgency, a critical understanding of that epoch requires further interrogation of the internal contradictions that characterised these communities. Analysis that emphasises the Niger Delta conflict as one between communities (collectively suffering from dispossession and marginalisation) and the state and international oil companies (engaged in rentier extraction, capital accumulation and profit seeking) without examining the contradictions and divisions that these conflicts generate within communities, fails to capture the extent of change taking place in the area. One way to go beyond this limited analysis is to borrow from Raufu Mustapha’s analytical framing of ethnicity and identity in Nigeria. Mustapha (1998) outlined the constructive nature of ethnic identities that defines community life in Nigeria, noting that individual experiences of these identities are shaped by specific local political, economic, and social contexts (Ehrhardt and Shah 2020). Applying this analytical frame to the Niger Delta, the conflict in the region begins to unravel not simply as one between society, on one hand, and state and international oil companies, on the other hand. Instead, it reveals itself as a conflict that includes individual and local political, economic and social contestations within communities. This analytical lens does not deny the role of the state and international oil companies. The essence of focusing on communities is to demonstrate the extent of the damage done to the socio-political fabric of local communities in the Niger Delta by the political economy of oil in the region. The next section examines how this process of changing the local socio-political structures in the Niger Delta emerged.
How armed militants gained power in Niger Delta communities
To understand how armed militants gained power in Niger Delta communities, it is important to go beyond the struggle between the people of the Niger Delta and the Nigerian state and international oil companies, and pay attention to the intra-communal struggle for control and access to resources accruing to communities (Ebiede 2017). This struggle led to violent confrontations among local people with opposing interests. The intra-communal and inter-communal conflicts within communities are horizontal conflicts between different groups over political power in the communities. These first occurred prior to the rebel–state conflict. Some actors that participated in the inter-communal conflict transmuted into militant groups following the advent of rebel–state violence. While the hostilities that characterised the intra-communal and inter-communal conflicts reduced, these local conflicts were still unresolved when the militant groups emerged (Ukiwo 2007).
In the cases of Peremabiri and Ologbobiri, two communities in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa State, two different militia groups developed out of this process. In Peremabiri, the militant group that emerged was led by a faction of youths who had been engaged in communal violence that claimed the lives of several community members. This was also the case in Ologbobiri. However, the origins of the conflicts in these two communities are different. In Peremabiri, intra-communal violence began in 1995 following disagreements within the community on how to manage rents from the raffia palm plantation that provides the main resource for the alcohol distillery in the community. This disagreement degenerated into violent conflicts that resulted in the deaths of several community members. While this conflict was ongoing, another conflict over control of funds paid as compensation to the community by Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) emerged in 1998. The existing fault lines in the community became part of the conflict over the distribution of this compensation. This led to divisions among the Chiefs and the Community Development Committee (CDC),2 and recurrent violence that claimed several lives in Peremabiri (Interview with community member 1, Peremabiri, January 2014). In 1999, the Government of Bayelsa State set up a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the conflict in the community. However, this commission did not submit a report to the government and the witness statements to the committee were not made public. Local community members believe that powerful and connected members of the community that could have been indicted by a commission report influenced the curtailed and inconclusive end of the inquiry (ibid.).
In Ologbobiri, intra-communal conflicts emerged from an initial communal mobilisation against the Nigerian AGIP Oil Company (NAOC).3 In January 2002, community youth, demanding a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with NAOC, mobilised themselves to occupy the NAOC Tebidaba flow station. The youths had gone there unarmed, and depended on Egbesu powers.4 The occupation was successful (Interview with ex-militant 1, Ologbobiri, February 2014). Following the successful stalling of NAOC’s operational activities at the flow station, the company was forced to sign an MOU with the community. According to community members, this MOU included the construction of a jetty, school buildings, and public toilets, and renovation of the community hospital (Interview with community member 4, Ologbobiri, February 2014). The community youths mobilised again to confront with NAOC following the expiration of the MOU in 2003. However, this second mobilisation led to a confrontation between the Nigerian military and community youths, in which the army killed 13 youths (Interview with ex-militant 1, Ologbobiri, February 2014).
The initial violence in Peremabiri and Ologbobiri set the stage for successive violence in these communities. However, the trajectories of violence were fundamentally different in each community. Peremabiri had been divided along the lines of communal groups seeking to control community development funds from SPDC. On the surface, it seemed as though Ologbobiri was united against NAOC in its demand for development. The signing and implementation of the MOU demonstrates that Ologbobiri’s unity brought positive developments to the community.
Despite the seeming unity of the Ologbobiri community, some community members believed that the second confrontation between the community youths and security agents did not reflect the community interest (Interview with community chief, Ologbobiri, February 2014). One community member argued that the first MOU had set the standard for the relationship between NAOC and the community, and that it was anticipated that NAOC would enter into another MOU when the first expired. Youths who participated in the second confrontation disagreed with this view. One such young person, who later became part of a militant group, explained that:
After the first incident the youths now had a second thought that ‘okay, if just this thing we did can bring these good things to the community, that means AGIP and the oil companies are persons that don’t listen to soft voices, but you must hold them with iron hand’. Here and then, in several occasions again, after maybe two or three years, if there is any agreement written with AGIP and not complied with, the youth body will take other actions again. (Interview with ex-militant 2, Ologbobiri, February 2014)
Apart from the payments to the community, the situation also led to increased engagement between Ologbobiri and NAOC. As the company decided to revisit the MOU, it also meant that more people from the community could access patronage from the oil company through jobs and contracts. However, the company only provided patronage to those who were in control of the community organisations that led the attacks on the company. This situation raised the premium on such organisations. Thus, community members interested in the patronage of the oil companies began to struggle for control of community governance structures such as the CDC and the Community Youth Group (CYG). A community chief explained:
In 2004, we had the problem of the Opubri [a section of the community] chairman. You know when you elect a CDC chairman; some people said the CDC chairman will bring development to the community. And as per that, he will go to AGIP and then bring finance too, because there are percentages that are being paid to the CDC chairman and the Council of Chiefs and the entire youth body. You know when someone wants to become CDC chairman, the other group will kick against it and say I will bring my own man and in short, the contractors who are moving between the communities and AGIP, they lobby these youths so as to bring them in as a contractor and they are indigenes. Then some other people too will hold meeting and bring maybe 1 million or 2 million naira so that we are going to give you the contract. For that reason, war broke out in the community and led to the killing of one boy in the community. (Interview with community chief, Ologbobiri, February 2014)
Due to their sustained nature, the local conflicts in Ologbobiri and Peremabiri were still ongoing when anti-state armed militancy emerged in the Niger Delta. This significantly reshaped the local conflicts in both communities. Members of the fighting factions in both communities joined militia groups in Rivers and Delta States. In Peremabiri, the militant leader was previously a factional leader of the youth groups that had participated in communal violence. He joined the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom in Rivers State. In Ologbobiri, two militant leaders emerged, both of whom joined the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) Camp 5 led by Government Ekpemupolo (aka Tompolo).5 These actors have often stated that their motivation to join these fighting groups was informed by the overarching sentiments of deprivation and marginalisation shared by youth groups in the Niger Delta. But their membership of militia groups had implications for the conflicts in their community, which manifested following their return to their communities as ‘Niger Delta freedom fighters’ during the period of armed militancy.
Both militant leaders from Ologbobiri returned there and established separate militant camps in 2006. Despite serving under the MEND leadership in Delta State, one of the leaders named his camp after the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) which was led by Asari Dokubo in Rivers State. The second leader maintained his alliance with MEND. Both militant leaders had been on the same side during the community violence and had been jailed as a result of the death of the youth during the fighting. Although there was no direct disagreement between them, the establishment of two different camps indicated that they were acting independently of, but not in conflict with, each other.
The militant leader in Peremabiri did not immediately return to his community. Instead, he joined forces with an armed group in Diebu, a neighbouring community in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area (Interview with ex-militant 5, Peremabiri, January 2014). This group was initially led by Prince Igodo (CEHRD 2009, 62), but in June 2007, internal clashes within the group led to the death of Prince Igodo and the Peremabiri warlord established himself as the militant leader in the area. Total control of the armed group in Diebu gave the Peremabiri warlord the opportunity to move back to his community, where he was able to establish himself as an armed militant leader.
The establishment of militant camps in Ologbobiri (2006) and Peremabiri (2008) can be explained within the perspective of the proliferation of armed groups under the umbrella of the MEND. However, the proliferation of militant camps is also a process that emerged from the contest for power and authority in the villages of the Niger Delta. With their emergence as warlords in their communities, militants in both Peremabiri and Ologbobiri began to gradually claim the power to determine the affairs of their communities by taking control of local leadership structures.
How armed militants used power in Niger Delta communities
In spite of the dominant narratives that provide the ideological justifications for most rebel groups, the survival strategies of rebel groups often do not lean on their stated ideological goals. Instead, groups often adopt different strategies with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of their organisations. Financing and recruitment methods shape the behaviour of rebel groups, while the availability of natural resources makes rebel groups less dependent on the civilian population (Weinstein 2006). By not relying on civilians, rebel groups can use non-selective violence to establish themselves in communities where they exist. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), a rebel group that fought for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia, successfully established central control over resources and effective governance structures that responded to the needs of Eritreans in territories it controlled during the war (Müller 2012).
Another dimension to the behaviour of rebel groups is their orientation towards the goal of state formation. While some rebel movements such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SLPA) in Sudan and the EPLF in Eritrea fought for independence, other groups such as the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Liberia are fighting for a change of government while maintaining the existing state. These differences are important in explaining how rebels use power gained during insurgencies, as groups with the ‘intention to govern’ will begin early enough to establish legitimacy within the territory and population they control (Podder 2014).
The militant groups in the Niger Delta differ to a large extent from the groups that inform much of the literature on how non-state armed groups use the power gained during insurgencies to govern communities. Also, no existing research has used empirical data to make a coherent analysis of the behaviour of armed groups in the Niger Delta. Instead, studies have focused on the emergence of these groups and their place in the Niger Delta’s struggle and political economy of oil in Nigeria (Watts 2004a). Governance in local communities in the Niger Delta is exercised at two levels: formal state institutions and traditional governance which predates the colonial and post-colonial Nigerian state. In addition to the traditional authorities, the CDC and CYG are other non-state governance institutions in local communities that emerged to negotiate with oil companies on behalf of the community. Traditional rulers derive their legitimacy to be at the helm of community affairs through ancient customs and traditions. This form of authority is not unique to the Niger Delta; it has been practised across different kingdoms, and it is considered as one of the sources of legitimacy for public authorities. On the other hand, the CDC and CYG are community creations to respond to development challenges in the Niger Delta. Thus, while traditional rulers provide leadership for the communities, the CDC serves as a development facilitator in these communities. In this sense, the CDC ought to complement the traditional rulers (Watts 2004b).
The CDC and traditional rulers, in principle, are de facto governance institutions in the communities. The state is present through the provision of the rule of law, security, public health, education and infrastructure. However, the CDC and traditional rulers also play a role in enabling the government to provide these services. Essentially, the CDC and traditional rulers represent the symbol of authority and traditional governance in the local communities.
In Peremabiri and Ologbobiri, the struggle to control these symbols of authority and traditional governance is linked to the struggle of local actors to be in charge of the resources that accrue to the community. The emergence of militant groups and the participation of a faction of those involved in the struggle to control community governance institutions symbolise a transformation of power relations among the groups competing for control of the community: the empowerment of a faction of the community, as these groups actively sought to capture governance structures and establish themselves as de facto leaders in the communities.
In Peremabiri, the militant leader adopted a more conciliatory approach in establishing control in the community. Recognising that he had left the community as a result of conflicts and needed the cooperation of community members, he used the provision of services and patronage of community indigenes to build a support base and claim the governance of the community. First, after successfully establishing control of the area – including neighbouring villages – after the death of Prince Igodo, he moved to Peremabiri to establish a militant base. He hired unemployed youths and women in the community to provide sanitation services (Interview with ex-militant 7, Peremabiri, January 2014). He also utilised the grievances of the communities towards oil companies operating in the area (Interviews with community members, Peremabiri, January 2014). During that period, he canvassed for unity among community members to enable them to demand development initiatives from oil companies (ibid.). There was no resistance from the indigenes. Instead, he was able to mobilise some community youths to join his group.
In Ologbobiri, the militant group leaders took control of the community governance institutions through coercion (Interview with community members, Ologbobiri, February 2014). In the community, ‘the young men who were active in the creeks would want to dictate community governance in the village’ (Interview with community member 2, Ologbobiri, February 2014); and ‘most worrisome was how the militants themselves decided to encroach on community governance. Ordinary CDC elections need an endorsement of the militant leader and because of the excessive use of force mostly innocent people lost their lives in the process and [it] also pitched indigenes against each other in the community’ (Interview with community chief, Yenagoa, January 2014). One community member also said that:
for you to be a CDC chairman you must identify yourself with a militant group. The community is deprived of its choice of leadership. The militants have hijacked the leadership; they imposed people on the community. They also removed the traditional ruler without following the norms and tradition of the community. (Interview with community member 2, Ologbobiri, February 2014)
The strategies adopted by the militant leaders in Ologbobiri and Peremabiri and the political dynamics in the Niger Delta led to the empowerment of community factions that joined the ‘armed struggle’ in the Niger Delta. This situation changed the power relations in the communities. Militant leaders were in charge of community governance and were also recognised by the government, while other community members who had fought against these militants during communal conflicts ultimately lost control of the community governance institutions.
Changing power relations in the aftermath of the Presidential Amnesty Programme
The implementation of the PAP, a local form of DDR, in the Niger Delta provided an opportunity for the reduction of arms and dissolution of armed groups in the region (Ebiede, Langer and Tosun 2020). Although ex-militants remained empowered as a result of the conflict and the nature of the peace process in the Niger Delta, the amnesty and DDR process created an opportunity for non-militants in the communities to contest the dominance of ex-militants. Community members recognised that they could explore legal means to reclaim community leadership structures. In Ologbobiri, some community members had reported the continued dominance of ex-militants to the Bayelsa State Command of the Nigerian Police Force (Interview with community member 2, Ologbobiri, December 2014). The police invited all the parties to its offices to discuss how to peacefully resolve the matter. Although ex-militant leaders in the community joined the discussions, they refused to accept the terms of the agreement, which limits their interference in the process of selecting the CDC President and the reinstatement of the traditional ruler in the community. However, the community did elect a new CDC President in October 2014. This displeased ex-militants, who then organised themselves to confront those they considered to have led the election process in the community.
Similarly, in Peremabiri, the immediate aftermath of the amnesty period has seen increasing rancour between the ex-militant leader and other members of his community. Community members are of the view that he may have been responsible for the death of a community youth secretary. The youth secretary had led community members in protests against SPDC in the community. However, according to informants, the militant leader insisted that only he could negotiate on behalf of the community. He did not install a CDC Chairman, but instead ensured that some members of his group became part of the CDC executive, allowing him to dictate its affairs. Other CDC members expelled loyalists of the militant leader in the committee immediately after the amnesty and DDR process was implemented. This created two CDC factions within the community: those loyal to the militant leader and those that were independent of him. Unlike Ologbobiri, where community members used law enforcement agents to confront ex-militant leaders, community members in Peremabiri used arms to confront the ex-militant leader in their community when he attacked the CDC.
The confrontation between the ex-militant groups and ordinary civilians reflects the changing dynamics of power relations in the communities. Ex-militant leaders had held power and ‘governed’ these communities as warlords without regard to the competing interests in the communities, which predate the armed insurgency. In fact, ex-militants were part of the competing interests who had contested to dominate the communities before the outbreak of militancy. The ex-militants’ attempts to continue to dominate community affairs have not gone unchallenged. Significantly, this dynamic emerges from the sentiments of other community members towards the continued dominance of armed groups in the community. The ex-militant leaders are seen as factional members in community conflicts, in which role they had committed crimes against fellow community members. In Peremabiri, community members still recount the role of the militant leader in the community conflicts that led to the death of several community members (Interview with community members, Peremabiri, December 2014). In addition, in their control of the community governance institutions during militancy, ex-militant leaders were seen as having ruled without regard to the ‘norms and traditions’ of the communities (Interview with community member 9, Ologbobiri, February 2014).
Conclusions
Armed militancy transformed power relations in local communities in a number of ways. The emergence of militant groups in the Niger Delta communities went beyond a struggle between the state and local communities for oil rents, and was equally influenced by an internal contest within local communities for control of communal governance structures. Following the rise of militant groups, a new ‘political complex’ emerged in communities in the Niger Delta. This political complex was defined by an unequal relationship between armed militants and other members of their communities. Both members of the militant group and non-militants had hitherto been contesting control of the traditional governance institutions of the community. With the emergence of militant groups, non-militants lost out in the struggle for control of the communities. The youths who joined militant groups gained control of the traditional governance structures and became gatekeepers in negotiations between the community and non-community interests (the Nigerian government and international oil companies) in the oil industry.
The resources that militants gained after taking control of the local governance structures in their host communities were also used to provide support to some community members. For example, militant leaders provided support for the education, healthcare and other incidental needs of non-combatant community members who sought their help due to the state not providing these services. This required community members to demonstrate their acceptance of militia governance in the community; those who did not were alienated from the community resources that were in the custody of the militant warlords. This finding is instructive as, even though it may seem that the state is not a party to local conflicts in the Niger Delta, further attention to the conflict dynamics shows that the state, either by its actions or inaction, contributes to these local conflicts. In Peremabiri and Ologbobiri, the state interacted with militants in ways that alienated other community members from power, and it also failed to provide basic public services, thus making those who are able to provide such services, in this case militants, de facto public service providers in communities.
The amnesty and DDR programme in the Niger Delta did not reduce the influence of militant groups in community governance, but rather reinforced the power of militant leaders as it transferred state resources to them to patronise non-militant youths in their communities. In the contest for control of community governance structures in the aftermath of the amnesty and DDR, militant leaders mobilise community youths who have benefited from the DDR programme through their patronage to pursue their interests in the community. This has divided communities into those who are loyal to ex-militant leaders and those who are not. This study’s findings also have implications for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta, showing that peacebuilding efforts should pay particular attention to power relations within communities as these are an important driver of conflicts in the Niger Delta.
The formal dissolution of armed groups in the Niger Delta created an opportunity for non-militant factions to challenge the dominance of ex-militant leaders in the community. The antagonism towards ex-militant leaders in the communities stems from the exclusionary character of community governance structures under the control of warlords. This process unveiled itself differently in Niger Delta communities. Two different confrontations between ex-militant leaders and other community members took place in Peremabiri and Ologbobiri. In Peremabiri, community members engaged in a violent confrontation with the ex-warlord in the community. In Ologbobiri, members have explored legal means to reduce the dominance of ex-warlords in their community. This difference is mainly due to the history of conflicts in each community. Intra-communal violent conflict in Peremabiri had a higher casualty rate and still dominates discussions in the community, while Ologbobiri does not have a persistent history of intra-communal violence. Discussions on the conflicts in Ologbobiri focus more on the contest for control of community governance institutions and not on the impact of violent conflicts on different members of the community.
The continued contest for the control of traditional governance structures in the communities has implications for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. The reintegration of ex-militants into communities is now tied to their role in the ensuing political contests between their leaders and other members of the community. Continued alignment with ex-militant leaders has a negative impact on ex-militants’ chances of being accepted by different sections of the community. On the other hand, aligning with community members against the interests of ex-militant leaders will reduce the benefits that ex-militants derive from their loyalty to the warlords. Ex-militants therefore have a dilemma, needing to choose between community interests and the interests of their group (held together by the warlord). As one community member noted (Interview with community chief, Ologbobiri, December 2014), ‘the militancy had very little to do with individuality, it is a group problem. If your name is Peter, personally we have no problem with Peter, but Peter belongs to a group and that group is the problem to the community.’