Enterprise democracy and worker voice

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Institute of Employment Rights Journal

Volume 3, Issue 1

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Enterprise democracy and worker voice

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Publication date (Print): 1 January 2020

Journal: Institute of Employment Rights Journal

Publisher: Pluto Journals

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Journal ID (doi): 10.2307/j50020018

Journal ID (jcode): instemplrighj

Title: Institute of Employment Rights Journal

Publisher: Pluto Journals

ISSN: 2398-1326

ISSN: 2398-1334

Publication date (Print): 1 January 2020

Volume: 3

Issue: 1 ( doiID: 10.13169/instemplrighj.3.issue-1 )

Pages: 50-61

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Publisher ID: instemplrighj.3.1.0050

DOI: 10.13169/instemplrighj.3.1.0050

SO-VID: 788b4b8a-e6a8-493a-951d-4c399b0815ed

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Endnotes

We think that such a provision is more likely to be compatible with the Convention (as well as more acceptable to some unions) than a provision that required automatic enrolment of workers in a union unless they opted out, as some commentators have suggested.
See T Schulten, L Eldring and R Naumann, The role of extension for the strength and stability of collective bargaining in Europe, in G Van Gyes and T Schulten (eds) Wage Bargaining Under the New European Economic Governance: alternative strategies for inclusive growth, ETUI, 2015; S Hayter and J Visser, Collective Agreements: Extending Labour Protection, ILO, 2018.
A Manifesto for Labour Law p23, para 3.22.
Manifesto (2016) 79, endnote 97.
See A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) Book V, ch 1, §107; and L Brandeis, Other People's Money And How the Bankers Use It, 1914.
In Switzerland, the so-called 'People's Initiative Against Rip-Off Salaries' of 2013, with the second-highest ever vote, banned banks voting as a financial intermediary, and placed a duty on pension funds to be active in casting their votes.
One suggestion would be that the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 should state that no financial intermediary may exercise votes on other people's money, unless on the express voting instructions of the owner(s). This might significantly impede asset managers supporting high CEO pay, union busting, ignoring environmental considerations and so on.
See E McGaughey, 'Votes at work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the 'Single Channel'' (2017) 46(4) ILJ 444 (summary on LSE British Politics and Policy blog http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-workers-votes-promote-good-corporate-governance/).
See the Representation of the People Act 1918 and the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928.
See S Deakin, 'The coming transformation of shareholder value' (2005) 13(1) Corporate Governance 11.
ONS, Small and medium-size enterprises (SME) count, employment and turnover 2010 to 2017: (a) 2.38m enterprises under 10 employees, employ 5.49m, (b) 231,715 enterprises of 10-49 employees employ 4.45m, (c) 40,530 enterprises of 50-250 employees employ 4m, and (d) 8,825 large enterprises employ 16.47m. Total 30.44m employees.
On this system's development, see E McGaughey, 'The codetermination bargains: the history of German corporate and labour law' (2017) 23(1) CJEL 135, 171 and C Kerr, 'The trade union movement and the redistribution of power in postwar Germany' (1954) 68(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 535.
Works Council Elections 2010: High Voter Turnout, Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (2011).
See T Berglund and M Holmen, 'Employees on Corporate Boards' (2016) 20(3) Multinational Finance Journal 237.

Comments

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[1] We think that such a provision is more likely to be compatible with the Convention (as well as more acceptable to some unions) than a provision that required automatic enrolment of workers in a union unless they opted out, as some commentators have suggested.

[2] See T Schulten, L Eldring and R Naumann, The role of extension for the strength and stability of collective bargaining in Europe, in G Van Gyes and T Schulten (eds) Wage Bargaining Under the New European Economic Governance: alternative strategies for inclusive growth, ETUI, 2015; S Hayter and J Visser, Collective Agreements: Extending Labour Protection, ILO, 2018.

[3] A Manifesto for Labour Law p23, para 3.22.

[4] Manifesto (2016) 79, endnote 97.

[5] See A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) Book V, ch 1, §107; and L Brandeis, Other People's Money And How the Bankers Use It, 1914.

[6] In Switzerland, the so-called 'People's Initiative Against Rip-Off Salaries' of 2013, with the second-highest ever vote, banned banks voting as a financial intermediary, and placed a duty on pension funds to be active in casting their votes.

[7] One suggestion would be that the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 should state that no financial intermediary may exercise votes on other people's money, unless on the express voting instructions of the owner(s). This might significantly impede asset managers supporting high CEO pay, union busting, ignoring environmental considerations and so on.

[8] See E McGaughey, 'Votes at work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the 'Single Channel'' (2017) 46(4) ILJ 444 (summary on LSE British Politics and Policy blog http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-workers-votes-promote-good-corporate-governance/).

[9] See the Representation of the People Act 1918 and the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928.

[10] See S Deakin, 'The coming transformation of shareholder value' (2005) 13(1) Corporate Governance 11.

[11] ONS, Small and medium-size enterprises (SME) count, employment and turnover 2010 to 2017: (a) 2.38m enterprises under 10 employees, employ 5.49m, (b) 231,715 enterprises of 10-49 employees employ 4.45m, (c) 40,530 enterprises of 50-250 employees employ 4m, and (d) 8,825 large enterprises employ 16.47m. Total 30.44m employees.

[12] On this system's development, see E McGaughey, 'The codetermination bargains: the history of German corporate and labour law' (2017) 23(1) CJEL 135, 171 and C Kerr, 'The trade union movement and the redistribution of power in postwar Germany' (1954) 68(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 535.

[13] Works Council Elections 2010: High Voter Turnout, Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (2011).

[14] See T Berglund and M Holmen, 'Employees on Corporate Boards' (2016) 20(3) Multinational Finance Journal 237.