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American hýbris: US Democracy Promotion in Cuba after the Cold War — Part 1
Abstract
Cuba is probably one of the best examples of the significance of the democracy promotion discourse in US foreign policy: the efforts to democratise the island have been one of the main features in the US—Cuba bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War. Even the embargo against the island has evolved from a tool to generate regime change to an instrument of democracy promotion to foster a democratic transition. Today, the Cuban embargo, after the codifications of the 1990s, is intimately connected to a ‘Cuban democratic future’. Moreover, in the last three decades, US presidents have committed themselves to promote democracy on the island, inaugurating a sort of ‘state policy’ with little or no evolutions or changes. The main aim of this two-part article is to explore the rationale behind US decennial efforts to promote a peaceful democratic change on the island, while trying to answer some crucial questions about US strategy in Cuba: Why promote democracy in Cuba? Why did democracy promotion become a long-lasting feature in US—Cuba relations? The first part deals with the security framework, and American economic interests in Cuba as a crucial push factor for democracy promotion, while the role of the Cuban-American community and the problems and perspectives of US strategy will be included in the second part, to be published in the next issue of the Journal.
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Notes
The word hýbris is of Greek origin. Among ancient Greeks, it defined a sort of sin against the Gods, and it was related to a human behaviour when common people pretended to be ‘like a God’ or even considered themselves more important than a divinity. Today, its meaning recalls arrogance or extreme and unjustified self-confidence.
The efficacy of the Cuban embargo on democracy (and democracy promotion) on the island is part of the ongoing debate on how economic sanctions influence the transition to democratic rule (and respect of human rights) in a targeted country, as regime change is considered one of the objectives of the sender(s) in imposing economic sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2008: 67–69). Scholars expressed several perplexities about the possibility of success of the sanctions oriented to the regime change (Kaempfer et al. 2004; Marinov 2005) and their effective role in halting human rights violations and promoting the democratic rule (Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2009, 2010).
In 2002, Ana Montes was sentenced to 25 years in prison. For further reading, see Sulick (2013: 267–273).
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 partly reconnected the Clintonian vision to promote democracy as cornerstone of America's and international security. The potential equivalence between ‘rough states’ and non-democracies in endangering international peace could have led to an unlimited application of US unilateral intervention worldwide, not only against state supporting terrorism (Leffler 2004).
The US rationale beyond promoting the regime change in Cuba through economic sanctions has been quite the same since the 1960s. In April 1960, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Lester D. Mallory, sent a memorandum to his chief suggesting the US could make ‘the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government’ (Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS 1991): VI, 885).
Díaz-Balart referred to Adolf Eichmann, the German Nazi lieutenant colonel of the Schutzstaffel (SS), who fled to Argentina after the collapse of the Reich. There, the Israeli secret service captured him, and Eichmann was sentenced and executed in Israel in 1962.
The CACR violations and penalties are currently published and updated on Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) website, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/civpen-index2.aspx.