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      Efficacy of counter-terrorism cooperation : A critical appraisal of Nigeria–United States counter-terrorism cooperation

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            Abstract

            Nigeria has struggled to combat terrorism for over a decade despite its domestic strategies and multilateral cooperation with its contiguous neighbors and bilateral assistance from several superpowers, especially the United States. This has resulted in the death of many innocent people and the displacement of others. There is no doubt that alliance formation is considered a needed panacea for thwarting terrorism. Despite the cooperation between Nigeria and the United States, the growth of terrorism in Nigeria has not been reversed. However, the task of finding the answer to why Nigeria–US counter-terrorism cooperation has not achieved the desired objective in Nigeria remains an imperative for this article to grapple with. Thus, the study concludes that for Nigeria–US counter-terrorism cooperation to be efficacious, both countries need to deepen their bilateral engagements devoid of politicization of assistance and vested interests.

            Main article text

            Introduction

            Combating violent extremism and terrorism has been a Herculean task for Nigeria for more than a decade, since the outbreak of Boko Haram terrorism. Even though a lot of internal shortcomings, such as politicization and corruption, that have undermined the country’s counter-terrorism (CT) efforts have been identified in the literature, 4 another dimension to these CT pitfalls arising from contradictions in external assistance has been given little attention. Foremost in this regard is Nigeria’s CT cooperation with the United States (US). This is because unlike France, which had simply used its military aid and presence in the Sahelian region to aid counter-Boko Haram operations, 5 or Britain and others who play limited roles in the entire CT operations, the US is a power to which Nigeria has consistently looked to for assistance since the outbreak of terrorism in its territory. 6

            To underscore the severity of the problem, terrorist attacks and the counter-attacks by Nigeria’s defense and security forces have been responsible for 39,311 deaths between 29 May 2011 and 2 February 2021. 7 There have also been displacements of more than 2.5 million citizens within Nigeria alone, not including the thousands seeking refuge in the neighboring countries, while well over 7.1 million Nigerians have faced existential threats and are in need of humanitarian assistance. 8 Apart from creating a very complex humanitarian emergency in the Lake Chad Basin that has largely affected women and children, 9 Boko Haram terrorists were declared the world’s most deadliest group in a 2015 report, and the group’s activities have made Nigeria rank as the third most terrorized state according to 2017, 2018, and 2019 Terrorism Index Reports. 10 And as much as the Nigerian authorities have claimed to have “technically defeated” the terror group, Boko Haram and its splinter faction known as the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) continue to increase in trajectory and organizational capability. Thus, Nigeria’s security and defense forces appear to lack the needed capacity, as can be seen in their inability to hold control of the liberated northeast territories, 11 a development justifying the country’s search for foreign assistance since the outbreak of violent extremism.

            However, Nigeria’s local CT strategy and programs have been enmeshed in myriads of internal contradictions, while its external CT assistance-seeking through multilateral and bilateral arrangements has not prevented a CT stalemate in the country. Fundamentally, Nigeria has developed multilateral cooperation exclusively with its neighbors in the Lake Chad Basin under the auspices of the African Union (AU) backed Joint Multinational Task Force (JMTF). Besides, while in its bilateral arrangement with any superpower, it has placed the US at the core of its CT assistance-seeking, especially concerning military equipment and intelligence needs. While the US has provided Nigeria with some forms of CT assistance, there is evidence of disturbing dynamics in their CT relations that raise concerns as to why their generally cordial bilateral ties have not translated into effective CT cooperation and positive outcomes. And even though the United Nations (UN) has charged the international community to make concerted efforts against global terrorism, 12 Nigeria–US CT cooperation has not altogether reversed the terrorism trajectory in Nigeria. It is in this regard that this study investigates the connection between the inconsistent American CT assistance and the lingering CT stalemate in Nigeria.

            However, this study provides a better understanding of the dynamics and issues in CT cooperation between Nigeria and the US by using the critical terrorism studies framework (CTS). CTS is an offshoot of critical security studies whose proponents and adherents have diverse viewpoints but generally disagree with the state-centric perspective of traditional terrorism studies, as they argue that terrorism analysis should equally fault state violence. 13 Jackson, Jarvis, and several other CTS scholars have challenged the traditional terrorism studies for their tendencies to encourage the inadequacies of the states that serve as drivers of radicalization and terrorism. 14 While CTS helps us to question the entire War on Terror approach of the US and the Nigerian government, it specifically helps in examining the politics and interests involved in the US–Nigerian CT relationship. 15 Thus, this study uses the CTS framework specifically to evaluate the politicization and interests involved in US inaction and certain actions that were taken against Nigeria in their CT cooperation.

            This article is organized into four sections. The first section examines Nigeria’s domestic CT programs and strategies to point out the areas of deficiencies that have warranted external CT assistance-seeking. The second section evaluates the general nature of Nigeria–US relations upon which their CT cooperation could be expectedly premised. The third section evaluates the dynamics of CT cooperation between Nigeria and the US and the issues arising therefrom. The evaluations in this section involve funding provision, troop training, and humanitarian assistance and impacts on the general CT dynamics in Nigeria. The last section probes the overall efficacy of Nigeria–US CT cooperation in light of the growing Boko Haram trajectory and organizational capability.

            Nigeria’s domestic counter-terrorism programs and strategies: challenges and the imperative for external assistance-seeking

            With the frequent violent activities of a group that was originally known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, which roughly translates to “People committed to the Prophet’s teaching through evangelism and jihad”, 16 the federal authorities responded in mid-2009 by launching a military operation codenamed Operation Flush. But then, the opportunities to nip the problem in the bud at its infancy were wasted during this period because CT approaches at such a stage only resulted in the destruction of lives and properties of the suspects and the extra-judicial killing of the group’s founder – Muhammed Yusuf –further causing worldwide condemnation of Nigeria. 17 The terror group went underground and re-emerged stronger in 2010, which coincided with the emergence of another terror group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) that also carried out violent onslaughts against the state, especially during Nigeria’s 50th independence anniversary on the 1 October 2010. 18 Nigeria was so destabilized during this time that the government had to celebrate the 51st Independence Anniversary in October 2011 without much fanfare as a result of the combined threats from both MEND and Boko Haram, 19 even though MEND’s activities ended quickly unlike the lingering Boko Haram menace.

            The first post-2010 CT response in Nigeria was the enactment of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (TPA) (re-enacted as the Amendment Act in 2013), which empowers the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to coordinate CT efforts of defense and security agencies and stakeholders in Nigeria. However, as the TPA 2013 came into existence as the CT legal framework for Nigeria, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2014 (NACTEST), revised in 2016, was also developed as Nigeria’s CT operational and policy framework. 20 Nigeria further attempted to strengthen its CT architecture by developing a Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in 2017. 21 But it should be noted that Nigeria’s CT frameworks and programs are complicated and have been ineffective in implementation due to the poor organizational structure of the respective agencies. 22 For instance, even though the tasks of coordinating the CT activities are vested in ONSA, the body lacks any statutory executive role apart from the advisory position granted it, which is the reason the Nigerian Armed Forces have been in charge of the bulk of Nigeria’s CT operations.

            However, Nigeria began its post-2010 kinetic CT operations with the December 2011 emergency rule declaration in about 15 local government areas (LGAs) that spanned six states, while a more elaborate state of emergency was declared in May 2013 in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. 23 The post-2010 kinetic CT operations saw a review of the previous 2009 Operation Flush, leading to the launch of the more elaborate Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) with the codename Operation Restore Order that was active between December 2011 and August 2013. 24 Drafting defense and security personnel from the Department of State Service (DSS), the Armed Forces, the Nigeria Police, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Operation Restore Order effectively saw about 100,000 servicemen in action. 25 Further improvement in the kinetic CT operations saw another CT force reconfiguration that led to the launching of Operation BOYONA in May 2013, when terror attacks became more pronounced in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States. By August 2013, Operation BOYONA gave way to more enlarged CT operations codenamed Operation Zamani Lafiya as the Boko Haram group grew in trajectory and capability. 26 The growth in the terrorism trajectory was also behind the idea of establishing the Nigerian Army 7 Division in Maiduguri with the operational responsibility of containing terrorism, and the troops from the 7 Division effectively formed the nucleus of Operation Lafiya Dole in 2015. 1 Military operations for decimating the materiel capacity of the terrorists codenamed Operation Crackdown was launched in April 2016, while another aggressive military offensive codenamed Operation Rescue Finale was launched in December 2016. 27 However, the Nigerian military has also carried out issue-specific military operations such as the 2018 Operations Deep Punch targeted at clearing the vestiges of terrorists from the Sambisa forest and restoration of order in the northeast generally. Operation Last Hold carried out in 2018 is also instructive. 28

            Nigeria also adopted an unconventional CT approach by enlisting local volunteers into what became known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) drawn from among the youths, hunters, vigilante groups, and farmers, whose activities, according to Dulin and Patino, had a deterrence effect on terrorist attacks in the northeast, owing to internal communal mechanism in the group’s engagement. 29 For reasons of their good knowledge of the terrain and demographics, CJTF troops acted as the de-facto intelligence apparatus of the larger CT operations and in a particular instance foiled an attempted bombing in the Maiduguri Internally Displaced Persons camp in March 2014. 30 In a similar unconventional instance, Nigeria engaged the service of private defense forces from South Africa known as Specialized Tasks, Trainings, Equipment and Protection (STTEP), whose activities were reportedly instrumental to the early 2015 dislodgement of Boko Haram terrorists in the northeast. As Matthew Page observed, the only significant and undeniable strategic CT achievement of Nigeria is the STTEP-aided liberation of northern Adamawa State and some areas of Borno State in early 2015 which seem to have blunted Boko Haram’s efforts to capture and hold large swaths of territory anymore, 31 even though Zenn has observed that parts of such territories have been recaptured by the terrorists in recent years. 32 Moreover, Nigeria spearheaded the refocusing of the west and central Africa’s Multinational Joint Task Force – Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon, and recently Benin, (MNJTF) for CT purposes in 2015. 33 Although there are still challenges with this arrangement, beginning in early 2017, efforts through the MNJTF led to some counter-terrorism gains and security improvements in parts of north-eastern Nigeria. 34

            In as much as kinetic operations are an inevitable strategy for neutralizing the violence of the terror group, Nigeria has at the same time embraced the soft-power approach, including political solutions (dialogue) and a transitional justice approach. For instance, efforts to dialogue with the terrorists led the government in August 2011 to inaugurate the Galtimiri Presidential Committee, 35 and another Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North Committee (Dialogue Committee) on 24 April 2013. The transitional justice mechanism embraced by Nigeria has been in the form of a tripod: deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for former Boko Haram combatants, while those found guilty of perpetrating acts of violence have been tried and placed in custody. The first of such programs is inside a correctional facility in the Federal Capital Territory, the second is carried out in the communities affected by terrorism and designated temporary rehabilitation centers, while the third is under the control of Operation Lafiya Dole and codenamed Operation Safe Corridor – OPSC. 36 Effectively, over 2,000 “repentant” terrorists have reportedly surrendered themselves to OPSC’s rehabilitation efforts and many have passed through the process, even though there are unfortunate reports that their home communities are not favorably disposed to welcoming these ex-combatants back, while there are also controversies trailing the entire process as likely unreliable and ineffectual. 37

            For the larger reconstruction and developmental efforts, a Presidential Initiative in the North East (PINE) was inaugurated in 2015 to address the underlying socio-economic problems in the northeast region, 38 in addition to the launching of a counter-narrative initiative against insurgency ideology that experts have advised as necessary for stopping youths’ radicalization. 39 To consolidate PINE’s efforts in the northeast, in October 2017, a more robust North East Development Commission (NEDC) was established and tasked with the reconstruction and development efforts of the terrorism-ridden region. 40 NEDC has also taken over the responsibilities of the 2016 Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI) chaired by retired Nigerian Army General Yakubu Danjuma and the Victims Support Fund (VSF) initiative that had spent billions of Naira for various humanitarian programs in the terrorism affected communities of Nigeria. 41

            However, despite all the above CT efforts, the trajectory of terrorism has continually grown while the country appears hapless and helpless, even as the current administration has tended to claim CT victory. It should, however, be noted that Nigeria has all along sought external assistance to address the identified areas of CT incapacity such as its poorly modernized defense forces. To this end, Nigeria sought to procure military materials and equipment, especially the game-changing air platforms such as Cobra helicopters and Super Tucano fighter jets from the US or other countries with American defense footprints and alliances. It is, therefore, the links between the US position on military and intelligence assistance support to Nigeria and the intractability of the Boko Haram terrorism that this study seeks to evaluate.

            The nature and character of Nigeria–US relations

            The background of Nigeria’s ties with the US can be best understood from its worldview during Cold War politics. Even though Nigeria claimed to be non-aligned and was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement in the global geopolitical environment it found itself in at its 1960 independence, it maintained policies that were favorable to the West and the US since its independence, except for the events of anti-American posturing during the Murtala Muhammed regime. 42 Moreover, the country began statehood as a parliamentary democracy but adopted the American version of the presidential system since its Second Republic in 1979. Even since, Nigeria and the US have maintained enduring bilateral relations and have both demonstrated strong strategic connections and interests, notwithstanding occasional strains and stresses in their relations.

            More so, Nigeria–US cordial relations could also be situated within the context of over 2 million educated and productive diaspora Nigerians in the US who serve as cement between the two countries through many means. 43 The US has often considered Nigeria as a congenial partner on African diplomatic and security issues to carry the water on African regional challenges where the US would not or could not take responsibility, which is why the West African country has been a great beneficiary of US military training for peacekeeping purposes. 44 In 2010, Nigeria–US relations assumed a more robust dimension at the highest level when both countries signed a Bi-National Commission Agreement designed to address issues of mutual concerns including security. With the deepening of bilateral relations post-Bi-National Commission Agreement, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under the Obama presidency referred to Nigeria as “probably the most strategically important country in Sub-Saharan Africa”, and Nigeria was generally considered a key ally by the administration. 45

            From the standpoint of economic relations, Nigeria is not only a country with the most significant US ties to continental Africa but it is the largest US trading partner in Africa and has also been the third-largest recipient of the US foreign direct investment in Africa. 46 There is a preferential trade benefit reserved for Nigeria under the US-inspired Africa Growth and Opportunity Act – AGOA. 47 The country has persistently enjoyed a good balance of trade with the US, especially during its heyday of crude oil supplies to the US. In 2018, US goods and services trade with Nigeria was estimated at $11.3 billion with exports of $5.1 billion and imports of $6.1 billion, while the US goods and services trade deficit with Nigeria stood at $1.0 billion. 48 Nigeria used to be one of the major sources of crude oil supplies to the US, accounting for around 11% of oil imports of the US in 2004 and becoming the second-largest crude oil supplier to the US by 2010, which endeared it to the Americans because supplies from Nigeria reduced the US’s over-reliance on oil supplies from the Middle East. 49 Unfortunately, such robust bilateral oil supply transactions have drastically dwindled from 2012 because of US local crude oil production occasioned by the Shale technology. 50 In any case, both countries are still economic partners as could be seen in the November 2017 US–Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue (CID) inspired by the US Commerce Department to partner with Nigeria in agriculture, investment, infrastructure, and reform in regulatory policies. 51

            In a similar vein, Nigeria has generally been among the major recipients of American aid and assistance since it gained independence in 1960, 52 and the US continues to be the largest bilateral donor to Nigeria with an average of over $450 million per annum. 53 Moreover, the US is one of Nigeria’s major development partners as can be seen in the USAID-inspired Power Africa Initiative, which is a program designed to provide 60 million new homes in Africa with electricity supplies and assist Africa in generating 30,000 megawatts of new power by the year 2030. 54

            From bilateral security and defense perspectives, Nigeria and the US have maintained relations since the Balewa era (1960), following Nigeria’s request for US assistance for the institutionalization of its armed forces that led to the training of Nigerian Army and Air Force officer cadets in 1963. 55 Through its International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, the US provided Nigeria with intermediate (Staff College) and strategic (War College) levels of training for Nigerians, a practice that continues to date. 56 The US has at different times helped the Nigerian military with capacity-building to advance and maintain American interests and stability in the West African sub-region. 57 However, given that Nigeria does not have a defense pact with any of the major powers, 58 its security relations with the US have traditionally been in the form of health and humanitarian assistance, training of forces, inconsistent equipment supplies, and, very recently, helping Nigeria with military reforms and countering violent extremism and terrorism. 59 But for whatever reasons, Nigeria has viewed its relations and the US with suspicion, a scenario that helps to understand the antagonism against the US Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) initiative negotiated by the Obasanjo administration in about 2000–2001 for re-professionalizing the Nigerian military after years of incursions into politics. 60 The same line of Nigerian reasoning was responsible for the total disapproval of the Nigerian military hierarchy of the US planned domiciliation of its African Command (AFRICOM) base in Nigeria around 2007–2008.

            But antagonistic dynamics of the Nigeria–US defense relations notwithstanding, American military institutions and personnel have continued to train Nigerian troops at various training institutions on modern warfare and on the use of modern military equipment, which are the main aspects of Nigeria’s relationship with the US on military issues. 61 Therefore, other than military training support and aid, Nigeria and the US do not have any strong defense pact. Perhaps what could have been developed to the level of a defense pact was the AFRICOM program, which would have allowed the US to have a forward operating base on the side of an Army Brigade on or close to the Nigerian shore, but this was not acceptable to the Nigerians leaders – political and military. 62 This is instructive to note given the speculation that Nigeria’s inaction and antagonism against AFRICOM have been used by the US as payback and is responsible for the US’s inconsistent CT support for Nigeria as the country continues to struggle with the scourge of terrorism.

            However, the important points of this section have been to point out the nature and character of Nigeria–US relations, which could help us understand the basis of any CT cooperation between the two countries. As the section has observed, Nigeria and the US could be regarded as partners, but how and the extent to which their partnership has galvanized them into cooperation for counter-Boko Haram measures remains to be seen. And as the focus of this study, the call for cooperation among the nations of the world toward countering the scourge of terrorism and the actual CT cooperation need an empirical explanation, and Nigeria–US CT cooperation provides a litmus test for this task. Accordingly, the next section examines the trajectory and dynamics of Nigeria–US CT cooperation.

            The trajectory and dynamics of counter-terrorism cooperation between Nigeria and the United States

            Concerns about the threat of terrorism became an agenda in the Nigeria–US relations in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks when the US government began paying attention to Nigeria. While Nigeria did not contribute troops to the field operations of the “War on Terror”, the country gave moral and diplomatic support and former President Obasanjo was among the first set of heads of state to call President Bush after 9/11 and the country’s anti-terrorism rhetoric was impeccable till the end of his administration. 63 With the overwhelming impacts of terrorism following the 2010 re-emergence of the Boko Haram group under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the conventional wisdom among the Nigerian military and political leadership was for their country to seek assistance from the US. 64 In 2012, a Presidential Committee (Galtimiri Committee) set up by the Jonathan administration specifically recommended that Nigeria should seek CT cooperation with the US. 65 Seeking the active involvement of the US appears to be premised upon the seemingly cordial bilateral relations between both countries and the appeal for cooperation as a veritable panacea for terrorism. After all, the combined efforts of CT partners such as the US, Russia, and Turkey in a raid that killed the wanted Islamic State (ISIS) commander – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – had demonstrated that when countries cooperate on security issues they tend to achieve desirable results. 66

            The CT cooperation between Nigeria and the US began to manifest following their 2010 signing of the Bi-National Commission Agreement, which largely focuses on security and CT cooperation. But this notwithstanding, the initial position in assisting Nigeria combat terrorism was affected by what Fred Agwu called “the Herskovits factor” in the light of the antagonistic postures against the Nigerian government championed by late Professor Jean Herskovits. 67 Herskovits and Campbell, whose expertise on the Nigerian and African affairs are widely sought by the US government, as could be seen in their various testimonies before the US Congressional Committees and their position papers, pressurized the US government not to be involved with the terrorism problem in Nigeria. 68 These experts were of the view that the Boko Haram phenomenon was not terrorism but a matter of internal political contradictions within Nigeria and a subterfuge by the Nigerian government to attract defense funding from the US. 69 But notwithstanding the Herskovits factor, the dynamics changed in June 2012, when the US State Department declared three individuals affiliated with Boko Haram and the group’s commander (Abubakar Shekau) as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). 70

            After the foreign terrorist designation of the Boko Haram group, the US CT assistance to Nigeria began to focus on troop training and capacity-building for the country’s armed forces, security services, and other services connected to the defense and security sectors. These assistance has generally been carried out by the US State Department and Department of Defense (Pentagon) through their overseas regional and global cooperation arrangements. 71 The US CT programs and assistance to Nigeria have been implemented in Nigeria through the State Department’s West Africa Regional Security Initiative (WARSI), Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), and other platforms. 72 The US Defense Department has equally provided funds and implemented myriads of CT cooperation programs for capacity-building and training for Nigeria. 73

            The provision of troop training for Nigeria has involved tactical-level training up to the strategic level training, such as field training, military formation courses up to staff courses, and strategic level courses at Defense College and so on. 74 The US has usually made some of this military training available to the Nigerian defense forces gratis, but there have been occasions when they were simply subsidized by the US government. 75 Effectively, Nigeria’s military officers have undergone a series of the US State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the US Defense Department anchored training programs in elite US military institutions, 76 which have aided policy formation and troops’ combat readiness in Nigeria to a significant extent. As an expert observed, the training received by the Nigerian officials has been instrumental to the country’s development of the CT legal and operational frameworks such as the 2013 TPA, 2016 NACTEST, and 2017 PCVE. 77

            Moreover, other agencies such as the Nigerian Police Force, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have had their officials undergo capacity-building and training programs provided by the US agencies. 78 There have also been efforts to strengthen Nigeria’s security systems through coordinated programs with the US Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and the International Civil Aviation Organisation. 79 Besides, even though direct US CT assistance to Nigeria has been the least provided to any Lake Chad Basin country, but despite the not-so-friendly disposition of the White House to Africa, there has been an increase in the volume of such assistance under the Trump Presidency to Nigeria. 80 For instance, the Pentagon’s Train-and-Equip program involved more than $16 million for the Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 for Nigeria. 81

            Nigeria reached an agreement on intelligence-sharing with the US in May 2014, even though such has not significantly helped the CT operations in Nigeria for reasons of operational challenges and political disagreement between both countries. 82 As much as Nigeria has often received intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assistance from the US, the sharing of intelligence between the two countries has been inconsistent to such an extent that the US considers giving raw intelligence to Nigeria as a dangerous endeavour. 83 However, an observer had hinted that the US refusal to divulge intelligence to the Nigerian military hierarchy is not unconnected to the existence of Trojan Horses among the Nigerian defense and security forces, who have been found to reveal Nigeria’s strategies to the terrorists. 84 But whatever the reasons for the poor intelligence-sharing practices between these supposed partners that both forswear global terrorism, the important point to note is that the US decision to deny Nigeria critical intelligence has only allowed the trajectory of terrorism to grow in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.

            However, the most topical issues in Nigeria–US CT cooperation has been the unwillingness and, at some points, outright refusal to allow Nigeria to procure critically needed military assets either directly from the US or through third-party arrangements such as Nigeria’s move to seek supplies from the State of Israel and other US allies. 85 Nigeria’s inclination toward getting defense supplies from the US is for the reasons that the country’s military doctrine and major training have been largely modeled on US military systems and received from American defense institutions as noted earlier. It was on such grounds that Nigeria vigorously sought US assistance for the supplies of an array of weapons and equipment such as an American-made Cobra combat helicopter, Super Tucano fighter jet, and other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, which the US refused to make available to Nigeria. 86 However, the US authorities shifted ground after the 2015 regime change in Nigeria and chose to provide more than 20 Mine Resistant Armored Personnel Carriers (MRAPs) in 2016 as part of the excess defense articles drawdown. 87 This, even though coming a bit late, was to boost Nigeria’s capacity in the area of unconventional conflict such as terrorism.

            The US had chosen to block the Jonathan administration from accessing air platforms by invoking the American Human Rights Law known as Leahy Vetting Law that prohibits the US from providing defense assistance to countries with records of human rights violations by its defense and security forces. 88 However, in 2016, following the emergence of new Nigerian leadership under President Muhammadu Buhari, found to be more tolerable by the Obama administration, the US activated the process for supplying Nigeria 12 Super Tucano A-29 air platforms with associated weaponry and ammunition. Unfortunately, such a decision was again suspended when a detachment of the Nigerian Air Force mistakenly shelled the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in January 2017. 89 This development would later be downplayed by the Trump administration which gave authorization in December 2017 for the supplies of Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria in a deal worth over half a billion USD ($593 million) to be delivered in May 2024. 90

            Furthermore, Nigeria–US CT cooperation had also taken place in the non-kinetic form through the activities of the US Mission in Abuja and other US agencies. Examples are the activities of the USAID that attempt to curb the menace of terrorism from a humanitarian perspective. The agency and other partners have provided the civilians affected in the terror zones in northeast Nigeria with relief materials, education, food aid, and health care. 91 In more remarkable ways, the activities of the agency and partners had been instrumental in denying the terrorists any safe haven in Nigeria and other Lake Chad Basin by helping the people in the affected zones not to be vulnerable to recruitment for the Boko Haram group or to serve as a shield for the terrorists. USAID has also been part of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs (Operation Safe Corridor) for the rehabilitation of former Boko Haram combatants. 92

            Lastly, while it is correct to argue that there has been CT cooperation between Nigeria and the US, it is also significant to note that the general disposition and characteristics of their cooperation have been marked by inconsistencies and politicization. This is why it can be disturbing to realize that two countries that are known to be partners and grossly affected by the scourge of terrorism would be unable to cooperate to address common threats. To this end, notwithstanding Nigeria’s desire for American support, the latter’s responses have been marked by methodological flaws that have rendered the actual assistance ineffective. Thus, the next section addresses issues that have played out as bottlenecks in Nigeria–US CT relations and equally assesses the outcomes of their cooperation as an evaluation of the efficacy of CT cooperation among the nations of the world.

            The contending issues in Nigeria–US counter-terrorism cooperation

            It is axiomatic that the Nigeria–US CT cooperation has not necessarily reversed the trajectory of terrorism in Nigeria. As much as the US has provided Nigeria with support in some areas, its reluctance and outright refusal of defense articles sales and withholding of critical intelligence from the latter had featured as the major bottlenecks in their CT cooperation that have impacted the CT efforts in Nigeria. 93 This, however, is a pointer to the limitations of CT cooperation because countries tend to pursue their national interests even when in cooperation with others. It is to this end that Saadat regrettably observed that “despite the rise in the frequency and deadliness of terrorist attacks, international cooperation for counter-terrorism is still limited”. 94 The irony of it all is that even though terror groups are conflating for their operations against a single government, partner governments are less united against a single terrorist threat. 95 Hence, this study’s evaluation of the efficacy of international CT cooperation using Nigeria–US CT cooperation as a case study reveals that cooperation may not always serve as a reliable mechanism to thwart or end terrorist threats because of politicization and vested interests that could be involved.

            The crux of the shortcomings in Nigeria–US CT relations became manifest when the US openly criticized the Nigerian authorities as weak and corrupt, in addition to the allegations of human rights abuses reportedly committed by the Nigerian military and security forces and the question of same-sex relationships which were outlawed by the then Jonathan administration. 96 These criticisms by the US eventually allowed for unmitigated animosity and general feelings of mistrust toward the US policymakers. It is in this regard that the US CT assistance to Nigeria can be said to have been marked by politicization and vested interests, instead of cooperation to end terrorism as demanded by the UN. For instance, how the American counter-Boko Haram strategies got beclouded by punishment for norms violation confirms that helping Nigeria surmount the tragedies of terrorism is not necessarily a priority for the US. This position has been well advanced by Jacob Zenn, who remarked that:

            The US is busy fighting jihadists in many theatres around the world today, especially Syria and Afghanistan. And then secondarily in Somalia, the Philippines, and other places. It simply does not have the resources or the will to also fight Boko Haram/Shekau in remote Borno (Nigeria), which is relatively unstrategic compared to even southern Nigeria or other locations around the world and the Nigerian army is at least capable of drawing Boko Haram to a stalemate. 97

            The above quotation is a pointer to the limitations of CT cooperation because the US appears to have cooperated with Nigeria only to the extent it deems necessary or considers American interests to be at stake. For instance, and as indicated in the quotation above, the US was largely involved in the resolution of the conflict in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta, apparently for its crude oil interests. 98 Thus, the US involvement in the CT efforts in Nigeria has been shaped by how it considers terrorism in Nigeria as posing no significant threat to its interests, 99 a line of thinking that has been called to question by the recent abduction of an American citizen in Niger and who was transferred to Nigeria but fortunately rescued by the US Navy SEALs. 100 Another possible argument is that the US is not so keen on working with Nigeria because it has preferred alternative means of addressing any perceived threats to American interests if there are any. This could be seen in the way the US kinetic support for countering the menace of terrorism has played out in West Africa. For example, even though Nigeria is the hotbed of terrorism in the West and Central African sub-regions, the American defense and security assistance for countermeasures against the Boko Haram group has majorly been channeled through the US direct engagement with Cameron, Niger, and Chad. 101 More so, the US and other foreign powers conduct ariel ISR operations leveraging the American Base in the Niger Republic, 102 while often isolating Nigeria in the scheme of things.

            Furthermore, Nigeria–US CT cooperation has equally been inconsistent to the extent that the Obama administration resisted the calls by the US Congress for the American military to play a direct role in fighting terrorism in Nigeria. Instead, the administration only approved of advisory roles and haphazard intelligence supplies or the mere designation of the Boko Haram group as a foreign terrorist organization. 103 In a more complicated scenario, despite the call by the US Congress for deeper American involvement in fighting terrorism in Nigeria, the Obama administration placed an arms embargo on Nigeria at a time when the country so much needed defense supplies for neutralizing the terrorists’ violence. 104 The resultant effect was a sharp reduction of the US support for Nigeria in the light of the ensuing tensions in which the US–Nigeria’s quest for arms supplies became impossible to the extent that the country had to seek solace in the recruitment of mercenaries and purchase of weapons from the black market through South Africa. 105 As Nigerian military officials and defense experts argued, Nigeria sought to procure defense equipment such as the American-made Cobra helicopters and A29 Super Tucano fighter because of their capacity for combat engagement such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations. Therefore, the Nigerian military hierarchy considered such air platforms as possible game-changers for turning the tide of CT operations in Nigeria’s favor. 106 Unfortunately, the US arms embargo only further worsened the situation for Nigeria’s poorly modernized and under-equipped defense forces, as the country’s military inventory and magazines were only stocked with materiel used during the glorious peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s that had exceeded their life spans. 107

            However, as noted earlier, one of the major issues that pitted the US against Nigeria was the allegation of human rights violations. It is customary for the US State Department to produce an annual “Human Rights Report” for the international community. This practice has become complicated with the invocation of the US human rights protection code known as the Leahy Vetting Law that prohibits the US from providing a nation with security assistance if its security forces have been accused of rights violations. 108 Although Nigeria’s human rights records are unenviable, the US also appears to be inconsistent in using such shortcomings to impede its CT assistance to Nigeria. For the benefit of hindsight, the US had behaved in ways that conflicted with its democratic norms and credentials when it supported undemocratic regimes in Zaire (now DR Congo), Chile, Somalia, and Panama during the heydays of the Cold War. 109 Besides, the US has traditionally supplied defense equipment to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and other states with similarly poor human rights records and poor democratic credentials. 110 If nothing else, the 2018 murder of a Saudi-born journalist – Jamal Khashoggi – in Turkey was globally acknowledged and confirmed by the CIA to have been masterminded by Saudi Arabia’s authorities. Yet, the US has downplayed such a murder case and had continued with its billion-dollar arms sales to that country until the recent Biden decision to hold the Saudi authorities accountable in February 2021. 111 Similarly, the US was among the first countries to tacitly approve of the military coup in Egypt which toppled a democratically elected government won by the Muslim Brotherhood and referred to by the US as mere change of regime and not a coup.

            It is, however, puzzling that the generally cordial bilateral relations between Nigeria and the US have not translated to effective CT cooperation and outcomes, unlike the experiences of the Kingdom of Jordan and Malaysia. For example, despite Jordan’s less than stellar human rights records, the US has cooperated closely in recent decades with the country in jointly combating shared security threats that had shored up stability in Jordan and strengthened the kingdom’s domestic CT capacity. 112 In the same vein, notwithstanding the complications that have characterized the US–Malaysia relations arising from their antagonistic worldviews, wider foreign policy questions and changing leaderships on both sides, yet they have fostered prominent CT cooperation within the evolution of their broader bilateral ties. 113 Unfortunately, Nigeria’s expectation for CT cooperation from the US to combat Boko Haram terrorism was shattered by US inaction, such as the decision not to supply arms to Nigeria at a critical stage. And even though there appears to be normalization of CT relations between the two countries since the emergence of the Trump administration, their CT cooperation weaknesses remain obvious. For instance, the acquisition of Super Tucano aircraft approved by the Trump administration still has unfavorable conditionality attached, ranging from fixing the delivery date for 2024 to the refusal to train the Nigerian technicians on the maintenance of the aircraft and non-inclusion of Nigerians in the production of the aircraft, a development that Nigeria attempted to protest against in early 2018. 114 Of course, the US appears to have allowed Nigeria to acquire the aircraft not necessarily for combating terrorism but for the sake of boosting defense jobs in the US, because the given waiting period without any immediate drawdown of some used US hardware from its inventory to enable Nigeria with some counterforce against the firepower of the terrorists appears to be a weakness in their CT cooperation.

            It is equally important not to sound like an apologist for the Nigerian government over the issues in the Nigeria–US CT cooperation because the latter cannot solely be held responsible for diplomatic, political and leadership pitfalls that have characterized the two countries’ CT cooperation. After all, there has been a lack of diplomatic dexterity on the part of Nigeria’s political leadership in managing the country’s CT cooperation with the US. For instance, the undiplomatic and open confrontation of a former Nigerian Ambassador to the US (2010 to 2015), Professor Ade Adefuye, with a delegation of the US in Washington around 2014 over the US alienation of Nigeria 115 was a pointer to the diplomatic mismanagement of bilateral relations for security assistance to Nigeria. Former Nigerian President Jonathan also made such a diplomatic blunder with his administration’s decision to cancel CT training with the US in late 2014. 116 This is because Nigeria earnestly needed the US military assistance to defeat terrorists and all that was needed was for the Nigerian government at those material points in time was to go on a diplomatic offensive. In any case, the inconsistencies in Nigeria–US CT cooperation have come with severe implications which are examined in the next section.

            Assessment of the efficacy of Nigeria–US counter-terrorism cooperation vis-à-vis the growth in terrorism trajectory in Nigeria

            It is instructive to analyze Nigeria–US CT relations within the context of implications and effectiveness of bilateral CT effort vis-à-vis the variation in the Boko Haram sect’s trajectory and organizational capability. Given that the goals of the CT efforts, and CT cooperation, are to degrade terrorists’ operational capabilities and circumvent their armed hostilities, this section, therefore, examines the implications and effectiveness of Nigeria–US CT cooperation vis-à-vis terrorist group’s operational capacity, organizational basing, political ties, and myriads of armed hostilities. Doing this helps to determine the outcomes of their CT cooperation and identify what needs to be done by Nigeria domestically and concerning its foreign CT assistance-seeking.

            Terrorists’ operational capability and resources

            The operational capability and resources of the terrorists refer to the group’s financing, tactics, training facilities, explosives making and maintenance, and the use of military equipment. Since the goal of CT efforts is to neutralize the terrorists, therefore, major evidence of ineffective CT cooperation between Nigeria and the US that has partly allowed terrorism to grow in trajectory is Boko Haram’s continued access to funding that has served as oxygen for the terrorists. Sources of terrorist financing have ranged from membership fees, extortion from the local population, external funding and support from local sympathizers, kidnapping, illicit drug trafficking, etc. 117 There was a confirmation by the Nigerian government of Boko Haram financing by Algerian-based al-Qaeda affiliate – AQIM, which on one occasion gave the Boko Haram 40 million Naira. 118

            In February 2012, some arrested Boko Haram elements confirmed the claims of foreign financial support, establishing the group’s links to AQIM and evidence of more funding from such bodies as the Al Muntada Trust Fund and entity known as the Islamic World Society in Saudi Arabia and the UK, respectively. 119 To understand how financing serves as oxygen for terrorist violence, we can look at how the US and the international community circumvented global terrorist financing after September 11 that led to the interception of about $147.4 million in July 2005 and effectively altered the spate of terror attacks. 120 Unfortunately, perhaps given the refusal of Nigeria and the US to ensure hitch-free CT cooperation as seen in US–Malaysian, US–Jordanian, and even US–Philippines CT collaboration, Boko Haram has successfully avoided detections of its funding sources, hence the failure in curtailing the sect’s funding that has helped it grow in trajectory.

            Another dimension of growth in the terrorism trajectory and Boko Haram operational capability could be seen in how the group that began with hit-and-run guerrilla tactics has graduated to the use of knives, machetes, locally made guns, clubs, Molotov cocktails (petrol bomb) and swords, drive-by shootings, and now bombings. 121 These terrorists effectively resorted to suicide terrorism using vehicle-borne explosive devices and using YouTube for propaganda. 122 Similarly, with the assistance of foreign allies, Boko Haram had reportedly acquired surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank missiles, AK47 rifles, and vehicle-mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, 123 with which it has sometimes outgunned the Nigerian forces. Nigeria, however, caused the group a setback around 2015 and 2017 following the recovery of some RPGs, anti-aircraft guns, 213 General Purpose Machine Guns, 120 PKM shells, four rocket-propelled guns, and 1,255 anti-aircraft munitions from the sect. 124 But if the events since late 2018 are anything to go by, it can be claimed that the group has continued to grow in its operational prowess trajectory.

            Therefore, the impacts of the US refusal to assist Nigeria in modernizing its military arising from the arms embargo and inconsistencies in intelligence-sharing could be seen in this dimension of the growth in terrorism trajectory in Nigeria. For example, the Theater Commander of Nigeria’s largest domestic military expedition against terrorism recently (March 2020) lamented the shortfalls in Nigeria’s military capacity and the imminent superior firepower of the terrorists. 125 According to such reports, terrorists continue to possess over 100 mortar bombs, about 100 RPGs, several gun trucks etc., 126 all of which are pointers to the resilience and continued growth in the group’s operational prowess and a pointer to the failure of Nigeria’s local efforts and Nigeria–US CT cooperation. However, from the tactical and strategic points of view, the US decision to withhold arms supplies to Nigeria most certainly did not produce any benefits for the US but brought Nigeria to a situation of near mortal peril given the magnitude of carnages that terrorists’ superior firepower caused the country. 127 A US Air Force commander made a point that persuasively explains the futility of the US arms embargo in a commentary on US-Saudi relations, thus:

            Arms exports are best used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client states; a tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms sourcing instead of shifting course … Thus, while a US embargo might be morally compelling and emotionally satisfying, it is unlikely to create meaningful change for those most at risk or be strategically beneficial to the United States. 128

            Organizational basing of the terrorists in Nigeria

            As Bruce Hoffman, the famous doyen of terrorism studies has noted, terrorism is, in modern times, sustained and nourished by the availability of sanctuary and the safe havens for the merchant of violence, which CT efforts should properly address. 129 In this regard, Boko Haram has consistently maintained organizational basing from the time of its emergence, which became more daring when the group took to insurgency tactics and territorial acquisition. 130 Inspired by ISIS’s operational tactic of territorial conquest, Boko Haram captured a large expanse of lands in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa and eventually declared its version of an Islamic caliphate with its capital in Gwoza around June 2014. 131 However, Nigeria achieved a strategic CT success with the early 2015 liberation of northeastern territories, ostensibly with the help of South African security mercenaries known as Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection. 132 A further victory was the capturing of the “Camp Zero” hideout of the sect in the Sambisa forest. 133

            But Nigeria’s 2015 territorial liberation notwithstanding, the unfolding events from the beginning, and especially since late 2018, point to the resilience of Boko Haram terrorists in terms of organizational basing. For example, a Boko Haram faction (ISWAP) made very deadly attacks on Nigeria’s military facility in Baga in November and December 2018, capturing and temporarily controlling a base of the regional MJTF troops in which scores of troops were killed. 134 More so, Boko Haram continues to use the Sambisa forest as a safe haven, and it has pushed into villages and towns from where it was previously dislodged by the security forces. 135 Arising from the above, therefore, both local CT efforts and Nigeria–US CT cooperation can be described as ineffective, which helps to understand the negative impact of the US intelligence-sharing failure and arms embargo on CT efforts in Nigeria.

            Unfortunately, therefore, a development in which Nigeria lacked the needed military capability and faced an arms embargo from the US only made it possible for the terrorists to succeed in declaring a Jihadi caliphate and taking over Nigerian territories in the northeastern region at some point. 136 Thus, the decade-long campaign of violence in Nigeria’s northeast region and Lake Chad Basin, by implication, has a direct link to the US human rights accusation and the attendant uncooperative stance on Nigeria. This is because, while the US arms embargo and antagonism against Nigeria lasted, Boko Haram terrorists simply grew in trajectory and organizational capability with huge human and material loses in terms of mass kidnapping, territorial conquest and mass murder in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region. 137

            Political relationship/external connections

            With the US refusal to share intelligence with Nigeria, Boko Haram terrorists had a field day to the point of establishing external alliances. An example of this is the group’s ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leading to its tactical sophistication with specialized skills that enabled it to kidnap, carry out suicide bombings, embark on media propaganda and eventually territorial conquest in 2013. 138 The group further built on its external alliance when it later pledged loyalty in 2015 and continues to maintain affiliation with Islamic State, a situation that ultimately gave birth to the current Islamic State West African Province. 139 Thus, the ineffectiveness of Nigeria’s CT efforts and, by implication, the growth in the Boko Haram trajectory, was facilitated by the inability to meaningfully disrupt the group’s external connections.

            According to Asfandyar Mir, to disrupt external links that reinforce the growth in terrorists’ trajectory and organizational capability, the military operations against a terror group should ensure the killing or arrest of terrorist commanders and disrupt the terror group’s infrastructure. 140 For instance, the collaboration between the US and Pakistan with the use of drones succeeded in thinning the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements in Pakistan to the extent of fracturing their external links. 141 However, internal contradictions such as lack of political will and politicization of terrorism appear to have at some point made the decimation of terrorist commanders impossible in Nigeria. For example, the Nigerian government has sometimes set free the arrested Boko Haram commanders. 142 Also, the country failed to maximize the CT success occasioned by its collaboration with STTEP that helped the country in the early 2015 liberation of the conquered territories. It was reported that STTEP’s planned strategy to decisively decimate the terrorist commanders was jettisoned following the termination of their contract by the current Nigerian administration. 143

            However, in addition to the internal contradictions in Nigeria, the inconsistencies in Nigeria–US CT cooperation also contributed to the growth in Boko Haram’s trajectory and organization capability concerning the group’s political ties. As Nigeria and the US were busy antagonizing each other, Boko Haram was building closer relations with al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, and effectively pledging allegiance to ISIS in 2015, leading to the 2016 creation of the Islamic State West African Province, a development that facilitated how the sect became the deadliest terror group. 144 Furthermore, Boko Haram has generally maintained links with AQIM, Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, and the Yemeni al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to obtain advanced training and financial assistance. 145 Pieces of evidence of the group’s external connections began to show in its sophisticated mode of operations, which became clear following Shekau’s emulation of ISIS’s enslavement of Yazidi women as could be seen in the abduction of Chibok female students in 2014. 146 The sect’s profile also grew with emulation of ISIS’s use of YouTube videos for propaganda, while it also got access to operational experiences as 80–200 members of its foot soldiers reportedly fought on the side of ISIS in Libya. 147

            The trajectory of terrorism in terms of armed hostilities against Nigeria

            It is equally important to note that any countermeasures against terrorism could be deemed effective only if the terror group’s collective-action drives (armed hostilities) break down. 148 As it stands, BH not only holds bases but has continued to wreak havoc, while Nigeria’s CT efforts with huge defense budgets, myriads of military operations, soft-power CT programs, and foreign-assisted programs have not significantly halted the operational capability of the group. BH continues to disrupt Nigeria’s stability and the large-scale attacks in November and December 2018 in Baga; the capturing of the Naval Base in the northeast in early 2019 and the March 2020 attacks on Operation Lafiya Dole troops are examples of the group’s growth in trajectory. 149 More so, BH still recruits and maintains a large pool of foot soldiers for its operations, which is why experts have questioned the strategic relevance and effectiveness of Operation Safe Corridor. 150

            However, the US arms embargo, among other things, could be said to have contributed to the weakening of the Nigerian security and defense prowess from the infancy of terrorism which largely denied Nigeria the capability for countermeasures against BH armed hostilities. 151 The ultimate implication of these developments is the ongoing and decade-long campaign of violence in Nigeria’s northeast region and Lake Chad Basin with unending growth in the terrorists’ trajectory and organizational capabilities. 152 Moreover, while the arms embargo and confrontations between Nigeria and the US lasted, BH terrorism was thus allowed to escalate uncontrollably with huge human and material loses for Nigeria. For instance, as the embargo and general antagonism from the US lasted, BH terrorists had a field day establishing external alliances that increased its means of attacks. An example is the group’s grooming by AQIM leading to its tactical sophistication and specialized skills that enabled it to kidnap, carry out suicide bombings, embark on media propaganda etc. 153

            Conclusion

            There has been a proliferation of the tri-evil forces of separatism, extremism, and particularly terrorism in recent decades that has created global pandemonium. But as terrorists have conflated to perpetrate violent acts, nations of the world have not allowed for such symbiotic relationships and synergy. The uncooperative tendencies of nations of the world have called to question the efficacy of CT cooperation, unlike the UN demand for member states to work together to end terrorism. The dynamics of poor cooperation among countries of the world have played out in the cooperation between Nigeria and the US to combat terrorism because using the excuse of human rights concerns to alienate Nigeria depicts inconsistencies in American human rights policy and politicization of CT assistance. In as much as the US has provided the country with CT assistance in some areas, their bilateral CT cooperation has not been the best if the fact that they have both been stable allies with huge bilateral economic relations is factored into the equation. Given that the US claims of human rights concerns and alienation of Nigeria have had untoward effects on the entire CT efforts, the country would have to look inward for national capacity-building and at the same time refocus its foreign relations for the enhancement of its national security.

            However, even though it is the responsibility of Nigeria to take care of its national security challenges, the place of external assistance from a superpower such as the US cannot be trivialized as a need effective counter-Boko Haram mechanism. Therefore, the US should revitalize its CT policy for Nigeria to involve increasing security assistance and defense supplies, and enhancement of the security force assistance mission to incorporate aviation training and non-lethal effects. The US would also be effective in assisting Nigeria by granting incentives for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts of the Operations Safe Corridor in Nigeria. Lastly, despite its generally robust relations with Nigeria, the US has proven to be an unreliable ally given the inconsistencies in its CT relations with Nigeria. However, given the fact that Nigeria has traditionally contributed to global peace and stability, it does not deserve to be denied cooperation by any section of the international community in its fight against terrorist violence. In any case, the continued refusal of needed support could mean that Nigeria would seek assistance from elsewhere from China, Russia, India, Turkey, or others.

            Footnotes

            1

            Department of History and International Studies, Nigeria Police Academy, Wudil, Kano State, Nigeria (bimboladavid@123456yahoo.com).

            2

            Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria (Corresponding author: larvickky02@123456gmail.com).

            3

            Department of East Asian Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

            4

            Banini, “Security sector corruption and military effectiveness”.

            5

            Griffin, “Operation Barkhane and Boko Haram”, 897.

            6

            Interview with a Nigerian Army Lt. Colonel at the Nigerian Army Headquarters Abuja, 3 December 2018.

            7

            Campbell, “Nigerian Security Tracker”.

            8

            Humanitarian Country Team, “Humanitarian Response Strategy-Nigeria”.

            9

            UNHCR, “Nigeria Emergency”; and Okolie-Osemene & Okolie-Osemene, “Nigerian Women and the Trends of Kidnapping”.

            10

            Institute for Peace and Economics, “Global Terrorism Index Reports” (2015, 2017, 2018, and 2019).

            11

            Soniyi & Ogunmade, “Nigerian Military Lacks Capacity”; Haruna, “In Rare Video, Military Commander Says Nigerian Troops Outgunned”.

            12

            The United Nations, “Cooperation, Collaboration between Countries Crucial in Combating International Terrorism”.

            13

            Solomon, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa, 15.

            14

            Jackson, Introduction: A Decade of Critical Terrorism Studies; and Jarvis, Critical Terrorism Studies After 9/11.

            15

            Interview (online) with Professor Richard Jackson, University of Otago, New Zealand, May 2019.

            16

            Onapajo & Uzodike 2012, “Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria”, 24–39.

            17

            Onuoha & Ugwueze, “United States Security Strategy”, 24.

            18

            Agwu, Themes and Perspectives on Africa’s, 297.

            19

            Ibid., 297–298.

            20

            Eme, “Inter-Security Agency Rivalry as an Impediment”; Mentone, “The Counterterrorism Framework in Nigeria”.

            21

            Mentone, “The Counterterrorism Framework in Nigeria”.

            22

            Onapajo, “Has Nigeria Defeated Boko Haram”.

            23

            Felter, “Nigeria’s Battle with Boko Haram”.

            24

            Falode, “The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War”.

            25

            Ibid.

            26

            Omenma et al., “Boko Haram Insurgency”.

            27

            Ibid.

            28

            Ibid.

            29

            Dulin & Patino, “Countering Boko Haram’s Violence”, 4.

            30

            Kazir, “Vigilantes in Counterinsurgencies”, 2.

            31

            Interview (online) with Matthew Page, Chatham House London, October 2019.

            32

            Zenn, “The Battle for Baga”.

            33

            Falode, “The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War”,

            34

            Brechenmacher, “Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria after Boko Haram”.

            35

            Agwu, Themes and Perspectives on Africa’s, 309; Thurston, “Amnesty for Boko Haram”.

            36

            Bukarti et al., “Dealing with Boko Haram Defectors”. 10; Felbab-Brown, “The Limits of Punishment”, 86–98.

            37

            Oduah, “Stigma Slows Reintegration of Former Boko Haram Fighters”; Adibe, “Should Nigeria have released Boko Haram suspects?”

            38

            Gado & Sanusi, “Prospects and Challenges of Presidential Initiatives for North-East”.

            39

            Tella, “Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism”; Olojo, “Resistance through Islamic Clerics against Boko Haram”.

            40

            Kiegbe, “Nigeria Unveils North East Development Commission”.

            41

            Tukur, “Buhari Directs NEDC to Take over Activities of Pine, PCNI”; Victim Support Fund, “Victims Support Fund Flags-Off Its 2019 Education Support Project”.

            42

            Fawole, Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy, 43; Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering, 17–29.

            43

            Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, xvii.

            44

            Burchard & Burgess, “U.S. Training of African Forces and Military Assistance”, 13–16.

            45

            Blanchard, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, 15.

            46

            Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, 16.

            47

            US Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Nigeria”.

            48

            US Trade Representative, “U.S.-Nigeria Trade Fact”.

            49

            Campbell, Dancing on the Brink, xvii, 151.

            50

            Blanchard & Husted, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, 18.

            51

            US Embassy & Consulate in Nigeria, “U.S. & Nigeria Agree to Commercial and Investment Dialogue”.

            52

            Thomas, The Political Economy of Nigeria-United States Relations.

            53

            Blanchard & Husted, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, 21.

            54

            Ibid., 18.

            55

            Interview with a Nigerian Air Force Group Captain, Lagos, January 2019.

            56

            Interview with Robert Nwasor (defence experts), Abuja, December 2018.

            57

            Burchard & Burgess, “U.S. Training of African Forces and Military Assistance”, 13.

            58

            Interview with Dr. Freedom Onuoha, a defence and security expert, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria, January 2019.

            59

            Imam, “The US-Nigerian Military Cooperation”, 3.

            60

            Agwu, National Interest, International Law, 30–31, 233.

            61

            Interview with a Nigerian Army Lt. Colonel, Nigerian Army Headquarters, 3 December 2018.

            62

            Interview with a former General Officer Commanding, Nigerian Army 82 Division, January 2019.

            63

            Schroeder, U.S. Security Assistance and Africa, 291–295; and Campbell, Dancing on the Brink, 127–129.

            64

            Interview with Professor Aja Agwu, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, September 2018.

            65

            Agwu, Themes and Perspectives on Africa’s International Relations, 422.

            66

            Baker et al., “ISIS Leader al-Baghdadi Is Dead, Trump Says”.

            67

            Agwu, Themes and Perspectives, 416–421.

            68

            Herskovits, “In Nigeria, Boko Haram Is Not the Problem”; Campbell, “Countering Violent Extremism in Nigeria”.

            69

            Interview with Professor Fred Aja Agwu; Agwu, Themes and Perspectives, 406–407; Meek & Hughes, “Debates in DC Delayed Action on Boko Haram”.

            70

            Gleen, “Boko Haram: Inside the State Department Debate”.

            71

            US Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Nigeria”.

            72

            Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, (2014), 12.

            73

            Ibid.

            74

            Interview with a Nigerian Air Force Group Captain, Lagos, January 2019.

            75

            Ibid.

            76

            US States Department & Defence Department, “Joint Report to the US Congress”.

            77

            Interview with Dr. Olawale Ismail, King’s College London. 7 March 2019, Lagos, Nigeria.

            78

            Interview with Dr. Freedom Onuoha, a defence and security expert, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria, January 2019.

            79

            Blanchard & Husted, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, 20.

            80

            Ibid., 22.

            81

            Ibid

            82

            Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, 13.

            83

            Iwuoha, “United States’ Security Governance in Nigeria”.

            84

            Agwu, Nations among Nations, 930–933.

            85

            Agwu, Nations among Nations, 906.

            86

            Interview with Dr Freedom Onuaha, January 2019; Interview with a retired Nigerian Army Colonel FDK, a former Military Commander in the Nigeria’s North-East CT operations, October 2019; Siollun, “No Helicopters for You”.

            87

            DefenceWeb, “US donates armoured vehicles to Nigeria”.

            88

            Burchard & Burgess, “U.S. Training of African Forces and Military Assistance”, 1–2.

            89

            Blanchard & Husted, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, (2019) 21.

            90

            Ibid., 19.

            91

            McQuaid & Asfura-Heim, “Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Boko Haram”, 18–19, 21.

            92

            USAID, Nigeria.

            93

            Agwu, Nations among Nations, 1040–1043.

            94

            Saadat, “International cooperation for counterterrorism”.

            95

            Ibid.

            96

            Interview with a retired Nigerian Army Colonel FDK, October 2019.

            97

            Interview with Professor Jacob Zenn, via the exchange of emails, 3 August 2020. (Parentheses are those of the authors).

            98

            Akande, “U.S., Five Govs Meet on Niger Delta Today”, 1–2.

            99

            Interview with a Nigerian Army Lt. Colonel, Nigerian Army Headquarters Abuja, 3 December 2018.

            100

            Paquette, “U.S. Special Operations Forces Rescue American Kidnapped in Niger”.

            101

            Blanchard & Husted, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, 20.

            102

            Snow & Correll, “US loses Drone Over Niger”.

            103

            Blanchard & Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram and the Islamic State”.

            104

            Ibid., 2.

            105

            Agwu, Nations among Nations, 896–906, 927–1042.

            106

            Interview with Dr. Freedom Onuoha, 2018.

            107

            Interview with a retired Nigerian Army Colonel FDK.

            108

            Burchard & Burgess, “U.S. Training of Afrian Forces and Military Assistance”, 1–2.

            109

            Owen IV & Poznansky, “When Does America Drop Dictators”.

            110

            Ibid., 1073, 1075.

            111

            Ward, “Why the US won’t break up with Saudi Arabia”.

            112

            Lang et al., “The Future of U.S. Jordanian Counterterrorism Cooperation”.

            113

            Parameswaran, “US-Malaysia Counterterrorism Cooperation”.

            114

            Onuah, “Nigeria to Protest U.S. Conditions”.

            115

            Agwu, Nations among Nations, 928.

            116

            Stein, “Nigerian Military Training Cancellation Baffles US Experts”.

            117

            Rock, “The funding of Boko Haram”, 1–12.

            118

            Dearn, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s terrorist insurgency evolves”.

            119

            Onapajo & Uzodike, “Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria”, 34

            120

            Rock, “The funding of Boko Haram”, 1.

            121

            Adesoji, “Boko Haram and the Global War”, 11.

            122

            Falode, “Countering the Boko Haram group in Nigeria”.

            123

            Adesoji, “Boko Haram and the Global War on Terror”, 10; and Gilbert, “Prolongation of Boko Haram Insurgency”, 150–156.

            124

            Banini, “Security sector corruption and military effectiveness”, 145.

            125

            Haruna, “In Rare Video, Military Commander Says”.

            126

            Ibid.

            127

            Campbell, “Nigeria Security Tracker”, 2020

            128

            Rounds, “The Case against Arms Embargos”.

            129

            Hoffman, “The Evolving Threat of Terrorism and Effective”.

            130

            Weeraratne, “Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram”, 617–618.

            131

            Ogbogu, “Analysing the Threat of Boko Haram”, 17.

            132

            Campbell, “More on Nigeria’s South African Mercenaries”.

            133

            Banini, “Security Sector Corruption and Military”, 146.

            134

            Aljazeera, “Boko Haram Storm Military Base”.

            135

            Mbah, “Nigeria’s Buhari Rattled by Boko Haram”.

            136

            Agwu, Nations among Nations, 907.

            137

            CNN, “Boko Haram Fast Facts”.

            138

            Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Conquest for the Caliphate”.

            139

            Ibid.

            140

            Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness”, 54.

            141

            Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness”, 70.

            142

            Adebayo, “Nigeria vows to recapture Boko Haram”.

            143

            Awojulugbe, “Nigeria ignored intel on Boko Haram”.

            144

            Zenn, “Islamic State in West Africa Province”, 6–8.

            145

            Azumah, “Boko Haram in retrospect”, 12.

            146

            Ogbogu, “Analysing the Threat of Boko Haram and the ISIS”, 17.

            147

            Ibid., 17–18.

            148

            Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness”, 49.

            149

            Haruna, “In rare video, military commander says”; and Aljazeera, “Boko Haram storm military base”.

            150

            Adibe, “Should Nigeria have released Boko Haram suspects”.

            151

            Aron et al., “Foreign Policy Cooperation: US and EU”.

            152

            Campbell, “Nigeria Security Tracker”.

            153

            Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Conquest for the Caliphate”, 1–34; and Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram”, 3–7.

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            Author and article information

            Journal
            10.13169/jglobfaul
            Journal of Global Faultlines
            GF
            Pluto Journals
            2397-7825
            2054-2089
            17 November 2023
            : 10
            : 2
            : 165-189
            Article
            10.13169/jglobfaul.10.2.0165
            94d97908-894f-41a5-9b58-7bfc94790688
            © 2023, Abimbola Joseph Owojori, Omolara V. Akinyemi, and Muhammad Danial Azman.

            This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY) 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

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            : 18 January 2023
            : 5 June 2023
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            Social & Behavioral Sciences
            the United States,Bilateral relations,critical terrorism studies,counter-terrorism cooperation,Nigeria,terrorism

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