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      Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means

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            Abstract

            Since 1947, Kashmiris are demanding freedom from Indian occupation. They have adopted numerous approaches to gain independence from Indian subjugation, including nonviolent resistance, election boycotts and international arbitration. Various new trends in the Kashmiri freedom struggle have been observed since 2008 including a signature campaign ‘Safr-e-Azadi’ (journey for freedom) in 2008, ‘Muzaffarabad Chalo’ (Got to Muzaffarabad) march of 2008 and sit-ins of 2010 which have significantly changed the nature of Kashmir struggle. This paper explores emerging trends of strategic nonviolent Kashmiri struggle and practical future options to strategize the former through the prism of Gene Sharp's Theory of Nonviolence. This study assumes that strategic nonviolent movement in IOJ&K has highlighted the Kashmir cause across the world. It has challenged the Indian occupation through staging mass protests and employing new forms of strategic methods, which will likely put India under pressure in the future. If organized, well-coordinated and strategically planned, this struggle can be successful. In the wake of the Indian government's abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A and illegal annexation of IOJ&K on August 5, 2019, the need for devising a well-calibrated, inclusive and comprehensive strategy and employing all viable options for peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute further increases.

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            Author and article information

            Journal
            10.2307/j50009730
            polipers
            Policy Perspectives
            Pluto Journals
            1812-1829
            1812-7347
            1 January 2019
            : 16
            : 2 ( doiID: 10.13169/polipers.16.issue-2 )
            : 41-57
            Affiliations
            [* ]PhD scholar, Centre of International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad; Research Officer, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan.
            Article
            polipers.16.2.0041
            10.13169/polipers.16.2.0041
            a40a1504-5d06-4a64-91fd-9d1cef6b55ff
            © 2019, Institute of Policy Studies

            All content is freely available without charge to users or their institutions. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission of the publisher or the author. Articles published in the journal are distributed under a http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

            History
            Custom metadata
            eng

            Education,Religious studies & Theology,Social & Behavioral Sciences,Law,Economics
            Kashmir Dispute,Long March; Abrogation of Article 370 and 35A,Strategic Nonviolence,Sit-ins,Collective Action

            Footnotes

            1. Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough are Democracies: Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 9-51; David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science Review 86, no. 1 (1992): 24-37, https://doi.org/10.2307/1964013; and Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 28-33. See also, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability,” The American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 841-845 (852), https://doi.org/10.2307/2082512; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 215-263.

            2. Meenakshi Ganguly, “India Wants to Avoid Internatinal Intervention but Needs to Address Human Rights in Kashmir,” Wire, August 17, 2019.

            3. “Ayaz Urges PUIC to Demand Indepdent Genocide Probe in IOK,” Associated Press of Pakistan, October 18, 2016, https://www.app.com.pk/ayaz-urges-puic-to-demand-indepdent-genocide-probe-in-iok/; and Khurram Abbas, “The Kashmir Dispute and Perceptions of Pakistan's Youth: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Current Affairs 2, no. 1 (2017): 95-115.

            4. The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990, No. 21 (1990), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/Armed%20Forces.pdf; and “India Imposes Tough New Restrictions in Occupied Kashmir,” Express Tribune, September 28, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2066752/3-india-imposes-tough-new-restrictions-occupied-kashmir/.

            5. Zia Sarhadi, “Pakistan's Young Parliamentarians Focus on Kashmir,” Crescent International 45, no. 11 (2017), https://crescent.icit-digital.org/articles/pakistan-s-young-parliamentarians-focus-on-kashmir; “Ayaz Urges PUIC to Demand Indepdent Genocide Probe in IOK,” Associated Press of Pakistan; and Mirza Waheed, “India's Crackdown in Kashmir: Is This the World's First Mass Blinding?” Guardian, November 8, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/08/india-crackdown-in-kashmir-is-this-worlds-first-mass-blinding.

            6. Arundhati Roy, “Land and Freedom,” Guardian, August 22, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/22/kashmir.india; and Sanjay Kak, “What are the Kashmir's Stone Pelters Saying to Us?” Economic and Political Weekly XLV, no. 37 (2013).

            7. Author estimated this number for this study.

            8. “Kashmir Special Status Explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?” Al Jazeera, August 5, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/kashmir-special-status-explained-articles-370-35a-190805054643431.html.

            9. Khurram Minhas, “BJP's Castle in the Air,” Express Tribune, August 7, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2029715/6-bjps-castle-air/.

            10. Richard Roth, “UN Security Council has its First Meeting on Kashmir in Decades–and Fails to Agree on a Statement,” CNN, August 16, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/16/asia/un-security-council-kashmir-intl/index.html.

            11. Although the author tried to contact many Kashmiri activists within the Valley, due to lockdown and internet shutdown it was difficult to reach those activists.

            12. “Gandhi's Philosophy of Nonviolence” (Mumbai: Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal - Gandhi Book Centre, n.d.), accessed December 17, 2019, https://www.mkgandhi.org/africaneedsgandhi/gandhis_philosophy_of_nonviolence.htm.

            13. “Dr Gene Sharp: 1928-2018” (East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, n.d.), accessed December 17, 2019, https://www.aeinstein.org/dr-gene-sharp/; and Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), 365.

            14. Ibid., 364.

            15. Ibid., 366.

            16. Ibid., 365.

            17. Ibid.

            18. Ibid.

            19. Robert L. Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about Fundamentals (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 89.

            20. Ibid.

            21. It is also known as direct approach as defined by Clausewitz. This approach employs targeting center of gravity of the opponent. However, this form of strategy is risky in nature, as if the opponent survives from the first decisive battle, it can become further difficult to remove the status quo. Hence, adoption of this strategy requires more in-depth and well-coordinated analysis of available resources, weaknesses and strengths of the opponent.

            22. Ibid., 91.

            23. Contrary to strategy of annihilation, this form of strategy employs battle through a variety of means, such as territorial occupation, destruction of crops, blockade, etc. The basic objective of this strategy is to socially and economically compel the opponent to surrender. In this form of strategy, soldiers are prepared for long term and for numerous small battles against the adversary. This concept of economic damage of the enemy plays a key role. It is also known as ‘British way of warfare’.

            24. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 3rd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), 335.

            25. Ibid.

            26. Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about Fundamentals, 93.

            27. Ibid.

            28. Ibid., 92; and Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action.

            29. Shashank Joshi, “Kashmir Uprising Threatens the ‘Idea of India‘” Interpreter, August 15, 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kashmir-uprising-threatens-idea-india.

            30. Altaf Hussain Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad), in discussion with the author, February, 2019; and Abdul Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)), in discussion with the author, January, 2018.

            31. Naseer Ganai, “J-K Police Study Says after Violent Summer, Kashmir not Far from Normalcy,” India Today, October 29, 2016, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/jammu-and-kashmir/story/kashmir-unrest-burhan-muzaffer-wani-curfew-in-valley-349152-2016-10-29.

            32. Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad); and Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)).

            33. Joshi, “Kashmir Uprising Threatens the ‘Idea of India’.”

            34. Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)).

            35. Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad).

            36. Ibid.

            37. Ibid.

            38. Rifat Fareed, “Kashmir: Social Media Gag on Government Workers Slammed,” Al Jazeera, December 27, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/kashmir-social-media-gag-government-workers-slammed-171227124240342.html; Aijaz Hussain, “India Bans 22 Social Media Sites over Alleged Abuse Videos,” Independent, April 27, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-bans-social-media-sites-22-kashmir-alleged-abuse-videos-inidan-forces-soldiers-residents-a7705766.html; and Sheikh Zaffar Iqbal, “Anger in Kashmir Valley after Blackout on Social Media,” NDTV, April 28, 2017, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/anger-in-kashmir-valley-after-blackout-on-social-media-1686935.

            39. Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad); and Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)); Joshi, “Kashmir Uprising Threatens the ‘Idea of India’.”

            40. Muhammad Tahir, “Youth Protests in Kashmir,” Asia Dialogue, July 24, 2017, https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/07/24/youth-protests-in-kashmir/.

            41. Rasheed (Member, Hizb-e-Islami and Representative, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)).

            42. Wani (Chairman, Kashmir Institute of International Relations, Islamabad).

            43. “MC Kash Raps for Kashmir Protest Victims,” BBC News, December 20, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11928968.

            44. Ibid.

            45. Bina Shah, “Kashmir in Words,” Dawn, August 18, 2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1500053.

            46. Waseem Ahmad Shah, “Kashmir Movement: A Transition from Armed Conflict to Peaceful Resistance” (Masters diss., Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and Management, Sikkim University, Gangtok, 2014), 82-89.

            47. Jocelyn and McEwen, “The Long March: The True Story Behind the Legendary Journey that Made Mao's China,” 320. Some 80,000 men, women and children left their homes to walk with Mao into the unknown. One year, 4,000 miles and countless battles later, fewer than 4,000 were left.

            48. Asghar Ali Shad (former research fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad), in discussion with the author, February, 2019.

            49. Rahul K. Bhonsle, India's National Security: The Asymmetrical Challenges (New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2004), 76.

            50. V. Krishna Ananth, India Since Independence: Making Sense of Indian Politics, 1st ed. (Delhi: Pearson Education, 2010), 353.

            51. Shaheen Akhtar, “Uprising in Indian-Held Jammu & Kashmir,” Regional Studies, 9, no. 2 (1991).

            52. Mukhtar Ahmad, “Separatist Leader Calls for Sit-ins at Indian Posts across Kashmir,” CNN, September 17, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/09/16/india.kashmir.violence/index.html.

            53. Hardy Merriman, “Costs and Risks in Nonviolent Conflict,” webinar (Washington, D.C.: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2010), https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/costs-and-risks-in-nonviolent-conflict/.

            54. Ibid.

            55. Sarhadi, Pakistan's Young Parliamentarians Focus on Kashmir”; “Ayaz Urges PUIC to Demand Indepdent Genocide Probe in IOK,” Associated Press of Pakistan; and Waheed, “India's Crackdown in Kashmir: Is This the World's First Mass Blinding?”

            56. Ibid.

            57. Ibid.

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