The US in China&apos;s Nuclear Threat Perception

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Volume 18, Issue 1

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The US in China's Nuclear Threat Perception

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Author(s): Khusrow Akkas Abbasi ^* , Zahida Khalid ^**

Publication date (Print): 1 January 2021

Journal: Policy Perspectives

Publisher: Pluto Journals

Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, United States, China, Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

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Abstract

China's nuclear threat perception, of which its nuclear weapons program is the by-product, is driven by the external strategic environment where the United States (US) is a key player. Chairman Mao Zedong, after the US nuclear intimidation during the Korean War and the Cross-Strait Crises, considered that nuclear weapons were central not only to deter their potential use against China but also to counter the nuclear threat. The geostrategic location of the country makes it vulnerable to a few nuclear powers. However, not all of these states constitute a key concern in Beijing's nuclear threat perception. In this regard, an analysis of the US nuclear weapons program and capabilities would help understand China's nuclear threat perception. The paper aims to explore the threat that China perceives from the US given the latter's growing focus against it, including through its nuclear arsenal. The study, after a brief historical background, begins with a cursory discussion on theoretical underpinnings for threat perception. The next section outlines the US nuclear weapon policy and capability that has a bearing on China's nuclear threat perception. The paper argues that with its intentions and excessive capability, the US is a primary actor in shaping China's nuclear threat perception and altering its long-standing nuclear weapons policy and modernization of its nuclear forces.

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Journal ID (doi): 10.2307/j50009730

Journal ID (jcode): polipers

Title: Policy Perspectives

Publisher: Pluto Journals

ISSN: 1812-1829

ISSN: 1812-7347

Publication date (Print): 1 January 2021

Volume: 18

Issue: 1 ( doiID: 10.13169/polipers.18.issue-1 )

Pages: 53-68

Affiliations

[* ]PhD Scholar, Department of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand.

[** ]Assistant Editor, Policy Perspectives, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

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Publisher ID: polipers.18.1.0053

DOI: 10.13169/polipers.18.1.0053

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ScienceOpen disciplines: Education,Religious studies & Theology,Social & Behavioral Sciences,Law,Economics

Keywords: United States,Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS),Nuclear Weapons,China

Notes

AMS, 战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy 2013], rev ed. (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 148.
“China Inaugurates PLA Rocket Force as Military Reform Deepens,” Xinhua, January 2, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0102/c90786-8998406.html.
John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, China's Strategic Perspectives 13, ed. Philip C. Saunders (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2018), 1, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf.
Eric Heginbotham, Michael S. Chase, Jacob L. Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark Cozad, Lyle J. Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael Nixon, Cristina L. Garafola and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States, report (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 112, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html.
Ibid., 110-115.
Kelsey Davenport, “China Elevates Nuclear Rocket Force,” Arms Control Today 15 (2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-03/news/china-elevates-nuclear-rocket-force.
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” in “Now, Then, and the Future: The Bulletin Turns 75,” special issue, Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists 76, no. 6 (2020): 443-457, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432.
NTI, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons” (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015), https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/nuclear/.
Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020.”
Bill Gertz, “China Tests Submarine-Launched JL-3 Missile Capable of Hitting U.S with Nuke,” Washington Times, December 24, 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/dec/24/china-tests-submarine-launched-jl-3-missile-capabl/.
“How is China Modernizing its Nuclear Forces?” China Power, last modified June 18, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/.
China Lifts the Veil on Its Advanced Weaponry, Stratfor, October 3, 2019, accessed October 26, 2019, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-lifts-veil-its-advanced-weaponry-military-parade.
Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “China is Building a Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field,” The Strategic Security Blog, July 26, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/.
Marilynn B. Brewer, “Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?” Journal of Social Issues 55, no. 3 (1999): 429-444, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.4614&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Martha L. Cottam and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics: The Political Behavior of Nation States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); and Howard Lavine, Milton Lodge and Kate Freitas, “Threat, Authoritarianism, and Selective Exposure to Information,” Political Psychology 26, no. 2 (2005): 219-244, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679221.2005.00416.x.
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Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” 22.
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Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2019,” in “The Global Competition for AI Dominance,” special issue, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 3 (2019): 122-134 (122), https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503.
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“Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Posture Review Report 2002 (Washington, DC: The Federation of American Scientists, 2002), https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Excerpts-of-Classified-Nuclear-Posture-Review.pdf.
Ibid.
Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 (Government of United States, 2010), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/ defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.
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Ibid.
Li Bin, “Will US Nuclear Posture Review See a Return to Hegemony?” Global Times, January 25, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1086434.shtml.
Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, 32.
Phil Stewart, “Trump Missile Defense Review Calls North Korea ‘Extraordinary Threat’,” Reuters, January 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-missiles/trump-missile-defense-review-calls-north-korea-extraordinary-threat-idUSKCN1PB04V.
Reuben Michael Steff, “Deterrence, Global Security and the Long Road to the Deployment of the Bush Administration's Missile Defense System” (PhD diss., University of Otago, 2012), 112-142.
Haynes, “China's Nuclear Threat Perceptions,” 44-52; Tompkins, “How U.S. Strategic Policy is Changing China's Nuclear Plans.”
Qiu Yong, “A Few Comments on the US Ballistic Missile Defense System,” in “Progress Despite Disagreements: The Sixth China–US Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and Matt Pottinger, eds., Issues & Insights 12, no. 5 (2011): 29-37, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155730/issuesinsights_vol12n5.pdf.
Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review, 2019 (Government of United States, 2019), https://media. defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” in “Space: Military Frontier or Arms Control Opportunity?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019): 171-178 (173), https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511.
“Missiles of China,” Missile Threat Project (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021), https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/; Jen Judson, “Pentagon Hits Pause on Redesign of Critical Homeland Missile Defense Component,” Defense News, May 28, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/05/28/pentagon-hits-pause-on-redesign-of-critical-homeland-missile-defense-component/; Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf.
Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” 444.
ACA, “Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance” (factsheet, Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, 2019), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “US Ballistic Missile Defenses, 2019,” in “Apocalypse Soon? How Civilization Might End—and How to Make Sure it Doesn't,” special issue, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 6 (2019): 295-306(296), https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1680055.
Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and Matt Pottinger, eds., “Progress Despite Disagreements: The Sixth China–US Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” Issues & Insights 12, no. 5 (2011) 11, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155730/issuesinsights_vol12n5.pdf.
Ibid.
ACA, “Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.”
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ACA, “Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.”
Ibid.
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Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.
Ibid., 11.
GoUS, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Government of United States, 2004), https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms2004.pdf?ver=UHt7ntCXi1EO3mgZSqFvNA%3d%3d.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010, 34.
Ibid.
Yao Yunzhu, “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” China-U.S. Focus, April 22, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy; also see Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues.
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Ibid.
Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019),https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6271735/Conventional-Prompt-Global-Strike-and-Long-Range.pdf.
Ibid, 4.
National Defense Authorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 112–239—(2013), https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ239/PLAW-112publ239.pdf.
Tong Zhao, “Conventional Counterforce Strike and Damage Limitation” (paper, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, 2011), https://igcc.ucsd.edu/_files/PPNT/NuclearBriefing2presentation1.pdf.
Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review 2018.
AMS, 战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy 2013], 171.

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[1] AMS, 战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy 2013], rev ed. (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 148.

[2] “China Inaugurates PLA Rocket Force as Military Reform Deepens,” Xinhua, January 2, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0102/c90786-8998406.html.

[3] John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, China's Strategic Perspectives 13, ed. Philip C. Saunders (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2018), 1, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf.

[4] Eric Heginbotham, Michael S. Chase, Jacob L. Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark Cozad, Lyle J. Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael Nixon, Cristina L. Garafola and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States, report (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 112, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html.

[5] Ibid., 110-115.

[6] Kelsey Davenport, “China Elevates Nuclear Rocket Force,” Arms Control Today 15 (2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-03/news/china-elevates-nuclear-rocket-force.

[7] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” in “Now, Then, and the Future: The Bulletin Turns 75,” special issue, Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists 76, no. 6 (2020): 443-457, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432.

[8] NTI, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons” (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015), https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/nuclear/.

[9] Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020.”

[10] Bill Gertz, “China Tests Submarine-Launched JL-3 Missile Capable of Hitting U.S with Nuke,” Washington Times, December 24, 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/dec/24/china-tests-submarine-launched-jl-3-missile-capabl/.

[11] “How is China Modernizing its Nuclear Forces?” China Power, last modified June 18, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/.

[12] China Lifts the Veil on Its Advanced Weaponry, Stratfor, October 3, 2019, accessed October 26, 2019, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-lifts-veil-its-advanced-weaponry-military-parade.

[13] Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “China is Building a Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field,” The Strategic Security Blog, July 26, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/.

[14] Marilynn B. Brewer, “Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?” Journal of Social Issues 55, no. 3 (1999): 429-444, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.4614&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Martha L. Cottam and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics: The Political Behavior of Nation States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); and Howard Lavine, Milton Lodge and Kate Freitas, “Threat, Authoritarianism, and Selective Exposure to Information,” Political Psychology 26, no. 2 (2005): 219-244, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679221.2005.00416.x.

[15] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 2001); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979), https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod_resource/content/0/Kenneth%20N.%20Waltz%20Theory%20of%20International%20Politics%20AddisonWesley%20series%20in%20political%20science%20%20%20%201979.pdf.

[16] Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” 22.

[17] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Jie Chen, “Urban Chinese Perceptions of Threats from the United States and Japan,” Public Opinion Quarterly 65, no. 2 (2001): 254-266, https://doi.org/10.1086/322200.

[18] Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Herbet Yee and Ian Storey, eds., The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (London: Routledge, 2002); and John Mearsheimer, “China's Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (2006): 160-162, https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2006.105.690.160.

[19] Joanne Tompkins, “How U.S. Strategic Policy is Changing China's Nuclear Plans,” Arms Control Today 33 (January/February 2003), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-01/features/us-strategic-policy-changing-china%E2%80%99s-nuclear-plans; and Susan Turner Haynes, “China's Nuclear Threat Perceptions,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 10, no. 2 (2016): 44-52, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-10_Issue-2/Haynes.pdf.

[20] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2020” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 1 (2020): 46-60 https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701286.

[21] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2019,” in “The Global Competition for AI Dominance,” special issue, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 3 (2019): 122-134 (122), https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503.

[22] Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, report (Washington, DC: The Federation of American Scientists, 2006), 130-134, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf.

[23] “Excerpts of Classified Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Posture Review Report 2002 (Washington, DC: The Federation of American Scientists, 2002), https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Excerpts-of-Classified-Nuclear-Posture-Review.pdf.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 (Government of United States, 2010), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/ defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.

[26] Yunzhu Yao, “A Chinese Perspective on the Nuclear Posture Review” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/05/06/chinese-perspective-on-nuclear-posture-review-pub-40758.

[27] Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (Government of United States, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Li Bin, “Will US Nuclear Posture Review See a Return to Hegemony?” Global Times, January 25, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1086434.shtml.

[30] Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, 32.

[31] Phil Stewart, “Trump Missile Defense Review Calls North Korea ‘Extraordinary Threat’,” Reuters, January 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-missiles/trump-missile-defense-review-calls-north-korea-extraordinary-threat-idUSKCN1PB04V.

[32] Reuben Michael Steff, “Deterrence, Global Security and the Long Road to the Deployment of the Bush Administration's Missile Defense System” (PhD diss., University of Otago, 2012), 112-142.

[33] Haynes, “China's Nuclear Threat Perceptions,” 44-52; Tompkins, “How U.S. Strategic Policy is Changing China's Nuclear Plans.”

[34] Qiu Yong, “A Few Comments on the US Ballistic Missile Defense System,” in “Progress Despite Disagreements: The Sixth China–US Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and Matt Pottinger, eds., Issues & Insights 12, no. 5 (2011): 29-37, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155730/issuesinsights_vol12n5.pdf.

[35] Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review, 2019 (Government of United States, 2019), https://media. defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.

[36] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” in “Space: Military Frontier or Arms Control Opportunity?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019): 171-178 (173), https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511.

[37] “Missiles of China,” Missile Threat Project (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021), https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/; Jen Judson, “Pentagon Hits Pause on Redesign of Critical Homeland Missile Defense Component,” Defense News, May 28, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/05/28/pentagon-hits-pause-on-redesign-of-critical-homeland-missile-defense-component/; Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf.

[38] Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” 444.

[39] ACA, “Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance” (factsheet, Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, 2019), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “US Ballistic Missile Defenses, 2019,” in “Apocalypse Soon? How Civilization Might End—and How to Make Sure it Doesn't,” special issue, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 6 (2019): 295-306(296), https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1680055.

[43] Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and Matt Pottinger, eds., “Progress Despite Disagreements: The Sixth China–US Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” Issues & Insights 12, no. 5 (2011) 11, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155730/issuesinsights_vol12n5.pdf.

[44] Ibid.

[45] ACA, “Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.”

[46] Wu Riqiang, “China's Anxiety About US Missile Defence: A Solution,” Survival 55 no. 5 (2013): 29-52, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.841803; Qiu Yong, “Analysis on the ASAT Capability of the GMD Interceptor” (paper presented at symposium, Tsinghua University, Beijing, July 17–25, 2004); Li Bin, “Impact of U.S. NMD on Chinese Nuclear Modernization” (paper presented at meeting no. 261, Korean Pugwash Group, Seoul, April 2001); Li Bin, Zhou Baogen, and Liu Zhiwei, “Missile Defense: China Will Have to Respond,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no. 6 (2001): 25-28, https://doi.org/10.2968/057006009; Hui Zhang, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Today 35 (December 2005), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-12/features/actionreaction-us-space-weaponization-china.

[47] Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (2010): 1-33, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523261003640819.

[48] Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 9-49 (11), https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273.

[49] “Leon Panetta: US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to Pacific,” BBC News, June 2, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-18305750.

[50] Sam LaGrone, “Sixty Percent of U.S. Navy and Air Force Will Be Based in Pacific by 2020,”US Naval Institute News, September 30, 2014, https://news.usni.org/2014/09/30/work-sixty-percent-u-s-navy-air-force-will-based-pacific-2020.

[51] Li Bin and Nie Hongyi, “An Investigation of China – U.S. Strategic Stability,” trans., Gregory Kulacki, World Economics & Politics, no. 2 (2008): 13-19, https://ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Li-and-Nie-translation-final-5-22-09.pdf.

[52] ACA, “Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.”

[53] Ibid.

[54] Tong Zhao, Narrowing the U.S.-China Gap on Missile Defense: How to Help Forestall a Nuclear Arms Race, report (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), 5-58, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Zhao_USChina_MissileDefense.pdf; Li Bin, “Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles,” Science and Global Security 15, no. 1 (2007): 1–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/08929880701350197; Lieber and Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence”; Tong Zhao, “U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,” China Security (Winter 2007): 66–89, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/29406/cs5_FULL.pdf; and Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015): 38–73, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150.

[55] Ian Williams, “More Than Missiles: China Previews its New Way of War” (brief, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-missiles-china-previews-its-new-way-war.

[56] Department of Defense, GoUS, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Government of United States, 2001), 43, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf.

[57] Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.

[58] Ibid., 11.

[59] GoUS, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Government of United States, 2004), https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms2004.pdf?ver=UHt7ntCXi1EO3mgZSqFvNA%3d%3d.

[60] Department of Defense, GoUS, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Government of United States, 2006), 49-50, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.pdf.

[61] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Government of United States, 2010), 32-33, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2010.pdf?ver=vVJYRVwNdnGb_00ixF0UfQ%3d%3d.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010, 34.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Yao Yunzhu, “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” China-U.S. Focus, April 22, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy; also see Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues.

[67] M. Taylor Fravel and Fiona S. Cunningham, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 7–50.(20-22, 44), https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00215.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019),https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6271735/Conventional-Prompt-Global-Strike-and-Long-Range.pdf.

[70] Ibid, 4.

[71] National Defense Authorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 112–239—(2013), https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ239/PLAW-112publ239.pdf.

[72] Tong Zhao, “Conventional Counterforce Strike and Damage Limitation” (paper, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, 2011), https://igcc.ucsd.edu/_files/PPNT/NuclearBriefing2presentation1.pdf.

[73] Department of Defense, GoUS, Nuclear Posture Review 2018.

[74] AMS, 战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy 2013], 171.