Utilizing Militia Forces in Modern Warfare: Role and Challenges

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Policy Perspectives

Volume 18, Issue 1

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Utilizing Militia Forces in Modern Warfare: Role and Challenges

research-article

Author(s): Muhammad Nasrullah Mirza , Naveed Mushtaq

Publication date (Print): 1 January 2021

Journal: Policy Perspectives

Keywords: PGMs, Militia, Modern Warfare, Middle East, Irregular Warfare

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Abstract

The militia as an informal pro-government irregular force helps government forces through a range of asymmetric security threats. Since 9/11, the employment of militia forces has been on the rise. Although the informal Pro-Government Militias (PGMs) operate in juxtaposition with the regular land forces, they are loosely aligned with them. Given the nativity of its members to the battlefield, a militia is best suited to comprehend the operational and tactical situation and, making itself a viable option for state-led forces both from the perspective of low-cost force or its flexibility to deal with irregular threats. Most informal PGMs maintain a stronger ideological and political base, they do not often care about the limitation of their sponsoring state's sovereignty and the legitimacy of their actions. They may even develop linkages with the terrorist outfits for their immediate goals. This puts national security in grave danger. Given the risks, weaker states become vulnerable at the hands of their sponsored militants. Still, the state-led forces will remain inclined to exploit such paramilitary forces to let them shoulder the burden of national security against asymmetric threats.

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Title: Policy Perspectives

ISSN: 1812-7347

Publication date (Print): 1 January 2021

Volume: 18

Issue: 1 ( doiID: 10.13169/polipers.18.issue-1 )

Pages: 69-84

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Publisher ID: polipers.18.1.0069

DOI: 10.13169/polipers.18.1.0069

SO-VID: 045e5a5a-c8ef-4e73-99a3-fcd9a8364fdf

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ScienceOpen disciplines: Education,Religious studies & Theology,Social & Behavioral Sciences,Law,Economics

Keywords: Modern Warfare,PGMs,Irregular Warfare,Militia,Middle East

Notes

Tobias Böhmelt and Govinda Clayton, “Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias,” Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 2 (2018): 197-237, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017699204.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Sabine C. Carey and Neil J. Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017):127-147, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051915-045433.
Paul Rexton Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 7-8.
HRW, “Libya,” country summary (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/libya_5.pdf.
International Committee of Red Cross, Customary IHL Database “Practice Relating to Rule 4. Definition of Armed Forces: Section A. General Definition,” accessed April 25, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule4.
Ibid.
Seth G. Jones, “The Strategic Logic of Militia” (paper, National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2012), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/RAND_WR913.pdf.
Phil Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq, report (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2009), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2019.pdf.
Kimberly Marten, “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security 31, no. 3 (2007), 41–73(43), https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.41.
Ibid., 24-25.
Ariel. I Ahram and Frederick Wehrey, “Harnessing Militia Power: Lessons of the Iraqi National Guard,” The Markaz Blog, May 27, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/05/27/harnessing-militia-power-lessons-of-the-iraqi-national-guard/.
Caitlin Ambrozik, “Not Whether, But When? Governments' Use of Militias in War,” Security Studies 28, no. 5 (2019): 870-900, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1662479.
Ibid.
Jacob L. Shapiro, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State,” Geopolitical Futures, March 21, 2019, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/rise-fall-islamic-state-1/.
Adam Day, “Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-Conflict Transitions” (paper, United Nations University, New York, 2020), https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/3895/HybridConflictSummaryWeb.pdf.
Böhmelt and Clayton, “Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias.”
Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 7.
Noah B. Cooper, “The Ongoing Challenge of Irregular Warfare: Thoughts on Responses and Intelligence,” Small Wars Journal, August 12, 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-ongoing-challenge-of-irregular-warfare-thoughts-on-responses-and-intelligence.
Ibid.
Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 17-18.
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Rise of Militias in Mexico: Citizens' Security or Further Conflict Escalation,” Brookings.edu, December 9, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rise-of-militias-in-mexico-citizens-security-or-further-conflict-escalation/.
Xander Snyder, “Iran's Strategy in Iraq, and the Militias That Make It Possible,” Geopolitical Futures, March 8, 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/irans-strategy-iraq-militias-make-possible/.
Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won't Abandon Assad(ism),” The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2013): 79-93, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.861715.
Frederic C. Hof, “Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and Beyond” (speech, Washington, DC, September 3, 2013), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/2958.
Kimberly Marten, “The Security Costs and Benefits of Non-State Militias: The Example of Eastern Ukraine” (Washington, DC: PONARS Eurosia, 2015), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/security-costs-and-benefits-non-state-militias-example-eastern-ukraine.
Sabine C. Carey and Neil J. Mitchell, “Why Do Governments Use Militias?” (paper, Centre for International Crisis Management & Conflict Resolution (ICMRC), Atlanta, 2011), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265111059_Why_Do_Governments_Use_Militias.
Ibid.
Ibid.
IISS, “Iraq,” in Iran's Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), accessed July28, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-06-ch-4-iraq.
Snyder, “Iran's Strategy in Iraq, and the Militias That Make It Possible.”
Murtaza Hussain, “Iran's Shadow War on ISIS,” Intercept, November 18, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/11/18/iran-isis-iraq-kurds/.
Aron Lund, “How Washington Learned to Love Haider al-Abadi” (New York: The Century Foundation, 29, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/report/washington-learned-love-haider-al-abadi/?session=1.
Böhmelt and Clayton, “Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias.”
Christoph V. Steinert, Janina I. Steinert and Sabine C. Carey, “Spoilers of Peace: Pro Government Militias as Risk Factors for Conflict Recurrence,” Journal of Peace Research, October 24, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318800524.
Kristine Phillips, “All States Prohibit ‘Militia Extremists’ and Paramilitary Activities. So Why Aren't They Stopped?” USA Today, November 3, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/03/all-states-prohibit-paramilitary-militia-extremists-but/6123774002/.
Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 80-82.
Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq, 234.
Jones, “The Strategic Logic of Militia.”
Frederic Wehrey and Ariel I. Ahram, “Taming the Militias: Building National Guards in Fractured Arab States” (paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2015), 10, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/fractured_national_guards.pdf.
Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq.
Max Boot, “Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq Poises to Expand Influence” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/iran-backed-militias-iraq-poised-expand-influence.
Ibid.
Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2011), 77, https://bit.ly/3jbizAN.
Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 79-80.
ISW, “Jaysh Al-Mahdi” (New York: Institute for the Study of War, 2009), http://www.understandingwar.org/jaysh-al-mahdi.
John Hannah, “Iran-Backed Militias are in Iraq to Stay,” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/31/iran-backed-militias-are-in-iraq-to-stay/.
Cathrin Schaer, “Iraq's Rogue Militias: Who can Stop Them from Attacking?” DW, February 20, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/who-can-stop-iraq-rogue-militias-from-attacking/a-56627671.
BPC, U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options, report (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Centre, 2018), 18, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-National-Security-Strategic-Options-on-Iran.pdf.
Snyder, “Iran's Strategy in Iraq, and the Militias That Make It Possible.”
Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Forces Linked to Vice President Terrorize Villagers,” news release, July 31, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/31/afghanistan-forces-linked-vice-president-terrorize-villagers.
Rod Nordland, “Accused of Rape and Torture, Exiled Afghan Vice President Returns,” New York Times, July 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/world/asia/afghanistan-general-abdul-rashid-dostum-rape.html.
Ibid.
United Nations, “Stronger Multilateralism Key to Tackling Tough Global Challenges but Not at Expense of State Sovereignty, Several Speakers Warn as General Assembly Debate Continues,” press release, September 28, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12198.doc.htm.
Emile Simpson, “This is How Great-Power Wars Get Started,” Foreign Policy, June 21, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/21/this-is-how-great-power-wars-get-started/.
Ibid.
Farooq Yousaf and Syed FurrukhZad, “Pashtun Jirga and Prospects of Peace and Conflict Resolution in Pakistan's ‘Tribal’ Frontier,” Third World Quarterly 41, no. 7 (2020): 1200-1217, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1760088.
Stephan M. Walt, “Don't Knock Offshore Balancing Until You've Tried It,” Foreign Policy, December 8, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/dont-knock-offshore-balancing-youve-tried-it-obama-middle-east-realism-liberal-hegemony/.
Jason Thomas, “The New Era of Non-State Actors: Warfare and Entropy,” Small War Journal, August 24, 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-new-era-of-non-state-actors-warfare-and-entropy.
Seth J. Frantzman, “Is the US Supporting Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq,” Jerusalem Post, November 15, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Is-the-US-supporting-Iranian-backed-militias-in-Iraq-514353.
Frederick Wehrey, “Armies, Militias and (Re)Integration in Fractured States” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/30/armies-militias-and-re-integration-in-fractured-states-pub-77604.
Ryan McMaken, “Decentralize the Military: Why We Need Independent Militias,” Mises Wire, July 29, 2016, https://mises.org/wire/decentralize-military-why-we-need-independent-militias.
Mazin Majeed, Asaad Baqal and Azad Mohammed Abdullah, “Clash Erupts between PKK, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq,” Anadolu Agency, June 6, 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/clash-erupts-between-pkk-hashd-al-shaabi-in-iraq/1166784.
Phil Williams, “Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security” (paper, International Relations and Security Network, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich-Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2008), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:jMZBhVsaSrYJ:https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/93880/vnsas.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=pk.
Ibid.
Imtiaz Ali, Mainstreaming Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas: Reforms, Initiatives and Roadblocks, report (Washington, Dc: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/sr-421-mainstreaming-pakistan-federally-administered-tribal-areas.pdf.
Paul Staniland, “Militias, Ideology and the State,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 770-793, https://thepearsoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/23.%20Staniland_Militias%2C%20ideology.pdf.
Nabih Bulos, W.J. Hennigan, Brian Bennett, and, “In Syria, Militias Armed by the Pentagon Fight Those Armed by the CIA,” Los Angeles Times, March 27, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-cia-pentagon-isis-20160327-story.html#.
Ibid., 11.
Dorian Jones, “Turkish Ally Accused of Widespread Rights Abuses in Syria,” VOA, November 27, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/turkish-ally-accused-widespread-rights-abuses-syria.
Anna Nemtsova and Christopher Dickey, “Ukraine's Anti-Russia Azov Battalion: ‘Minutemen’ or Neo-Nazi Terrorists?” Daily Beast, November 15, 2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ukraines-anti-russia-azov-battalion-minutemen-or-neo-nazi-terrorists.
Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Future” (Washington, Dc: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_63_Mansour_PMF_Final_Web.pdf.
Jones, “The Strategic Logic of Militia.”

Comments

Comment on this article

[1] Tobias Böhmelt and Govinda Clayton, “Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias,” Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 2 (2018): 197-237, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017699204.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Sabine C. Carey and Neil J. Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017):127-147, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051915-045433.

[5] Paul Rexton Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 7-8.

[6] HRW, “Libya,” country summary (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/libya_5.pdf.

[7] International Committee of Red Cross, Customary IHL Database “Practice Relating to Rule 4. Definition of Armed Forces: Section A. General Definition,” accessed April 25, 2021, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule4.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Seth G. Jones, “The Strategic Logic of Militia” (paper, National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2012), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/RAND_WR913.pdf.

[10] Phil Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq, report (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2009), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2019.pdf.

[11] Kimberly Marten, “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security 31, no. 3 (2007), 41–73(43), https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.41.

[12] Ibid., 24-25.

[13] Ariel. I Ahram and Frederick Wehrey, “Harnessing Militia Power: Lessons of the Iraqi National Guard,” The Markaz Blog, May 27, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/05/27/harnessing-militia-power-lessons-of-the-iraqi-national-guard/.

[14] Caitlin Ambrozik, “Not Whether, But When? Governments' Use of Militias in War,” Security Studies 28, no. 5 (2019): 870-900, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1662479.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Jacob L. Shapiro, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State,” Geopolitical Futures, March 21, 2019, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/rise-fall-islamic-state-1/.

[17] Adam Day, “Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-Conflict Transitions” (paper, United Nations University, New York, 2020), https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/3895/HybridConflictSummaryWeb.pdf.

[18] Böhmelt and Clayton, “Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias.”

[19] Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 7.

[20] Noah B. Cooper, “The Ongoing Challenge of Irregular Warfare: Thoughts on Responses and Intelligence,” Small Wars Journal, August 12, 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-ongoing-challenge-of-irregular-warfare-thoughts-on-responses-and-intelligence.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 17-18.

[23] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Rise of Militias in Mexico: Citizens' Security or Further Conflict Escalation,” Brookings.edu, December 9, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rise-of-militias-in-mexico-citizens-security-or-further-conflict-escalation/.

[24] Xander Snyder, “Iran's Strategy in Iraq, and the Militias That Make It Possible,” Geopolitical Futures, March 8, 2018, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/irans-strategy-iraq-militias-make-possible/.

[25] Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won't Abandon Assad(ism),” The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2013): 79-93, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.861715.

[26] Frederic C. Hof, “Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and Beyond” (speech, Washington, DC, September 3, 2013), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/2958.

[27] Kimberly Marten, “The Security Costs and Benefits of Non-State Militias: The Example of Eastern Ukraine” (Washington, DC: PONARS Eurosia, 2015), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/security-costs-and-benefits-non-state-militias-example-eastern-ukraine.

[28] Sabine C. Carey and Neil J. Mitchell, “Why Do Governments Use Militias?” (paper, Centre for International Crisis Management & Conflict Resolution (ICMRC), Atlanta, 2011), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265111059_Why_Do_Governments_Use_Militias.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] IISS, “Iraq,” in Iran's Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), accessed July28, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-06-ch-4-iraq.

[32] Snyder, “Iran's Strategy in Iraq, and the Militias That Make It Possible.”

[33] Murtaza Hussain, “Iran's Shadow War on ISIS,” Intercept, November 18, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/11/18/iran-isis-iraq-kurds/.

[34] Aron Lund, “How Washington Learned to Love Haider al-Abadi” (New York: The Century Foundation, 29, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/report/washington-learned-love-haider-al-abadi/?session=1.

[35] Böhmelt and Clayton, “Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias.”

[36] Christoph V. Steinert, Janina I. Steinert and Sabine C. Carey, “Spoilers of Peace: Pro Government Militias as Risk Factors for Conflict Recurrence,” Journal of Peace Research, October 24, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318800524.

[37] Kristine Phillips, “All States Prohibit ‘Militia Extremists’ and Paramilitary Activities. So Why Aren't They Stopped?” USA Today, November 3, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/03/all-states-prohibit-paramilitary-militia-extremists-but/6123774002/.

[38] Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 80-82.

[39] Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq, 234.

[40] Jones, “The Strategic Logic of Militia.”

[41] Frederic Wehrey and Ariel I. Ahram, “Taming the Militias: Building National Guards in Fractured Arab States” (paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2015), 10, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/fractured_national_guards.pdf.

[42] Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq.

[43] Max Boot, “Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq Poises to Expand Influence” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/iran-backed-militias-iraq-poised-expand-influence.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2011), 77, https://bit.ly/3jbizAN.

[46] Kan, The Global Challenge of Militias and Paramilitary Violence, 79-80.

[47] ISW, “Jaysh Al-Mahdi” (New York: Institute for the Study of War, 2009), http://www.understandingwar.org/jaysh-al-mahdi.

[48] John Hannah, “Iran-Backed Militias are in Iraq to Stay,” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/31/iran-backed-militias-are-in-iraq-to-stay/.

[49] Cathrin Schaer, “Iraq's Rogue Militias: Who can Stop Them from Attacking?” DW, February 20, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/who-can-stop-iraq-rogue-militias-from-attacking/a-56627671.

[50] BPC, U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options, report (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Centre, 2018), 18, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-National-Security-Strategic-Options-on-Iran.pdf.

[51] Snyder, “Iran's Strategy in Iraq, and the Militias That Make It Possible.”

[52] Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Forces Linked to Vice President Terrorize Villagers,” news release, July 31, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/31/afghanistan-forces-linked-vice-president-terrorize-villagers.

[53] Rod Nordland, “Accused of Rape and Torture, Exiled Afghan Vice President Returns,” New York Times, July 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/world/asia/afghanistan-general-abdul-rashid-dostum-rape.html.

[54] Ibid.

[55] United Nations, “Stronger Multilateralism Key to Tackling Tough Global Challenges but Not at Expense of State Sovereignty, Several Speakers Warn as General Assembly Debate Continues,” press release, September 28, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12198.doc.htm.

[56] Emile Simpson, “This is How Great-Power Wars Get Started,” Foreign Policy, June 21, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/21/this-is-how-great-power-wars-get-started/.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Farooq Yousaf and Syed FurrukhZad, “Pashtun Jirga and Prospects of Peace and Conflict Resolution in Pakistan's ‘Tribal’ Frontier,” Third World Quarterly 41, no. 7 (2020): 1200-1217, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1760088.

[59] Stephan M. Walt, “Don't Knock Offshore Balancing Until You've Tried It,” Foreign Policy, December 8, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/dont-knock-offshore-balancing-youve-tried-it-obama-middle-east-realism-liberal-hegemony/.

[60] Jason Thomas, “The New Era of Non-State Actors: Warfare and Entropy,” Small War Journal, August 24, 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-new-era-of-non-state-actors-warfare-and-entropy.

[61] Seth J. Frantzman, “Is the US Supporting Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq,” Jerusalem Post, November 15, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Is-the-US-supporting-Iranian-backed-militias-in-Iraq-514353.

[62] Frederick Wehrey, “Armies, Militias and (Re)Integration in Fractured States” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/30/armies-militias-and-re-integration-in-fractured-states-pub-77604.

[63] Ryan McMaken, “Decentralize the Military: Why We Need Independent Militias,” Mises Wire, July 29, 2016, https://mises.org/wire/decentralize-military-why-we-need-independent-militias.

[64] Mazin Majeed, Asaad Baqal and Azad Mohammed Abdullah, “Clash Erupts between PKK, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq,” Anadolu Agency, June 6, 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/clash-erupts-between-pkk-hashd-al-shaabi-in-iraq/1166784.

[65] Phil Williams, “Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security” (paper, International Relations and Security Network, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich-Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2008), https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:jMZBhVsaSrYJ:https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/93880/vnsas.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=pk.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Imtiaz Ali, Mainstreaming Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas: Reforms, Initiatives and Roadblocks, report (Washington, Dc: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/sr-421-mainstreaming-pakistan-federally-administered-tribal-areas.pdf.

[68] Paul Staniland, “Militias, Ideology and the State,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 770-793, https://thepearsoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/23.%20Staniland_Militias%2C%20ideology.pdf.

[69] Nabih Bulos, W.J. Hennigan, Brian Bennett, and, “In Syria, Militias Armed by the Pentagon Fight Those Armed by the CIA,” Los Angeles Times, March 27, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-cia-pentagon-isis-20160327-story.html#.

[70] Ibid., 11.

[71] Dorian Jones, “Turkish Ally Accused of Widespread Rights Abuses in Syria,” VOA, November 27, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/turkish-ally-accused-widespread-rights-abuses-syria.

[72] Anna Nemtsova and Christopher Dickey, “Ukraine's Anti-Russia Azov Battalion: ‘Minutemen’ or Neo-Nazi Terrorists?” Daily Beast, November 15, 2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ukraines-anti-russia-azov-battalion-minutemen-or-neo-nazi-terrorists.

[73] Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Future” (Washington, Dc: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_63_Mansour_PMF_Final_Web.pdf.

[74] Jones, “The Strategic Logic of Militia.”