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      Efficient Passive ICS Device Discovery and Identification by MAC Address Correlation

      proceedings-article
      1 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 1
      5th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2018 (ICS-CSR 2018)
      ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research
      29 - 30 August 2018
      industrial control systems, vulnerability scanner, programmable logic controllers, security assessment
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            Abstract

            Owing to a growing number of attacks, the assessment of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) has gained in importance. An integral part of an assessment is the creation of a detailed inventory of all connected devices, enabling vulnerability evaluations. For this purpose, scans of networks are crucial. Active scanning, which generates irregular traffic, is a method to get an overview of connected and active devices. Since such additional traffic may lead to an unexpected behavior of devices, active scanning methods should be avoided in critical infrastructure networks. In such cases, passive network monitoring offers an alternative, which is often used in conjunction with complex deep-packet inspection techniques. There are very few publications on lightweight passive scanning methodologies for industrial networks. In this paper, we propose a lightweight passive network monitoring technique using an efficient Media Access Control (MAC) address-based identification of industrial devices. Based on an incomplete set of known MAC address to device associations, the presented method can guess correct device and vendor information. Proving the feasibility of the method, an implementation is also introduced and evaluated regarding its efficiency. The feasibility of predicting a specific device/vendor combination is demonstrated by having similar devices in the database. In our ICSi testbed, we reached a host discovery rate of 100% at an identification rate of more than 66%, outperforming the results of existing tools.

            Content

            Author and article information

            Contributors
            Conference
            August 2018
            August 2018
            : 21-30
            Affiliations
            [1 ]Hochschule Augsburg Augsburg, Germany
            [2 ]Fraunhofer AISEC Munich, Germany
            Article
            10.14236/ewic/ICS2018.3
            b63def0e-71ff-46cc-96cd-5a61da3ab026
            © Niedermaier et al. Published by BCS Learning and Development Ltd. Proceedings of ICS & SCADA 2018

            This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

            5th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2018
            ICS-CSR 2018
            5
            University of Hamburg, Germany
            29 - 30 August 2018
            Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)
            ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research
            History
            Product

            1477-9358 BCS Learning & Development

            Self URI (article page): https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.14236/ewic/ICS2018.3
            Self URI (journal page): https://ewic.bcs.org/
            Categories
            Electronic Workshops in Computing

            Applied computer science,Computer science,Security & Cryptology,Graphics & Multimedia design,General computer science,Human-computer-interaction
            industrial control systems,vulnerability scanner,programmable logic controllers,security assessment

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