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      Investigating Current PLC Security Issues Regarding Siemens S7 Communications and TIA Portal

      proceedings-article

      1 , 1

      5th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2018 (ICS-CSR 2018)

      ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research

      29 - 30 August 2018

      Programmable Logic Controllers, PLC, cyber security

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            Abstract

            Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the essential components in many Industrial Control Systems that control physical processes. However, in recent years the security flaws of these devices have come under scrutiny, particularly since the widely discussed Stuxnet attack. To help the industry state-of-the-art to move forward and to provide information required to improve the security for these controllers, this work investigates potential exploits of the Siemens S7-1211C controllers and the Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) engineering software. Using Windbg and Scapy, the anti-replay mechanism of the Siemens proprietary communication protocol, S7CommPlus, and the Profinet Discovery and Basic Configuration Protocol are found to be vulnerable. Attacks like session stealing, phantom PLC, cross connecting controllers and denial of S7 connections are demonstrated. The lack of authentication and consequent exploitation of the S7-ACK packet, an application layer packet for the S7CommPlus protocol, is highlighted as a key issue in this investigation.

            Content

            Author and article information

            Contributors
            Conference
            August 2018
            August 2018
            : 67-73
            Affiliations
            [1 ]Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queen’s University Belfast
            Article
            10.14236/ewic/ICS2018.8
            26c45b9d-4e5a-45f6-be8a-5cd5dfc29b72
            © Hui et al. Published by BCS Learning and Development Ltd. Proceedings of ICS & SCADA 2018

            This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

            5th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2018
            ICS-CSR 2018
            5
            University of Hamburg, Germany
            29 - 30 August 2018
            Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)
            ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research
            Product
            Product Information: 1477-9358BCS Learning & Development
            Self URI (journal page): https://ewic.bcs.org/
            Categories
            Electronic Workshops in Computing

            REFERENCES

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            3. Industry Support Siemens 2013 Announcement: Product Phase-Out for SIMATIC S7-200 - ID: 67598674 Available at: https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/67598674/announcement%3A-product-phase-out-for-simatic-s7-200?dti=0&lc=en-WW 19 March 2018

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