A Separate Network for Control System CyberSecurity

Abstract

The electric utility sector smart-grid definition implies the need for ubiquitous communications and extensive controls to increase reliability, efficiency, flexibility, and cost effectiveness. Smart-grid features include demand-response capabilities, advanced controls, DER integration, increased situational awareness, smart metering, advancement of ancillary services, time-of-use pricing, and peak curtailment, to name a few. The communication technologies at the smart grid’s heart provide the backbone for these features, which risks being exploited by adversaries. Furthermore, adding numerous automated services and devices to support smart-grid objectives risk compromise. In essence, the attack surface of the utility control systems is significantly larger. For example, smart meter and Advanced Metering Infrastructure systems, when implemented incorrectly, could provide injection points to the utility and meters equipped with demand response capabilities introduce the possibility of direct customer power disconnect.

A separate network for control system cybersecurity defines a highly secure, resilient and redundant critical communications, sensing, and technical assistance solution supporting all elements of the electricity enterprise and its supply chain. It is designed to retain national continuity of operations, enable rapid restoration, and facilitate cost-effective protective measures to thwart consequences of cyberattacks, operational and physical threats, and natural disaster. Security and resilience enhancements are not about bolting on a costly, cumbersome exoskeleton. As a nation, we must infuse the grid’s operational architecture digital native attributes (DNA) with modifications resulting in immunity to attack and degradation. Objectives of a project to implement utilization ofa separate communication network include:

• Implementing cyber defensive measures beyond what is possible on the public internet.

• Enhancing grid state monitoring with advanced sensing, measurements, escalating alert and situational awareness.

• Using existing buried treasure of infrastructure (e.g., dark fiber) as a cost-effective protective measure, exploiting advanced communications (5G-LTE private wireless) and cybersecurity technologies suitable for the expanding smart grid requirements.

• Using living laboratories to test security functionality and resilience – collaborating with utilities and suppliers for proof of concept.

A review of this concept is presented.

Contributors

Peter L. Fuhr

Conference

Publication date: September 2019

Publication date (Print): September 2019

Pages: 144-156

Affiliations

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

One Bethel Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 USA

Article

DOI: 10.14236/ewic/icscsr19.18

Copyright statement: © Peter L. Fuhr. Published by BCS Learning and Development Ltd. 6th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2019

License:

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Conference name: 6th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2019

Conference acronym: ICS-CSR

Conference number: 6

Conference location: Athens, Greece

Conference date: 10th-12th September 2019

Conference sponsor: Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)

Conference theme: Cyber Security Research

Product

Product Information: 1477-9358BCS Learning & Development

Self URI (article page): https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.14236/ewic/icscsr19.18

Self URI (journal page): https://ewic.bcs.org/

Categories

Series title: Electronic Workshops in Computing