The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) may not bear fruit in its
current incarnation, but it certainly teaches us crucial lessons regarding the institutional
dynamics of market integration beyond the state. I argue that the TTIP’s so-called
‘regulatory cooperation’, in principle a mere mechanism for ‘discussion’ and ‘exchange’
between regulators, would have had a profound impact on the regulatory culture across
the Atlantic. I make this argument in three interrelated steps. First, building on
insights from constitutional law and political science, I outline an analytical framework
for the study of rule-making institutions beyond the state. Second, I analyse the
TTIP through the lens of this framework, illustrating the mechanisms through which
its model for regulatory cooperation could reform the regulatory culture in the EU.
Third, I argue that this change in the EU regulatory culture would have been neither
an accident, nor a result of a US-led hegemonic project. Instead, the TTIP’s regulatory
cooperation is a part of the EU’s internal political struggle, intended ultimately
to re-balance not only powers between the legislative and the executive in the EU,
but also within the EU’s executive branch itself.