The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) may not bear fruit in its current incarnation, but it certainly teaches us crucial lessons regarding the institutional dynamics of market integration beyond the state. I argue that the TTIP’s so-called ‘regulatory cooperation’, in principle a mere mechanism for ‘discussion’ and ‘exchange’ between regulators, would have had a profound impact on the regulatory culture across the Atlantic. I make this argument in three interrelated steps. First, building on insights from constitutional law and political science, I outline an analytical framework for the study of rule-making institutions beyond the state. Second, I analyse the TTIP through the lens of this framework, illustrating the mechanisms through which its model for regulatory cooperation could reform the regulatory culture in the EU. Third, I argue that this change in the EU regulatory culture would have been neither an accident, nor a result of a US-led hegemonic project. Instead, the TTIP’s regulatory cooperation is a part of the EU’s internal political struggle, intended ultimately to re-balance not only powers between the legislative and the executive in the EU, but also within the EU’s executive branch itself.
Assistant Professor, University of Amsterdam. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org. Many thanks to Daniela Caruso, Candida Leone, Fernanda Nicola and a number of friends and colleagues who have commented on the earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to warmly thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful comments. The remaining errors are mine.