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      FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROFIT TARGET

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            Abstract

            The theoretical and practical dilemma of profit maximization offers an opportunity for enterprises to achieve the target of laudable and harmonious development while pursuing comprehensive profit. The realization of the comprehensive profit target is based on the expansion of assumptions of self-regarding and stable preference in the mainstream analysis paradigm and the integration of these preferences. Thus, the integrated individual preferences are the unity of self-regarding and other-regarding preferences, which are scenario-dependent, endogenous, evolutionary, and rooted in social systems. Analysis of the dynamic evolution of the integration of individual preferences shows that the comprehensive profit target is the necessary claim of the enterprise to maximize its profit, and it is an endogenous variable in the operation of enterprise. This proves that it has far-reaching significances in economic theory and policy analysis of the harmonious development of enterprises in the context of financial crisis.

            Content

            Author and article information

            Journal
            worlrevipoliecon
            10.2307/j50005553
            World Review of Political Economy
            Pluto Journals
            2042891X
            1 December 2010
            : 1
            : 4
            : 652-674
            Article
            10.2307/41931895
            9e245be9-a9bc-4f94-975f-b18c04f9a811
            © WORLD ASSOCIATION FOR POLITICAL ECONOMY 2010

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            History

            Political economics

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