Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition

Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one--present in the same room--was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain. Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain matrix." We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.

A neuroimaging study examined the neural correlates of social exclusion and tested the hypothesis that the brain bases of social pain are similar to those of physical pain. Participants were scanned while playing a virtual ball-tossing game in which they were ultimately excluded. Paralleling results from physical pain studies, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was more active during exclusion than during inclusion and correlated positively with self-reported distress. Right ventral prefrontal cortex (RVPFC) was active during exclusion and correlated negatively with self-reported distress. ACC changes mediated the RVPFC-distress correlation, suggesting that RVPFC regulates the distress of social exclusion by disrupting ACC activity.

Numerous functionally distinct regions of cortex (e.g., V1, MT, the fusiform face area) can be easily identified in any normal human subject in just a few minutes of fMRI scanning. However, the locations of these regions vary across subjects. Investigations of these regions have therefore often used a functional region of interest (fROI) approach in which the region is first identified functionally in each subject individually, before subsequent scans in the same subjects test specific hypotheses concerning that region. This fROI method, which resembled long-established practice in visual neurophysiology, has methodological, statistical, and theoretical advantages over standard alternatives (such as whole-brain analyses of group data): (i) because functional properties are more consistently and robustly associated with fROIs than with locations in stereotaxic space, functional hypotheses concerning fROIs are often the most straightforward to frame, motivate, and test, (ii) because hypotheses are tested in only a handful of fROIs (instead of in tens of thousands of voxels), advance specification of fROIs provides a massive increase in statistical power over whole-brain analyses, and (iii) some fROIs may serve as candidate distinct components of the mind/brain worth investigation as such. Of course fROIs can be productively used in conjunction with other complementary methods. Here, we explain the motivation for and advantages of the fROI approach, and we rebut the criticism of this method offered by Friston et al. (Friston, K., Rotshtein, P., Geng, J., Sterzer, P., Henson, R., in press. A critique of functional localizers. NeuroImage).