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      Is Antigenic Sin Always “Original?” Re-examining the Evidence Regarding Circulation of a Human H1 Influenza Virus Immediately Prior to the 1918 Spanish Flu

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          Abstract

          What makes the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic stand out from all the others is its well-known W-shaped mortality signature, which was caused by unusually high mortality among adults aged 20 to 40 [1]. Much debate remains as to the exact reason for this atypical pattern [2]. A contribution by Worobey et al. [3] published recently in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) is no doubt adding important information to this debate. In agreement with previous work [4–7], Worobey et al. propose that the very high mortality experienced by young adults during the 1918 H1N1 virus pandemic was primarily due to their childhood exposure to the heterosubtypic H3-like virus that is thought to have caused the earlier 1889–1890 Russian flu pandemic [3]. As is generally accepted, the authors also presume that older adults had immunological cross-protection from earlier exposures to a putative H1-like virus, which circulated prior the 1890 pandemic. As for the lower mortality of children and adolescents, however, a new and compelling hypothesis is put forward: this pattern may be attributed to the appearance of a new H1 influenza variant in the early 1900s, which would have provided protection in 1918 for individuals born at the turn of the century, presumably exposed early in life (or “primed”) to this new variant. They propose that this H1N8 virus arose from reassortment between an H1 lineage virus and an avian influenza virus sometime between 1901 and 1907, replacing the H3N8 virus of the 1889–1890 pandemic. This phylogenetic reconstitution appears to be supported by (often forgotten) seroarcheological and mortality evidence. Did H1 Really Replace H3 in the Early 1900s? Although the phylogenetic analysis presented by Worobey et al. is quite appealing, the results gathered from the seroarcheological literature that they abundantly cite do not always support it [3]. Most notably, it is not immediately clear that all seroarcheology and mortality data point to the swift replacement of the 1890 H3 virus by an H1 variant at the turn of the 20th century. Furthermore, any seroarcheological data gathered to measure responses to viruses for which isolates are not available must be interpreted cautiously. Using old serological studies from Masurel [8,9] adapted here in Fig. 1, other investigators such as Dowdle [10] deduced earlier that about half of those born a few years after the 1890 pandemic, i.e., in 1893, were “primed” to the H3 virus that caused that pandemic while the other half would have been primed to H1N1 during the 1918 pandemic. According to Worobey et al., this is highly unlikely because it would mean that many members of this cohort fully escaped all influenza virus infections for a period of about 25 years [3]. However, Dowdle’s explanation for the H1 seroacheological data is only problematic if we adhere to a historical interpretation of “original antigenic sin” by assuming that the highest antibody titres in a birth cohort systematically reflect the antigens of the earliest childhood exposure to influenza virus and that, as a consequence, seroarcheological studies invariably reveal the identity of the first strain of influenza virus to which each cohort were exposed. 10.1371/journal.ppat.1004615.g001 Fig 1 Death rate ratios from pneumonia and influenza (P&I) during the 1968–1969 pandemic and percent without antibody titers against H1 and H3 influenza viruses. Serological data on H1 and H3 viruses were adapted from Masurel [8,9,25] and Doodle et al. [10]. Years of birth were deduced from data originally presented by age by Masurel (HI > 9–19) [8,9,25]. We used life tables from the Netherland Bureau of Statistics, available in the Human Life-Table Database [26], in order to estimate average ages (and years of birth) for donor sera grouped in age bins larger than five years. The death rate ratio by age (or by birth cohort) in 1968 was estimated by dividing the P&I death rate calculated for the December 1968 to January 1969 pandemic flu season [27] with the average P&I death rates of the same seasons from 1959–1960 to 1967–1968. These ratios represent the increase of mortality due to the 1968 pandemic (a ratio of 1.5 means a mortality increment of 50% in comparison with the previous ten-year’s average). Monthly P&I death counts were taken from the National Center for Health Statistics, available on the National Bureau of Economic Research website [28], while the populations exposed to risk were interpolated from the Human Mortality Database [29]. In order to account for secular mortality improvements, we detrended the time series from 1959 to 1968 with quadratic regressions of mortality rates based on the 20 epidemic seasons from 1959 to 1978, excluding the 1968–1969 pandemic season. This assumption is not always sound [2], as can be readily observed in Fig. 1, which shows that cohorts born between 1863 and 1890 all had a high percentage of individuals with detectable antibodies against the A/Hong Kong/68 (H3) strain. About 80% to 90% of sera collected in 1956–1957 for these cohorts contained HI antibodies against this strain (red line with squares). The maximum proportion, virtually 100%, occurs for those born in 1871, i.e., almost 20 years before the 1890 pandemic. If it is true that the antibody signature resulting from the first influenza virus infection during one’s lifetime is hierarchically programmed into the immunological repertoire of a cohort, then we are forced to suppose that individuals born in the 1860s or 1870s escaped exposure and infection to the putative H1-variant that circulated prior to the 1890 pandemic for a very long period. This is, indeed, highly unlikely. Similarly, the proportion of individuals with antibodies against A/Swine/15/1930/(H1) is over 90%–95% in Fig. 1 for cohorts born long before the appearance of the strain in 1918 (blue line with circles). This trend was also observed recently in sera collected just prior to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Those born during the first two decades of the 20th century, presumably exposed early in life to the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, had high neutralizing antibody titers against the 2009 H1N1 virus. These titers dropped sharply for those born after 1918, who were exposed to the antigenically distinct “human” H1N1 viruses that circulated from the 1920s to the 1950s [11]. Other independent studies have also reported similar sudden drops in antibody titers against the H3 pandemic and the H1 swine strains [12,13]. For Enhanced Protection in the Future, Get Your “Pandemic Flu Shot” Now The sudden increase of the percentage of people born after 1890 with no detectable antibody titers to the H3 virus shown in Fig. 1 would seem to be too steep and too tightly associated with the 1890 pandemic to be interpreted as a sign that H3 was replaced by H1 in 1900 as the first exposure strain for those born in the 1890s. What these seroarcheological observations might instead suggest is that exposure to a pandemic strain any time before ~20 years of age can “reprogram” the antibody repertoire by inducing the most robust antibody titers against the pandemic virus, at the expense of any previously encountered non-pandemic strain, whether from the same subtype or not. This would evidently be sufficient to provide increased protection in a subsequent outbreak of the same subtype [10]. The degree of protection would then rapidly fall for cohorts born right after the pandemic, as the virus drifts and becomes seasonal. Our own analyses of mortality from P&I during the 1968 pandemic are consistent with this “immunological refocusing” scenario, occurring for those exposed to a pandemic strain at a sufficiently young age. We calculated and added to Fig. 1 the death rates ratios of P&I mortality during the 1968–1969 Hong Kong pandemic relative to the average P&I mortality during the years 1959–1967 in the United States. It is clear that people born between 1878 and 1890 had the lowest mortality increments during that pandemic. The relative risk of mortality sharply increased for those who were born immediately after the 1890 pandemic, in concert with the increase in the percentage of individuals who had no detectable HI antibodies to H3N2. Individuals born up to 20–25 years before the 1890 pandemic all had about the same protection against the H3N2 virus of the 1968 Hong Kong pandemic. While persons born around 1870 might very well have first “committed” to an H1-like variant early in life, most of the sera collected years later (in 1956–1957) from these people contained large amounts of antibodies to the H3 virus, to which they were exposed in the early 1890s (20 years after their birth) and which offered them substantial protection about 80 years later, during the 1968 outbreak. These results on mortality risk ratios are consistent with a study from Simonsen et al. [14] who found that the risk of influenza-related mortality among the elderly aged 75+ did not increase during the 1968 pandemic relative to the 1975–1976 and 1980–1981 influenza seasons, which were relatively severe. Intriguingly, death rates ratios in 1968 as summarized by the lowess smoothing in Fig. 1 attain a maximum for the cohorts born just before the 1918 pandemic, as if being born during pandemic years carried an increased risk of mortality to a subsequent pandemic caused by a heterosubtypic influenza virus. Refining the “Original Antigenic Sin” Doctrine Implicit in Worobey et al.’s scenario is the notion that the first antigenic variant encountered during childhood systematically conditions immunity for the rest of someone’s life [3]. This phenomenon, referred to as “original antigenic sin” (OAS), has been described since the early 1950s, when sequential exposures to drifting variants of the H1N1 subtype seemed to induce more neutralizing antibody titers against the childhood variant than against the contemporary circulating strain of the same subtype [15]. Recent studies have challenged the historical mechanistic implications of the OAS model [16–18], and have proposed the term “antigenic seniority” as a more apt description for the hierarchical nature of antibody responses to previously encountered influenza virus strains. Indeed, the term “OAS” itself has often been used in the literature to describe phenomena related to immunological memory that are not directly linked to the hierarchical responses to influenza virus (as in [14]). To avoid confusion, other research has also proposed a more general conception of antigenic imprinting [19] that would cover all instances of ‘‘commitment” to the strain of first exposure, including sequences involving heterosubtypic pandemic strains like those that caused the 1890 and the 1918 pandemics [5]. It was recently found and confirmed in various locations that mortality during the 1918 pandemic peaked at the exact age of 28 [5,6,20,21] (but see [7,22]), which corresponds to a birth year of 1890 (i.e., during the Russian flu pandemic). To account for this striking regularity, it has been speculated that the development of immunological memory to an influenza virus strain early in life may lead to a dysregulated immune response when encountering a novel and highly antigenically dissimilar strain later in life [5]. For example, encounter with the 1889–1890 H3 virus very early in life would have resulted in robust cytotoxic T cell memory, which, without the complement of cross-protective antibodies between H3 and H1, may have caused immunopathology when recalled upon infection during the 1918 pandemic, resulting in increased risks of death. Those born later in the 1890 decade were primed to progressively drifted and less virulent strains of the H3 virus. This would have decreased the magnitude of the cytotoxic T cell memory response and, thus, lowered the potential for immunopathology in 1918. Similarly, in this study, mortality increments during the 1968 pandemic peaked for those born around one year before the 1918 pandemic, and decreased for those born in the following years. It is worth noting that despite the fact that no new H3-like variant appeared between 1918 and 1968, death rates ratios in 1968 dropped for those born after 1918. In this case, there was no need for circulation of a novel H3 virus to account for this drop, as Worobey et al.’s scenario for the 1918 pandemic would imply if it was applied to the 1968 case [3]. The specific scenarios that result in OAS-like antibody responses are complex, and likely require further refinement (i.e., distinguishing sequences of infections from seasonal virus to pandemic virus, and vice-versa, or sequences involving heterosubtypic pandemic strains). Unfortunately, the disproportionate protection against heterosubtypic infection afforded by T cells in mice makes recapitulating the effects of these exposure scenarios difficult in the mouse model [23,24], and the tools required to study the contribution of specific cell types in ferrets remain lacking. We believe that a detailed understanding of these scenarios will be essential if we ever hope to understand how previous exposures to influenza virus are likely to shape the outcome of future pandemics. More importantly, this knowledge may be critical in the design and implementation of immunization campaigns that are “personalized” with regard to age and exposure history.

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          Observations on mortality during the 1918 influenza pandemic.

          The original purpose of our study was to examine the unusual W-shaped mortality curve associated with the 1918 influenza pandemic and possibly explain the peak in mortality among individuals aged 20-40 years. We plotted age-specific excess mortality instead of total mortality for the 1918 pandemic using a 5-year baseline. For comparison, we also graphed excess mortality curves for the 1957 and 1968 pandemics using 5-year baselines. The 1957 and 1968 curves exhibited the usual U-shaped curve, with high excess mortality among infants and the elderly population relative to young adults. The 1918 curve, however, presented unexpected results. A peak in excess mortality among infants and young adults was seen, but the expected W shape did not result. We instead found negative excess mortality among elderly individuals, suggesting that this group was exposed, at an earlier date, to an influenza strain similar to the so-called Spanish influenza (H1N1) strain.
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            Age-Specific Mortality During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Unravelling the Mystery of High Young Adult Mortality

            The worldwide spread of a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus in 2009 showed that influenza remains a significant health threat, even for individuals in the prime of life. This paper focuses on the unusually high young adult mortality observed during the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918. Using historical records from Canada and the U.S., we report a peak of mortality at the exact age of 28 during the pandemic and argue that this increased mortality resulted from an early life exposure to influenza during the previous Russian flu pandemic of 1889–90. We posit that in specific instances, development of immunological memory to an influenza virus strain in early life may lead to a dysregulated immune response to antigenically novel strains encountered in later life, thereby increasing the risk of death. Exposure during critical periods of development could also create holes in the T cell repertoire and impair fetal maturation in general, thereby increasing mortality from infectious diseases later in life. Knowledge of the age-pattern of susceptibility to mortality from influenza could improve crisis management during future influenza pandemics.
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              Pathogenic Responses among Young Adults during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic

              The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 was the most deadly single event in recorded history. Because of its unique severity and global effects, it is the prototype of a global natural disaster. In recent years, fears of recurrence of an influenza pandemic similar to that in 1918 have motivated planning, preparations, and allocations of resources by public health and other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, medical care providers, pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, medical researchers, private businesses, and persons worldwide ( 1 ). Because of severe consequences and current relevance of the 1918 pandemic, it is essential to review its events and effects, determine their underlying causes, and assess likelihood of a recurrence. These tasks are difficult because the 1918 pandemic occurred at the end of World War I, before influenza viruses were discovered and before influenza vaccines, antiviral and antibacterial drugs, and intensive medical care were available. Fortunately, abundant and detailed written records exist of clinical, laboratory, and epidemiologic events during the pandemic period ( 2 – 6 ). In addition, isolates of the virus that caused the lethal second wave of the pandemic (in the fall of 1918 in most locations) have been reconstructed from preserved remains of patients who died ( 7 ). These isolates have been used to determine the genetic relationships between the 1918 pandemic influenza strain and subsequent seasonal and pandemic A/H1N1 strains ( 8 ). Genetic relationships between the 1918 pandemic strain and strains that caused the clinically mild first wave of epidemics in 1918 and pandemics before 1918 remain undefined ( 9 – 11 ). It is commonly believed that the 1918 pandemic resulted from the sudden emergence and worldwide spread of an inherently hypervirulent influenza strain. However, this view is inconsistent with several well-documented characteristics of the pandemic. In this report, we review unique, poorly understood, or unexplained clinical and epidemiologic characteristics of the 1918 pandemic. Also, we present hypotheses that are scientifically credible, consistent with the historical record, and account for epidemiologic and clinical manifestations of the pandemic. Finally, we discuss implications of our hypotheses regarding pandemic influenza preparedness and research and development of universal influenza vaccines ( 12 ). Unique and Unexplained Characteristics of the 1918 Pandemic Mortality and Case-Fatality Rates Because the 1918 pandemic spread worldwide and caused unprecedented numbers of deaths, it is often presumed that the pandemic strain was unusually transmissible and that infection with the virus was inherently lethal (i.e., direct effects of the virus routinely and rapidly caused death). During the 1918 pandemic, influenza infection rates were similar to those during other pandemics of the last century; and in most affected populations, overall mortality rates were 7 days after illness onset and were the result of secondary bacterial pneumonia caused by common colonizers of the respiratory tract, e.g., Haemophilus influenzae, Streptococcus pneumoniae, S. pyogenes, and Staphylococcus aureus ( 3 – 5 , 14 ). Clinical and pathologic records suggest that lethal secondary bacterial pneumonias often followed dysregulated immune responses to infections with influenza ( 15 , 16 ). Increased Mortality Rate in Young Adults (W-shaped Mortality Curve) In general, during the 1918–19 influenza pandemic period, illness rates were highest among children of school age. However, mortality rates were highest among infants, young adults, and the elderly (Figure) ( 17 ). The W-shaped relationship between mortality rate and age is a unique and unexplained characteristic of the 1918 pandemic. The lack of correspondence between illness and mortality rate in relation to age belies the common views that direct pathologic effects of the virus were independently and invariably life threatening and that the usual clinical course after infection was rapid deterioration of respiratory function terminating in death. Figure Illness attack rate (red line) and overall mortality rate (black line) for influenza-related pneumonia, by age groups of selected US populations, during the 1918 influenza pandemic period. In 1889–90, pandemic influenza (Russian flu) spread rapidly throughout the world, and from 1890 through the winter of 1900–01, widespread epidemics of influenza-like illness recurred ( 4 , 18 ). The 1890–91 and subsequent epidemic waves likely were caused by variants of the 1889–90 pandemic strain ( 19 ). Thus, before 1918, most members of the 1875–1900 birth cohorts had been exposed to the 1889–90 pandemic influenza strain. These persons were 18–43 years old, the age groups at highest mortality risk, during the lethal second wave of the 1918 pandemic ( 20 ). Timing and Characteristics of Epidemic Waves During 1918–19, three distinct influenza epidemic waves occurred. The first wave (mid-1918 in most locations) caused widespread illness but few deaths (3-day fever). The second wave (fall of 1918 in most locations) caused widespread illness and high mortality rates ( 14 ). The third wave (winter 1919) caused widespread illness but affected fewer persons and caused fewer deaths than the second wave. The sharp contrast in the clinical expressions of infections during the first and second waves suggests that they were caused by different influenza virus strains. If the first 2 epidemic waves of the 1918–19 pandemic were caused by the same or immunologically cross-reactive influenza A (H1N1) viruses, persons affected during the first wave should have been protected from infection and, in turn, illness, secondary pneumonia, and death during the second wave. Protection from infection would have derived from neutralizing antibodies against the same or similar viral surface antigens (e.g., hemagglutinin). There are conflicting reports regarding the immunologic susceptibility to infection during the second wave among persons who were infected during the first wave. Several reports of the experiences of localized groups (e.g., students, prisoners, military units) suggest that illness during the first wave protected from influenza during the second wave ( 3 , 9 ). However, our review of the medical records of all persons who served in the Australian Imperial Forces in Europe and the Middle East in 1918 documents that persons affected during the first wave were as likely to become ill, but were much less likely to die, from influenza–pneumonia during the second wave ( 12 ). Together, the findings suggest that infections during the first wave altered immune responses to the pandemic strain during the second wave. In turn, persons infected during the first wave had milder clinical expressions and lower mortality rates when infected with the pandemic strain during the second wave. Mortality Rates among Nurses and Medical Officers During the 1918 pandemic period, military nurses and medical officers were intensively and repeatedly exposed to the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic strain in clinics, in ambulances, and on crowded open wards. However, during the lethal second wave, nurses and medical officers of the Australian Army had influenza-related illness rates similar to, but mortality rates lower than, any other occupational group ( 12 ). Similar observations were made in other groups of military and civilian health care workers ( 21 ). These findings suggest that the occupational group with the most intensive exposure to the pandemic strain had relatively low influenza-related pneumonia mortality rates during the second wave ( 12 ). Mortality Rates among Military Members with Least Service During the fall of 1918, all 40 large mobilization/training camps throughout the United States and Puerto Rico were affected by influenza epidemics ( 13 , 22 ). During the camp epidemics, influenza–pneumonia mortality rates were inevitably highest among the soldiers with the least military service. In the US Army overall, 60% of those who died of influenza-related pneumonia were soldiers with 100× higher than in 2009 ( 31 ). Hypotheses Unique and unexplained characteristics of the 1918 pandemic suggest that the risk for lethal secondary bacterial pneumonia after influenza infections depended on the nature, timing, and intensity of immune responses to the pandemic strain; and subsequently on the likelihood of exposure during transient periods of increased susceptibility to bacterial strains against which affected persons had no protective antibodies. In 1918, nearly all humans were immunologically susceptible to infection with the A/H1N1 pandemic strain; not surprisingly, the pandemic spread rapidly worldwide. The rapid spread of the pandemic with high illness attack rates in most age groups indicates that an influenza virus antigenically similar to the pandemic strain did not widely circulate among humans within at least several decades before 1918. We hypothesize that in 1918 many persons had second lifetime exposures to an immunodominant T-cell epitope that was conserved on an internal protein of the 1918 pandemic strain and a heterosubtypic other strain (e.g., 1889 pandemic strain). When persons were reexposed to the identical epitope in 1918, epitope-specific memory CD8+ T-cells produced excessive cytokines, chemokines, immune cell activation, and epithelial cell necrosis. The immunopathologic effects of the dysregulated T-cell response transiently increased susceptibility of infected hosts to respiratory bacterial strains against which they lacked protective antibodies. In contrast, persons who were first exposed in 1918 to the immunodominant T-cell epitope of hypothesized concern may have had primary T-cell responses that controlled virus replication without increasing susceptibility to bacterial invasion of the lower respiratory tract. Persons who had multiple prior exposures to influenza viruses and other respiratory infectious agents before 1918 had diversely partitioned memory CD8+ T-cell repertoires and extensive portfolios of bacterial strain–specific antibodies. Their immune responses to infection with the 1918 pandemic strain may have controlled virus replication without increasing their susceptibility to bacterial invasion. Modern genetic analyses have estimated that 3 distinct variants of influenza A (H1N1) viruses co-circulated in the early 1900s ( 8 , 32 ). These variants were the respective prototypes of all pandemic, seasonal, and classical swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses since 1918. The first epidemic wave of the 1918 pandemic may have been the last wave of the 1889–90 Russian flu pandemic. If so, the first wave spread widely and rapidly in the face of background immunity to an influenza strain that had been circulating among humans for nearly 3 decades ( 4 , 18 ). Alternatively, the first wave may have been caused by an antigenically distinct seasonal strain of influenza A (H1N1) ( 8 , 32 ). If so, antibodies against hemagglutinin of the seasonal strain did not provide complete protection against infection with the pandemic strain. However, because many internal proteins of human influenza viruses are conserved and strongly immunogenic (e.g., matrix 2, nucleoprotein [NP]), antibodies and memory CD8+ T lymphocytes that were produced during the first wave may have altered clinical expressions, decreased susceptibility to secondary bacterial pneumonia, and reduced deaths during the second wave ( 33 ). The peak of mortality rates among young adults (W-shaped mortality curve) remains a unique and unexplained characteristic of the 1918 pandemic ( 20 ). Before World War I, there was relatively little global interconnectedness. Even in the most industrialized countries, many persons lived their entire lives in their birth communities and had relatively little exposure to outsiders. The situation sharply and permanently changed with the social disruptions and population dislocations precipitated by worldwide armed conflict. Persons born before 1901 (the last year of widespread circulation of the 1890 Russian flu pandemic strain) and after 1875 (the first year after widespread epidemics of a poorly characterized influenza-like illness) were 18–43 years of age in 1918. Worldwide, members of these birth cohorts had high influenza attack rates and were likely to die from secondary bacterial pneumonia during the 1918 pandemic period (Figure). Persons born before 1875 were >43 years of age in 1918. Before the 1918 pandemic period, they likely had been exposed to more heterosubtypes of influenza A and more respiratory bacterial strains than their younger counterparts. In general, during the pandemic period, middle-age and elderly adults had lower influenza attack rates and were less likely to die than their younger counterparts (Figure). Also in 1918, persons born after 1901 were less likely than those older to have been exposed to the 1890 pandemic strain or displaced by war-related activities. During the pandemic period, persons <17 years of age had relatively high influenza attack rates but relatively low mortality rates (except for infants) (Figure). We hypothesize that, soon after infection with the 1918 pandemic influenza strain, infected persons experienced a transient increase in susceptibility of the lower respiratory tract to invasion by bacteria to which they were immunologically naive. Thus, for example, those who were relatively new to their living or work environments (e.g., military recruits, soldiers on troop ships, patients on hospital wards) at the time they were infected with the 1918 pandemic strain had a relatively high risk of death from secondary bacterial pneumonia ( 12 ). During the course of their influenza illnesses, such persons were likely to be exposed to bacterial strains to which they lacked protective antibodies ( 10 ). Thus, for example, residents of rural areas were relatively unlikely to be exposed to novel strains of bacteria while recovering from influenza, and they had low pandemic-related mortality rates. In contrast, military recruits from the same rural areas were likely to be exposed to novel strains of bacteria while recovering from influenza, and they had relatively high pandemic-related mortality rates ( 24 ). This interpretation explicates the somewhat counterintuitive finding that nurses, medical officers, and the crews of troop ships had high influenza attack rates but relatively low mortality rates during the lethal second wave of the 1918 pandemic. Before being infected with the pandemic influenza strain, these persons were often exposed in their occupational settings to high concentrations of diverse strains of respiratory infectious agents. Because of their extensive portfolios of respiratory bacteria strain–specific antibodies, they were naturally immune to and protected from secondary pneumonia caused by these agents ( 12 , 23 , 24 ). The hypotheses presented here are consistent with the historical record and scientifically plausible. For example, studies in humans have identified an immunodominant NP-derived CD8+ T-cell epitope that is consistently presented by high frequency HLA class I molecules and recognized by cytotoxic T lymphocytes. The epitope is present on the NP of the 1918, 1976, and 2009 human pandemic strains and on most swine strains, but not on most other human strains of the past century ( 34 ). Studies in pigs suggest that the NP of most swine influenza strains contains a strongly immunogenic CD8+ T-cell epitope. For example, pigs that were primed with a DNA vaccine that expresses NP, and subsequently challenged with an influenza A strain with the same NP, had dysregulated, pathogenic immune responses ( 35 ). Also, pigs that were primed with an inactivated swine influenza A vaccine (A/swine/Iowa/15/1930 H1N1) and subsequently challenged with a later generation swine influenza A strain with markedly different surface proteins (A/swine/Minnesota/00194/2003 H1N2) showed development of enhanced (immunologically potentiated) pneumonia that were not observed after challenge with the homologous strain ( 36 ). The findings have been reproduced by using pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus as the challenge strain and adding a recombinant matrix 2 protein to the vaccine construct ( 37 ). Studies in mice have documented that T-cell–mediated immunopathologic responses can contribute to severe pneumonitis when mice are exposed to a highly glycosylated influenza virus and subsequently infected with a poorly glycosylated strain. Infection with a recent seasonal influenza virus (H1N1), followed by infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, elicited severe immunopathogenic responses ( 38 ). Finally, studies in ferrets have documented that those infected with pneumococci after acquiring influenza, but not before, showed development of lethal secondary pneumonia and other invasive complications ( 39 ). In summary, we hypothesize that mortality risk after infection with the 1918 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) strain depended on the number, nature, and diversity of prior infections with influenza virus and respiratory bacteria. Specifically, mortality rates during the lethal second wave were highest among persons with prior exposures to heterosubtypic influenza strains that enhanced immunopathogenic effects when a person was infected with the 1918 pandemic strain and had limited exposures to other respiratory infectious agents. In such persons, infection with the pandemic strain caused high viral loads, dysregulated and pathogenic cell mediated immune responses, and transient increases in susceptibility to invasive bacterial infections. If such influenza virus–infected hosts were subsequently exposed to bacterial strains to which they had no protective antibodies, they were at high risk of acquiring life-threatening secondary bacterial pneumonia. The unique circumstances that enabled the unprecedented mortality rates of the 1918 pandemic no longer exist on a global scale. For example, in modern times, even the most isolated communities (e.g., Pacific islanders, indigenous populations of North America, Australia, and New Zealand) are interconnected through myriad commercial and sociopolitical activities. As a result, most populations are exposed to annual seasonal influenza viruses, and most young adults are exposed to numerous viral and bacterial respiratory pathogens. Thus, compared with the situation in 1918, adults in modern communities have more diversified immune repertoires against influenza strains and bacterial respiratory pathogens. The hypotheses presented may explain at least in part the relatively low mortality rate associated with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. During the 2009 pandemic, many persons who died had underlying medical conditions, including obesity, asthma, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and pregnancy; histopathologic changes consistent with diffuse alveolar damage; and evidence of bacterial co-infections ( 40 ). Finally, the findings of this report are relevant to the research and development of a universal influenza vaccine. Candidate vaccines that contain antigens that are highly conserved across influenza A strains and strongly immunogenic must be closely monitored to ensure that T-cell–mediated immune responses to future seasonal and pandemic strains are protective but not pathogenic.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Role: Editor
                Journal
                PLoS Pathog
                PLoS Pathog
                plos
                plospath
                PLoS Pathogens
                Public Library of Science (San Francisco, CA USA )
                1553-7366
                1553-7374
                5 March 2015
                March 2015
                : 11
                : 3
                : e1004615
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Département de Démographie, Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
                [2 ]Department of Microbiology and Immunology and Microbiome and Disease Tolerance Centre, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
                [3 ]Department of Biochemistry and Biomedical Sciences, Institute for Infectious Diseases Research, McMaster Immunology Research Centre, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
                The Fox Chase Cancer Center, UNITED STATES
                Author notes

                The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

                Article
                PPATHOGENS-D-14-02410
                10.1371/journal.ppat.1004615
                4351064
                25742615
                069152f0-ab27-4f22-b821-5a567604ef59
                Copyright @ 2015

                This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited

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                This work was supported by the Social Science and Humanity and Research council of Canada ( http://www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/home-accueil-eng.aspx) (AG) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research ( http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/193.html) (AG, MSM, and JM). JM holds a Tier I Canada Research Chair in Human Immunology. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
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