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      Concepts, Control, and Context: A Connectionist Account of Normal and Disordered Semantic Cognition

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          Abstract

          Semantic cognition requires conceptual representations shaped by verbal and nonverbal experience and executive control processes that regulate activation of knowledge to meet current situational demands. A complete model must also account for the representation of concrete and abstract words, of taxonomic and associative relationships, and for the role of context in shaping meaning. We present the first major attempt to assimilate all of these elements within a unified, implemented computational framework. Our model combines a hub-and-spoke architecture with a buffer that allows its state to be influenced by prior context. This hybrid structure integrates the view, from cognitive neuroscience, that concepts are grounded in sensory-motor representation with the view, from computational linguistics, that knowledge is shaped by patterns of lexical co-occurrence. The model successfully codes knowledge for abstract and concrete words, associative and taxonomic relationships, and the multiple meanings of homonyms, within a single representational space. Knowledge of abstract words is acquired through (a) their patterns of co-occurrence with other words and (b) acquired embodiment, whereby they become indirectly associated with the perceptual features of co-occurring concrete words. The model accounts for executive influences on semantics by including a controlled retrieval mechanism that provides top-down input to amplify weak semantic relationships. The representational and control elements of the model can be damaged independently, and the consequences of such damage closely replicate effects seen in neuropsychological patients with loss of semantic representation versus control processes. Thus, the model provides a wide-ranging and neurally plausible account of normal and impaired semantic cognition.

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          Most cited references122

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          Grounded cognition.

          Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition. Accumulating behavioral and neural evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on perception, memory, knowledge, language, thought, social cognition, and development. Theories of grounded cognition are also reviewed, as are origins of the area and common misperceptions of it. Theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues are raised whose future treatment is likely to affect the growth and impact of grounded cognition.
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            Perceptual symbol systems.

            Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.
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              The time course of perceptual choice: the leaky, competing accumulator model.

              The time course of perceptual choice is discussed in a model of gradual, leaky, stochastic, and competitive information accumulation in nonlinear decision units. Special cases of the model match a classical diffusion process, but leakage and competition work together to address several challenges to existing diffusion, random walk, and accumulator models. The model accounts for data from choice tasks using both time-controlled (e.g., response signal) and standard reaction time paradigms and its adequacy compares favorably with other approaches. A new paradigm that controls the time of arrival of information supporting different choice alternatives provides further support. The model captures choice behavior regardless of the number of alternatives, accounting for the log-linear relation between reaction time and number of alternatives (Hick's law) and explains a complex pattern of visual and contextual priming in visual word identification.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Role: Editor
                Journal
                Psychol Rev
                Psychol Rev
                Psychological Review
                American Psychological Association
                0033-295X
                1939-1471
                April 2018
                : 125
                : 3
                : 293-328
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Neuroscience and Aphasia Research Unit, University of Manchester, and Centre for Cognitive Ageing and Cognitive Epidemiology, Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh
                [2 ]Department of Psychology, Center for Mind, Brain and Computation, Stanford University
                [3 ]Neuroscience and Aphasia Research Unit, University of Manchester
                Author notes
                We are grateful to David Plaut for his helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The work was supported by a MMHSCT Stepping Stone Award to Paul Hoffman, an MRC Programme Grant (MR/J004146/1) to Matthew A. Lambon Ralph and a Wellcome Trust Institutional Strategic Support Fund (ISSF) award (097820) to the University of Manchester. Paul Hoffman is supported by the University of Edinburgh Centre for Cognitive Ageing and Cognitive Epidemiology, part of the cross-council Lifelong Health and Wellbeing Initiative (MR/K026992/1). Funding from the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) and MRC is gratefully acknowledged. Portions of these data were presented at the 2017 joint meeting of the Society of Mathematical Psychology and International Conference on Cognitive Modeling.
                [*] [* ]Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul Hoffman, Centre for Cognitive Ageing and Cognitive Epidemiology, Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ, United Kingdom p.hoffman@ 123456ed.ac.uk
                Article
                rev_125_3_293 2018-20732-001
                10.1037/rev0000094
                5937916
                29733663
                1405841d-b7bb-4074-b772-055471dac3cd
                © 2018 The Author(s)

                This article has been published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s). Author(s) grant(s) the American Psychological Association the exclusive right to publish the article and identify itself as the original publisher.

                History
                : 20 January 2017
                : 22 November 2017
                : 22 November 2017
                Categories
                Articles

                Clinical Psychology & Psychiatry
                semantic diversity,imageability,parallel distributed processing,semantic dementia,semantic aphasia

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