Suez se nagevolge: Persoonlikhede en kolonialisme Translated title: The Suez aftermath: Personalities and colonialism

Abstract

Eisenhower, Dulles, Eden en Macmillan was instrumenteel tydens die Suezkrisis wat beduidende implikasies vir die Midde-Ooste en die globale magsbalans meegebring het, maar nie een van hulle het heeltemal ongeskonde uit die krisis gekom nie. Eisenhower het die inperking van kommunisme as sy hoogste prioriteit geag en het Brittanje se koloniale erfenis as onhoudbaar beskou, en Dulles het die koloniale dimensie dikwels opgehaal. Brittanje se dalende status as 'n wêreldmoondheid is blootgelê en as 'n tweederangse moondheid bevestig. Die feit dat Brittanje 'n koloniale mag was, het 'n stigma gelaat waaraan Eden en Macmillan weinig kon doen. Dit was alombekend dat Eden die reëls van geheimhouding verontagsaam het in sy meedoënlose en bloedige strewe na regverdiging. Wat Eden se konserwatiewe regering noodlottig ondermyn het, was die onenigheid in sy eie geledere. Hyself was polities, fisies en emosioneel deur Suez verpletter. Macmillan het uit die wrak van Suez getree om 'n gedemoraliseerde Konserwatiewe Party te lei en 'n land wat nog in die dieptes van vertwyfeling verkeer het. Frankryk was diep gegrief oor Nasser se steun aan rebelle in Algerië. Die nagevolge van die krisis het die agteruitgang van Europese kolonialisme beklemtoon en 'n blywende impak op Frankryk se internasionale verhoudings gehad. Algerië het ontsaglike probleme vir Frankryk veroorsaak en selfs sy politieke stabiliteit bedreig.

Translated abstract

Eisenhower, Dulles, Eden and Macmillan played crucial roles in the Suez crisis, which had significant repercussions for the Middle East and the global balance of power. However, none of them entirely escaped the crisis unscathed. Eisenhower viewed containment of communism as his primary objective. He believed that it was untenable for the USA to identify with Britain's colonial past. Dulles rarely lost sight of the colonial dimension during the crisis. Ultimately, the crisis had a significant impact on Britain's international standing, confirming its status as a second-rate nation and revealing its waning status as a global power. As the international aspect of decolonisation was crucial for Macmillan to address, he pursued withdrawal from Africa as a vital objective to maintain and expand Britain's status as a powerful nation. He was unable to eradicate the stigma associated with the fact that Britain was a colonial power. His efforts to strengthen the status of Britain as a significant power through the Commonwealth were similarly ineffectual. The importance of British colonialism had attained its pinnacle. In some quarters, it was believed that Macmillan had always played a dubious role targeting Eden's removal as prime minister. Reasons for these apparent misrepresentations remain a matter of conjecture. The most favourable interpretation was that he attempted to use his association with Eisenhower from World War II to bolster Eden's domestic position against cabinet opponents. Alternately, he may have led Eden intentionally into a political catastrophe from which he expected to profit. He was the ultimate beneficiary of Suez. Macmillan was involved in all of the crucial decisions during the crisis and may have had greater intent than Eden to bring down Nasser. Added to the suspicions about Macmillan's behaviour was his reluctance, if not outright refusal, to formally evaluate Suez that prompted him to collaborate closely with the Cabinet Office in order to authorise ministerial memoirs and official publications that were required to be submitted to him prior to publication. As it involved extremely delicate concerns of foreign and domestic politics, he ruled that nothing could be published regarding Suez without his permission. In his ruthless and violent pursuit of vindication, it was common knowledge that Eden disregarded the norms of confidentiality. His conservative administration was fatally undermined by internal discord. Suez ruined him politically, materially and emotionally. Eden made the final decision to invade Egypt without extensive consultation with his cabinet, without playing open cards with the United States, and while keeping members of the Commonwealth in the dark. Suez remained a highly visible and fiercely contested issue in British academic, media and political circles, and a parliamentary campaign continued as new publications, radio and television programmes addressed new aspects of the issue. The crisis resulted in moral defeat and diplomatic catastrophe for the two former colonial powers. Their authority and prestige among Arab powers were irreparably harmed. They were now dependent on Israel, the youngest and most rapidly expanding military power in the Middle East. The crisis had an enduring effect on the international relations of France. Mollet, the French premier, disapproved of Nasser's support for Algerian insurgents who presented France with substantial challenges and even posed a threat to its political stability. Following the collapse of the Fourth Republic, General Charles de Gaulle was elected president of France. He held his own opinion about France's indispensable role in international affairs. Nasser was at ease within the Soviet sphere of influence due to hostility and vilification from the West. The Soviet Union and its allies took advantage of the concurrent Hungarian insurrection to condemn Western imperialism, thereby diverting global attention away from their own brutality in Hungary. Nasser emerged from the crisis with distinction owing to his Pan-Arab nationalism and neutrality. It allowed him to strengthen his position as an advocate for the Arab cause and decolonisation. The new realities, which the West encountered in the Middle East, turned out to be the decline of colonialism and the rise of nationalism.