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      La posibilidad combinatoria de nada: una consecuencia para universales inmanentes Translated title: Combinatorial Possibility of Nothing: A Consequence for Inmanent Universals

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          Abstract

          Resumen: Este trabajo se centra en la posibilidad de concebir un Nihilismo Ontológico a partir del combinatorialismo de D. M. Armstrong, según lo han sugerido Efird y Stoneham, aunque presentando una estrategia alternativa al denominado ‘argumento de la sustracción’. Según los autores, es posible postular dicho nihilismo mediante las nociones de construcción y estado de cosas de totalidad. Sin embargo, tal hipótesis genera la consecuencia de admitir universales no instanciados en la teoría, es decir, platónicos. Esto último se opone a los requerimientos básicos que fundan la teoría combinatoria, donde ha de imponerse la concepción de universales que únicamente existen en sus instanciaciones. Por ende, asumir una concepción platónica en este ámbito supone un coste muy alto para un naturalismo combinatorio, según el cual sólo existe lo que se encuentra localizado espacio-temporalmente.

          Translated abstract

          Abstract: This paper focuses on the possibility of conceiving a form of ontological nihilism, starting from D. M. Armstrong’s combinatorialism. This possibility has been suggested by Efird and Stoneham, by means of proposing an alternative strategy to the ‘subtraction argument’. They claim that it is possible to sustain such nihilism trough the concepts of construction and totality state of affairs. However, this hypothesis will require the acceptance of non-instanciated universals, that is, platonic universals. Yet this is opposite to requirements that are basic for a combinatorial theory, which should uphold that universals exist only in their instantiations. Then, the assumption of platonic universals results in high costs for a combinatorial naturalism, according to which only exists what is located in space and time.

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          Most cited references 9

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          "Why Is There Anything At All?: II"

           E.J. Lowe (1996)
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            "Combinatorialism and The Possibility of Nothing"

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              "Metaphysical Nihilism"

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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Role: ND
                Journal
                rhv
                Revista de humanidades de Valparaíso
                Rev. humanid. Valpso.
                Universidad de Valparaíso. Facultad de Humanidades .Instituto de Filosofía. (Valparaíso, , Chile )
                0719-4234
                0719-4242
                June 2018
                : 11
                : 75-91
                Affiliations
                Valparaíso orgnameUniversidad de Valparaíso Chile srparra09@ 123456gmail.com
                Article
                S0719-42422018000100075
                10.22370/rhv.2018.11.639

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 15, Pages: 17
                Product
                Product Information: SciELO Chile
                Categories
                Artículos-Miscelánea

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